Overdiagnosis and Undertesting for Infectious Diseases
References
- (2023) Impact of physician payment scheme on diagnostic effort and testing. Management Sci., ePub ahead of print October 26, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4937.Link, Google Scholar
- (2005) Pricing diagnostic information. Management Sci. 51(7):1092–1100.Link, Google Scholar
- (1963) Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. Amer. Econom. Rev. 53(5):941–973.Google Scholar
- (2020) Some economics of flu pandemics. Chicago Booth Rev. (Summer), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/project/chicago-booth/chicago-booth-review/past-issue-pdfs/20202junelowres.pdf.Google Scholar
- (2012) Implications of the impact of prevalence on test thresholds and outcomes: Lessons from tuberculosis. BMC Res. Notes 5(1):563–569.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2001) Delegating pricing decisions. Marketing Sci. 20(2):143–169.Link, Google Scholar
- (2008) Buyer-initiated vs. seller-initiated information revelation. Management Sci. 54(6):1104–1114.Link, Google Scholar
- (2018) Overdiagnosis: What it is and what it isn’t. BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine 23(1):1–3.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Occurrence and transmission potential of asymptomatic and presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections: A living systematic review and meta-analysis. PLoS Medicine 17(9):e1003346.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Selection of a cutoff value for real-time polymerase chain reaction results to fit a diagnostic purpose: Analytical and epidemiologic approaches. J. Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation 23(1):2–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020) COVID-19 pandemic planning scenarios. Accessed January 31, 2021, http://bit.ly/cdcestimates.Google Scholar
- (2022) Capacitated SIR model with an application to COVID-19. University of Toronto working paper, University of Toronto, Toronto.Google Scholar
- (2020) The COVID-19 pandemic and the $16 trillion virus. JAMA 324(15):1495–1496.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Conspicuous by its absence: Diagnostic expert testing under uncertainty. Marketing Sci. 39(3):540–563.Link, Google Scholar
- Dai T, Akan M, Tayur S (2017) Imaging room and beyond: The underlying economics behind physicians’ test-ordering behavior in outpatient services. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(1):99–113.Google Scholar
- (1973) Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. J. Law Econom. 16(1):67–88.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Informing the public about a pandemic. Management Sci. 27(10):6350–6357.Google Scholar
- Dogan M, Jacquillat A, Yildirim P (2024) Strategic automation and decision-making authority. J. Econom. Management Strategy 33(1):203–246.Google Scholar
- (2013) Using and interpreting diagnostic tests with quantitative results. Doi SAR, Williams GM, eds. Methods of Clinical Epidemiology (Springer, Berlin), 67–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1988) Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship. Econom. Inquiry 26(2):281–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2009) Corruptible advice. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 1(2):220–242.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1985) Disclosure of nonproprietary information. J. Accounting Res. 23(1):123–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) ROC curves—What are they and how are they used? Acute Care Testing (January), https://acutecaretesting.org/en/articles/roc-curves-what-are-they-and-how-are-they-used.Google Scholar
- (1993) Marketing-production joint decision-making. Eliashberg J, Lilien GL, eds. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 827–880.Google Scholar
- (2021) Optimal test allocation. J. Econom. Theory 193(3):105236.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2013) Overdiagnosis and overtreatment in cancer. JAMA 310(8):797–798.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2021) Quantifying population contact patterns in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nature Comm. 12(1):893.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Breakingviews—How U.S. made Covid-19 tests a profitable disaster. Reuters (July 23), https://reut.rs/2Lt0pwb.Google Scholar
- (2007) Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes. RAND J. Econom. 38(2):400–418.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1981) The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. J. Law Econom. 24(3):461–483.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) NBC faces blowback for holding Trump’s town hall opposite Biden’s. New York Times (October 14), https://nyti.ms/31JhHKM.Google Scholar
- (2020) Upstream exploitation and strategic disclosure. Marketing Sci. 39(5):923–938.Link, Google Scholar
- (2022a) The credibility of communication in a pandemic. J. Marketing Res., ePub ahead of print September 10, https://doi.org/10.1177/00222437221128503.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2022b) Lockdown or quarantine: When should mandatory isolation be targeted? Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, New Territories, Hong Kong.Google Scholar
