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Wine Analytics

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Abstract Among agricultural goods, wine is a specialty product. Fine wine grapes require exceptional care and attention. After the harvest, grapes are crushed, and the wine goes through a long aging process. In the case of Bordeaux-style wines, for example, the aging process in barrels can last 18–24 months. The aging continues for another 20–30 years in the bottle. This long aging process makes wine production a risky venture. Consumers follow the evolution of these fine wines closely, track their corresponding tasting reviews and scores, and are often informed about climatic conditions during the growing seasons. Thus, wine is one of the most heavily tracked and publicized agricultural products. Considering the long production time, winemakers can mitigate their operational and financial risks by selling their wines in advance in the form of wine futures. In this tutorial, we describe predictive and prescriptive analytical methods that assist primary enterprises that produce and distribute wine in their decision-making processes. The tutorial begins with predictive models that estimate the true value of wine futures prices. These estimation models are essential to the financial exchange known as the London International Vintners Exchange (Liv-ex), where wine futures contracts are traded. Coined as “realistic prices” by Liv-ex, these predictive models assist buyers in their purchasing decisions as they can determine whether a futures contract is underpriced or overpriced. The tutorial then develops risk mitigation models to assist winemakers in mitigating uncertainty in weather conditions and tasting expert reviews. These prescriptive models rely on predictive analytics, which help determine consumers’ utilities from buying the wine in advance or later, or from not purchasing it at all. Prescriptive models such as a multinomial logit model focus on determining how much of the wine should be sold in advance in order to reduce risk exposure and maximize the expected profits of the winemaker. On the buyer side, the tutorial introduces stochastic portfolio optimization models for both wine distributors and importers in their decision regarding how to allocate limited budgets between wine futures contracts and bottled wine. These prescriptive models are, once again, built on predictive analytics that estimate the evolution of futures and bottle prices over time under fluctuating market and weather conditions. Wine is an exemplary agricultural product; its production and quality perceptions are widely tracked by businesses and consumers. The predictive and prescriptive models of this tutorial help create transparency in this largely opaque market. They assist the industry in its drive toward market efficiency. The tutorial also offers future research directions in wine analytics and describes how these techniques can be beneficial for the production and distribution of other agricultural products.

Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at <https://doi.org/10.1287/educ.2020.0218>.

Keywords wine analytics • wine futures • price • weather • barrel score • Liv-ex 100 • wine economics • *en primeur*

1. Introduction

Wine is an important agricultural product with a growing global interest. The global wine market is estimated to be greater than \$385 billion in 2020 and is expected to grow annually

by 3.7% (Globe Newswire [32]). The U.S. wine industry generates \$52 billion annually. Italy produces the largest amount of wine, but France is the most celebrated wine producing country with the greatest amount of exports. The Bordeaux region of France, for example, produces the most sought-after wines in the world. Bordeaux wine prices often influence the prices of wines globally. Many countries try to emulate the Bordeaux style of winemaking by growing Bordeaux varietal grapes. Thus, Bordeaux wines are perceived as the best wines, and they set the pace in global wine supply chains.

Wine production departs from other agricultural products for several reasons. First, the time it takes to produce wine is substantially longer than most agricultural commodities. Second, consumers follow the reviews of well-known tasting experts and their publications wholeheartedly. Although grape production also encounters risks stemming from climatic conditions, diseases (e.g., botrytis), and economic fluctuations, it has the added risks of long production times and potentially devastating reviews. Third, wine is an alternative investment mechanism. Financial institutions and investment banks follow the trends in the industry and provide reports that offer recommendations for industry participants and their clients. McMillan [51], for example, offers a report from Silicon Valley Bank regarding the state of the wine industry in the United States. The report demonstrates the need for rigorous analytical methods that will support the interests of the wine enterprises as well as the investors.

We focus on the risk mitigation aspects of analytics that help decision makers in the wine supply chain. Specifically, we focus on one element that combines the tools known in marketing as “advance selling,” as “inventory financing” in supply chain finance, and as “wine futures” in the wine industry. Because wine takes a long time to age, wine futures enable winemakers to sell the wine in the form of futures contracts. We illustrate in Section 2 through predictive analytics models how wine futures can be assessed, evaluated, and estimated. In Section 3, we show how winemakers can determine the price and amount of wine futures to be sold in order to mitigate the risks stemming from uncertain tasting reviews and retail prices. Section 4 uses these instruments in designing a buyer’s (e.g., a wine distributor and/or importer) purchasing portfolio under limited budgets and varying risk profiles. Section 5 offers prescriptions regarding future research directions.

This leads to the natural question: What is *wine analytics*? Wine analytics refers to employing analytical methodologies, be it predictive or prescriptive, to solve problems in the wine industry. One might wonder whether wine analytics constitutes an area of study, especially in the presence of a field called wine economics. It should be emphasized that the wine economics literature focuses on “explaining” the impact of factors such as climatic conditions and tasting reviews in wine problems. Wine analytics, on the other hand, develops methods that “predict” the evolution of agricultural, climatic, economic, and market conditions and build “prescriptive models” in order to guide executives and managers of wine businesses.

1.1. Literature Review

Wine draws attention from various fields including agricultural economics, marketing, tourism, hospitality, and operations management. The emergence of wine economics as a field of study has led many scholars in economics to examine various problems. We provide some background on these areas.

1.1.1. Wine Economics. The research question associated with the pricing of wine has attracted numerous scholars to investigate the factors that influence the value of these agricultural goods. The wine economics literature dedicates econometric models in order to “explain” wine prices using weather conditions. However, there is a limited amount of work that “predicts” the value of these goods. The two publications known for predictive analytics are Ashenfelter [5] and Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34]. The wine economics literature examines the pricing of aged wine using weather and expert opinions; however, these studies fail to estimate young wine prices (i.e., the prices that initiate the trade when the wine is in its early stages

of aging). Young wine prices are important because leading Bordeaux wines are primarily sold before they are bottled; they are traded in the form of wine futures contracts. Ashenfelter et al. [8] and Ashenfelter [5] show that mature Bordeaux wine prices can be explained using weather and age. These two publications report significantly high errors for young wines. Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] use Ashenfelter [5] as the benchmark study in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of their predictive models. Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of publications that explain wine prices using either weather information or tasting experts' reviews. Bazen and Cardebat [12] build statistical models in order to predict the prices of generic wines in Bordeaux; these wines are often sold in bulk and are not traded in the form of wine futures. Gergaud et al. [31] evaluate the collective economic benefits rather than the price. Wine analytics literature complements this wine economics literature by building predictive pricing models that provide transparency to the constituents of the wine supply chains.

The wine economics literature pays close attention to the influence of tasting expert opinions. There are publications (e.g., *Wine Advocate*, *Wine Spectator*, and *Decanter*) that give tasting reviews and scores. Avid consumers follow these numbers closely, as they create a quality perception. Wine prices are influenced by the tasting scores. Quality perceptions are also created for other agricultural products. The quality of an olive oil, for example, is determined by an oleic acidity test (Ayvaz-Çavdaroğlu et al. [10]); thus, it is much less subjective than a tasting expert's score. There are futures for olive oil in global markets; however, the oils that get traded are almost always poorer in quality. The predictive and prescriptive analytical methods developed for wine can also be used in other agricultural products. In the case of an olive oil, the tasting score would be replaced by an oleic acidity level (a numerical value between 0.3% and 2%).

Fluctuations in economic conditions also influence wine prices. Traditional financial indices—for example, the Standard & Poor's 500 index and the Dow Jones index—do not explain the movements in wine prices. Rather, the industry needs to follow new and different indices. London International Vintners' Exchange (Liv-ex) is the financial exchange where fine wines and their futures contracts are traded. Liv-ex has established

Table 1. The list of factors used in publications that examine wine prices.

Publication	Factors examined				
	Temperature	Rainfall	Tasting score	Liv-ex 100 index	Consecutive vintage comparison
Ashenfelter et al. [8]	+	+			
Byron and Ashenfelter [22]	+	+			
Combris et al. [27]			+		
Jones and Storchmann [37]	+	+	+		
Cardebat and Figuet [23]			+		
Haeger and Storchmann [33]	+	+	+		
Lecocq and Visser [44]	+	+			
Wood and Anderson [61]	+	+			
Ali and Nauges [3]			+		
Ali et al. [4]			+		
Ashenfelter [5]	+	+			
Ashenfelter and Storchmann [7]	+	+			
Dubois and Nauges [30]			+		
Ashenfelter and Jones [6]	+	+	+		
Dimson et al. [28]	+	+			
Ashton [9]			+		
Cardebat et al. [25]			+		
Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34]	+	+	+	+	+

the Liv-ex 100 index, which constitutes the prices of the most sought-after 100 wines in the world, most of which are from Bordeaux. This index is used to describe the financial health and sustainability of the global wine industry; it is widely cited by Bloomberg and Reuters to inform investors. Hekimoğlu et al. [35] show that the Liv-ex 100 index can be used to examine the influence of market fluctuations. Cardebat and Jiao [24] conclude that the Liv-ex 100 serves as a proxy reflecting the consumers' willingness to pay for fine wines. Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] show how the Liv-ex 100 index can be used in a predictive analytical model for Bordeaux wine futures. However, the literature in the creation of wine indices is sparse. Masset and Weisskopf [49] argue that indices that are developed for the wine industry are not as efficient as other commodity markets.

1.1.2. Finance. Wine is an alternative investment asset. Storchmann [57] provides a comprehensive review about wine economics literature focusing on wine as an investment option. Dimson et al. [28] find that young Bordeaux wines yield greater returns than mature ones. This finding further amplifies the importance of explaining the evolution of young wine prices; Hekimoğlu et al. [35] provide the predictive models to develop functional forms of this price evolution. Jaeger [36], Burton and Jacobsen [21], Masset and Henderson [46], Masset and Weisskopf [47], and Masset et al. [50] conclude that wine can be used as a long-term investment. Jaeger [36], Burton and Jacobsen [21], and Dimson et al. [28] show that wines can yield greater returns than treasury bills, but less than equities. Masset and Weisskopf [48] demonstrate that fine wines often yield higher returns than do equities, especially when there is a financial crisis and when financial assets are highly correlated.

