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Management Science
 
     
  Volume Number 53   Issue Number 12   First Page 1843   Last Page 1858   Cover Date December 01, 2007

 
 
 
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  Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains
Sang-Hyun Kim, Morris A. Cohen, Serguei Netessine
 
  Performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital-intensive industries such as aerospace and defense. Known as "power by the hour"" in the private sector and as "performance-based logistics"" (PBL) in defense contracting, it aims to replace traditionally used fixed-price and cost-plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier"s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer (buyer). To analyze implications of performance-based relationships, we introduce a multitask principal-agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts. In our model the customer (principal) faces a product availability requirement for the "uptime"" of the end product. The customer then offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers (agents) of the key subsystems used in the product, who in turn exert cost reduction efforts and set spare-parts inventory investment levels. We show that the first-best solution can be achieved if channel members are risk neutral. When channel members are risk averse, we find that the second-best contract combines a fixed payment, a cost-sharing incentive, and a performance incentive. Furthermore, we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as uncertainty in support cost changes. Finally, we illustrate the application of our model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance requirements and contractual terms change under various environmental assumptions.  
   
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