

A Additional Studies

A.1 Study 1a: An Online Experiment

Study 1a involves data from 200 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in February 2016 who made a series of binary decisions between money for Make-A-Wish foundation state chapters and/or money for themselves.³⁵ In addition to receiving a \$3 completion fee, participants knew that one of their decisions would be randomly selected to count for payment. Relative to the Study 1, participants in Study 1a faced simplified decisions to draw greater attention to the performance metrics and to mitigate other potential concerns detailed below. Cognitive dissonance from exploiting excuses — that may arise from participants’ altering how they respond to performance metrics according to whether their own money is at stake — may therefore be greater in Study 1a than Study 1. In addition to serving as a replication check on a larger sample, Study 1a serves as a plausibly more conservative test of excuse-driven behavior. The design and results for Study 1a are detailed below (and see Appendix B.2 for instructions and screenshots).

First, to limit noise that is introduced when comparing performance metrics across charities and to draw greater attention to the performance metrics, each participant makes decisions involving five Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapters, which aside from their performance metrics, are indistinguishable from each other. That is, participants only learn about the performance metric for a particular state chapter, not the actual state involved.

Second, to help minimize the ambiguity about the interpretation of the performance metrics themselves, participants are presented with performance metrics that are measurable across different types of charities. In particular, participants are randomly assigned to either learn the program expense rates or the “overall scores” for the state chapters. The five program expense rates involved in this study are described via the following ranges: 85% or better, 80 - 84%, 75 - 79%, 70 - 74%, and 65 - 69%. The five overall scores – which indicate the financial health, accountability and transparency of the state chapters – are described via the following ranges: 95% or better, 90 - 94%, 85 - 89%, 80 - 84%, and 75 - 79%.³⁶

Third, to facilitate comparisons between money for oneself and money for charity, the normalization procedure is used to determine “tokens” that allow for decisions to be made in similar units in both the charity-charity treatment and the charity-self treatment. To begin, on each row of a normalization price list, participants choose between (i) 200 cents for the top-rated charity and (ii) some amount for themselves that increases by 10 cents from 0 to 200 cents as they proceed down the twenty-one rows of the price list (the charity t notation is dropped since a participant only evaluates one charity type).³⁷ The amounts at which they switch to choosing

³⁵Study 1a was advertised as a 20-minute study, and the median completion time was 12.1 minutes.

³⁶See <http://www.charitynavigator.org> for information on how overall scores are calculated.

³⁷While the normalization price list in Study 1 holds the amount of money for the participants constant, instead holding the amount of money for the top-rated charity constant in Study 1a helps to prevent censored valuations.

money for themselves imply Y values such that participants are indifferent between 200 cents for the top-rated charity and Y cents for themselves. Their Y values, unbeknownst to participants, determine the stakes involved in the subsequent “valuation” price lists.³⁸ In particular, the tokens involved in the valuation price lists are such that any token for a charity yields 2 cents for that charity and any token for a participant yields $\frac{Y}{100}$ cents for that participant.

Participants complete the valuation price lists in two treatments — the charity-charity treatment and the charity-self treatment — for each low-rated (i.e., 2nd-rated, 3rd-rated, 4th-rated, or 5th-rated) charity. The order of the treatments are randomly determined. In the charity-charity treatment, participants choose between (i) 100 tokens for a low-rated charity and (ii) some amount of tokens for the top-rated charity that increases by 5 tokens from 0 to 100 as participants proceed down the twenty-one rows of a valuation price list. In the charity-self treatment, participants choose between (i) 100 tokens for a low-rated charity and (ii) some amount of tokens for themselves that increases by 5 tokens from 0 to 100 as participants proceed down the twenty-one rows of a valuation price list. Given participants are indifferent between 200 cents for the top-rated charity and Y cents for themselves, the row at which they switch from (i) to (ii) should be the same in both treatments if they are not excuse-driven.³⁹ If participants are excuse-driven, however, they may switch more quickly to (ii) in the charity-self treatment to choose tokens that benefit themselves more often, resulting in lower valuations in the charity-self treatment than in the charity-charity treatment.

Before turning to participants’ valuations of the lower-rated charities, a few notes on the results from the normalization price list are useful. To begin, note that 5% of participants never switch between money for the top-rated charity and money for themselves and thus have “censored” Y values, which are assumed to equal 200 cents if they always choose money for the charity or 10 cents if they always choose money for themselves. In all other cases, Y values are easily inferred by the unique amounts at which participants switch from choosing 200 cents for themselves to Y cents for the top-rated charity.⁴⁰ When these non-censored Y values are translated into self-to-charity-exchange rates (SCXR), the average SCXR of 8.33 implies participants are on

³⁸As in Study 1, participants in Study 1a are aware that there will be subsequent price lists when making their decisions in the normalization price lists but details of any given price list are only revealed as one progresses throughout the study. There is no evidence that participants expected their decisions in the normalization price list to subsequently influence the amounts in the valuation price lists. Less than 5% of participants make decisions that yield the highest Y value and thus highest amount available for themselves in later valuation price lists. Moreover, our results are robust to the exclusion of participants with censored Y values (Column 1 - 5 of Table A.1) and to the inclusion of participants with censored Y values (Column 6 of Table A.1).

³⁹As in Study 1, this assumes linearity in money, which is made more reasonable by the small stakes involved.

⁴⁰That is, unlike in Study 1 where participants could have multiple switch points, the experimental platform in Study 1a forces participants to only have one switch point on the normalization price list (and later valuation price lists). Also, to bias against finding evidence of excuse-driven behavior, the lower bounds of the indifference ranges implied by normalization price list switch points are chosen (when non-zero) so that participants weakly prefer 200 cents for the top-rated charity over Y cents for themselves. For the 23% of participants with implied indifference ranges from 0-10 cents, the upper bound of 10 cents is instead chosen.

average indifferent between Y cents for themselves and $Y \times 8.33$ cents for the top-rated charity.⁴¹ While the main analysis will focus on decisions involving non-censored Y values, subsequent analyses confirm the robustness to also including decisions that involve censored Y values.