1.1.3. Marketing. This literature focuses on consumers' preferences, their willingness to pay functions, and their experiences in tasting rooms. Schmit et al. [56] use sensory effects to explore customer valuation of environmentally friendly wines. Kelley et al. [43] present a conjoint analysis to examine consumers' preferences for wines. Perla et al. [55] examine consumer preferences and sensory effects and provide guidance in the marketing of wine in restaurants. Kelley et al. [42] extend this work to marketing in tasting rooms. Park et al. [54] investigate what makes consumers revisit a winery. Back et al. [11] relate these marketing preferences to margins and markups in fair trade wine supply chains.

1.1.4. Operations Marketing Interface. This literature builds on the advance selling mechanisms originally developed in marketing. Xie and Shugan [62], Boyacı and Özer [20], Cho and Tang [26], Tang and Lim [60], and Yu et al. [63, 64] examine advance-selling quantity decisions under uncertainty and risk. Noparumpa et al. [52] develop a prescriptive model for a winemaker (seller) to determine the proportion of wine to be sold in the form of wine futures—the remaining proportion is distributed after the wine is bottled. Hekimoğlu et al. [35] develop a stochastic program to solve a wine distributor's (buyer) purchasing decision between wine futures and bottled wine.

Operations literature examines problems for other agricultural products in the context of uncertainty in climatic conditions and crop supply. Examples include Jones et al. [38], Kazaz [39], Kazaz and Webster [40, 41], Boyabatlı et al. [19], Boyabatlı [18], and Noparumpa et al. [53].

In the remaining part of this tutorial, we build predictive and prescriptive models that estimate and employ wine futures. They can create a less risky operating environment for winemakers, offer transparency to the buyers, and build confidence in the efficiency of the wine market.

2. Predictive Analytics for Wine Futures

Wine futures is a term that refers to selling wine in advance of bottling. It is a mechanism to help winemakers mitigate the uncertainty in their future cash flows. By selling early, a winemaker can recuperate her cash investment in the wine that will be sitting in the barrel for an additional year before it is bottled. The wine may not even sell immediately after bottling,


and it may sit on retail shelves without earning money for some time. Selling wine in the form of wine futures has been practiced by French winemakers since the 17th century. Winemakers are often willing to sell their wine in the form of wine futures at a discounted price. These reduced prices make it attractive for buyers such as wine distributors and importers. In this section of the tutorial, we begin our discussion by describing the trade mechanisms that serve as the foundation for the most celebrated wines, those of the Bordeaux region. Then, we develop predictive analytics models that focus on the most critical and challenging question in the wine industry: What is the right price for these wine futures contracts?

Ashenfelter et al. [8] and Ashenfelter [5] use level panel data and provide successful regression results in estimating the impact of weather on aged Bordeaux wines. However, their models do not estimate young wine prices accurately. We present new predictive analytics approaches that lead to accurate estimations for young wine prices. We focus on the wines that are still aging in the barrel but traded in the form of France’s *en primeur* system, which is loosely translated into English as wine futures.

Let us begin our discussion with the winemaking process in the Bordeaux wine supply chain. Figure 1 presents a timeline of events in the winemaking process. Châteaux grow their grapes on their estate from May to August each summer. Grapes are harvested and pressed in early fall. The wine is referred to as vintage t and begins its aging process in barrels at this time. In the spring of calendar year $t + 1$, tasting experts visit châteaux, taste samples, and establish what is known as “the barrel score.” These barrel scores are often described out of 100 points, and they create a perception of quality for buyers and consumers. In the French system, following the release of barrel scores, châteaux begin to sell their wines to middleman known as *négociants*. *Négociants* purchase the wine from châteaux at a price what the market refers to as the *ex-château* price. The *ex-château* prices are private information and are not known publicly. At the beginning of the summer of year $t + 1$, *négociants* sell the wine immediately in terms of futures contracts through a financial exchange—this price is referred to as the *ex-négociant* price and is known as the futures price. A vast majority of Bordeaux wines, more than 80% and often 100%, are traded in the form of wine futures in the summer of year $t + 1$.

It is important to highlight that the *ex-négociant* price is the “market price” for wine futures. The predictive analytics model presented in this section aims to estimate this market price; the estimate represents the true value of the wine futures price known as the *ex-négociant* price in Liv-ex. This price is important for the entire supply chain because it sets the pace in the downstream and influences the trade significantly. After being sold in the form of wine futures, the wine continues to age in barrels for another year. It gets bottled during the summer of year $t + 2$. As a result, the total aging process is 18–24 months. In the absence of wine futures, this is a long period of time to have cash tied up in this continually evolving good. After bottling, the wine gets delivered to the buyers of futures contracts; the shipment is made from the *négociants* to the buyers, who are often distributors and importers.

Figure 1. (Color online) The sequence of events leading to the revelation of *ex-négociant* prices for vintage t wines.




Estimating the true value of the market price is a challenging task and even industry experts fail to provide meaningful estimates. A 2016 Liv-ex survey involving 440 of the world's leading wine merchants shows the estimation errors of industry experts regarding the futures prices of the 2015 vintage; see <https://www.liv-ex.com/2016/06/merchants-underestimated-bordeaux-2015-release-prices/>. The survey relied on a basket of futures contracts from Bordeaux's premium wine producers Cheval Blanc, Cos d'Estournel, Léoville-Las Cases, Mission Haut-Brion, Montrose, Mouton Rothschild, Pavie, Pichon Lalande, Pontet-Canet, and Talbot. The 2016 survey results show that these 440 leading wine merchants underestimated the total value of the basket by 21%. These experts estimated a 17.8% increase in the futures prices for the 2015 vintage from the futures prices of the same wines' 2014 vintage. The actual prices, however, increased by 45.8%. This is a great example of the need for a predictive analytics study intended to estimate wine futures prices accurately.

A reliable futures price estimate is essential for the wine industry. In the absence of good estimations, buyers would have the inertia to invest in wine futures. Conversations with the executives of the largest wine distributors in the United States confirm this concern. These executives point to the necessity for establishing a benchmark price so that they can determine in confidence whether a wine is overpriced or underpriced and, thus, whether they should invest a smaller or large amount of money into futures contracts. One might wonder why we cannot decide this value by using just the tasting scores. We must remember that barrel scores established by the tasting experts do not immediately translate to prices. The predictive analytics approach in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] fills the necessary gap, and it establishes the much needed benchmark prices. Reliable estimations from predictive analytics bring transparency into this otherwise highly opaque market.

The adjustments in futures prices from the previous vintage exhibit a highly similar behavior in Figure 2. The reliance on the prior vintage's futures prices appear to be an operational planning phenomenon. Châteaux replace barrels each year, bottle the wine and push it downstream, and take in the new batch of grapes in order to produce the next vintage's wine. By selling their wine in the form of wine futures, they recover their cash investment in one year and use these funds to finance next year's operations. Négociants also operate on a yearly basis; they move the inventory of the wine futures contracts they purchased from châteaux to the market so that they can recover their cash investment in these futures agreements. In sum, this one-year planning phenomenon creates a coordinated financial and physical flow that influences adjustments from the prior vintage's futures prices. It turns out that when this one-year operational emphasis is incorporated into the predictive model, the estimations

Figure 2. (Color online) Percentage change in the futures prices from the previous vintage between 2002 and 2017 for 40 Bordeaux châteaux examined in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34].



improve significantly. Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] make use of the one-year operational planning phenomenon displayed in Figure 2. They define a unique variable definition that compares two consecutive vintages and use this “change” variable rather than level panel data. This variable definition is shown to improve accuracy.

Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] develop a comprehensive predictive analytics model in order to estimate wine futures prices. Their study examines a total of 33 factors but identify that there are only 5 key factors that estimate futures prices accurately: (1) temperature, (2) precipitation, (3) the Liv-ex 100 index, (4) barrel scores of the most influential tasting experts, and (5) a positive interaction term that captures the improvement in temperatures and market conditions from the previous vintage.

The online supplement provides the details of the data used in the analysis of Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34]. In summary, futures prices are collected from Liv-ex (<https://www.liv-ex.com>); Table A1 of the online supplement provides the details of the châteaux involved in the analysis. Météo-France is the primary source for local weather information. The Méridon and Saint-Émilion weather stations are the main weather locations for the Left Bank and Right Bank châteaux, respectively. The weather data consist of daily maximum temperatures (in degrees Celsius) and daily total rainfall (in centimeters) during the growing season (May 1–August 31). Figure A1 of the online supplement illustrates the weather data between 2001 and 2017. Barrel tasting scores are provided by Liv-ex. They rely on the most influential publication, *Wine Advocate*, as well as leading wine authority RobertParker.com.¹ The Liv-ex Fine Wine 100 Index captures marketwide fluctuations in this industry. Even though the index includes only bottled wines of older vintages, the value of the index is an excellent proxy for reflecting consumers’ willingness to pay for fine wines. Figure A2 of the online supplement illustrates the values of Liv-ex 100 since its inception in July 2001.

2.1. Predictive Analytics Model

The predictive model in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] uses the following dependent and independent variable definitions:

Change in futures prices. The dependent variable is the logarithmic change across the futures prices of two consecutive vintages from the same château; that is, $\Delta p_{i,t} = \log(p_{i,t}/p_{i,t-1})$, where $p_{i,t}$ is the futures price of vintage t of château i .

Change in average temperature. The temperature variable is the logarithmic change across the average growing season temperatures of two consecutive vintages; that is, $\Delta m_{i,t} = \log(m_{i,t}/m_{i,t-1})$, where $m_{i,t}$ is the average of daily maximum temperatures during the growing season (May 1–August 31) of year t in the region where château i is located. Because warmer temperatures are expected to produce a higher-quality wine, a positive change is expected to result in higher prices from the previous vintage.

Change in total rainfall. The precipitation variable is the logarithmic change across the total growing season rainfall of two consecutive vintages; that is, $\Delta p_{i,t} = \log(p_{i,t}/p_{i,t-1})$, where $p_{i,t}$ is the total rainfall during the growing season period of year t in the region where château i is located. A rainier growing season is expected to have a negative impact on the *ex-négociant* price.

Change in barrel tasting score. The barrel score variable is the difference between the barrel tasting scores of two consecutive vintages of the same château; that is, $\Delta s_{i,t} = s_{i,t} - s_{i,t-1}$, where $s_{i,t}$ is the barrel tasting score of vintage t of château i . A higher score is expected to have a positive impact on the *ex-négociant* price.

Change in Liv-ex 100. The Liv-ex 100 index variable is the logarithmic change in the value of Liv-ex 100 index between the *en primeur* campaign of the previous vintage and shortly before the *en primeur* campaign of the new vintage. It is expressed as $\Delta l_t = \log(l_t^{\text{mar}}/l_{t-1}^{\text{may}})$, where l_{t-1}^{may} is the value of Liv-ex 100 around the *en primeur* campaign of vintage $t-1$ (corresponding to May of year t), and l_t^{mar} is the value of Liv-ex 100 in March prior to the

en primeur campaign of vintage t (corresponding to March of year $t + 1$). The index value at the end of March is used in order to predict prices, rather than to explain prices. A positive change in the Liv-ex 100 index is expected to have a positive impact on the *ex-négociant* price.

Table A2 in the online supplement shows that the correlation coefficients among these variables are not strong enough to suggest any collinearity issues. Figure 2 highlights the hype effect that can be seen in vintages that are tagged as phenomenal (e.g., 2003, 2005, and 2009). To capture this hype effect, Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] define additional positive interaction variables.

2.1.1. Positive Interaction Variables. The following six interaction variables are defined in order to combine the pairwise positive effects of temperature and rainfall $(mr_{i,t})^+$, temperature and Liv-ex 100 $(ml_{i,t})^+$, temperature and barrel score $(ms_{i,t})^+$, rainfall and Liv-ex 100 $(rl_{i,t})^+$, rainfall and barrel score $(rs_{i,t})^+$, and Liv-ex 100 and barrel score $(ls_{i,t})^+$:

$$(mr_{i,t})^+ = \Delta m_{i,t} \times |\Delta r_{i,t}| \text{ if } m_{i,t} > m_{i,t-1} \text{ and } r_{i,t} < r_{i,t-1}, (mr_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise,}$$

$$(ml_{i,t})^+ = \Delta m_{i,t} \times \Delta l_t \text{ if } m_{i,t} > m_{i,t-1} \text{ and } l_t^{mar} > l_{t-1}^{may}, (ml_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise,}$$

$$(ms_{i,t})^+ = \Delta m_{i,t} \times \Delta s_{i,t} \text{ if } m_{i,t} > m_{i,t-1} \text{ and } s_{i,t} > s_{i,t-1}, (ms_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise,}$$

$$(rl_{i,t})^+ = |\Delta r_{i,t}| \times \Delta l_t \text{ if } r_{i,t} < r_{i,t-1} \text{ and } l_t^{mar} > l_{t-1}^{may}, (rl_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise,}$$

$$(rs_{i,t})^+ = |\Delta r_{i,t}| \times \Delta s_{i,t} \text{ if } r_{i,t} < r_{i,t-1} \text{ and } s_{i,t} > s_{i,t-1}, (rs_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise,}$$

$$(ls_{i,t})^+ = \Delta l_t \times \Delta s_{i,t} \text{ if } l_t^{mar} > l_{t-1}^{may} \text{ and } s_{i,t} > s_{i,t-1}, (ls_{i,t})^+ = 0 \text{ if otherwise.}$$

2.1.2. Other Explanatory Variables. As will be seen later, Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] report that they test a total of 33 explanatory variables; however, as presented in the online supplement, the remaining variables are not selected by the Lasso analysis.

2.2. Analysis and Results

The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of various models is presented in Table 2 with cluster-robust standard errors (using classical standard errors leads to the same statistical inferences). Models 1–4 show that each independent variable (temperature, rainfall, barrel score, and Liv-ex 100) influences futures prices independently at the highest statistical significance. Moreover, their coefficients produce the positive and negative values as expected. Model 5 uses only weather information: temperatures and rainfall. Model 6 adds barrel scores, and Model 7 uses all four independent variables. All variables in Models 5, 6, and 7 continue to be significant at 1%. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the variables in Model 7 are 1.06 for Δl_t , 1.24 for $\Delta s_{i,t}$, 1.41 for $\Delta m_{i,t}$, and 1.62 for $\Delta r_{i,t}$; they are substantially lower than the well-established threshold of 5.00 for collinearity (Studenmund [59]). Models 8–13 add the positive interaction terms to Model 7; they reveal positive coefficients as expected in accordance with their definition and are statistically significant at 1%. Models 14–16 study the combined effects of two interaction terms. Model 9 prevails as the predictive model to be used. This conclusion comes from the Akaike information criterion (AIC) that determines the best estimation model. The preferred model, Model 9, has the minimum AIC value of -133.56 and a relatively high R^2 of 74.62% with all statistically significant coefficients. Model 9 can be described as

$$\Delta p_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta m_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \Delta r_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \Delta s_{i,t} + \alpha_4 \Delta l_t + \alpha_5 (ml_{i,t})^+ + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \tag{1}$$

Table 2. Regression results for the dependent variable $\Delta p_{i,t}$ in Hekimoglu and Kazaz [33].

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Int.	0.060 <i>15.61***</i>	0.077 <i>19.59***</i>	0.056 <i>12.95***</i>	-0.007 <i>-1.28</i>	0.072 <i>19.93***</i>	0.066 <i>14.95***</i>	-0.004 <i>-0.64</i>	-0.056 <i>-6.65***</i>	-0.086 <i>-8.81***</i>	-0.022 <i>-2.60**</i>	-0.049 <i>-5.80***</i>	-0.029 <i>-3.90***</i>	-0.024 <i>-2.57**</i>	-0.061 <i>-6.85***</i>	-0.083 <i>-8.20***</i>	-0.061 <i>-6.36***</i>
$\Delta m_{i,t}$	2.931 <i>13.66***</i>	1.205 <i>6.40***</i>	1.026 <i>5.68***</i>	1.594 <i>8.21***</i>	1.205 <i>6.40***</i>	1.026 <i>5.68***</i>	1.594 <i>8.21***</i>	1.027 <i>5.81***</i>	0.568 <i>3.59***</i>	1.189 <i>5.58***</i>	1.775 <i>8.59***</i>	1.568 <i>8.02***</i>	1.538 <i>7.99***</i>	1.063 <i>6.22***</i>	0.536 <i>3.51***</i>	1.405 <i>6.44***</i>
$\Delta r_{i,t}$	-0.507 <i>-17.48***</i>	-0.427 <i>-16.87***</i>	-0.352 <i>-14.57***</i>	-0.241 <i>-11.67***</i>	-0.427 <i>-16.87***</i>	-0.352 <i>-14.57***</i>	-0.241 <i>-11.67***</i>	-0.114 <i>-5.38***</i>	-0.060 <i>-2.99***</i>	-0.253 <i>-11.80***</i>	-0.054 <i>-2.34**</i>	-0.174 <i>-6.79***</i>	-0.218 <i>-8.28***</i>	-0.117 <i>-5.60***</i>	-0.068 <i>-3.17***</i>	-0.071 <i>-3.16***</i>
$\Delta s_{i,t}$			0.066 <i>11.76***</i>			0.035 <i>6.88***</i>	0.035 <i>8.14***</i>	0.033 <i>8.35***</i>	0.032 <i>8.70***</i>	0.028 <i>5.60***</i>	0.037 <i>8.95***</i>	0.029 <i>6.65***</i>	0.026 <i>6.91***</i>	0.028 <i>7.72***</i>	0.034 <i>8.39***</i>	0.031 <i>6.72***</i>
Δl_t				1.556 <i>18.23***</i>			1.405 <i>16.61***</i>	1.168 <i>14.31***</i>	0.835 <i>12.37***</i>	1.391 <i>16.68***</i>	1.084 <i>14.09***</i>	1.303 <i>16.32***</i>	1.196 <i>14.80***</i>	1.076 <i>14.03***</i>	0.836 <i>12.34***</i>	1.087 <i>14.14***</i>
$(m_{i,t})^+$								7.626 <i>8.67***</i>						6.712 <i>6.31***</i>		
$(m_{i,t})^-$									54.318 <i>14.50***</i>					56.319 <i>13.95***</i>		
$(ms_{i,t})^+$										0.393 <i>3.15***</i>					0.293 <i>2.81***</i>	
$(r_{i,t})^+$											2.109 <i>9.70***</i>				2.021 <i>9.32***</i>	
$(rs_{i,t})^+$												0.079 <i>4.38***</i>			-0.017 <i>-0.98</i>	
$(ls_{i,t})^+$													0.280 <i>3.74***</i>	0.162 <i>2.07**</i>		
R^2 (%)	19.00	34.48	21.41	28.52	36.82	41.83	63.76	67.32	74.62	64.50	67.26	65.29	65.30	67.78	74.68	67.66
N	626	626	623	626	626	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623	623
AIC	581.41	448.63	562.69	503.15	427.81	379.20	86.40	24.05	-133.56	75.52	25.23	61.57	61.40	17.24	-133.05	19.44

Note. The t -statistics using cluster-robust standard errors are given in italics below the coefficients.

