An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining

Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail.

This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)].

Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800.