Teaching through television: Experimental evidence on entrepreneurship education in Tanzania*
Online Appendix A

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We here provide complementary analysis, as referred to in the main text.

List of Figures

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1 Additional figures



Figure A1: Distributions of gender composition by treatment
Note: Histograms of the share of males at each school by treatment.



Figure A2: Treatments effect on willingness to take risk (alternative definitions)
Note: The figure reports the treatment effects for males and females on risk for alternative definitions of the willingness to take risk. The willingness to take risk is here defined by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the participant chooses the risky alternative at least 1/2/3 times.



Figure A3: Treatment effects on patience (alternative definitions)

Note: The figure reports the treatment effects for males and females on patience for alternative definitions. Patience is here defined by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the participant chooses the later payment date at least 1/2/3/4/5/6 times.



Figure A4: Robustness of standard error methodology

Note: The figure reports absolute values of t-statistics of the regression coefficients in Tables 3–8 (except for the constant term in each regression). The 45-degree line is included for reference, and we see that the choice of method for calculating standard errors is not important for any substantial conclusions – and that if anything, the wild clustered bootstrap t-stats tend to fall marginally above the 45 degree line, indicating that the reported clustered sandwich standard errors represent a marginally conservative approach).



Figure A5: Bounds on impact of exposure to edutainment show

Note: Bounds on the treatment effects presented in Table 4. In each panel, the box represents the point estimates of the lower and upper bounds, with a vertical line inside the box representing the estimated mean treatment effect (without control variables). Error bars are indicated for the mean treatment effect (standard errors clustered at the school level). On each side of the box, one standard error is indicated, calculated using 1000 bootstrap replications clustered at the school level. The upper row of panels are estimated using the Lee (2009) approach, which assumes that treatment has a monotone effect on attrition. The lower row of panels are estimated present bounds that only assume the bounded support of the missing outcomes (Manski, 1990).



Figure A6: Bounds on impact on ambitions

Note: Bounds on the treatment effects presented in Table 5. In each panel, the box represents the point estimates of the lower and upper bounds, with a vertical line inside the box representing the estimated mean treatment effect (without control variables). Error bars are indicated for the mean treatment effect (standard errors clustered at the school level). On each side of the box, one standard error is indicated, calculated using 1000 bootstrap replications clustered at the school level. The upper row of panels are estimated using the Lee (2009) approach, which assumes that treatment has a monotone effect on attrition. The lower row of panels are estimated present bounds that only assume the bounded support of the missing outcomes (Manski, 1990).



Figure A7: Bounds on impact on knowledge

Note: Bounds on the treatment effects presented in Table 6. In each panel, the box represents the point estimates of the lower and upper bounds, with a vertical line inside the box representing the estimated mean treatment effect (without control variables). Error bars are indicated for the mean treatment effect (standard errors clustered at the school level). On each side of the box, one standard error is indicated, calculated using 1000 bootstrap replications clustered at the school level. The upper row of panels are estimated using the Lee (2009) approach, which assumes that treatment has a monotone effect on attrition. The lower row of panels are estimated present bounds that only assume the bounded support of the missing outcomes (Manski, 1990).



Figure A8: Bounds on impact on mind-set

Note: Bounds on the treatment effects presented in Table 7. In each panel, the box represents the point estimates of the lower and upper bounds, with a vertical line inside the box representing the estimated mean treatment effect (without control variables). Error bars are indicated for the mean treatment effect (standard errors clustered at the school level). On each side of the box, one standard error is indicated, calculated using 1000 bootstrap replications clustered at the school level. The upper row of panels are estimated using the Lee (2009) approach, which assumes that treatment has a monotone effect on attrition. The lower row of panels are estimated present bounds that only assume the bounded support of the missing outcomes (Manski, 1990).



Figure A9: Bounds on impact on long-term outcomes

Note: Bounds on the treatment effects presented in Table 8. In each panel, the box represents the point estimates of the lower and upper bounds, with a vertical line inside the box representing the estimated mean treatment effect (without control variables). Error bars are indicated for the mean treatment effect (standard errors clustered at the school level) On each side of the box, one standard error is indicated, calculated using 1000 bootstrap replications clustered at the school level. The upper row of panels are estimated using the Lee (2009) approach, which assumes that treatment has a monotone effect on attrition. The lower row of panels are estimated present bounds that only assume the bounded support of the missing outcomes (Manski, 1990).

