Overdiagnosis and Undertesting for Infectious Diseases

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2022.0038

References

  • Adida E, Dai T (2023) Impact of physician payment scheme on diagnostic effort and testing. Management Sci., ePub ahead of print October 26, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4937.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Arora A, Fosfuri A (2005) Pricing diagnostic information. Management Sci. 51(7):1092–1100.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Arrow KJ (1963) Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. Amer. Econom. Rev. 53(5):941–973.Google Scholar
  • Becker GS (2020) Some economics of flu pandemics. Chicago Booth Rev. (Summer), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/project/chicago-booth/chicago-booth-review/past-issue-pdfs/20202junelowres.pdf.Google Scholar
  • Bentley TG, Catanzaro A, Ganiats TG (2012) Implications of the impact of prevalence on test thresholds and outcomes: Lessons from tuberculosis. BMC Res. Notes 5(1):563–569.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bhardwaj P (2001) Delegating pricing decisions. Marketing Sci. 20(2):143–169.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bhardwaj P, Chen Y, Godes D (2008) Buyer-initiated vs. seller-initiated information revelation. Management Sci. 54(6):1104–1114.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Brodersen J, Schwartz LM, Heneghan C, O’Sullivan JW, Aronson JK, Woloshin S (2018) Overdiagnosis: What it is and what it isn’t. BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine 23(1):1–3.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Buitrago-Garcia D, Egli-Gany D, Counotte MJ, Hossmann S, Imeri H, Ipekci AM, Salanti G, Low N (2020) Occurrence and transmission potential of asymptomatic and presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections: A living systematic review and meta-analysis. PLoS Medicine 17(9):e1003346.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Caraguel CGB, Stryhn H, Gagné N, Dohoo IR, Hammell KL (2011) Selection of a cutoff value for real-time polymerase chain reaction results to fit a diagnostic purpose: Analytical and epidemiologic approaches. J. Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation 23(1):2–15.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020) COVID-19 pandemic planning scenarios. Accessed January 31, 2021, http://bit.ly/cdcestimates.Google Scholar
  • Chen N, Hu M, Zhang C (2022) Capacitated SIR model with an application to COVID-19. University of Toronto working paper, University of Toronto, Toronto.Google Scholar
  • Cutler DM, Summers LH (2020) The COVID-19 pandemic and the $16 trillion virus. JAMA 324(15):1495–1496.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dai T, Singh S (2020) Conspicuous by its absence: Diagnostic expert testing under uncertainty. Marketing Sci. 39(3):540–563.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Dai T, Akan M, Tayur S (2017) Imaging room and beyond: The underlying economics behind physicians’ test-ordering behavior in outpatient services. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(1):99–113.Google Scholar
  • Darby MR, Karni E (1973) Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. J. Law Econom. 16(1):67–88.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • de Véricourt F, Gurkan H, Wang S (2020) Informing the public about a pandemic. Management Sci. 27(10):6350–6357.Google Scholar
  • Dogan M, Jacquillat A, Yildirim P (2024) Strategic automation and decision-making authority. J. Econom. Management Strategy 33(1):203–246.Google Scholar
  • Doi SAR (2013) Using and interpreting diagnostic tests with quantitative results. Doi SAR, Williams GM, eds. Methods of Clinical Epidemiology (Springer, Berlin), 67–78.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dranove D (1988) Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship. Econom. Inquiry 26(2):281–298.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Durbin E, Iyer G (2009) Corruptible advice. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 1(2):220–242.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dye RA (1985) Disclosure of nonproprietary information. J. Accounting Res. 23(1):123–145.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ekelund S (2011) ROC curves—What are they and how are they used? Acute Care Testing (January), https://acutecaretesting.org/en/articles/roc-curves-what-are-they-and-how-are-they-used.Google Scholar
  • Eliashberg J, Steinberg R (1993) Marketing-production joint decision-making. Eliashberg J, Lilien GL, eds. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 827–880.Google Scholar
  • Ely J, Galeotti A, Jann O, Steiner J (2021) Optimal test allocation. J. Econom. Theory 193(3):105236.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Esserman LJ, Thompson IM, Reid B (2013) Overdiagnosis and overtreatment in cancer. JAMA 310(8):797–798.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Feehan DM, Mahmud AS (2021) Quantifying population contact patterns in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nature Comm. 12(1):893.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Foley J (2020) Breakingviews—How U.S. made Covid-19 tests a profitable disaster. Reuters (July 23), https://reut.rs/2Lt0pwb.Google Scholar
  • Gal-Or E, Gal-Or M, Dukes A (2007) Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes. RAND J. Econom. 38(2):400–418.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Grossman SJ (1981) The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. J. Law Econom. 24(3):461–483.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Grynbaum MM (2020) NBC faces blowback for holding Trump’s town hall opposite Biden’s. New York Times (October 14), https://nyti.ms/31JhHKM.Google Scholar
  • Guo L (2020) Upstream exploitation and strategic disclosure. Marketing Sci. 39(5):923–938.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Guo L (2022a) The credibility of communication in a pandemic. J. Marketing Res., ePub ahead of print September 10, https://doi.org/10.1177/00222437221128503.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Guo L (2022b) Lockdown or quarantine: When should mandatory isolation be targeted? Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, New Territories, Hong Kong.Google Scholar