** and ***Statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.

VIFs for Model 9 variables are 1.24 for $\Delta s_{i,t}$, 1.41 for Δl_t , 1.63 for $\Delta m_{i,t}$, 2.01 for $\Delta r_{i,t}$, and 2.43 for $(ml_{i,t})^+$, which are all less than the commonly used threshold of 5.00 for collinearity. Thus, there is no collinearity issue in the predictive analytics model. It is also important to observe that Model 15 has a higher R^2 than Model 9; however, the additional interaction term $(rs_{i,t})^+$ is not significant and has a higher AIC score, indicating less desirability for predictive purposes.

Using the equation (1) of Model 9, the predictive analysis populates the estimated futures prices $\hat{p}_{i,t}$ by converting the realized future prices of the previous vintage, denoted by $p_{i,t-1}$:

$$\hat{p}_{i,t} = \exp(\hat{\Delta}p_{i,t})p_{i,t-1}. \tag{2}$$

Figure 3 shows the accuracy of Model 9 by plotting the estimated and actual futures prices and fitting a line. The fitted line $y = 1.0002x$ has a slope extremely close to 1 and has an R^2 value of 94.87%. The figure reveals a remarkable success in prediction accuracy.

2.3. Prediction Accuracy with Out-of-Sample Testing

Ashenfelter [5] reports that its predictive model has a mean absolute percentage error of 36.14% for vintages between 1967 and 1972. How does Model 9 perform in an out-of-sample test? Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] employ an out-of-sample test by holding out the data for vintages between 2015 and 2017. Their approach trains the model by using the data for vintages up until 2014 and makes predictions for the 2015 vintage. The test is then replicated by including the data for 2015 and 2016 in reestimating the coefficients in order to predict the 2016 and 2017 vintage prices, respectively. Defining the percentage error for the 2017 vintage as $e_{i,t=2017} = (\hat{p}_{i,t=2017} - p_{i,t=2017})/p_{i,t=2017}$, Table 3 shows the estimated and actual futures prices for the 2017 vintage and their percentage errors. Model 9 has a mean absolute percentage error of 9.19% with a standard deviation of 7.17%. More than two-thirds of the châteaux have prediction errors with less than 10%.

Figure 3. (Color online) The fit between the actual and estimated futures prices in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34] for the vintages between 2002 and 2017 using Model 9, where $n = 623$.




Table 3. The estimated and actual futures prices for the 2017 vintage in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [33].

Château (<i>i</i>)	Estimated price (€) ($\hat{p}_{i,t=2017}$)	Actual price (€) ($p_{i,t=2017}$)	Error (%) ($e_{i,t=2017}$)	Château (<i>i</i>)	Estimated price (€) ($\hat{p}_{i,t=2017}$)	Actual price (€) ($p_{i,t=2017}$)	Error (%) ($e_{i,t=2017}$)
Angélus	269.38	276.00	-2.40	Lafleur	425.56	460.00	-7.49
Ausone	505.77	480.00	5.37	Léoville Barton	63.33	52.80	19.94
Beychevelle	46.62	52.80	-11.70	Léoville-Las Cases	153.04	144.00	6.27
Calon Ségur	56.51	60.00	-5.81	Léoville Poyferré	57.91	54.00	7.25
Carruades de Lafite	134.42	135.00	-0.43	Lynch-Bages	79.08	75.00	5.44
Cheval Blanc	474.80	432.00	9.91	Margaux	368.55	348.00	5.90
Clarence (Bahans) Haut-Brion	101.56	102.00	-0.43	Mission Haut-Brion	285.67	240.00	19.03
Clinet	63.92	56.00	14.14	Montrose	92.38	96.00	-3.77
Clos Fourtet	73.51	72.00	2.09	Mouton Rothschild	368.55	348.00	5.90
La Conseillante	133.17	120.00	10.97	Palmer	224.34	192.00	16.84
Cos d'Estournel	105.30	108.00	-2.50	Pape Clément	59.77	61.20	-2.33
Ducru-Beaucaillon	126.07	120.00	5.06	Pavie	245.02	276.00	-11.23
Duhart Milon	49.81	48.00	3.77	Pavillon Rouge	103.25	132.00	-21.78
L'Église-Clinet	206.16	168.00	22.72	Pichon Baron	103.25	96.00	7.55
L'Évangile	154.83	180.00	-13.98	Pichon Lalande	108.68	90.00	20.76
Grand-Puy-Lacoste	52.65	52.80	-0.28	Pontet-Canet	97.81	80.00	22.27
Gruaud-Larose	47.82	51.75	-7.60	Smith Haut Lafitte	69.56	67.20	3.51
Haut-Bailly	73.71	72.00	2.37	Troplong Mondot	91.99	72.00	27.77
Haut-Brion	380.38	348.00	9.30	Vieux Château Certan	181.57	168.00	8.08
Lafite Rothschild	438.97	420.00	4.52				

Notes. Mean absolute % error = 9.19. Minimum of absolute % error = 0.28. Maximum of absolute % error = 27.77. Standard deviation of absolute % errors = 7.17.

To see the prediction accuracy, Model 9 is compared with three benchmark models:

$$\text{Model B0: } \log(p_{i,t}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log(m_{i,t}) + \alpha_2 \log(r_{i,t}) + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

$$\text{Model B1: } \log(p_{i,t}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log(m_{i,t}) + \alpha_2 \log(r_{i,t}) + \alpha_3 \log(l_t^{mar}) + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

$$\text{Model B2: } \log(p_{i,t}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log(m_{i,t}) + \alpha_2 \log(r_{i,t}) + \alpha_3 \log(l_t^{mar}) + \alpha_4 s_{i,t} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where μ_i represents the time-invariant chateau characteristics. Models B0–B2 rely on the traditional level panel data and do not employ the definition of change variables. Model B0 is equivalent to the prediction model of Ashenfelter [5], which relies solely on weather information. Model B1 incorporates the Liv-ex 100 index into Model B0, and Model B2 adds the barrel scores to Model B1. Note that Model 7 uses the same four factors but employs the change variable definition.

Table 4 provides the comparison of Models B0, B1, B2, 7, and 9 in the same out-of-sample test and makes the following conclusions: First, Model 9 makes significantly more accurate predictions than the widely practiced benchmark B0. Incorporating market information (the Liv-ex 100 index) improves the performance by 20.97% and barrel scores by another 3.17%. Changing the variable definition prompts an improvement of 3.65%, and the interaction term adds another 0.55% performance boost.

A comprehensive robustness analysis is presented in the online supplement. The Lasso analysis is a popular machine learning methodology for variable selection (Ahrens et al. [1, 2], Belloni et al. [13, 14, 15, 16]). Analyzing 33 independent variables leading to $2^{33} = 8,589,934,592$ independent models, the analysis confirms that the optimal set of variables is the set of variables featured in Model 9. Using quantile regression, robust regression (Li [45], Street et al. [56]), hierarchical linear modeling, the hierarchical Bayes model, and parametric and nonparametric variable transformations (e.g., Duan [29]), robustness tests show the extraordinary accuracy of this predictive model. As a result, Liv-ex has decided to publish the estimated prices of Model 9 as “realistic prices.” Realistic prices provide transparency in the wine industry: Buyers can now determine whether a wine is underpriced or overpriced.

Improving the performance of price estimations would build additional investor confidence in wine futures. A higher number of participants in the futures market would improve the efficiency of the financial exchange. Future research should construct additional predictive analytics for other wine-producing regions. This is particularly important in the U.S. wine industry where there is no financial exchange to trade wine futures even though many offer it through wine club memberships (e.g., Harlan Estate, Hawkes, and the Far Niente group’s Nickel & Nickel). As a result, winemakers rely primarily on their direct-to-consumer channels. This can be seen in McMillan [51], where a winery’s financial sustainability is measured in terms of the size of its direct-to-consumer channel. In the absence of a financial exchange, when a winemaker goes bankrupt, the financial institution receives priority in taking

Table 4. Out-of-sample testing results of models B0, B1, B2, 7, and 9 in Hekimoğlu and Kazaz [34].

Vintage	Mean absolute % error				
	Model B0	Model B1	Model B2	Model 7	Model 9
2015	38.20	18.57	16.10	10.12	12.74
2016	45.79	21.24	16.20	12.29	11.42
2017	34.38	15.66	13.66	12.61	9.19
Average	39.46	18.49	15.32	11.67	11.12
Δ Liv-ex 100 (B0 – B1)		20.97			
Δ Barrel score (B1 – B2)			3.17		
Δ Variable definition (B2 – 7)				3.65	
Δ Positive interaction (7 – 9)					0.55

possession of the existing inventory of wines. Thus, club members who paid the winemaker in advance, may not receive their wines. In sum, establishing a financial exchange would be beneficial for protecting their investments in futures; it would incentivize more people to participate in wine futures trade.

3. The Supplier: Winemaker

Winemakers who focus on producing premium quality wines take a substantial risk with the long production times, with 18–24 months before the wine is bottled. It is easy to see that monetary investment is tied up in this liquid for a long time. To combat the risks in the value during the production process, French winemakers have always sold premium wines in the form of wine futures. This risk mitigation technique corresponds to the popular advance selling mechanism in marketing and to the inventory financing mechanism in supply chain finance. Section 2 developed a predictive analytics model that determined the value of the wine futures contracts. In this section of the tutorial, we develop a prescriptive model that helps winemakers endogenize the pricing decision and determine the amount of wine to be sold in advance in the form of futures contracts.

Noparumpa et al. [52] develop predictive and prescriptive analytics approaches in order to manage the risks in the long production process. To help mitigate risks, their study develops a prescriptive analytical method that relies on a multinomial logit (MNL) model. The winemaker makes two critical decisions at the halfway point of the aging process (i.e., when the wine is still in the barrel): (1) What proportion of the wine should be sold in advance in the form of wine futures, and what proportion of the wine should be kept for retail sales? And (2) what should be the price of wine futures contracts? The latter decision sets an expectation about the retail price upon bottling. In this MNL model, consumers can purchase the wine at two different points in time: either as a wine futures contract while the wine continues to age in the barrel or at retail after the wine is bottled.