Table A.1 presents the results from OLS regressions of the valuations for low-rated charities on whether the valuation occurs in the charity-self treatment.⁴² If, as in Study 1, participants use performance metrics as an excuse not to give, valuations should be lower in the charity-self treatment than in the charity-charity treatment. Column 1 of Table A.1 confirms that this is the case: the average valuation significantly drops by 6 percentage points if it is elicited in the charity-self treatment than if it is elicited in the charity-charity treatment.

As similarly seen in Study 1, excuse-driven responses to charity performance metrics are: robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects (Column 2), more likely among individuals who are more selfish and thus have higher self-to-charity-exchange rates (Column 3), not significantly different according to the type of performance metric involved (Column 5), and robust to the inclusion of the participants with censored Y values (Column 6).⁴³

However, unlike in Study 1, Column 4 shows that significant ordering effects emerge in Study 1a. To begin, consider the participants who first complete valuation price lists in the charity-self treatment (captured by the indicator, $order(cs,cc)$). The sum of coefficients on $charity-self$ and $charity-self*order(cs,cc)$ implies that their valuations of low-rated charities are not significantly different across the two treatments.⁴⁴ After first evaluating low-rated charities when self-serving motives are relevant in the charity-self treatment, they subsequently evaluate low-rated charities in a similar manner when self-serving motives are no longer relevant in the charity-charity treatment. Consistent with a desire to avoid cognitive dissonance from altering how they evaluate low-rated charities across treatments, the negative coefficient on $order(cs,cc)$ suggests that they achieve this similarity by engaging in more negative evaluations of low-rated charities in the charity-charity treatment to match how they previously evaluated low-rated charities in the charity-self treatment.

A different pattern of behavior emerges among participants who first complete the charity-charity treatment. After evaluating low-rated charities when self-serving motives are not relevant in the charity-charity treatment, they subsequently respond more negatively to low performance metrics when self-serving motives are relevant in the charity-self treatment: their valuations

⁴¹The average SCXR of 8.64 among participants viewing program expense rates is not significantly different than the average SCXR of 8.01 among participants viewing overall scores ($p = 0.57$). Also, note that the notably larger SCXR in Study 1a than in Study 1 likely reflects the normalization price list procedure in Study 1a allowing SCXRs to range from 0 to 20 while the SCXRs could only range from 0 to 4 in Study 1.

⁴²Valuations are considered in terms of token-valuations, which are equivalent to percentage point changes in valuations. These valuations are set to equal the midpoint of implied ranges, or if needed because of censoring, to equal the lowest censored valuation of 0 tokens or the highest censored valuation of 100 tokens.

⁴³The results in Columns 1 - 6 are robust to instead considering Tobit regressions.

⁴⁴The sum of the coefficients on $charity-self$ and $charity-self*order(cs,cc)$ is not significantly different than zero ($p = 0.57$)

Table A.1: Ordinary least squares regressions of valuations for low-rated charities in Study 1a

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>charity-self</i>	-5.62**	-5.62**	-5.62**	-13.19***	-12.10***	-9.76***
	(2.29)	(2.44)	(2.24)	(2.82)	(3.45)	(3.72)
$(SCXR - \overline{SCXR})$			-0.75**	-0.76**	-0.74**	-0.75**
			(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)
<i>charity-self</i>			-0.85**	-0.83**	-0.84**	-1.04***
$*(SCXR - \overline{SCXR})$			(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)
<i>order(cs,cc)</i>				-8.49**	-8.86**	-8.44**
				(4.13)	(4.11)	(4.02)
<i>charity-self</i>				15.05***	15.21***	14.27***
$*order(cs,cc)$				(4.33)	(4.35)	(4.35)
<i>overall score</i>					5.41	5.51
					(4.12)	(4.03)
<i>charity-self</i>					-2.37	-4.37
$*overall score$					(4.34)	(4.35)
Constant	36.68***	17.97***	36.68***	40.95***	38.47***	38.53***
	(2.23)	(1.50)	(2.22)	(2.85)	(3.44)	(3.41)
Rating FEs	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Ind FEs	no	yes	no	no	no	no
Censored Y	no	no	no	no	no	yes
N	1512	1512	1512	1512	1512	1600

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. The above presents OLS regression results of valuations of a lower-rated charity receiving 200 cents. Valuations are in tokens, where each token for a charity yields 2 cents and each token for a participant yields $\frac{Y}{100}$ cents. *charity-self* is an indicator for valuations elicited in the charity-self treatment. $(SCXR - \overline{SCXR})$ is an individual's self-to-charity-exchange rate minus the average self-to-charity-exchange rate. *order(cs,cc)* is an indicator for individuals who first complete valuation price lists in the charity-self treatment. *overall score* is an indicator for participants' decisions involving overall scores instead of program expense rates of Make-A-Wish foundation state chapters. "Rating FEs" and "Ind FEs" indicate whether charity rating fixed effects and individual fixed effects are included, respectively. "Censored Y" indicates whether individuals with censored Y values are included. When individuals with censored Y values are not included, the data include valuations from 189 participants. When individuals with censored Y values are included, the data include valuations from 200 participants.

significantly fall by 13 percentage points as shown by the coefficient estimate on *charity-self*. Cognitive dissonance that may arise from altering how one evaluates low-rated charities is not sufficient to prevent excuse-driven behavior. Thus, there is only evidence for participants adjusting their valuations in a manner consistent with limiting cognitive dissonance when doing so is costless to them.

