Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning

References

• Alizamir S, de Vericourt F, Wang S (2018) Warning against recurring risks: An information design approach. Working paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT.Google Scholar
• Allon G, Bassamboo A (2011) Buying from the babbling retailer? The impact of availability information on customer behavior. Management Sci. 57(4):713–726.Link, Google Scholar
• Allon G, Bassamboo A, Gurvich I (2011) We will be right with you: Managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk. Oper. Res. 59(6):1382–1394.Link, Google Scholar
• Allon G, Bassamboo A, Randhawa RS (2012) Price as a signal of product availability: Is it cheap? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
• Alonso R, Câmara O (2016) Persuading voters. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(11):3590–3605.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aviv Y, Pazgal A (2008) Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of forward-looking consumers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 10(3):339–359.Link, Google Scholar
• Aydinliyim T, Pangburn MS, Rabinovich E (2017) Inventory disclosure in online retailing. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 261(1):195–204.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Morris S (2017) Information design: A unified perspective. CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.Google Scholar
• Besanko D, Winston WL (1990) Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers. Management Sci. 36(5):555–567.Link, Google Scholar
• Blinder A, Canetti ERD, Lebow DE, Rudd JB (1998) Asking About Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness (Russell Sage Foundation, New York).Google Scholar
• Candogan O, Drakopoulos K (2020) Optimal signaling of content accuracy: Engagement vs. misinformation. Oper. Res. 68(2):497–515.Google Scholar
• Coase RH (1972) Durability and monopoly. J. Law Econom. 15(1):143–149.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cui R, Shin H (2018) Sharing aggregate inventory information with customers: Strategic cross-selling and shortage reduction. Management Sci. 64(1):381–400.Link, Google Scholar
• Dasu S, Tong C (2010) Dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic: Analysis of posted and contingent pricing schemes. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 204(3):662–671.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamenica E, Gentzkow M (2011) Bayesian persuasion. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(6):2590–2615.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kremer I, Mansour Y, Perry M (2014) Implementing the “wisdom of the crowd.” J. Political Econom. 122(5):988–1012.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lingenbrink D, Iyer K (2018) Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals. Working paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.Google Scholar
• Lingenbrink D, Iyer K (2019) Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues with strategic customers. Oper. Res. 67(5):1397–1416.Google Scholar
• Liu Q, van Ryzin GJ (2008) Strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases. Management Sci. 54(6):1115–1131.Link, Google Scholar
• Mehta N, Agashe A, Detroja P (2017) Swipe to Unlock: The Non-Coder’s Guide to Technology and the Business Strategy Behind It (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Scotts Valley, CA).Google Scholar
• Papanastasiou Y, Bimpikis K, Savva N (2018) Crowdsourcing exploration. Management Sci. 64(4):1727–1746.Link, Google Scholar
• Rayo L, Segal I (2010) Optimal information disclosure. J. Political Econom. 118(5):949–987.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shen Z-JM, Su X (2007) Customer behavior modeling in revenue management and auctions: A review and new research opportunities. Production Oper. Management 16(6):713–728.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spence M (1973) Job market signaling. Quart. J. Econom. 87(3):355–374.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stokey NL (1979) Intertemporal price discrimination. Quart. J. Econom. 93(3):355–371.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Veeraraghavan S, Debo L (2009) Joining longer queues: Information externalities in queue choice. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 11(4):543–562.Link, Google Scholar
• Yu M, Ahn H-S, Kapuscinski R (2014) Rationing capacity in advance selling to signal quality. Management Sci. 61(3):560–577.Link, Google Scholar