- (2023) “We are the world”: When more equality improves efficiency and antipandemic consumptions are intervened. Marketing Sci. 42(2):214–232.Link, Google Scholar
- (2009) Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction. Marketing Sci. 28(3):488–501.Link, Google Scholar
- (2018) Voluntary product safety certification. Management Sci. 64(2):695–714.Link, Google Scholar
- (2022) Persuasion contest: Disclosing own and rival information. Marketing Sci. 41(4):254–281.Link, Google Scholar
- (2024) Robust combination testing: Methods and application to COVID-19 detection. Management Sci. 70(4):2661–2681.Link, Google Scholar
- (2014) Signaling through pricing by service providers with social preferences. Marketing Sci. 33(5):641–654.Link, Google Scholar
- (1982) Truthful disclosure of information. Bell J. Econom. 13(1):36–44.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1986) Delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce. Marketing Sci. 5(2):159–168.Link, Google Scholar
- (2020) Why Trump’s rapid-testing plan worries scientists: Experts were already divided on the right way to deploy new coronavirus tests. Then the White House barged ahead. Atlantic (October 9), http://bit.ly/rapidcovidtesting.Google Scholar
- (2022) Managing two-dose COVID-19 vaccine rollouts with limited supply: Operations strategies for distributing time-sensitive resources. Production Oper. Management 31(12):4424–4442.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020a) Your coronavirus test is positive. Maybe it shouldn’t be. New York Times (August 29), https://nyti.ms/31Vyv1B.Google Scholar
- (2020b) You’re infected with the coronavirus. But how infected? New York Times (December 29), https://nyti.ms/3bpcaPx.Google Scholar
- (2011) Uninformative advertising as an invitation to search. Marketing Sci. 30(4):666–685.Link, Google Scholar
- (2000) Physician agency. Culyer AJ, Newhouse JP, eds. Handbook of Health Economics, Volume 1, Part A (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 461–536.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1975) Primer on certain elements of medical decision making. New England J. Medicine 293(5):211–215.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1981) Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell J. Econom. 12(2):380–391.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2022) Diagnosing physician error: A machine learning approach to low-value healthcare. Quart. J. Econom. 137(2):679–727.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2018) Information sharing, advice provision, or delegation: What leads to higher trust and trustworthiness? Management Sci. 64(1):474–493.Link, Google Scholar
- (2020) Covid-19 test reports must also state cycle threshold value: Doctors. Times of India (September 6), http://bit.ly/toictvalue.Google Scholar
- (2021) My epic, infuriating quest for a Covid test. Washington Post (December 27), https://wapo.st/3z4l0vy.Google Scholar
- (2009) Applications in clinical microbiology. Logan J, Logan JMJ, Edwards KJ, Saunders NA, eds. Real-Time PCR: Current Technology and Applications (Caister Academic Press, Norfolk, UK), 177–220.Google Scholar
- (2002) Temporal differentiation and the market for second opinions. J. Marketing Res. 39(1):129–136.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) A call for diagnostic tests to report viral load. Science 370(6512):22.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) The lost month: How a failure to test blinded the U.S. to Covid-19. New York Times (March 28), https://nyti.ms/3joYBj5.Google Scholar
- (2020) We’ll see more shortages of diagnostic tests if the FDA has its way. STAT (April 15), http://bit.ly/stat-testing.Google Scholar
- (2017) Competition in corruptible markets. Marketing Sci. 36(3):361–381.Link, Google Scholar
- (2020) Product fit uncertainty and information provision in a distribution channel. Production Oper. Management 29(10):2381–2402.Crossref, Google Scholar
- This Week in Virology (2020) TWiV 641: COVID-19 with Dr. Anthony Fauci. This Week in Virology (July 17), https://www.microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-641/.Google Scholar
- U.S. Census (2019) Historical households tables. October 10. Accessed January 1, 2022, http://bit.ly/censushhsize.Google Scholar
- (1983) Discretionary disclosure. J. Accounting Econom. 5(April):179–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2024) The spillover effect of suspending non-essential surgery: Evidence from kidney transplantation. Johns Hopkins University working paper, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.Google Scholar
- (2011) Overdiagnosed: Making People Sick in the Pursuit of Health (Beacon Press, Boston).Google Scholar
- (1993) Competition in a market for informed experts’ services. RAND J. Econom. 24(3):380–398.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) In coronavirus testing, false positives are more hazardous than they might seem. New York Times (October 25), https://nyti.ms/34zqRf1.Google Scholar
- (2014) Policy and inference: The case of product labeling. MIT Sloan School of Management working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar

