Scalable Optimal Online Auctions

References

• Abraham I , Athey S , Babaioff M , Grubb MD (2020) Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information. Games Econom. Behav. 124:454–477.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abrevaya J , Huang J (2005) On the bootstrap of the maximum score estimator. Econometrica 73(4):1175–1204.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ali SN , Lewis G , Vasserman S (2019). Voluntary disclosure and personalized pricing. NBER Working Paper No. 26592, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Andreyanov P , Caoui E (2020). Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers. Working paper, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.Google Scholar
• Aradillas-López A , Gandhi A , Quint D (2013) Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values. Econometrica 81(2):489–534.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Athey S , Haile PA (2002) Identification of standard auction models. Econometrica 70(6):2107–2140.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Athey S , Haile PA (2007) Nonparametric approaches to auctions. Heckman JJ , Leamer EE , eds. Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 6A (North-Holland ), 3847–3965.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Austin D , Seljan S , Moreno J , Tzeng S (2016) Reserve price optimization at scale. Zaiane OR, Matwin S, eds. Proc. 2016 IEEE Internat. Conf. on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (IEEE, New York), 528–536.Google Scholar
• Backus M , Lewis G (2020). Dynamic demand estimation in auction markets. Working paper, Columbia University, New York.Google Scholar
• Balseiro SR , Besbes O , Weintraub GY (2015) Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges: Approximations and design. Management Sci. 61(4):864–888.Link, Google Scholar
• Bodoh-Creed A , Boehnke J , Hickman B (2021) How efficient are decentralized auction platforms? Rev. Econom. Stud., 88(1):91–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bounie D , Dubus A , Waelbroeck P (2021) Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets. RAND J. Econom., Forthcoming.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J , Klemperer P (1996) Auctions vs. negotiations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(1):180–194.Google Scholar
• Bulow J , Roberts J (1989) The simple economics of optimal auctions. J. Political Econom. 97(5):1060–1090.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai H , Riley J , Ye L (2007) Reserve price signaling. J. Econom. Theory 135(1):253–268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cattaneo MD , Jansson M , Nagasawa K (2020) Bootstrap-based inference for cube root asymptotics. Econometrica 88(5):2203–2219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Celis LE , Lewis G , Mobius M , Nazerzadeh H (2014) Buy-it-now or take-a-chance: Price discrimination through randomization auctions. Management Sci. 60(12):2927–2948.Link, Google Scholar
• Cesa-Bianchi N , Gentile C , Mansour Y (2015) Regret-minimization for reserve prices in second-price auctions. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 61(1):549–564.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chawla S , Hartline J , Nekipelov D (2014). Mechanism design for data science. Preprint, submitted April 23, 2014, https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5971.Google Scholar
• Chetty R (2009) Sufficient statistics for welfare analysis: A bridge between structural and reduced-form methods. Annu. Rev. Econom. 1:451–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Choi H , Mela CF (2019). Display advertising pricing in exchange markets. Working paper, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.Google Scholar
• Coey D , Larsen BJ , Platt B (2020) Discounts and deadlines in consumer search. Amer. Econom. Rev. 110(12):3748–3785.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coey D , Larsen B , Sweeney K (2019) The bidder exclusion effect. RAND J. Econom. 50(1):93–120.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coey D , Larsen B , Sweeney K , Waisman C (2017) Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries. Quant. Econom. 8(1):181–200.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coey D , Larsen B , Sweeney K , Waisman C (2018) The simple empirics of optimal online auctions. NBER Working Paper No. 24698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Google Scholar
• Cole R , Roughgarden T (2014) The sample complexity of revenue maximization. Shmoys D, ed. Proc. 46th Annu. ACM Sympos. on Theory of Computing, (ACM, New York), 243–252.Google Scholar
• Decarolis F , Goldmanis M , Penta A (2020) Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions. Management Sci. 66(10):4433–4454.Link, Google Scholar
• Delgado MA , Rodriguez-Poo JM , Wolf M (2001) Subsampling inference in cube root asymptotics with an application to Manski’s maximum score estimator. Econom. Lett. 73(2):241–250.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Einav L , Farronato C , Levin JD , Sundaresan N (2018) Auctions vs. posted prices in online markets. J. Political Econom. 126(1):178–215.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Freyberger J , Larsen B (2021) Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management. Quant. Econom. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
• Guerre E , Perrigne I , Vuong Q (2000) Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68(3):525–574.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haile PA , Tamer E (2003) Inference with an incomplete model of English auctions. J. Political Econom. 111(1):1–51.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hendricks K , Sorensen A (2018) Dynamics and efficiency in decentralized online auction markets. NBER Working Paper No. 25002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Hernández C , Quint D , Turansick C (2020) Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity. RAND J. Econom. 51(3):868–904.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hong H , Li J (2020) The numerical bootstrap. Ann. Statist. 48(1):397–412.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Horowitz JL (1992) A smoothed maximum score estimator for the binary response model. Econometrica 60(3):505–531.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hortaçsu A , Nielsen ER (2010) Commentary: Do bids equal values on eBay? Marketing Sci. 29(6):994–997.Link, Google Scholar