2 Additional tables

Table A1: Treatment-Control Balance (males)

		Treatment status			
	All	Control	Treated	Difference	p-value
Age	18.279	18.287	18.268	-0.019	0.913
	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.148)	(0.172)	
Household with no parents	0.258	0.236	0.292	0.056	0.046
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.028)	
Access to TV	3.415	3.381	3.468	0.087	0.448
	(0.062)	(0.094)	(0.069)	(0.115)	
Business stream	0.296	0.238	0.385	0.147	0.283
	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.112)	(0.137)	
Business knowledge	0.234	0.271	0.178	-0.094	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.035)	
Business ambitions	0.143	0.126	0.170	0.044	0.140
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.030)	
O-level failure rate for school	0.573	0.582	0.559	-0.024	0.668
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.056)	
Number of schools	43	22	21		
Number of individuals	949	572	377		

Note: For details, see Table 2. Joint p-value of the explanatory variables in a regression predicting treatment on background variables: $p < 0.001$.

Table A2: Treatment-Control Balance (females)

		Treatment status			
	All	Control	Treated	Difference	p-value
Age	17.624	17.561	17.676	0.116	0.253
	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.101)	
Household with no parents	0.257	0.225	0.283	0.058	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.021)	
Access to TV	3.396	3.318	3.460	0.143	0.256
	(0.062)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.125)	
Business stream	0.452	0.462	0.444	-0.018	0.911
	(0.078)	(0.120)	(0.105)	(0.157)	
Business knowledge	0.276	0.307	0.249	-0.058	0.232
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.049)	
Business ambitions	0.094	0.088	0.099	0.012	0.620
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.023)	
O-level failure rate for school	0.555	0.565	0.547	-0.018	0.670
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.043)	
Number of schools	42	21	21		
Number of individuals	1183	537	646		

Note: For details, see Table 2. Joint p-value of the explanatory variables in a regression predicting treatment on background variables: $p = 0.013$.

Table A3: Treatment-Control Balance (lab sample)

		Treatment status			
	All	Control	Treated	Difference	p-value
Male	0.444	0.513	0.365	-0.148	0.003
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.050)	
Age	17.910	17.940	17.875	-0.064	0.606
	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.125)	
Household with no parents	0.254	0.229	0.283	0.054	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.020)	
Access to TV	3.408	3.348	3.477	0.129	0.222
	(0.055)	(0.091)	(0.056)	(0.106)	
Business stream	0.385	0.346	0.429	0.083	0.569
	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.145)	
Business knowledge	0.264	0.289	0.235	-0.054	0.173
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.040)	
Business ambitions	0.108	0.101	0.116	0.015	0.493
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.022)	
O-level failure rate for school	0.564	0.572	0.554	-0.019	0.695
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.047)	
Number of schools	43	22	21		
Number of individuals	1915	1025	890		

Note: For details, see Table 2. Joint p-value of the explanatory variables in a regression predicting treatment on background variables: $p < 0.001$.

Table A4: Treatment-Control Balance (admin sample)

		Treatment status			
	All	Control	Treated	Difference	p-value
Male	0.447	0.518	0.369	-0.149	0.003
	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.051)	
Age	17.910	17.930	17.888	-0.042	0.733
	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.097)	(0.124)	
Household with no parents	0.258	0.230	0.288	0.057	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.020)	
Access to TV	3.408	3.358	3.461	0.103	0.325
	(0.054)	(0.091)	(0.055)	(0.105)	
Business stream	0.384	0.347	0.424	0.078	0.589
	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.144)	
Business knowledge	0.257	0.289	0.222	-0.067	0.071
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.037)	
Business ambitions	0.113	0.104	0.123	0.019	0.406
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.023)	
O-level failure rate for school	0.565	0.577	0.552	-0.025	0.587
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.045)	
Number of schools	43	22	21		
Number of individuals	2039	1059	980		