A.2 Study 1b: An Online Experiment with A Policy Test

Study 1 and Study 1a document excuse-driven responses to charity performance metrics. These studies show that the extent to which individuals respond negatively to performance metrics

need not be indicative of how much they value performance metrics; it may instead be indicative of excuse-driven behavior. However, the use of performance metrics as an excuse not to give need not imply reduced overall giving. When individuals have the opportunity not only to give to lower-rated charities — but also to give to higher-rated charities — excuse-driven responses to performance metrics may not persist or may result in simply a shift towards more money being given to higher-rated charities. Study 1b investigates this possibility by collecting decisions from an additional 201 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in April 2016.⁴⁵ In addition to receiving a \$3 completion fee, these participants knew that one of their decisions would be randomly selected to count for payments. The design and results for Study 1b are detailed below (and see Appendix B.3 for instructions and screenshots).

The design for the control group in Study 1b replicates Study 1a’s design with one minor exception: the order of treatments does not vary. All participants first complete price lists in the charity-charity treatment and then in the charity-self treatment. The design for the reallocation group only differs from the control group in that, if participants choose for any money to be given to low-rated charities in the charity-self treatment, they can choose to redirect this money to the top-rated charity by completing an effort task. Successfully completing the effort task involves correctly counting the number of 0s that are in a series of 400 numbers.⁴⁶ This effort task is meant to mimic the scenario where individuals have to exert some effort or pay some search costs in order to find a more effective charity when they are asked to give by a particular charity.

Using performance metrics as an excuse not to give may be more difficult for participants in the reallocation group regardless of whether they intend to complete the effort task. Participants who intend to complete the effort task may view their charitable giving decisions in the charity-self treatment as only involving the top-rated charities. Participants who do not intend to complete the effort task may find it difficult to simultaneously believe that (i) it is not worthwhile to put forth effort to redirect money from a low-rated charity to the top-rated charity and (ii) low performance metrics serve as good excuses not to give.

Table A.2 presents results from several OLS regressions of the valuations for low-rated charities. Column 1 confirms excuse-driven responses to performance metrics persist in the control group: the average valuation significantly drops by 14 percentage points if it is elicited in the charity-self treatment instead of the charity-charity treatment. Similar results are observed when

⁴⁵Study 1b was advertised as a 20-minute study, and the median completion time was 15.8 minutes.

⁴⁶In [Exley and Terry \(Forthcoming\)](#), participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk are presented with an opportunity to earn money for charity by counting the number of 0s in a series of 0s and 1s. The 50th percentile of effort involved counting through 173 numbers (11.5 “tables” in that study where each table involved 15 numbers), the 75th percentile of effort involved counting through 375 numbers, and the 90th percentile effort involved counting through 788 numbers. In light of this data, the effort task in this study required participants to count through 400 numbers because it seemed correspondingly non-trivial but reasonable. It is possible that an easier effort task could better mitigate excuse-driven behavior.

Table A.2: Ordinary least squares regressions of valuations for lower-rated charities in Study 1b

	1	2	3	4
<i>charity-self</i>	-14.12*** (3.16)	-14.34*** (2.99)	-10.40*** (3.50)	-10.30*** (3.49)
<i>reallocation group</i>	2.69 (3.99)	2.87 (3.96)	2.05 (3.90)	0.99 (3.85)
<i>charity-self</i> * <i>reallocation group</i> ($SCXR - \overline{SCXR}$)	2.84 (4.66)	3.29 (4.40)	4.15 (4.37)	5.77 (4.25)
<i>charity-self</i> *($SCXR - \overline{SCXR}$)		-0.52* (0.29)	-0.54* (0.29)	-0.64** (0.28)
<i>overall score</i>		-1.34*** (0.31)	-1.33*** (0.31)	-1.50*** (0.29)
<i>charity-self</i> * <i>overall score</i>			8.66** (3.91)	9.11** (3.88)
Constant	38.57*** (2.79)	38.48*** (2.78)	34.69*** (3.20)	35.97*** (3.18)
Rating FEs	yes	yes	yes	yes
Censored Y	no	no	no	yes
N	1504	1504	1504	1608

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. The above presents OLS regression results of valuations of the P-rated charity receiving 200 cents, where $P \in \{2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th\}$. Valuations are in tokens, where each token for a charity yields 2 cents and each token for a participant yields $\frac{Y}{100}$ cents. *charity-self* is an indicator for valuations elicited in the charity-self treatment. $(SCXR - \overline{SCXR})$ is an individual's self-to-charity-exchange rate minus the average self-to-charity-exchange rate. *reallocation group* is an indicator for individuals in the reallocation group. *overall score* is an indicator for participants' decisions involving overall scores instead of program expense rates of Make-A-Wish foundation state chapters. "Rating FEs" indicate whether charity rating fixed effects are included. "Censored Y" indicates whether individuals with censored Y values are included. When individuals with censored Y values are not included, the data include valuations from 188 participants. When individuals with censored Y values are included, the data include valuations from 201 participants.

participants have the opportunity to reallocate giving towards the top-rated charity. Relative to the control group, participants in the reallocation group neither give more overall (as seen by the coefficient estimate on *reallocation group*) nor exhibit less excuse-driven responses to performance metrics (as seen by the coefficient estimate on *charity-self*reallocation group*). In line with the persistence of excuse-driven responses to performance metrics, 61% of participants in the reallocation group do not even provide a guess in the effort task and only 8% of participants provide the correct answer.

Finally, and as also seen in Study 1 and Study 1a, excuse-driven responses to charity performance metrics are: more likely among individuals who are more selfish and thus have higher self-to-charity-exchange rates (Column 2), robust to either type of performance metric involved although levels of giving significantly differ by the involved metric (Column 3), and robust to

the inclusion of the participants with censored Y values (Column 4).⁴⁷

A.3 Study 2a: Impact of Framing Manipulation Absent Self-Serving Motives

Study 2a collects decisions from an additional 174 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in September 2018.⁴⁸ In addition to receiving a \$1 completion fee, these participants knew that one of their decisions would be randomly selected to count for payments of others. The design and results for Study 2a are detailed below (see Appendix B.5 for instructions and screenshots).

The design for Study 2a closely follows Study 2 except for one main change: instead of participants making decisions about how much to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation when they receive any amount that is not donated, they make decisions about how much to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation when other MTurk participants receive any amount that is not donated. In this way, Study 2a allows us to consider the impact of the framing manipulation (i.e., compare behavior in the disaggregated-information treatment to that in the aggregated-information treatment) in a setting where self-serving motives and thus excuses are not relevant. However, as detailed in Section 2, the lack of a normalization procedure in Study 2 and Study 2a implies that how much participants value the stakes in Study 2 and Study 2a may widely vary. Thus, caution is warranted in any comparison of the magnitudes of the impact of the framing manipulation across Study 2 and Study 2a.

Table A.3 presents results from OLS regressions of donation behavior on the processing fee. Columns 1 - 2 present results on the donation amount. While a processing fee causes average giving to insignificantly decrease by 0.19 cents in the aggregated-information treatment, a processing fee causes average giving to significantly decrease by an additional 4.09 cents in the disaggregated-information treatment. Given an average donation amount of 27.20 cents, note that this additional 4.09 cent decrease is equivalent to an additional 15% decrease. In Study 2, note that the corresponding percent decrease is larger: it is 36% relative to an average donation amount of 12.60, and thus 2.4 times larger than 15%.

Columns 3 - 4 present results when instead considering the likelihood of a participant making a donation. While a processing fee causes the likelihood of giving to insignificantly decrease by 1 percentage point in the aggregated-information treatment, a processing fee causes the likelihood of giving to marginally significantly decrease by an additional 4 percentage points in the

⁴⁷The average self-to-charity-exchange rates (SCXR) is 8.94. The average SCXR of 8.78 among participants viewing program expense rates is not significantly different than the average SCXR of 9.10 among participants viewing overall scores ($p = 0.77$). The results in Columns 1 - 4 are robust to considering Tobit regressions.

⁴⁸Study 2a was advertised as a 5-10 minute study, and the median completion time was 4.7 minutes. Study 2a aimed to recruit 200 participants, but 1 participant did not submit a valid completion code and 25 participants had completed one of the previous studies in this paper (note that these 25 participants could not be excluded ex-ante due to a research assistant having run the other studies and that research assistant no longer working for the author of this paper).

Table A.3: Ordinary least squares regressions of donation behavior in Study 2a

Dependent Variable:	donation		donation > 0		donation		donation > 0	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>fee</i> > 0	-0.19 (0.64)	-0.21 (0.64)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)				
<i>disagg.</i>	5.34* (3.09)	5.30* (3.10)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	4.59 (3.11)	4.61 (3.11)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
<i>disagg.</i> * <i>fee</i> > 0	-4.09*** (1.45)	-4.03*** (1.45)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)				
<i>fee</i>					-1.00 (2.25)	-0.91 (2.23)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
<i>disagg.</i> * <i>fee</i>					-12.58** (5.39)	-12.68** (5.34)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.09)
Constant	26.33*** (2.13)	26.27*** (2.14)	0.85*** (0.04)	0.86*** (0.04)	26.38*** (2.13)	26.14*** (2.15)	0.85*** (0.04)	0.86*** (0.04)
Order FEs	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
N	870	870	870	870	870	870	870	870

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 present OLS regression results of how much participants donate. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 present OLS regression results of an indicator on whether participants donate. $fee > 0$ is an indicator for a processing fee greater than 0, or equivalently a multiplier less than 5. *disagg.* is an indicator for participants in the disaggregated-information treatment. *fee* equals 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, or 0.5 when the processing fee is 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, or 40% in the disaggregated-information treatment or when the multiplier equals 5, 4.5, 4, 3.5, or 3 in the aggregated-information treatment. “Order FEs” indicate whether fixed effects for the order of each decision are included. The data include 5 observations from each of the 174 participants.

disaggregated-information treatment. Given a baseline giving rate of 83%, note that the this additional 4 percentage point decrease is equivalent to an additional 5% decrease. In Study 2, note that the corresponding percent decrease is larger: it is 19% relative to a baseline giving rate of 64%, and thus 3.9 times larger than 5%.

Columns 4 - 8 show similar results when instead considering a continuous measure of the underlying processing fee.

B Experimental Instructions

B.1 Study 1’s Experimental Instructions

Before making the decisions in the study, participants consent to participate in the study. They are then informed of the \$20 study completion fee and the opportunity to earn additional payment. To explain their additional payment, participants learn that they will make a series of

decisions involving two options, Option A and Option B. Each option corresponds with some amount of money for a charity or for the participant. The amount of money associated with whichever option they choose in a randomly selected “decision-that-counts” will be distributed as additional payment. If participants read through and correctly answer understanding questions about the decision-that-counts and a potential choice pattern of a hypothetical participant, they then proceed to the main study decisions.

The main study decisions are presented to participants in the form of price lists. Prior to viewing a price list involving a specific type of charity, participants view descriptions about that type of charity. There are three charity types: Make-A-Wish Foundation, Knowledge is Power Program charter schools, and Bay Area animal shelters. The descriptions for each charity type are shown in Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3, respectively.

Figure B.1: Description for Make-A-Wish Foundation

According to their website (www.charitynavigator.org), Charity Navigator "has become the nation's largest and most-utilized evaluator of charities." They provide information on program expenses for each charity. A charity's program expense rate is the percentage of total functional expenses spent on its programs and services. Charity Navigator says the higher the program expense rate, the better - as non-program expenses typically involve overhead costs that do not directly fulfill a charity's mission. Make-A-Wish foundation, which "grants the wishes of children with life-threatening medical conditions to enrich the human experience with hope, strength, and joy," has many of its state chapters listed on Charity Navigator.

Out of Make-A-Wish's state chapters listed on Charity Navigator, the highest program expense rate is 90%.

Your decisions will involve the following state chapters of Make-A-Wish Foundation.

- For the Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter in New Hampshire, the program expense rate is 90%. Hence, this chapter will be denoted as:

Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate)

- For the Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter in Rhode Island, the program expense rate is 80%. Hence, this chapter will be denoted as:

Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate)

- For the Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter in Maine, the program expense rate is 71%. Hence, this chapter will be denoted as:

Make-A-Wish ME (71% program rate)

Figure B.2: Description for Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) charter schools

According to their website (<http://www.kipp.org>), "The mission of KIPP is to create a respected, influential, and national network of public schools that are successful in helping students from educationally underserved communities develop the knowledge, skills, character and habits needed to succeed in college and the competitive world beyond... There are currently 141 KIPP schools in 20 states and the District of Columbia serving 50,000 students. More than 86 percent of our students are from low-income families and eligible for the federal free or reduced-price meals program, and 95 percent are African American or Latino."

On average, out of the students who have completed the 8th grade at a KIPP charter school, the college matriculation rate for KIPP alumni is 80%.

Your decisions will involve the following KIPP charter schools.

- For the KIPP charter schools in Chicago IL, out of the students who have completed the 8th grade at their schools, the college matriculation rate is 92%. Hence, these charter schools will be denoted as:

KIPP Chicago (92% college rate)

- For the KIPP charter schools in Philadelphia PN, out of the students who have completed the 8th grade at their schools, the college matriculation rate is 74%. Hence, these charter schools will be denoted as:

KIPP Philadelphia (74% college rate)

- For the KIPP charter schools in Denver CO, out of the students who have completed the 8th grade at their schools, the college matriculation rate is 61%. Hence, these charter schools will be denoted as:

KIPP Denver (61% college rate)

Figure B.3: Description for Bay Area animal shelters

According to their website (<http://www.maddiesfund.org>), Maddie's Fund is a foundation dedicated to animal welfare and provides information on live release rate for various animal shelters. An animal shelter's live release rate is the percentage of their dogs that have live outcomes - i.e., are adopted, transferred to another rescue organization, or are returned to their owner/guardian. Maddie's Fund aims to help shelters become "no-kill", which means that they do not kill any healthy or treatable animal.

An animal shelter with a live release rate above 90% is considered no-kill.

Your decisions will involve the following animal shelters.

- For the San Francisco Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the live release rate is 97%. Hence, this animal shelter will be denoted as:

SFSPCA (97% live release rate)

- For the Humane Society of Silicon Valley, the live release rate is 82%. Hence, this animal shelter will be denoted as:

HSSV (82% live release rate)

- For the San Jose Animal Care and Services, the live release rate is 66%. Hence, this animal shelter will be denoted as:

SJACS (66% live release rate)

The first price list participants view for each charity type is a “normalization” price list. A normalization price list involves the highest rated state chapter for a given charity type. Figure B.4 is an example of a normalization price list when the charity type is Make-A-Wish Foundation.

Figure B.4: Normalization price list for Make-A-Wish Foundation

In this list:

- **Option A** will always be **you receive \$10 dollars** (and Make-A-Wish NH receives nothing).

- **Option B** will be **Make-A-Wish NH receives some dollar amount** (and you receive nothing). As you proceed down the rows of a list, the amount Make-A-Wish NH receives will increase from \$0 to \$40.

For each row, all you have to do is decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Indicate your preference by selecting the corresponding button. **Most people begin by preferring Option A and then switch to Option B, so one way to complete this list is to determine the best row to switch from Option A to Option B.**

Now, please make your decisions below.

**Option A
(you receive)**

- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10
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- You: \$10
- You: \$10
- You: \$10

**Option B
(Make-A-Wish NH receives)**

- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$0
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$2
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$4
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$6
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$8
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$10
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$12
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$14
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$16
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$18
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$22
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$24
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$26
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$28
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$30
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$32
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$34
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$36
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$38
- Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$40

The second price list participants view for each charity type is a “buffer” price list. Figure B.5 is an example of a buffer price list when the charity type is Make-A-Wish Foundation.

Figure B.5: Buffer price list for Make-A-Wish Foundation

In this list:

- **Option A** will always be **you receive \$5 dollars** (and Make-A-Wish NH receives nothing).
- **Option B** will be **Make-A-Wish NH receives some dollar amount** (and you receive nothing). As you proceed down the rows of a list, the amount Make-A-Wish NH receives will increase from \$0 to \$40.

For each row, all you have to do is decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Indicate your preference by selecting the corresponding button. **Most people begin by preferring Option A and then switch to Option B, so one way to complete this list is to determine the best row to switch from Option A to Option B.**

Now, please make your decisions below.

Option A (you receive)	Option B (Make-A-Wish NH receives)
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$0
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$2
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$4
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$6
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$8
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$10
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$12
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$14
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$16
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$18
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$20
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$22
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$24
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$26
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$28
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$30
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$32
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$34
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$36
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$38
<input type="radio"/> You: \$5	<input type="radio"/> Make-A-Wish NH (90% program rate): \$40

After participants complete the normalization price list and the buffer price list for one charity type, they then proceed to complete the normalization price list and the buffer price list for the second charity type and then the third charity type. The order of the charity types is randomly determined on the participant level.

Figure B.7 is an example of a valuation price list in the charity-self treatment involving the 2nd-rated state chapter of Make-A-Wish Foundation when a participant's X value equals \$20.

Figure B.7: Valuation price list in charity-self treatment for 2nd-rated state chapter of Make-A-Wish Foundation

In this list:

- **Option A** will always be **Make-A-Wish RI receives \$20** (and you receive nothing). As you proceed down the rows of the list, the amount that Make-A-Wish RI will remain the same.

- **Option B** will be **you receive some dollar amount** (and the Make-A-Wish RI receives nothing). As you proceed down the rows of a list, the amount you receive will increase from \$0 to \$10.

For each row, all you have to do is decide whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Indicate your preference by selecting the corresponding button. **Most people begin by preferring Option A and then switch to Option B, so one way to complete this list is to determine the best row to switch from Option A to Option B.**

Now, please make your decisions below.

Option A
(Make-A-Wish RI receives)

- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20
- Make-A-Wish RI (80% program rate): \$20

Option B
(You receive)

- You: \$0
- You: \$0.50
- You: \$1
- You: \$1.50
- You: \$2
- You: \$2.50
- You: \$3
- You: \$3.50
- You: \$4
- You: \$4.50
- You: \$5
- You: \$5.50
- You: \$6
- You: \$6.50
- You: \$7
- You: \$7.50
- You: \$8
- You: \$8.50
- You: \$9
- You: \$9.50
- You: \$10

After participants complete all valuation price lists for one charity type, they then proceed to complete the valuation price lists for the second charity and third charity type. The order of the charity types is randomly determined on the participant level. Within a charity type, participants first complete all valuation price lists in the charity-charity treatment or instead first complete all valuation price lists in the charity-self treatment. The order is again randomly determined on the participant level.

After completing the valuation price lists, on the final screen of the study, participants answer follow-up questions about their decisions in the study and provide demographic information.

B.2 Study 1a's Experimental Instructions

Before making the decisions in the study, participants consent to participate in the study. They are then informed of the \$3 study completion fee and the opportunity to earn additional payment. To explain their additional payment, participants learn that they will make a series of decisions involving two options, Option A and Option B. Each option corresponds with some amount of money for a charity or for the participant. The amount of money associated with whichever option they choose in a randomly selected "decision-that-counts" will be distributed as additional payment. If participants read through and correctly answer understanding questions about the decision-that-counts and a potential choice pattern of a hypothetical participant, they then proceed to the main study decisions.

The main study decisions are presented to participants in the form of price lists. Participants are randomly assigned to view price lists that involve state chapters of Make-A-Wish Foundation that vary according to program expense rates or instead that vary according to overall scores. Prior to viewing the price lists, participants view the description shown in Figure B.8 or in Figure B.9 if they are assigned to group with program expense rates or overall scores, respectively.

Figure B.8: Description for Make-A-Wish Foundation if performance metric is program expense rate

Program Expense Rate: According to their website (www.charitynavigator.org), Charity Navigator "has become the nation's largest and most-utilized evaluator of charities." Among other metrics, they provide information on program expenses for each charity.

A charity's program expense rate is the "percent of total expenses a charity spends on the programs and services it exists to deliver." In other words, a charity's program expense rate is the percent of total expenses NOT spent on overhead costs such as administrative and fundraising expenses. The higher the program expense rate the better.

Make-A-Wish Foundation (MAW): Make-A-Wish foundation, which "grants the wishes of children with life-threatening medical conditions to enrich the human experience with hope, strength, and joy," has many of its state chapters listed on Charity Navigator.

Your decisions may involve a state chapter of Make-A-Wish Foundation, and if so, information on their program expense rates will be provided. In particular, you will learn whether the involved Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter has a program expense rate of 85% or better, 80-84%, 75-79%, 70-74%, or 65-69%. Aside from learning this information on the program expense rate for an involved Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter, no other information will be provided.

Figure B.9: Description for Make-A-Wish Foundation if performance metric is overall score

Overall Score: According to their website (www.charitynavigator.org), Charity Navigator "has become the nation's largest and most-utilized evaluator of charities." Among other metrics, they provide information an overall score (out of 100) for each charity. A charity's overall score "is derived by analyzing the charity's (1) Financial Health and (2) Accountability and Transparency performance." In other words, a charity's overall score is higher if they have better financial health ratings and accountability and transparency ratings. The higher the overall score the better.

Make-A-Wish Foundation (MAW): Make-A-Wish foundation, which "grants the wishes of children with life-threatening medical conditions to enrich the human experience with hope, strength, and joy," has many of its state chapters listed on Charity Navigator. Your decisions may involve a state chapter of Make-A-Wish Foundation, and if so, information on their overall scores will be provided. In particular, you will learn whether the involved Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter has a overall score of 95 or better, 90-94, 85-89, 80-84, or 75-79. Aside from learning this information on the overall score for an involved Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter, no other information will be provided.

The first price list participants view for each charity type is a "normalization" price list. The normalization price list involves the highest-rated state chapter for the given performance metric. Figure B.10 is an example normalization price list when the performance metric is the overall score.

Figure B.10: Normalization price list if performance metric is overall score

For the first list:

- The option on the LEFT will always involve a **Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter with a overall score of 95 or better receiving 200 cents**. This charity will be denoted as MAW (95 or better).

- The option on the RIGHT will involve **you receiving some amount of money**. The amount of money will increase from 0 to 200 cents as you proceed down the rows of the list.

Please indicate which payment option you prefer on each row by clicking on the row where you would like to switch from choosing the option on the left to choosing the option on the right.

(Note that you cannot click on the submit button until you have selected an answer.)

DONATION TO MAW (95 OR BETTER)		BONUS FOR SELF
200 CENTS	OR	0 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	10 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	20 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	30 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	40 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	50 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	60 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	70 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	80 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	90 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	100 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	110 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	120 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	130 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	140 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	150 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	160 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	170 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	180 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	190 CENTS
200 CENTS	OR	200 CENTS

After completing the normalization price list, participants learn about "tokens." Figure B.11 shows how tokens are explained assuming a participant's Y value equals 100 cents.

Figure B.11: Description of Tokens

Modification: Payments will now be shown in TOKENS instead of cents. How tokens translate into cents depends on whether they are given to you or to a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter. In particular:

- Each token given to you translates into you receiving a bonus payment of 1 cents.
- Each token given to a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter translates into them receiving a donation of 2 cents.

After completing understanding questions about the conversion of tokens to money, participants complete “valuation” price lists for the 2nd-, 3rd-, 4th- and 5th-rated charities for each charity type. Figure B.12 is an example of a valuation price list in the charity-charity treatment involving the 2nd-rated state chapter if the given performance metrics is the overall score when a participant’s Y value equals 100 cents.

Figure B.12: Valuation price list in charity-charity treatment of 2nd-rated charity if performance metric is overall score

For the next list:

- The option on the LEFT will always involve a **Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter with a overall score of 90-94 receiving 100 tokens**. This charity will be denoted as MAW (90-94). Also, recall that 100 tokens for a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter translates into them receiving 200 cents.

- The option on the RIGHT will always involve a **Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter with a overall score of 95 or better receiving some tokens**. This charity will be denoted as MAW (95 or better). The amount of tokens will increase from 0 to 100 as you proceed down the rows of the list. Also, recall that 100 tokens for a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter translates into them receiving 200 cents.

Please indicate which payment option you prefer on each row by clicking on the row where you would like to switch from choosing the option on the left to choosing the option on the right.

(Note that you cannot click on the submit button until you have selected an answer.)

DONATION TO MAW (90-94)		DONATION TO MAW (95 OR BETTER)
100 TOKENS	OR	0 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	5 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	10 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	15 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	20 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	25 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	30 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	35 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	40 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	45 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	50 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	55 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	60 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	65 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	70 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	75 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	80 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	85 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	90 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	95 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	100 TOKENS

Figure B.13 is an example of a valuation price list in the charity-self treatment involving the 2nd-rated state chapter if the given performance metrics is the overall score when a participant's Y value equals 100 cents.

Figure B.13: Valuation price list in charity-self treatment of 2nd-rated charity if performance metric is the overall score

For the next list:

- The option on the LEFT will always involve a **Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter with a overall score of 90-94 receiving 100 tokens**. This charity will be denoted as MAW (90-94). Also, recall that 100 tokens for a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter translates into them receiving 200 cents.

- The option on the RIGHT will involve **you receiving some tokens**. The amount of tokens will increase from 0 to 100 as you proceed down the rows of the list. Also, recall that 100 tokens for yourself translate into you receiving 100 cents.

Please indicate which payment option you prefer on each row by clicking on the row where you would like to switch from choosing the option on the left to choosing the option on the right.

(Note that you cannot click on the submit button until you have selected an answer.)

DONATION TO MAW (90-94)		BONUS FOR SELF
100 TOKENS	OR	0 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	5 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	10 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	15 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	20 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	25 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	30 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	35 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	40 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	45 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	50 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	55 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	60 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	65 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	70 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	75 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	80 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	85 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	90 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	95 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	100 TOKENS

After participants complete all valuation price lists in one treatment, they proceed to complete the valuation price lists in the other treatment. The order of price lists — whether they first complete all prices list in the charity-charity treatment or instead first complete all valuation price lists in the charity-self treatment — is randomly determined on the participant level.

After completing the valuation price lists, on the final screen of the study, participants answer follow-up questions about their decisions in the study and provide demographic information.

B.3 Study 1b's Experimental Instructions

Study 1b proceeds in exactly the same manner as Study 1a except for two changes. The first change is that participants always complete all of the valuation price lists in the charity-charity treatment and then in the charity-self treatment. The second change only involves participants

assigned to the “reallocation” group. When they complete the valuation price lists in the charity-self treatment, they learn about an opportunity to redirect any money designated for a low-rated charity to the top-rated charity by completing a simple effort task. Figure B.14 is an example of a valuation price list in the charity-self treatment involving the 2nd-rated state chapter if the given performance metrics is the overall score when a participant’s Y value equal 100 cents.

Figure B.14: Valuation price list in charity-self treatment of 2nd-rated charity if performance metric is the overall score

For the next list:

- The option on the LEFT will always involve a **Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter with a overall score of 95 or better or 90-94 receiving 100 tokens**. These two charities will be denoted as MAW (95 or better) and MAW (90-94), respectively. Also, recall that 100 tokens for a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter translates into them receiving 200 cents. If you choose the option on the LEFT in the decision-that-counts, which charity receives 100 tokens will depend on whether you choose to count how many 0s are in a series of 400 numbers. In particular:

*If you provide the correct number of 0s that are in the series of 400 numbers, MAW (95 or better) will receive the 100 tokens.

*If you do not provide the correct number of 0s that are in the series of 400 numbers, MAW (90-94) will receive the 100 tokens.

- The option on the RIGHT will involve **you receiving some tokens**. The amount of tokens will increase from 0 to 100 as you proceed down the rows of the list. Also, recall that 100 tokens for yourself translate into you receiving 100 cents.

Please indicate which payment option you prefer on each row by clicking on the row where you would like to switch from choosing the option on the left to choosing the option on the right.

(Note that you cannot click on the submit button until you have selected an answer.)

DONATION TO MAW (90-94) OR MAW (95 OR BETTER)		BONUS FOR SELF
100 TOKENS	OR	0 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	5 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	10 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	15 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	20 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	25 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	30 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	35 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	40 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	45 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	50 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	55 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	60 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	65 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	70 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	75 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	80 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	85 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	90 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	95 TOKENS
100 TOKENS	OR	100 TOKENS

After participants complete all valuation price lists, but before the follow-up questions, they then have the opportunity to complete the effort task. Figure B.15 shows how this effort task is displayed if the given performance metrics is the overall score.

Figure B.15: Effort task if performance metric is the overall score

As explained in the previous four lists, if you choose the option on the LEFT in the decision-that-counts, a Make-A-Wish Foundation state chapter will receive 100 tokens. If you provide the *correct* number of 0s in a series of 400 numbers, the Make-A-Wish Foundation with the highest overall score of 95 or better will receive 100 tokens. If you do not provide the *correct* number of 0s in a series of 400 number, then a Make-A-Wish Foundation with a performance metrics of 90-94, 85-89, 80-84, or 75-79 will receive 100 tokens, depending on the list.

If you do not want to count the number of 0s in the series, please push the arrow to continue to the follow-up survey now.

If you would like to count the number of 0s in the series, please provide your count of how many 0s are in the series below.

```
0000000000000100000010011110111110011000
1111111011111001100000000010100001111000
0001000010001010001011000100111110000101
1111100000111010100001110111101111111111
01010000001100010111010101010101011111
1101101110000000110011100001001000111001
0110001110000001010101100000010101000100
0000100001000010000011111001010010000111
1011101001010000111110100111101010101111
01000001100000000011000000000100000010
```

Number of 0s:

B.4 Study 2's Experimental Instructions

Before making the decisions in Study 2, participants consent to participate in the study. They are then informed of the \$1 study completion fee and the opportunity to earn additional payment. To explain their additional payment, participants learn that they will make a 5 decisions, and that in each decision, they must indicate how much money they would like to keep for themselves (out of an additional 50 cents) and how much money they would instead like to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation. The amount of money associated with whichever option they choose in a randomly selected “decision-that-counts” will be distributed as additional payment. If participants read through and correctly answer understanding questions about the decision-that-counts, they then proceed to the main study decisions.

The order of the five decisions is randomly determined. If participants are randomly assigned to the aggregated-information treatment, their five decisions only vary in terms of whether donations to charity are multiplied by 5, 4.5, 4, 3.5, or 3. Figure B.16 shows a decision screen for when the multiplier is 3.

Figure B.16: Decision screen in aggregated-information treatment if the multiplier is 3

In this decision, the **multiplier is 3**.

Recall that the total amount of money that Make-A-Wish Foundation receives will then be equal to the amount you chose to donate multiplied by the multiplier.

How many cents, out of an additional 50 cents, would you like to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation if this decision is the decision-that-counts?

If participants are randomly assigned to the disaggregated-information treatment, their five decisions only vary in terms of whether donations to charity, after being multiplied by 5, are discounted by a processing fee of 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, or 40%. Figure B.17 shows a decision screen for when the processing fee is 40%.

Figure B.17: Decision screen in disaggregated-information treatment if the processing fee is 40%

In this decision, the matching rate is 5 and **the processing fee is 40%**.

Recall that the total amount of money that Make-A-Wish Foundation receives will then be determined as follows:

- First, the amount of money you choose to donate will be multiplied by the matching rate.
 - Second, after the amount of money you choose to donate is multiplied by the matching rate, that amount will be decreased by the processing fee.
-

How many cents, out of an additional 50 cents, would you like to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation if this decision is the decision-that-counts?

After participants complete all decisions, they answer follow-up questions about their decisions in the study and provide demographic information.

B.5 Study 2a's Experimental Instructions

Study 2a follows the same procedure as in Study 2 except for one change: instead of participants making decisions about how much to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation when they receive any

amount that is not donated, they make decisions about how much to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation when other MTurk participants receive any amount that is not donated.

Figure B.18 shows a decision screen for when the multiplier is 3 in the aggregated-information treatment.

Figure B.18: Decision screen in aggregated-information treatment if the multiplier is 3 (and money for self not at stake)

In this decision, the multiplier is 3.

Recall that the total amount of money that Make-A-Wish Foundation receives will then be equal to the amount you chose to donate multiplied by the multiplier.

Recall also that any amount you choose NOT to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation will be distributed to another MTurk worker who completes a different study than this one.

Thus, how much money you choose to donate or not to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation will NOT influence how much money you receive from this study.

How many cents, out of an additional 50 cents that will otherwise be distributed to another MTurk worker who completes a different study than this one, would you like to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation if this decision is the decision-that-counts?

Figure B.19 shows a decision screen for when the processing fee is 40% in the disaggregated-information treatment.

Figure B.19: Decision screen in disaggregated-information treatment if the processing fee is 40% (and money for self not at stake)

In this decision, the matching rate is 5 and the processing fee is 40%.

Recall that the total amount of money that Make-A-Wish Foundation receives will then be determined as follows:

- First, the amount of money you choose to donate will be multiplied by the matching rate.
- Second, after the amount of money you choose to donate is multiplied by the matching rate, that amount will be decreased by the processing fee.

Recall also that any amount you choose NOT to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation will be distributed to another MTurk worker who completes a different study than this one.

Thus, how much money you choose to donate or not to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation will NOT influence how much money you receive from this study.

How many cents, out of an additional 50 cents that will otherwise be distributed to another MTurk worker who completes a different study than this one, would you like to donate to Make-A-Wish Foundation if this decision is the decision-that-counts?