The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2009) Strategy-proofness vs. efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(5):1954–1978.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE, Sönmez T (2005) The Boston public school match. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(2):368–371.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Che Y-K, Pathak PA, Roth AE, Tercieux O (2017) Minimizing justified envy in school choice: The design of New Orleans’ OneApp. NBER Working Paper 23265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Antler Y (2015) Two-sided matching with endogenous preferences. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 7(3):241–258.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Antler Y (2018) No one likes to be second choice. Econom. J. (London) 129(619):1119–1138.Google Scholar
• Arslan HA (2018) Preference estimation in centralized college admissions from reported lists. Preprint, submitted March 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126391.Google Scholar
• Artemov G, Che Y-K, He Y (2017) Strategic “mistakes”: Implications for market design research. Working paper, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Gonczarowski YA (2018) Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof. J. Econom. Theory 177:405–425.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Braverman M, Hassidim A (2014) Stability in large matching markets with complementarities. Oper. Res. 62(4):713–732.Link, Google Scholar
• Attiyeh G, Franciosi R, Isaac RM (2000) Experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods. Public Choice 102(1–2):93–112.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Azevedo EM, Budish E (2018) Strategy-proofness in the large. Rev. Econom. Stud. 86(1):81–116.Google Scholar
• Basteck C, Mantovani M (2018) Cognitive ability and games of school choice. Games Econom. Behav. 109:156–183.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2011) Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets. Quart. J. Econom. 126(2):805–855.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benjamin DJ, Brown SA, Shapiro JM (2013) Who is ‘behavioral’? Cognitive ability and anomalous preferences. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(6):1231–1255.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bettinger EP, Long BT, Oreopoulos P, Sanbonmatsu L (2012) The role of application assistance and information in college decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA experiment. Quart. J. Econom. 127(3):1205–1242.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Biró P (2007) Higher education admission in Hungary by a score-limit algorithm. Working paper, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.Google Scholar
• Bó I, Hakimov R (2020) Iterative vs. standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence. Econom. J. (London) 130(626):356–392.Google Scholar
• Braun S, Dwenger N, Kübler D, Westkamp A (2014) Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis. Games Econom. Behav. 85:232–251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Budish E, Cantillon E (2012) The multi-unit assignment problem: Theory and evidence from course allocation at Harvard. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(5):2237–2271.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Budish E, Kessler JB (2017) Can agents “report their types”? An experiment that changed the course allocation mechanism at Wharton. Chicago Booth Research Paper 15-08, University of Chicago, Chicago.Google Scholar
• Calsamiglia C, Haeringer G, Klijn F (2010) Constrained school choice: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(4):1860–1874.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cason TN, Plott CR (2014) Misconceptions and game form recognition: Challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing. J. Political Econom. 122(6):1235–1270.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cason TN, Saijo T, Sjöström T, Yamato T (2006) Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? Games Econom. Behav. 57(2):206–235.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Che Y-K, Tercieux O (2019) Efficiency and stability in large matching markets. J. Political Econom. 127(5):2301–2342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen L, Pereyra JS (2019) Self-selection in school choice. Games Econom. Behav. 117:59–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Kesten O (2019) Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study. Games Econom. Behav. 115:83–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Sönmez T (2006) School choice: An experimental study. J. Econom. Theory 127(1):202–231.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ding T, Schotter A (2016) Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. Games Econom. Behav. 103:94–115.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ding T, Schotter A (2019) Learning and mechanism design: An experimental test of school matching mechanisms with intergenerational advice. Econom. J. (London) 129(623):2779–2804.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dreyfuss B, Heffetz O, Rabin M (2019) Dominated choices or loss-averse choosers? (Sub)optimal behavior in truthful mechanisms and expectations-based reference dependence. Working paper, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.Google Scholar
• Dubins LE, Freedman DA (1981) Machiavelli and the Gale–Shapley algorithm. Amer. Math. Monthly 88(7):485–494.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dur U, Kominers SD, Pathak PA, Sönmez T (2018) Reserve design: Unintended consequences and the demise of Boston’s walk zones. J. Political Econom. 126(6):2457–2479.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dwenger N, Kübler D, Weizsäcker G (2018) Flipping a coin: Evidence from university applications. J. Public Econom. 167:240–250.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Echenique F, Wilson AJ, Yariv L (2016) Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study. Quant. Econom. 7(2):449–482.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fack G, Grenet J, He Y (2019) Beyond truth-telling: Preference estimation with centralized school choice and college admissions. Amer. Econom. Rev. 109(4):1486–1529.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Featherstone CR, Niederle M (2016) Boston vs. deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation. Games Econom. Behav. 100:353–375.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guillen P, Hakimov R (2017) Not quite the best response: Truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others. Experiment. Econom. 20(3):670–686.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guillen P, Hing A (2014) Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism. Eur. Econom. Rev. 70:178–185.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hällsten M (2010) The structure of educational decision making and consequences for inequality: A Swedish test case. Amer. J. Sociol. 116(3):806–854.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2016) “Strategic” behavior in a strategy-proof environment. Proc. 2016 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 763–764.Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2017a) Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master’s Match. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(5):205–209.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Déborah M, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2017b) The mechanism is truthful, why aren’t you? Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(5):220–224.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hastings JS, Weinstein JM (2008) Information, school choice, and academic achievement: Evidence from two experiments. Quart. J. Econom. 123(4):1373–1414.Crossref, Google Scholar
• He Y (2015) Gaming the Boston school choice mechanism in Beijing. Working Paper 12-345, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France.Google Scholar
• He Y, Magnac T (2017) A Pigouvian approach to congestion in matching markets. Working Paper 17-870, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France.Google Scholar
• Kagel JH, Harstad RM, Levin D (1987) Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica 55(6):1275–1304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamada Y, Kojima F (2018) Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition. Theoret. Econom. 13(2):761–793.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kapor A, Neilson C, Zimmerman S (2016) Heterogeneous beliefs and school choice. Working Paper 612, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar
• Kőszegi B (2006) Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 4(4):673–707.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leyton-Brown K, Milgrom P, Segal I (2017) Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 114(28):7202–7209.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li S (2017) Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(11):3257–3287.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McFadden D (2009) The human side of mechanism design: A tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Rev. Econom. Design 13(1–2):77–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pais J, Pintér Á (2008) School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. Games Econom. Behav. 64(1):303–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pais J, Pintér Á, Veszteg RF (2011) College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study. Internat. Econom. Rev. 52(3):713–737.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pallais A (2015) Small differences that matter: Mistakes in applying to college. J. Labor Econom. 33(2):493–520.Google Scholar
• Peranson J (2019) Design and implementation of the genetic counseling admissions match. Proc. 5th Internat. Workshop Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2019), Monte Verità, Ascona, Switzerland.Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A (2017a) Mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm: Implications for positive assortative matching. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(5):225–229.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A (2017b) Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match. Games Econom. Behav. 108:317–330.Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Skowronek S (2018) An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 115(45):11471–11476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth AE (1982) The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. Oper. Res. 7(4):617–628.Google Scholar
• Roth AE, Xing X (1997) Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists. J. Political Econom. 105(2):284–329.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Saijo T, Sjöström T, Yamato T (2007) Secure implementation. Theoret. Econom. 2(3):203–229.Google Scholar
• Shapley L, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econom. 1(1):23–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shorrer RI, Sóvágó S (2017) Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college-admissions environment. Preprint, submitted November 13, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068672.Google Scholar
• Sönmez T (2013) Bidding for army career specialties: Improving the ROTC branching mechanism. J. Political Econom. 121(1):186–219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thaler RH, Sunstein CR (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).Google Scholar
• Zhu M (2015) Experience transmission: Truth-telling adoption in matching. Preprint, submitted July 20, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631442.Google Scholar