Note: For details, see Table 2. Joint p-value of the explanatory variables in a regression predicting treatment on background variables: $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Treatment-Control Balance (long term sample)

		Treatment status			
	All	Control	Treated	Difference	p-value
Male	0.447	0.486	0.406	-0.081	0.401
	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.096)	
Age	18.063	17.986	18.145	0.159	0.493
	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.196)	(0.231)	
Household with no parents	0.271	0.219	0.326	0.107	0.018
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.045)	
Access to TV	3.459	3.361	3.562	0.201	0.229
	(0.086)	(0.148)	(0.081)	(0.167)	
Business stream	0.363	0.342	0.384	0.042	0.784
	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.152)	
Business knowledge	0.254	0.247	0.261	0.014	0.778
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.051)	
Business ambitions	0.106	0.123	0.087	-0.036	0.341
	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.038)	
O-level failure rate for school	0.557	0.565	0.549	-0.016	0.754
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.052)	
Number of schools	42	22	20		
Number of individuals	284	146	138		

Note: For details, see Table 2. Joint p-value of the explanatory variables in a regression predicting treatment on background variables: $p = 0.002$.

Table A6: Impact on exposure to the edutainment show, overall impact, full model

	Content question (Incentivized)				Episodes watched (Non-incentivized)			
	Edutainment		Weekend movie		Edutainment		Weekend movie	
Treated (edutainment)	1.063***	1.039***	−0.755***	−0.761***	1.407***	1.372***	−0.442***	−0.458***
	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Male	−0.172***	−0.103*	−0.279***	−0.200***	−0.108*	−0.029	−0.057	−0.038
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Age		−0.074***		−0.091***		−0.063**		−0.028
		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.027)		(0.018)
Household with no parents		0.034		−0.050		−0.004		−0.001
		(0.052)		(0.054)		(0.053)		(0.036)
Access to TV		0.068***		0.070***		0.056**		0.037**
		(0.022)		(0.021)		(0.027)		(0.018)
Business stream		0.077		0.018		0.181**		0.004
		(0.071)		(0.073)		(0.088)		(0.054)
Business knowledge		0.020		0.131**		−0.079		−0.043
		(0.046)		(0.056)		(0.070)		(0.038)
Business ambitions		−0.005		−0.133*		−0.054		0.039
		(0.078)		(0.074)		(0.081)		(0.068)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.893***		−0.599**		−1.041***		−0.268
		(0.236)		(0.274)		(0.365)		(0.193)
Constant	0.088	1.623***	0.143**	1.822***	0.055	1.523***	0.029	0.559
	(0.065)	(0.380)	(0.068)	(0.370)	(0.081)	(0.524)	(0.054)	(0.378)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,867	1,854	1,899	1,886
R^2	0.206	0.232	0.134	0.169	0.297	0.326	0.062	0.069

Note: Full version of panel A, Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A7: Impact on exposure to the edutainment show, gender specific effects, full model

	Content question (Incentivized)				Episodes watched (Non-incentivized)			
	Edutainment		Weekend movie		Edutainment		Weekend movie	
Treated (edutainment)	1.021***	1.010***	−0.750***	−0.756***	1.350***	1.337***	−0.429***	−0.441***
	(0.109)	(0.089)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.125)	(0.109)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Treated × Male	0.098	0.068	−0.011	−0.012	0.133	0.083	−0.030	−0.039
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Male	−0.215***	−0.134*	−0.274***	−0.194***	−0.167**	−0.067	−0.043	−0.020
	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Age		−0.073***		−0.091***		−0.063**		−0.028
		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.027)		(0.018)
Household with no parents		0.033		−0.050		−0.004		−0.001
		(0.052)		(0.054)		(0.053)		(0.036)
Access to TV		0.069***		0.070***		0.057**		0.037**
		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.027)		(0.018)
Business stream		0.074		0.019		0.178**		0.005
		(0.071)		(0.072)		(0.088)		(0.053)
Business knowledge		0.021		0.131**		−0.078		−0.044
		(0.046)		(0.056)		(0.071)		(0.039)
Business ambitions		−0.007		−0.133*		−0.057		0.040
		(0.079)		(0.074)		(0.081)		(0.068)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.892***		−0.600**		−1.038***		−0.269
		(0.232)		(0.273)		(0.364)		(0.192)
Constant	0.111	1.630***	0.140**	1.821***	0.085	1.530***	0.022	0.555
	(0.072)	(0.384)	(0.068)	(0.370)	(0.084)	(0.519)	(0.063)	(0.378)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,867	1,854	1,899	1,886
R^2	0.206	0.232	0.134	0.169	0.298	0.327	0.062	0.070

Note: Full version of panel B, Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A8: Impact on ambitions, overall impact, full model

	Demand for business training								Rating of having		Ambition	
	Incentivized						Self-report		own business		index	
	Main		# of courses		any courses							
Treated (edutainment)	0.038	0.038	0.084	0.080	0.046	0.042	0.134***	0.123***	0.155**	0.150**	0.279***	0.264***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.078)
Male	0.003	−0.005	−0.034	−0.051	−0.037	−0.046*	−0.058**	−0.044*	−0.019	−0.007	−0.078	−0.061
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Age		0.007		0.020		0.013		−0.009		−0.005		−0.004
		(0.006)		(0.016)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.019)		(0.020)
Household with no parents		−0.008		0.019		0.027		0.064**		0.008		0.073*
		(0.014)		(0.034)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.044)		(0.041)
Access to TV		0.001		−0.001		−0.002		0.008		0.027		0.028
		(0.005)		(0.013)		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.023)		(0.027)
Business stream		−0.018		0.000		0.018		0.057**		0.033		0.070
		(0.026)		(0.070)		(0.050)		(0.028)		(0.064)		(0.075)
Business knowledge		0.004		0.019		0.014		0.028		0.105*		0.143**
		(0.019)		(0.036)		(0.022)		(0.025)		(0.056)		(0.061)
Business ambitions		0.027		0.057		0.030		0.072**		0.143*		0.200***
		(0.027)		(0.058)		(0.041)		(0.034)		(0.078)		(0.077)
O-level failure rate for school		0.006		0.098		0.092		−0.260**		−0.105		−0.495**
		(0.081)		(0.197)		(0.132)		(0.102)		(0.160)		(0.239)
Constant	0.077***	−0.046	0.467***	0.054	0.390***	0.100	0.603***	0.836***	2.786***	2.774***	1.250***	1.404***
	(0.016)	(0.115)	(0.052)	(0.300)	(0.040)	(0.219)	(0.030)	(0.195)	(0.063)	(0.335)	(0.074)	(0.344)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,910	1,897	1,863	1,851	1,859	1,847
R^2	0.004	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.004	0.008	0.025	0.043	0.007	0.013	0.022	0.039

Note: Full version of panel A, Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$). Variant definitions of incentivized demand for business training (columns 3–6) is first the count (0,1,2) of courses demanded and then an indicator for whether any courses are demanded.

Table A9: Impact on ambitions, gender specific impact, full model

	Demand for business training								Rating of having		Ambition	
	Incentivized						Self-report		own business		index	
	Main		# of courses		any courses							
Treated (edutainment)	0.060*	0.058*	0.127	0.118	0.067	0.060	0.117***	0.112***	0.125	0.121	0.268**	0.259**
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Treated × Male	−0.049*	−0.045*	−0.098	−0.089	−0.049	−0.044	0.039	0.025	0.070	0.069	0.025	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.107)
Male	0.025	0.016	0.009	−0.011	−0.016	−0.027	−0.075*	−0.055	−0.050	−0.039	−0.089	−0.066
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Age		0.007		0.019		0.012		−0.009		−0.004		−0.004
		(0.006)		(0.016)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.019)		(0.020)
Household with no parents		−0.008		0.020		0.028		0.064**		0.007		0.073*
		(0.014)		(0.034)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.044)		(0.041)
Access to TV		0.001		−0.001		−0.002		0.008		0.028		0.028
		(0.005)		(0.013)		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.023)		(0.027)
Business stream		−0.016		0.003		0.020		0.057**		0.031		0.069
		(0.026)		(0.069)		(0.049)		(0.028)		(0.063)		(0.074)
Business knowledge		0.004		0.018		0.014		0.028		0.106*		0.143**
		(0.019)		(0.036)		(0.022)		(0.025)		(0.057)		(0.061)
Business ambitions		0.028		0.059		0.031		0.071**		0.141*		0.200***
		(0.028)		(0.058)		(0.041)		(0.034)		(0.078)		(0.077)
O-level failure rate for school		0.005		0.096		0.091		−0.259**		−0.104		−0.495**
		(0.079)		(0.193)		(0.131)		(0.101)		(0.158)		(0.239)
Constant	0.066***	−0.050	0.445***	0.046	0.379***	0.096	0.612***	0.839***	2.802***	2.780***	1.255***	1.405***
	(0.016)	(0.114)	(0.057)	(0.302)	(0.045)	(0.222)	(0.034)	(0.195)	(0.073)	(0.335)	(0.083)	(0.345)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,910	1,897	1,863	1,851	1,859	1,847
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.006	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.026	0.043	0.007	0.014	0.022	0.039

Note: Full version of panel B, Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$). Variant definitions of incentivized demand for business training (columns 3–6) is first the count (0,1,2) of courses demanded and then an indicator for whether any courses are demanded.

Table A10: Impact on knowledge, overall impact, full model

	Subindices									
	Macro		Business:							
	Facts		Facts		Concepts		Practice		Knowledge index	
Treated (edutainment)	0.105	0.101	0.055	0.045	−0.126	−0.146*	−0.034	−0.068	0.001	−0.068
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.246)	(0.204)
Male	0.308***	0.354***	−0.068*	−0.055	0.117**	0.172***	0.064	0.181**	0.420***	0.652***
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.151)	(0.154)
Age		−0.053*		−0.020		0.006		−0.098***		−0.165***
		(0.029)		(0.018)		(0.016)		(0.037)		(0.059)
Household with no parents		0.130*		0.033		−0.005		0.041		0.199
		(0.073)		(0.037)		(0.049)		(0.090)		(0.142)
Access to TV		−0.043*		0.003		0.021		0.041		0.022
		(0.026)		(0.016)		(0.018)		(0.036)		(0.059)
Business stream		0.072		0.043		0.260***		0.235**		0.611***
		(0.072)		(0.039)		(0.087)		(0.109)		(0.205)
Business knowledge		0.080		−0.032		0.027		−0.006		0.069
		(0.074)		(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.091)		(0.130)
Business ambitions		0.006		0.058		−0.149**		−0.076		−0.161
		(0.097)		(0.058)		(0.064)		(0.123)		(0.203)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.191		−0.202**		−0.622**		−1.144***		−2.159***
		(0.296)		(0.095)		(0.248)		(0.280)		(0.746)
Constant	2.046***	3.151***	0.890***	1.323***	1.449***	1.519***	4.016***	6.152***	8.401***	12.145***
	(0.056)	(0.469)	(0.041)	(0.322)	(0.071)	(0.286)	(0.097)	(0.657)	(0.165)	(1.021)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902
R^2	0.014	0.020	0.004	0.010	0.011	0.047	0.001	0.026	0.006	0.041

Note: Full version of panel A, Table 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A11: Impact on knowledge, gender specific impact, full model

	Subindices									
	Macro		Business:							
	Facts		Facts		Concepts		Practice		Knowledge index	
Treated (edutainment)	0.029	0.035	0.048	0.045	−0.163	−0.168*	−0.105	−0.111	−0.192	−0.199
	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.111)	(0.099)	(0.160)	(0.138)	(0.292)	(0.243)
Treated × Male	0.176	0.154	0.018	−0.001	0.086	0.052	0.166	0.101	0.446	0.306
	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.171)	(0.159)	(0.296)	(0.284)
Male	0.229***	0.284***	−0.076	−0.055	0.079	0.148**	−0.010	0.136	0.221	0.513***
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.194)	(0.188)
Age		−0.052*		−0.020		0.006		−0.097***		−0.163***
		(0.029)		(0.018)		(0.016)		(0.038)		(0.059)
Household with no parents		0.129*		0.033		−0.005		0.040		0.198
		(0.073)		(0.037)		(0.049)		(0.090)		(0.142)
Access to TV		−0.043		0.003		0.022		0.041		0.023
		(0.026)		(0.016)		(0.018)		(0.036)		(0.059)
Business stream		0.067		0.043		0.258***		0.232**		0.600***
		(0.072)		(0.040)		(0.087)		(0.108)		(0.204)
Business knowledge		0.082		−0.032		0.028		−0.004		0.074
		(0.073)		(0.032)		(0.047)		(0.091)		(0.129)
Business ambitions		0.002		0.058		−0.150**		−0.079		−0.169
		(0.098)		(0.058)		(0.064)		(0.122)		(0.205)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.188		−0.202**		−0.621**		−1.142***		−2.153***
		(0.287)		(0.096)		(0.246)		(0.276)		(0.731)
Constant	2.086***	3.165***	0.894***	1.323***	1.469***	1.524***	4.054***	6.161***	8.503***	12.173***
	(0.063)	(0.463)	(0.049)	(0.321)	(0.078)	(0.285)	(0.110)	(0.658)	(0.181)	(1.021)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902
R^2	0.015	0.021	0.004	0.010	0.012	0.047	0.001	0.027	0.007	0.042

Note: Full version of panel B, Table 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A12: Impact on mind-set, overall impact, full model

	Risk		Patience		Compete		Mind-set index	
Treated (edutainment)	0.075	0.083	0.072	0.078	−0.005	−0.020	0.082	0.072
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Male	0.028	0.023	−0.227***	−0.172**	0.041	0.046	−0.017	0.006
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Age		−0.006		−0.019		0.023		0.015
		(0.014)		(0.030)		(0.016)		(0.024)
Household with no parents		0.027		−0.052		−0.032		−0.037
		(0.048)		(0.082)		(0.022)		(0.054)
Access to TV		0.010		−0.038		−0.010		−0.017
		(0.019)		(0.040)		(0.016)		(0.030)
Business stream		−0.088		0.198		0.109		0.135
		(0.063)		(0.163)		(0.088)		(0.100)
Business knowledge		0.117***		−0.037		−0.062*		0.004
		(0.034)		(0.079)		(0.036)		(0.063)
Business ambitions		0.069		−0.215**		−0.060		−0.098
		(0.057)		(0.100)		(0.038)		(0.070)
O-level failure rate for school		0.115		0.040		−0.452		−0.425
		(0.182)		(0.428)		(0.297)		(0.333)
Constant	1.314***	1.309***	3.491***	3.878***	0.354***	0.228	2.772***	2.768***
	(0.053)	(0.286)	(0.127)	(0.588)	(0.081)	(0.363)	(0.094)	(0.456)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,914	1,901	1,914	1,901
R^2	0.003	0.012	0.006	0.013	0.002	0.038	0.002	0.011

Note: Full version of panel A, Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A13: Impact on mind-set, gender specific impact, full model

	Risk		Patience		Compete		Mind-set index	
Treated (edutainment)	0.146**	0.144**	0.144	0.171	−0.045	−0.055	0.120	0.117
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.132)	(0.133)
Treated × Male	−0.165**	−0.143*	−0.167	−0.216	0.092	0.081	−0.089	−0.103
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.175)	(0.163)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Male	0.102**	0.088*	−0.153	−0.074	−0.000	0.010	0.022	0.053
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.104)	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.096)	(0.089)
Age		−0.007		−0.021		0.023		0.014
		(0.014)		(0.030)		(0.016)		(0.024)
Household with no parents		0.028		−0.050		−0.033		−0.037
		(0.047)		(0.082)		(0.022)		(0.054)
Access to TV		0.009		−0.038		−0.010		−0.017
		(0.018)		(0.039)		(0.016)		(0.030)
Business stream		−0.083		0.205		0.106		0.139
		(0.062)		(0.161)		(0.087)		(0.100)
Business knowledge		0.115***		−0.041		−0.061*		0.002
		(0.034)		(0.079)		(0.035)		(0.062)
Business ambitions		0.073		−0.210**		−0.062*		−0.096
		(0.056)		(0.098)		(0.038)		(0.069)
O-level failure rate for school		0.112		0.036		−0.450		−0.427
		(0.175)		(0.423)		(0.295)		(0.335)
Constant	1.277***	1.296***	3.453***	3.858***	0.375***	0.235	2.752***	2.758***
	(0.056)	(0.280)	(0.138)	(0.590)	(0.090)	(0.361)	(0.106)	(0.457)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,914	1,901	1,914	1,901
R^2	0.006	0.015	0.007	0.014	0.004	0.039	0.002	0.012

Note: Full version of panel B, Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$).

Table A14: Mind-set: Ordered probit models of risk-taking

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated (edutainment)	0.111	0.123	0.217**	0.215**
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.104)
Treated × Male			−0.246**	−0.215*
			(0.110)	(0.112)
Male	0.046	0.040	0.156**	0.138*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Age		−0.012		−0.013
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Household with no parents		0.041		0.042
		(0.071)		(0.071)
Access to TV		0.014		0.014
		(0.028)		(0.028)
Business stream		−0.135		−0.127
		(0.094)		(0.093)
Business knowledge		0.176***		0.173***
		(0.052)		(0.051)
Business ambitions		0.105		0.111
		(0.084)		(0.083)
O-level failure rate for school		0.158		0.154
		(0.273)		(0.264)
Cutoffs:				
$(0,1)$	-1.256	-1.315	-1.202	-1.298
	(0.085)	(0.421)	(0.091)	(0.414)
$(1,2)$	0.342	0.295	0.399	0.314
	(0.085)	(0.425)	(0.090)	(0.418)
$(2,3)$	1.624	1.588	1.684	1.609
	(0.088)	(0.430)	(0.093)	(0.422)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902

Note: Ordered probit models of the number of risky decisions taken (0–3). Intercept of linear index normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$).

Table A15: Mind-set: Ordered probit models of patience

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated (edutainment)	0.048	0.053	0.095	0.114
	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.129)
Treated × Male			−0.108	−0.143
			(0.117)	(0.109)
Male	−0.150***	−0.114**	−0.102	−0.049
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.058)
Age		−0.013		−0.014
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Household with no paremts		−0.037		−0.037
		(0.054)		(0.055)
Access to TV		−0.025		−0.025
		(0.026)		(0.026)
Business streatm		0.132		0.137
		(0.109)		(0.109)
Business knowledge		−0.027		−0.029
		(0.052)		(0.052)
Business ambitions		−0.142**		−0.138**
		(0.066)		(0.065)
O-level failure rate for school		0.030		0.027
		(0.284)		(0.281)
Cutoffs:				
$(0,1)$	-1.770	-2.031	-1.746	-2.019
	(0.116)	(0.371)	(0.123)	(0.373)
$(1,2)$	-1.353	-1.619	-1.320	-1.607
	(0.095)	(0.378)	(0.103)	(0.380)
$(2,3)$	-0.645	-0.905	-0.620	-0.892
	(0.080)	(0.386)	(0.087)	(0.387)
$(3,4)$	0.009	-0.250	0.033	-0.237
	(0.086)	(0.392)	(0.093)	(0.393)
$(4,5)$	0.685	0.426	0.710	0.439
	(0.091)	(0.393)	(0.097)	(0.395)
$(5,6)$	1.111	0.857	1.136	0.870
	(0.101)	(0.399)	(0.107)	(0.400)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902

Note: Ordered probit models of the number of times participants waited for higher returns (0–6). Intercept of linear index normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$).