• Kanoria Y , Nazerzadeh H (2021) Incentive-compatible learning of reserve prices for repeated auctions. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2444495.Google Scholar
• Kehoe PJ , Larsen BJ , Pastorino E (2020). Dynamic competition in the era of big data. Working paper, Stanford University, Standford, CA.Google Scholar
• Kim D-H (2013) Optimal choice of a reserve price under uncertainty. Internat. J. Industrial Organ. 31(5):587–602.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim J , Pollard D (1990) Cube root asymptotics. Ann. Statist. 18(1):191–219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koltchinskii V (2001) Rademacher penalties and structural risk minimization. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 47(5):1902–1914.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koltchinskii V , Panchenko D (2002) Empirical margin distributions and bounding the generalization error of combined classifiers. Ann. Statist. 30(1):1–50.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee SMS , Pun MC (2006) On m out of n bootstrapping for nonstandard M-estimation with nuisance parameters. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 101(475):1185–1197.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin D , Smith JL (1994) Equilibrium in auctions with entry. Amer. Econom. Rev. 84(3):585–599.Google Scholar
• Li T , Perrigne I , Vuong Q (2003) Semiparametric estimation of the optimal reserve price in first-price auctions. J. Bus. Econom. Statist. 21(1):53–64.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luo Y , Xiao R (2020) Identification of auction models using order statistics. Working paper, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.Google Scholar
• Manski CF (1975) Maximum score estimation of the stochastic utility model of choice. J. Econometrics 3(3):205–228.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Manski CF (1985) Semiparametric analysis of discrete response: Asymptotic properties of the maximum score estimator. J. Econometrics 27(3):313–333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mbakop E (2017) Identification of auctions with incomplete bid data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Working paper, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada.Google Scholar
• Milgrom PR , Weber RJ (1982) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50(5):1089–1122.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mohri M , Medina AM (2016) Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve. J. Machine Learning Res. 17:1–25.Google Scholar
• Mohri M , Rostamizadeh A , Talwalkar A (2012) Foundations of Machine Learning (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). Google Scholar
• Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.Link, Google Scholar
• Newey WK , McFadden D (1994) Large sample estimation and hypothesis testing. Engle RF , McFadden DL , eds. Handbook of Econometrics , vol. 4 (North-Holland), 2111–2245.Google Scholar
• Ostrovsky M , Schwarz M (2016) Reserve prices in Internet advertising auctions: A field experiment. Working paper, Stanford University, Standford, CA.Google Scholar
• Platt BC (2017) Inferring ascending auction participation from observed bidders. Internat. J. Industrial Organ. 54:65–88.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pollard D (1989) Asymptotics via empirical processes. Statist. Sci. 4(4):341–354.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prasad K (2008) Price asymptotics. Rev. Econom. Design 12(1):21–32.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Quint D (2017) Common values and low reserve prices. J. Industrial Econ. LXV(2):363–396.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rhuggenaath J , Akcay A , Zhang Y , Kaymak U (2019) Optimizing reserve prices for publishers in online ad auctions. Ishibuchi H, Zhao D, eds. Proc. 2019 IEEE Conf. Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering and Economics (IEEE, New York, NY), 1–8.Google Scholar
• Roughgarden T (2014) Approximately optimal mechanism design: Motivation, examples, and lessons learned. ACM SIGEcom Exchanges 13(2):4–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rudolph MR , Ellis JG , Blei DM (2016) Objective variables for probabilistic revenue maximization in second-price auctions with reserve. Bourdeau J, Hendler JA, Nkambou R, eds. Proc. 25th Internat. Conf. on World Wide Web, Geneva, Switzerland, 1113–1122.Google Scholar
• Samuelson WF (1985) Competitive bidding with entry costs. Econom. Lett. 17(1):53–57.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Segal I (2003) Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):509–529.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Song U (2004) Nonparametric estimation of an eBay auction model with an unknown number of bidders. Working paper, University of British Columbia, British Columbia, Canada.Google Scholar
• Tang X (2011) Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices. RAND J. Econom. 42(1):175–203.Crossref, Google Scholar
• van den Berg GJ (2007) On the uniqueness of optimal prices set by monopolistic sellers. J. Econometrics 141(2):482–491.Crossref, Google Scholar
• van der Vaart AW , Wellner JA (1996) Weak Convergence and Empirical Processes: With Applications to Statistics (Springer, Berlin). Crossref, Google Scholar
• Waisman C (2020) Selling mechanisms for perishable goods: An empirical analysis of an online resale market for event tickets. Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.Google Scholar
• Zeithammer R (2006) Forward-looking bidding in online auctions. J. Marketing Res. 43(3):462–476.Crossref, Google Scholar