Tasting experts review premium wines at two points in time: first, when the wine is still aging in the barrel (and before it is offered to the public in the form of wine futures), and second, when the wine is bottled and distributed for retail sales. Each time, the review will be a score given out of 100 points.² The first review is the “barrel score” and is denoted by s_1 ; the wine is still aging in the barrel at this time. The second review is called the “bottle score” and is denoted by \hat{s}_2 , representing the randomness as it takes place in a future time period (i.e., after the wine is bottled). The barrel scores are published before the wine is offered in the form of wine futures, and we already established the fact these barrel scores influence the price of wine futures. For example, when the most influential tasting expert, Robert Parker, provided his almost perfect score for the 2008 Lafite Rothschild, the price of wine futures jumped approximately 50%–75% in value.

The MNL model describes consumers’ valuation in terms of three decision options:

1. Purchase the wine in advance of bottling and in the form of wine futures (at time epoch t_1).
2. Wait for a year and purchase the wine after it is bottled at an unknown retail price (at time epoch t_2).
3. Not purchase the wine.

The average valuation of a wine future at the time it is offered to the public is influenced by three factors: (a) the expectation from the unknown bottle score, which is often assumed to be equal to the barrel score (i.e., $E[\hat{s}_2] = s_1$); (b) the variation in the bottle score σ ; and (c) the risk-free rate r_f that indicates the time-value-of-money from paying today and receiving the product a year later. Note that the weather information during the growing season is already revealed at this time; it is not random anymore.

We denote the average consumer value from a future under bottle-score uncertainty with v_f and employ a conditional value at risk (CVaR) framework to determine its value. For a given

$\xi \in (0, 1]$, let $z(\xi) = G^{-1}(\xi)$ describe the ξ th percentile of the bottle score (i.e., $s_2(\xi) = s_1 + z(\xi)\sigma$). The valuation of wine futures by an average consumer is equal to the conditional expected value of the bottle score discounted to time t_1 at the risk-free rate:

$$v_f = (1 + r_f)^{-1} E[\tilde{s}_2 | s_1, \tilde{s}_2 \leq s_2(\xi)] = (1 + r_f)^{-1} (s_1 - E[-\tilde{z} | \tilde{z} \leq z(\xi)]\sigma) = (1 + r_f)^{-1} (s_1 - \gamma\sigma),$$

where $\gamma = E[-\tilde{z} | \tilde{z} \leq z(\xi)]$ represents a measure of sensitivity to uncertainty in bottle score. Note that γ is decreasing in ξ , $\gamma \geq 0$ (because of $E[\tilde{z}] = 0$), and $\gamma = 0$ when $\xi = 1$. Then, v_f can be written as $v_f = \theta s_1$, where $\theta = (1 + r_f)^{-1}(1 - \gamma(\sigma/s_1))$ is the risk-adjusted discount factor. Note that in this definition of consumers' risk-adjusted discount factor, the risk-free discount factor $((1 + r_f)^{-1})$ is reduced by the uncertainty in the bottle score (γ) and the coefficient of variation of the bottle score (σ/s_1). The valuation of a wine future by a random consumer is then $V_f = v_f + \epsilon_f = \theta s_1 + \epsilon_f$, where ϵ_f is a random variable with $E[\epsilon_f] = 0$. The utility of a future is equal to the consumer surplus; that is, the difference between valuation and price, $U_f = V_f - p_f = \theta s_1 + \epsilon_f - p_f$. The average utility of a future among consumers can be written as $u_f = E[U_f] = \theta s_1 - p_f$.

One can observe that the utility from purchasing the wine in the form of a wine futures contracts is increasing in the expected bottle score (s_1) and is decreasing in price (p_f), the uncertainty in bottle score (σ), the risk-free discount rate (r_f), and risk aversion (γ).

A consumer who does not purchase the wine in the form of a wine future has two choices at the time that the wine is bottled: (1) purchase the wine at the unknown retail price $p_r(\tilde{s}_2 | s_1) = \tilde{s}_2$ at time t_2 or (2) do not purchase it. The average utility of a retail purchase choice among consumers is the difference between the expected valuation and the expected price discounted by the risk-adjusted discount rate (i.e., is $u_f = \theta(E[\tilde{s}_2 | s_1] - E[p_r(\tilde{s}_2 | s_1)]) = 0$), and the random utility is $U_r = \epsilon_r$, where ϵ_r is a random variable with $E[\epsilon_r] = 0$. The average utility of the no purchase option is 0, and the random utility is $U_0 = \epsilon_0$. The utility of not purchasing a wine future in the first time epoch is the maximum utility among the two no-purchase alternatives (i.e., $\max\{U_r, U_0\} = \max\{\epsilon_r, \epsilon_0\}$).

We next derive the purchase probability for wine futures considering that a consumer selects the alternative with the highest utility. The fraction of consumers who purchase the wine in the form of wine futures is $P[U_f > \max\{U_r, U_0\}] = P[\max\{\epsilon_r, \epsilon_0\} - \epsilon_f < \theta s_1 - p_f]$. Assuming that ϵ_f , ϵ_r , and ϵ_0 are independent and identically distributed Gumbel random variables with zero mean and scale parameter β , $\max\{\epsilon_r, \epsilon_0\}$ is a Gumbel random variable with $E[\max\{\epsilon_r, \epsilon_0\}] = \beta \ln 2$ and scale parameter β (because the Gumbel distribution is closed under maximization), and $\max\{\epsilon_r, \epsilon_0\} - \epsilon_f$ is a logistic random variable (because the difference between two independent Gumbel random variables with the same scale parameter is a logistic random variable). Thus, the futures purchase probability conforms to the multinomial logit (MNL) model:

$$P[U_f > \max\{U_r, U_0\}] = \frac{e^{(\theta s_1 - p_f)/\beta}}{2 + e^{(\theta s_1 - p_f)/\beta}} = \frac{e^{((1+r_f)^{-1}(s_1 - \gamma\sigma) - p_f)/\beta}}{2 + e^{((1+r_f)^{-1}(s_1 - \gamma\sigma) - p_f)/\beta}}.$$

MNL models are commonly used in retail settings. What sets wine apart from a traditional retail good is that the market size increases or decreases with higher or smaller barrel scores. Let us describe this market size as a nondecreasing function of the barrel score s_1 and denote it by $M(s_1)$, where $M'(s_1) \geq 0$. Individuals will purchase a wine futures contract only when it provides the highest utility:

$$q_f(p_f) = M(s_1)P[U_f > \max\{U_r, U_0\}] = M(s_1) \left[\frac{e^{(\theta s_1 - p_f)/\beta}}{2 + e^{(\theta s_1 - p_f)/\beta}} \right]. \tag{3}$$

Inverting (3) allows us to write the futures price as a function of quantity:

$$p_f(q_f) = \theta s_1 + \beta \ln [(M(s_1) - q_f)/2q_f]. \tag{4}$$

The winemaker’s risk-adjusted discount factor is denoted by ϕ , and its value reflects the risk of selling a bottle of wine at an uncertain retail price in the future. The higher the uncertainty of the bottle price and the more risk averse the winemaker, the lower the value of ϕ .

A predictive analytics method relying on a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can be employed in order to estimate the risk-adjusted discount factor for a winemaker. The estimate of the value of ϕ can then be used to solve the prescriptive analytical model for the winemaker. In this approach, let us describe the winemaker’s risk-adjusted discount factor with $\phi = (1 + r_f + \gamma(r_m - r_f))^{-1}$, where r_m is the market return. For the international wine companies, it is appropriate to use the average annual percentage change in the Liv-ex 100 index as the market return r_m . Then, $r_m - r_f$ is the risk premium. The value of γ representing the winemaker’s risk measure can be estimated through a CAPM approach using $\gamma = \text{Cov}(r_j, r_m) / \text{Var}(r_m)$, which represents the covariance between the returns of the specific winemaker (r_j) and the market returns (defined as $\text{Cov}(r_j, r_m)$) divided by the variance in market returns (defined as $\text{Var}(r_m)$).

The winemaker’s risk-adjusted expected profit can then be expressed as follows:

$$\Pi(q_f) = q_f p_f(q_f) + \phi E[p_r(\tilde{s}_2 | s_1)](Q - q_f) = q_f \left((\theta - \phi)s_1 + \beta \ln \left[\frac{M(s_1) - q_f}{2q_f} \right] \right) + \phi s_1 Q, \quad (5)$$

and the winemaker’s objective function maximizes the aforementioned risk-adjusted expected profit function:

$$\rho^* = \max_{q_f \leq Q} \Pi(q_f). \quad (6)$$

These derivations help in developing the expressions for the optimal values of the expected profit ρ^* , the optimal amount of wine to be sold in the form of wine futures q_f^* , and the optimal futures price p_f^* . These expressions rely on the Lambert W function $W(z)$; $W(z)$ is the value of w satisfying $z = we^w$. Let us describe the winemaker’s total production amount with Q . The optimal fraction of the market that will buy the wine in the form of wine futures is then equal to $\alpha^0 = e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta} - W\left(\frac{e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta}}{2e}\right) / (2e + e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta} - W\left(\frac{e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta}}{2e}\right))$ when the supply constraint is non-binding, (i.e., when $Q \geq M(s_1)\alpha^0$). The optimal solution for a MNL model using consumers’ CVaR perspective and winemakers’ risk-adjusted profits is characterized in Table 5.

Noparumpa et al. [52] estimate empirically that Bordeaux châteaux increase their futures allocation by an average of 27.65% as a result of the risks stemming from uncertainty in the bottle reviews and retail prices. It is also estimated that the model improves their expected profits by an average of 10.10%.