  • Guo L, Xu W (2023) “We are the world”: When more equality improves efficiency and antipandemic consumptions are intervened. Marketing Sci. 42(2):214–232.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Guo L, Zhao Y (2009) Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction. Marketing Sci. 28(3):488–501.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Iyer G, Singh S (2018) Voluntary product safety certification. Management Sci. 64(2):695–714.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Iyer G, Singh S (2022) Persuasion contest: Disclosing own and rival information. Marketing Sci. 41(4):254–281.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Jain S, Jónasson JO, Pauphilet J, Ramdas K (2024) Robust combination testing: Methods and application to COVID-19 detection. Management Sci. 70(4):2661–2681.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Jiang B, Ni J, Srinivasan K (2014) Signaling through pricing by service providers with social preferences. Marketing Sci. 33(5):641–654.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Jovanovic B (1982) Truthful disclosure of information. Bell J. Econom. 13(1):36–44.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lal R (1986) Delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce. Marketing Sci. 5(2):159–168.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Madrigal AC, Meyer R (2020) Why Trump’s rapid-testing plan worries scientists: Experts were already divided on the right way to deploy new coronavirus tests. Then the White House barged ahead. Atlantic (October 9), http://bit.ly/rapidcovidtesting.Google Scholar
  • Mak H, Dai T, Tang CS (2022) Managing two-dose COVID-19 vaccine rollouts with limited supply: Operations strategies for distributing time-sensitive resources. Production Oper. Management 31(12):4424–4442.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mandavilli A (2020a) Your coronavirus test is positive. Maybe it shouldn’t be. New York Times (August 29), https://nyti.ms/31Vyv1B.Google Scholar
  • Mandavilli A (2020b) You’re infected with the coronavirus. But how infected? New York Times (December 29), https://nyti.ms/3bpcaPx.Google Scholar
  • Mayzlin D, Shin J (2011) Uninformative advertising as an invitation to search. Marketing Sci. 30(4):666–685.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • McGuire TG (2000) Physician agency. Culyer AJ, Newhouse JP, eds. Handbook of Health Economics, Volume 1, Part A (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 461–536.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • McNeil BJ, Keeler E, Adelstein SJ (1975) Primer on certain elements of medical decision making. New England J. Medicine 293(5):211–215.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Milgrom PR (1981) Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell J. Econom. 12(2):380–391.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mullainathan S, Obermeyer Z (2022) Diagnosing physician error: A machine learning approach to low-value healthcare. Quart. J. Econom. 137(2):679–727.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Özer Ö, Subramanian U, Wang Y (2018) Information sharing, advice provision, or delegation: What leads to higher trust and trustworthiness? Management Sci. 64(1):474–493.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Rao S (2020) Covid-19 test reports must also state cycle threshold value: Doctors. Times of India (September 6), http://bit.ly/toictvalue.Google Scholar
  • Rosenthal E (2021) My epic, infuriating quest for a Covid test. Washington Post (December 27), https://wapo.st/3z4l0vy.Google Scholar
  • Salis AD (2009) Applications in clinical microbiology. Logan J, Logan JMJ, Edwards KJ, Saunders NA, eds. Real-Time PCR: Current Technology and Applications (Caister Academic Press, Norfolk, UK), 177–220.Google Scholar
  • Sarvary M (2002) Temporal differentiation and the market for second opinions. J. Marketing Res. 39(1):129–136.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Service RF (2020) A call for diagnostic tests to report viral load. Science 370(6512):22.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shear MD, Goodnough A, Kaplan S, Fink S, Thomas K, Weiland N (2020) The lost month: How a failure to test blinded the U.S. to Covid-19. New York Times (March 28), https://nyti.ms/3joYBj5.Google Scholar
  • Shirts BH (2020) We’ll see more shortages of diagnostic tests if the FDA has its way. STAT (April 15), http://bit.ly/stat-testing.Google Scholar
  • Singh S (2017) Competition in corruptible markets. Marketing Sci. 36(3):361–381.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Sun M, Tyagi RK (2020) Product fit uncertainty and information provision in a distribution channel. Production Oper. Management 29(10):2381–2402.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • This Week in Virology (2020) TWiV 641: COVID-19 with Dr. Anthony Fauci. This Week in Virology (July 17), https://www.microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-641/.Google Scholar
  • U.S. Census (2019) Historical households tables. October 10. Accessed January 1, 2022, http://bit.ly/censushhsize.Google Scholar
  • Verrecchia RE (1983) Discretionary disclosure. J. Accounting Econom. 5(April):179–194.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Wang G, Zhang M, Dai T (2024) The spillover effect of suspending non-essential surgery: Evidence from kidney transplantation. Johns Hopkins University working paper, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.Google Scholar
  • Welch HG, Schwartz L, Woloshin S (2011) Overdiagnosed: Making People Sick in the Pursuit of Health (Beacon Press, Boston).Google Scholar
  • Wolinsky A (1993) Competition in a market for informed experts’ services. RAND J. Econom. 24(3):380–398.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Wu KJ (2020) In coronavirus testing, false positives are more hazardous than they might seem. New York Times (October 25), https://nyti.ms/34zqRf1.Google Scholar
  • Zhang J (2014) Policy and inference: The case of product labeling. MIT Sloan School of Management working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.