In Section 2, we estimated the realistic price (i.e., the *ex-négociant* price) at which the futures contract should be released to the financial exchange Liv-ex. Let \hat{p}_f denote the *ex-négociant* price estimate. Let δ represent the négociant’s margin; thus, the winemaker’s realistic earning is $\hat{p}_f - \delta$. Consider the case when production is not binding (i.e., $Q \geq M(s_1)\alpha^0$ and $\phi s_1 + \beta[1 + W(e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta}/2e)] > \hat{p}_f - \delta$). This case implies that the winemaker’s optimal

Table 5. The optimal solution of the MNL model based on the winemaker’s production amount.

Production is nonbinding (i.e., $Q \geq M(s_1)\alpha^0$)	Production is binding (i.e., $Q < M(s_1)\alpha^0$)
$q_f^* = M(s_1)\alpha^0$	$q_f^* = Q$
$p_f^* = \phi s_1 + \beta \left[1 + W\left(\frac{e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta}}{2e}\right) \right]$	$p_f^* = \theta s_1 + \beta \ln \left[\frac{M(s_1) - Q}{2Q} \right]$
$\rho^* = M(s_1) \left[\beta W\left(\frac{e^{(\theta-\phi)s_1/\beta}}{2e}\right) + \phi s_1 \frac{Q}{M(s_1)} \right]$	$\rho^* = Q \left(\theta s_1 + \beta \ln \left[\frac{M(s_1) - Q}{2Q} \right] \right)$

price choice is greater than the estimated realistic earning. It tells the winemaker that this price can potentially create a problem in terms of the winemaker's estimate of the demand function derived from the MNL model. In this case, the winemaker is recommended to reduce the futures price to $p_f^* = \hat{p}_f - \delta$; the amount of futures contracts $q_f(p_f)$ that the winemaker should expect to sell can be obtained by substituting $p_f^* = \hat{p}_f - \delta$ in (3).

In the United States, winemakers are not required to grow their grapes in their own estates like the French winemakers. The U.S. winemakers lease vineyards in order to secure the supply of grapes and control the quality of their agricultural input. The above-mentioned MNL model can easily be extended in order to determine the optimal amount of a vineyard lease for such winemakers. Incorporating the MNL-based prescriptive model into the leasing decisions enables winemakers to grow their businesses without requiring a substantial amount of capital and, thus, in a financially healthier manner.

Boutique and artisanal winemakers in the United States exhibit significantly more risk-averse behavior than do Bordeaux châteaux. These small winemakers often possess a smaller amount of cash and operate under higher financial uncertainty. Thus, the estimates for the risk-adjusted discount factors for these boutique and artisanal winemakers in the United States are substantially greater than those of Bordeaux châteaux. This implies that the value from selling wine in advance in the form of wine futures is significantly more valuable to boutique and artisanal winemakers of the United States than the Bordeaux châteaux. Noparumpa et al. [52] estimate empirically that one such winemaker, Heart and Hands Wine Company, would increase its wine futures allocation by an average of 55.03% and improve its expected profits by an average of 13.87%.

Noparumpa et al. [52] show that winemakers benefit from selling wine in the form of wine futures. Will the buyers of wine futures, distributors and importers, lose if they engage in wine futures?


4. The Buyer: Distributor and Importer

This section develops a prescriptive analytics model that helps wine distributors determine the investment allocation between wine futures and bottled wine. Hekimoğlu et al. [34] examine how the prices of wine futures and bottled wine are influenced by randomness in weather and market conditions. The predictive analytics framework in their publication provides the necessary empirical foundation for the functional forms that will be used in the prescriptive model. Every May of calendar year t , a distributor can buy wine futures of vintage $t - 1$ and bottled wines of vintage $t - 2$ from each winemaker. How much money should the wine distributor invest in the wine futures of vintage $t - 1$, and how much money should she allocate to the bottled wines from vintage $t - 2$? In order to decide, the wine distributor needs to predict the price evolution of wine futures and bottled wine from May of calendar year t to May of calendar year $t + 1$. The online supplement presents the details of the predictive analytics models that estimate the evolution of prices for wine futures and bottled wine. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of realized futures and bottle prices over time.

We denote weather fluctuations with random variable \tilde{w} and its realization with w and denote market fluctuations with random variable \tilde{m} and its realization with m . The predictive analytics study establishes the functional forms of futures and bottled wine prices in our analytical model as functions of w and m .

The predictive analysis presented in the online supplement shows that futures prices are negatively influenced by the new weather information: the value of f_2 decreases from f_1 with better weather information designated by a positive value of w , and the value of f_3 further decreases (with a larger coefficient) from f_2 with a positive value of w . Futures prices improve with better market conditions: the value of f_2 increases from f_1 with better market information designated by a positive value of m , and the value of f_3 further increases (with a larger coefficient) from f_2 with a positive value of m . The predictive analysis pertaining to the bottled

Figure 4. The evolution of futures and bottled wine prices under weather and market uncertainty.



wine prices shows that the next vintage’s weather information does not influence the evolution of bottled wine prices because the coefficient of w is not statistically significant in the price evolution from b_1 to b_2 or from b_2 to b_3 . Market information positively impacts the evolution of bottled wine prices: the value of b_2 increases from b_1 with a positive value of m , and the value of b_3 further increases (with a larger coefficient) from b_2 with a positive value of m . From the analysis of the predictive analytics model, Hekimoğlu et al. [35] define the following:

- $\partial f_2(w, m)/\partial w < 0$ and $\partial f_3(w, m)/\partial w < 0$ (because of the negative coefficients), with $\partial f_3(w, m)/\partial w < \partial f_2(w, m)/\partial w < 0$ (because of the greater value of coefficients in later periods);
- $\partial f_2(w, m)/\partial m > 0$ and $\partial f_3(w, m)/\partial m > 0$ (because of the positive coefficients), with $\partial f_3(w, m)/\partial m > \partial f_2(w, m)/\partial m > 0$ (because of the greater value of coefficients in later periods); and
- $\partial b_2(m)/\partial m > 0$ and $\partial b_3(m)/\partial m > 0$ (because of the positive coefficient), with $\partial b_3(m)/\partial m > \partial b_2(m)/\partial m > 0$ (because of the greater value of coefficients in later periods).

4.1. The Prescriptive Model for the Buyer

Distributors often have a dedicated budget, denoted as B , for each winemaker. The question is, how much of that money should be allocated into wine futures (of vintage $t - 1$) versus bottled wine (of vintage $t - 2$)? A two-stage stochastic program with recourse provides the optimal decisions.

Stage 1 (May of year t): The distributor determines the optimal values of the following terms, within the limited budget of B and under risk aversion:

- x_1 : the amount of money to be invested in the wine futures of vintage $t - 1$, and
- y_1 : the amount of money to be invested in the bottled wine from vintage $t - 2$. Wine distributors exhibit risk aversion that conforms to the value at risk (VaR) measure where they try to limit the amount of loss with an associated probability. We denote the unit prices of wine futures and bottled wine with f_1 and b_1 and normalize their values to $f_1 = b_1 = 1$. We normalize the means of the two random variables \tilde{w} and \tilde{m} to zero (i.e., $E[\tilde{w}] = E[\tilde{m}] = 0$). Their probability density functions (pdfs) are denoted by $\phi_w(w)$ and $\phi_m(m)$ on respective supports $[w_L, w_H]$ and $[m_L, m_H]$. We define the set $\Omega = [w_L, w_H] \times [m_L, m_H]$.

Stage 2 (September of year t): After observing the realizations for weather and market fluctuations (w, m) in September of year t , the distributor determines the optimal values for the following terms:

- x_2 : the amount of additional money to be invested in the wine futures of vintage $t - 1$, and
- y_2 : the amount of additional money to be invested in the bottled wine from vintage $t - 2$.

Note that the distributor can sell some of the futures purchased in stage 1 in May, and thus, the value of x_2 can be negative. The unit price for wine futures is $f_2(w, m)$ and for bottled wine is $b_2(m)$.

The returns from wine futures and bottled wine at the end of stage 2 (May of year $t + 1$) are also uncertain; they are described by random variables $(\tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)$, and their mean values are $E[\tilde{z}_f] = E[\tilde{z}_b] = 0$. The realized prices at the end of stage 2 are described as $f_3(w, m) + z_f$ and $b_3(m) + z_b$. Thus, $E[f_3(w, m) + \tilde{z}_f] = f_3(w, m)$ and $E[b_3(m) + \tilde{z}_b] = b_3(m)$.

From the analysis of the predictive models, note that when the futures and bottle prices move in one direction in the evolution from f_1 to $f_2(w, m)$ and from b_1 to $b_2(m)$, then often they also evolve in the same direction from $f_2(w, m)$ to $f_3(w, m) + z_f$ and from $b_2(m)$ to $b_3(m) + z_b$. As a result, we assume the following:

$$\text{If } f_2(w, m) \diamond f_1, \text{ then } E[f_3(w, m) + \tilde{z}_f] \diamond f_2(w, m) \text{ for all } \diamond \in \{>, =, <\} \text{ and for all } (w, m). \quad (7)$$

$$\text{If } b_2(m) \diamond b_1, \text{ then } E[b_3(m) + \tilde{z}_b] \diamond b_2(m) \text{ for all } \diamond \in \{>, =, <\} \text{ and for all } m. \quad (8)$$

The realized profit at the end of stage 2 can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2, y_2, z_f, z_b) \\ & = -x_1 - y_1 - f_2(w, m)x_2 - b_2(m)y_2 + [f_3(w, m) + z_f](x_1 + x_2) + [b_3(m) + z_b](y_1 + y_2). \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

The stage 2 model can be expressed as follows:

$$\max_{x_2, y_2} E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2, y_2, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)] \quad (10)$$

subject to

$$f_2(w, m)x_2 + b_2(m)y_2 \leq B - x_1 - y_1, \quad (11)$$

$$P[\Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2, y_2, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b) < -\beta] \leq \alpha, \quad (12)$$

$$x_2 \geq -x_1, \quad (13)$$

$$y_2 \geq 0. \quad (14)$$

Inequality (11) is the second-stage budget constraint; the distributor can use the remaining budget from stage 1 in addition to the money generated through the sale of futures in stage 2 (when $x_2 < 0$). Inequality (12) is the second-stage VaR constraint; the probability of realized profit less than the tolerated loss of $-\beta$ should not exceed α . Inequality (13) indicates that the distributor cannot sell more futures in stage 2 than the amount purchased in stage 1. For given x_1, y_1, w , and m , we let (x_2^*, y_2^*) denote the optimal solution; that is,

$$(x_2^*(x_1, y_1, w, m), y_2^*(x_1, y_1, w, m)) = \underset{x_2, y_2}{\operatorname{argmax}} E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2, y_2, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)] \text{ s.t.} \\ (11)-(14).$$

We can define $z_{f\alpha}$ and $z_{b\alpha}$ as the realizations of \tilde{z}_f and \tilde{z}_b at fractile α (i.e., $P[\tilde{z}_f \leq z_{f\alpha}] = P[\tilde{z}_b \leq z_{b\alpha}] = \alpha$) and assume that $z_{f\alpha} < 0$ and $z_{b\alpha} < 0$, implying that the distributor is worried about the negative returns at the end of stage 2. Distributors often invest only in bottled wine; therefore, it is practical to assume that the VaR constraint is satisfied in the event the distributor invests the entire budget on bottles:

$$(1 - b_3(mL) - z_{b\alpha})B < \beta. \quad (15)$$

The stage 1 model selects x_1 and y_1 that maximize the expected profit:

$$\max_{x_1, y_1 \geq 0} E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^*(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}), y_2^*(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}), \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)] \quad (16)$$

subject to

$$x_1 + y_1 \leq B, \tag{17}$$

$$P[\Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2^*(x_1, y_1, w, m), y_2^*(x_1, y_1, w, m), \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b) < -\beta] \leq \alpha \text{ for all } (w, m) \in \Omega. \tag{18}$$

Inequality (17) is the budget constraint. Inequality (18) is the VaR constraint under a time-consistent risk measure (e.g., see Boda and Filar [17]). Some (x_1, y_1) decisions may satisfy the VaR constraint in stage 1 but violate it in stage 2; these decisions become infeasible in the model. To examine whether a distributor should invest in futures, it is appropriate to assume equal and positive returns at the end of stage 2:

$$E[f_3(\tilde{w}, \tilde{m}) + \tilde{z}_f] = E[b_3(\tilde{m}) + \tilde{z}_b] > 1. \tag{19}$$

4.2. Analysis of the Prescriptive Model

Partitioning the state space for (\tilde{w}, \tilde{m}) allows us to identify when the distributor would (1) sell futures, (2) buy futures, and (3) sell futures in order to buy bottles:

$$\Omega 0 = \{(w, m) \in \Omega : f_3(w, m)/f_2(w, m) = b_3(m)/b_2(m) = 1\},$$

$$\Omega 1 = \{(w, m) \in \Omega : f_3(w, m)/f_2(w, m) < 1 \text{ and } b_3(m)/b_2(m) < 1\},$$

$$\Omega 2 = \{(w, m) \in \Omega : f_3(w, m)/f_2(w, m) \geq \max\{b_3(m)/b_2(m), 1\} \setminus \Omega 0\},$$

$$\Omega 3 = \{(w, m) \in \Omega : b_3(m)/b_2(m) \geq \max\{f_3(w, m)/f_2(w, m), 1\} \cup \Omega 0\}.$$

Let us define the equilibrium points as m_τ where $b_3(m_\tau)/b_2(m_\tau) = 1$ and $f_3(0, m_\tau)/f_2(0, m_\tau) = 1$, $w_\tau(m)$ where $f_3(w_\tau(m), m)/f_2(w_\tau(m), m) = 1$ for $m \leq m_\tau$, and $\bar{w}_\tau = w_\tau(m_L)$. Note that

$$m_\tau < 0, w_\tau(m) < 0 \text{ for all } m \leq w_\tau, \text{ and } w_\tau(m_\tau) = 0 \text{ (follows from (7), (8), (19)).} \tag{20}$$

We assume that

$$m_\tau > m_L \text{ and } w_\tau(m_L) > w_L. \tag{21}$$

The set $\Omega 0$ identifies the set of realizations where the distributor is indifferent between wine futures and bottled wine. The set $\Omega 1$ defines realizations where it is best to sell the futures purchased in stage 1 and without buying bottled wine. The set $\Omega 2$ defines realizations where it is best to buy additional futures if there is any money left from the stage 1 investments. The set $\Omega 3$ defines realizations where it is best to sell the futures and buy bottles instead; this set of realizations shows the benefits of the liquidity from purchasing wine futures in stage 1.

It is useful to solve the risk-neutral version of stage 2 before analyzing risk aversion. This is accomplished by relaxing the VaR constraint in (12); we denote its solution as (x_2^0, y_2^0) , where

$$(x_2^0(x_1, y_1, w, m), y_2^0(x_1, y_1, w, m)) = \underset{x_2, y_2}{\operatorname{argmax}} E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, w, m, x_2, y_2, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]$$

s.t. (11), (13), (14).

Then, it can be seen that (x_2^0, y_2^0) is given as follows:

$$(x_2^0, y_2^0) = \begin{cases} (-x_1, 0) & \text{if } (w, m) \in \Omega 1, \\ ((B - x_1 - y_1)/f_2(w, m), 0) & \text{if } (w, m) \in \Omega 2, \\ (-x_1, (B - x_1 - y_1 + f_2(w, m)x_1)/b_2(m)) & \text{if } (w, m) \in \Omega 3. \end{cases} \tag{22}$$

Assuming that the bottled wine is more profitable than holding cash in stage 1,

$$\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^0, y_2^0, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)] / \partial y_1|_{(x_1, y_1)=(0,0)} > 0, \tag{23}$$

the following proposition shows that buying futures is even more profitable. Thus, for any (x_1, y_1) ,

$$\frac{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^0, y_2^0, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]}{\partial x_1} \geq \frac{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^0, y_2^0, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]}{\partial y_1} > 0. \quad (24)$$

Wine futures are advantageous because of the additional flexibility that they offer liquidity—that is, being able to sell futures after observing weather and market random variables, and even swap them for bottles. Thus, a risk-neutral buyer would invest all budget in futures. The expected profit increases (a) in the variation in market fluctuations in all cases and (b) in the variation of weather only when it increases the value from liquidity and swapping. Let us define the following for the risk-averse buyer:

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^+ &= \beta/[1 - f_3(w_H, m_L)]; \\ X_1^V &= [\beta + Z_{b\alpha}B]/([1 - f_2(w_H, m_\tau)][1 + Z_{b\alpha}]), \\ X_1^s &= (\beta - B[1 - b_3(m_L) - Z_{b\alpha}])/[b_3(m_L) + Z_{b\alpha} - f_2(w_H, m_L)], \\ Y_1^V &= [\beta - [1 - f_2(w_H, m_L)]X_1^V]/[1 - b_3(m_L) - Z_{b\alpha}], \text{ and} \\ Y_1^s &= (B[1 - f_2(w_H, m_L)] - \beta)/[b_3(m_L) + Z_{b\alpha} - f_2(w_H, m_L)]. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, let

$$-z_{fa} < \beta/B, \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^0, y_2^0, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]/\partial y_1 \big|_{(x_1, y_1)=(0,0)}}{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^0, y_2^0, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]/\partial x_1 \big|_{(x_1, y_1)=(0,0)}} < \frac{1 - b_3(m_L) - z_{b\alpha}}{1 - f_2(w_H, m_L)}. \quad (26)$$

The values of x_1^+ , x_1^V , and y_1^V are determined at various (w, m) pairs that bind the VaR constraint in (18). The values of x_1^s and y_1^s are obtained when the VaR constraint (18) intersects with the budget constraint (17); note that x_1^s is strictly smaller than x_1^+ when $x_1^+ < B$. Inequality (25) states that investing the entire budget in futures in stage 2 at point (w_τ, m_L) , the point at which the distributor switches to buying additional futures, does not violate the VaR constraint in (12). Inequality (25) is a weaker assumption than (15). Unlike (15), inequality (25) allows the possibility that investing the entire budget in futures in stage 1 can violate the VaR constraint in (18). In sum, the comparison of (25) with (15) reveals that there is greater uncertainty in the randomness in futures prices than that in bottle prices. Inequality (26) states that wine futures is preferred at the worst realizations of weather and market random variables.

It can be shown that it is always optimal to invest in some futures because $x_1^* > 0$ in all conditions. When (25) holds and $(\tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)$ follow a bivariate normal distribution, the optimal solution is as follows:

- a. If $\{x_1^+, x_1^V\} \geq B$, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (B, 0)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$.
- b. If $x_1^V < B \leq x_1^+$, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^V, B - x_1^V)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$.
- c. If $x_1^+ < \{x_1^V, B\}$, then
 - i. if (26) holds, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^+, 0)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$;
 - ii. if (26) does not hold, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^s, y_1^s)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$.
- d. If $x_1^s \leq x_1^V < x_1^+ < B$, then
 - i. if (26) holds, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^V, y_1^V)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$;
 - ii. if (26) does not hold, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^s, y_1^s)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$.
- e. If $x_1^V \leq x_1^s < x_1^+ < B < B$, then $(x_1^*, y_1^*) = (x_1^V, B - x_1^V)$ and $(x_2^*, y_2^*) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$.

Although it is optimal to invest in some futures all the time, it is not necessarily optimal to invest in bottles all the time, as shown in list items a and c(i). The conclusion to always invest in some futures holds true even in the presence of a higher degree of uncertainty in futures and

bottled wine and even if $(\tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)$ do not follow a bivariate normal distribution as specified in (25). When $\phi_w(w)$ follows a symmetric pdf and $(\tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)$ follow a bivariate normal distribution,

$$\frac{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^*, y_2^*, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]}{\partial x_1} \geq \frac{\partial E[\Pi(x_1, y_1, \tilde{w}, \tilde{m}, x_2^*, y_2^*, \tilde{z}_f, \tilde{z}_b)]}{\partial y_1} > 0. \tag{27}$$

In conclusion, the distributors are recommended to invest in wine futures despite the fact that wine futures exhibit a higher degree of risk than purchasing bottled wine.

4.3. Financial Benefits from the Predictive and Prescriptive Models

We next present the financial benefits of the distributor’s model using the Bordeaux châteaux employed in the analysis in Section 2. The evolution of futures prices for the 2010 and 2011 vintages are estimated from vintages 2007, 2008, and 2009. Similarly, the evolution of bottled wine prices for the 2009 and 2011 vintages are estimated from vintages 2006, 2007, and 2008. In May of 2011, the distributor can purchase the futures of the 2010 vintage or bottled wine of the 2009 vintage. At this time point, the distributor knows the actual futures and bottle prices (f_1 and b_1 , respectively) for each winemaker. Similarly, in May of 2012, the distributor can purchase the futures of the 2011 vintage or bottled wine of the 2010 vintage. Using the coefficient estimates from the predictive analytics models, the evolution of futures and bottled wine prices are estimated for September of 2011 and 2012 (i.e., $f_2(w, m)$ and $b_2(m)$) and May of 2012 and 2013 (i.e., $f_3(w, m) + z_f$ and $b_3(m) + z_b$) for given realizations of all four random variables. The analysis here relaxes the earlier assumption that wine futures and bottled wine have equal expected returns as in (19). The distributor’s tolerable loss is designated as 20% of the budget (i.e., $\beta = 0.2B$). Risk aversion is captured at $\alpha \in \{1, 0.20, 0.10\}$; $\alpha = 1$ corresponds to a risk-neutral distributor, whereas $\alpha = 0.20$ and $\alpha = 0.10$ represent low and high risk aversion, respectively. The results are independent of the choice of B , which is set to $B = 10,000$. The term $E[\Pi_1^{j,t}(x_1^*, y_1^*)]$ denotes the optimal profit coming from winemaker j with futures and bottled wine in year t , and $E[\Pi_1^{j,t}(0, y_1^{**})]$ is the expected profit from the current practice of investing only in bottled wine with no investment in futures (i.e., $(x_1, x_2) = (0, 0)$). The financial benefit from the prescriptive model is

$$\Delta^{j,t} (E[\Pi_1^{j,t}(x_1^*, y_1^*)] - E[\Pi_1^{j,t}(0, y_1^{**})]) / E[\Pi_1^{j,t}(0, y_1^{**})]. \tag{28}$$

Table 6 summarizes the financial benefits with the average benefit $\bar{\Delta}^j = (1/2)\Sigma_t(\Delta^{j,t})$ for each winemaker at different levels of risk aversion. The average financial benefit for all châteaux is $\bar{\Delta} = \Sigma_j \bar{\Delta}^j / 35$.

Even the largest risk-neutral distributors would benefit significantly from investing in wine futures. The average expected profit improvement is estimated to be 17.83%, with the largest improvement at 55.74% at Lafleur. The financial benefits increase in the presence of risk aversion: the average profit improvement is 19.46% for low risk aversion and 20.53% for high risk aversion; however, the improvement is not always monotone in risk aversion (see the decrease in La Conseillante as an example).

Let f_1^{jr} denote the estimated realistic price for wine futures, corresponding to the initial release price, for château j from the analysis described in Section 2. Recall that the actual release price f_1^j can be greater than the estimated release price f_1^{jr} ; we argued earlier that these futures contracts are not desirable for the buyer. Among the 35 châteaux and two vintages, 39 of the initial release prices out of 70 futures prices (for vintages 2010 and 2011) are overpriced; this means that the actual release price is greater than the estimated realistic price (i.e., $f_1^j > f_1^{jr}$). For some of these overpriced futures prices, the appreciation over time can still make it an attractive investment especially when f_1^j evolves to f_2^j and f_3^j . For the 39 overpriced futures releases (with $f_1^j > f_1^{jr}$), the average benefit is only 5.24%. The benefit is not equal to zero because some futures contracts continue to appreciate at greater levels over time. Let us now compare this gain with the truly attractive—and underpriced—futures contracts where

Table 6. The average financial benefit to the wine distributor from the model.

Winemaker (g)	Risk neutral (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)	Low risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)	High risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)	Winemaker (g)	Risk neutral (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)	Low risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)	High risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}^j$)
Angélus	4.45	7.40	10.00	Léoville Barton	18.63	18.63	21.58
Ausone	48.33	53.18	54.32	Léoville-Las Cases	28.20	24.78	25.92
Beychevelle	0.00	0.00	0.00	Léoville Poyferré	36.72	23.82	23.39
Calon Ségur	1.88	1.88	1.88	Lynch-Bages	20.97	20.97	20.97
Cheval Blanc	29.71	34.44	36.89	Margaux	31.84	50.52	53.81
Clos Fourtet	38.92	38.96	39.30	Mission Haut-Brion	4.75	12.99	12.62
La Conseillante	10.69	5.95	5.35	Montrose	14.90	14.07	17.98
Cos d'Estournel	36.04	31.53	31.99	Mouton Rothschild	10.93	20.65	22.62
Ducru-Beaucailou	0.00	2.30	4.33	Palmer	0.00	0.00	0.00
Duhart Milon	10.35	8.94	12.74	Pavie	24.46	25.99	28.53
L'Église-Clinet	6.64	21.90	21.71	Pavillon Rouge	5.00	5.00	5.00
L'Évangile	14.48	33.16	34.81	Petit Mouton	3.69	3.69	3.69
Grand-Puy-Lacoste	25.13	26.18	27.41	Pichon Baron	17.06	17.06	17.06
Gruaud-Larose	7.34	7.34	7.34	Pichon Lalande	10.29	5.85	7.49
Haut-Bailly	1.38	1.38	1.38	Pontet-Canet	10.44	10.44	10.44
Haut-Brion	9.91	11.94	14.32	Troplong Mondot	32.24	31.29	31.21
Lafite Rothschild	22.06	43.32	47.28	Vieux Château Certan	21.33	29.73	31.83
Lafleur	55.74	35.73	33.29				
Average		Risk neutral (%) ($\bar{\Delta}$) 17.83		Low risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}$) 19.46		High risk aversion (%) ($\bar{\Delta}$) 20.53	

the release price is below the estimated realistic price (i.e., $f_1^j > f_1^{j^*}$). From the 34 underpriced futures contracts in the sample, the average financial benefit is 33.05%. The analysis confirms our earlier assertion that underpriced futures are substantially more beneficial for the wine distributor than are the overpriced futures. Realistic prices provide valuable insights for the wine distributor's purchasing decisions.

A distributor may hold on to a greater amount of cash under risk aversion. But the presence of futures and its attractiveness with liquidity causes the distributor to increase early spending. In the absence of futures, the firm may hold excess cash (i.e., $y_1^{**} < B/b_1$). When futures are incorporated into the prescriptive model, the firm may invest more in stage 1 (i.e., $f_1 x_1^* + b_1 y_1^* > b_1 y_1^{**}$), which leads to a greater average improvement than that for a risk-neutral distributor where $f_1 x_1^* + b_1 y_1^* = b_1 y_1^{**} = B$. Collectively, it can be concluded that wine futures is increasingly beneficial for risk-averse distributors. Note that the distributor's profit can be further improved by considering a single budget for all châteaux; this adjustment can recommend carrying only a few châteaux. However, this approach is not always desirable for distributors because the business model requires that they carry wine from almost all châteaux.

5. Future Research Directions

Research in wine analytics will continue to contribute to the practice of winemaking and distribution. We offer a list of future research directions where analytical methods would benefit wine enterprises.

5.1. Climate Change

Wine is especially sensitive to climate change. The intensely warmer summers during the growing seasons cause the grapes to ripen faster with higher levels of sugar that converts to a higher level of alcohol. Wines from central California often feature alcohol levels close to 16% in comparison with 13.5% often seen in Bordeaux. Investigating the climate change impact on wine production might require a multifaceted study on the choice of grape varieties that are resistant to hot summer temperatures to adopting better-suited locations for grape growth. One of the consequences of climate change is the frequency of wildfires, such as those that took place in the summers of 2017 and 2019 in northern California (the winemaking capital of the United States) and those in Australia and New Zealand, as well as the spring frosts in Bordeaux. Wildfires are not only detrimental to grapes and vineyards; the smoke can taint the wines that are already aging in barrels. Frosts can be equally detrimental; the frost of 2017 reduced the overall crop yield substantially in Bordeaux.

5.2. Wine Indices

Similar to the Liv-ex 100 index that reflects the consumers' willingness to pay for fine wines in a global context, new indices need to be developed in order to provide information about the local wine markets (e.g., California and Argentina). These new indices should reveal whether a vintage will be a success in a specific geography.

5.3. Digital Transformation

Analytical methods are heavily employed in smart agricultural techniques. Weather forecasts tell winemakers whether there will be precipitation and, thus, whether or not they should irrigate the vineyard. Technological advancements need to be coupled with analytical methods in digital transformation. There is technology that identifies the minerals in the soil; important missing minerals can be supplemented in the irrigation systems for the optimal soil composition necessary for grape growth.

5.4. Tasting Scores

There are various tasting experts, and their scores are demonstrated to be important for the price and quality perceptions. Future research should develop composite tasting scores using machine learning algorithms. These composite scores are likely to improve the predictions in futures prices.

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Endnotes

¹The late President François Mitterrand recognized Robert Parker with the Chevalier de l'Ordre National du Mérite in 1993, and President Chirac awarded Robert Parker with France's Legion of Honor, an extremely rare distinction, in 2005 for his contributions to the quality and education of French wines. The industry perceives Robert Parker as the most influential tasting expert.

²There are a few tasting experts who provide scores out of 20 (e.g., Jancis Robinson).

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