Table A16: Long-term behavior, overall impact, full model

	Administrative		Long-term survey							
	Passed final exam		Currently a student		Started a business		Currently employed		Moved	
Treated (edutainment)	−0.182**	−0.198***	−0.210***	−0.187***	0.043	0.057	−0.051	−0.044	0.111**	0.065
	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Male	0.022	0.102***	−0.072	0.034	−0.020	−0.025	−0.037	−0.053	−0.086**	−0.107*
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.054)
Age		−0.060***		−0.095***		−0.006		0.004		0.038
		(0.009)		(0.025)		(0.028)		(0.019)		(0.028)
Household with no parents		0.043*		−0.049		−0.065		0.033		0.206***
		(0.023)		(0.053)		(0.069)		(0.046)		(0.064)
Access to TV		−0.006		−0.040*		−0.012		−0.011		−0.001
		(0.012)		(0.023)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.026)
Business stream		0.111*		−0.000		−0.030		−0.001		0.005
		(0.058)		(0.070)		(0.059)		(0.055)		(0.055)
Business knowledge		0.058**		0.049		0.031		−0.010		−0.049
		(0.029)		(0.063)		(0.066)		(0.034)		(0.070)
Business ambitions		−0.087**		−0.031		−0.007		0.101		−0.085
		(0.034)		(0.092)		(0.102)		(0.075)		(0.076)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.894***		−0.394*		0.361**		0.072		−0.410**
		(0.192)		(0.210)		(0.173)		(0.085)		(0.165)
Constant	0.644***	2.159***	0.644***	2.669***	0.279***	0.235	0.162***	0.062	0.243***	−0.213
	(0.060)	(0.181)	(0.055)	(0.427)	(0.046)	(0.487)	(0.041)	(0.317)	(0.039)	(0.452)
Observations	2,039	2,029	284	281	282	279	282	279	282	279
R^2	0.035	0.162	0.047	0.132	0.003	0.023	0.009	0.023	0.027	0.093

Note: Full version of panel A, Table 8. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A17: Long-term behavior, gender specific impact, full model

	Administrative		Long-term survey							
	Passed final exam		Currently a student		Started a business		Currently employed		Moved	
Treated (edutainment)	−0.227***	−0.232***	−0.124	−0.099	0.092	0.086	−0.073	−0.073	0.136**	0.104
	(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.077)
Treated × Male	0.103	0.077	−0.192	−0.200*	−0.110	−0.067	0.050	0.067	−0.058	−0.089
	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.109)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.093)
Male	−0.026	0.066*	0.020	0.127	0.032	0.007	−0.061	−0.084	−0.058	−0.065
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.075)
Age		−0.060***		−0.089***		−0.004		0.003		0.040
		(0.009)		(0.026)		(0.029)		(0.019)		(0.028)
Household with no parents		0.043*		−0.050		−0.065		0.033		0.206***
		(0.023)		(0.053)		(0.069)		(0.045)		(0.064)
Access to TV		−0.006		−0.041*		−0.012		−0.010		−0.001
		(0.012)		(0.023)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.026)
Business stream		0.108*		0.014		−0.026		−0.006		0.012
		(0.057)		(0.067)		(0.055)		(0.056)		(0.056)
Business knowledge		0.059**		0.045		0.030		−0.009		−0.051
		(0.029)		(0.064)		(0.066)		(0.033)		(0.069)
Business ambitions		−0.089***		−0.030		−0.007		0.101		−0.085
		(0.034)		(0.088)		(0.102)		(0.076)		(0.075)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.894***		−0.434**		0.349**		0.086		−0.428***
		(0.190)		(0.187)		(0.172)		(0.089)		(0.165)
Constant	0.669***	2.171***	0.600***	2.539***	0.253***	0.193	0.173***	0.106	0.230***	−0.272
	(0.064)	(0.179)	(0.056)	(0.448)	(0.046)	(0.499)	(0.047)	(0.324)	(0.046)	(0.448)
Observations	2,039	2,029	284	281	282	279	282	279	282	279
R^2	0.038	0.164	0.056	0.141	0.007	0.024	0.010	0.025	0.028	0.095

Note: Full version of panel B, Table 8. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^*: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A18: Impact on social preferences

	Incentivized		
	Money for self	Proportional bonus	Unfairness of salary inequality
Panel A: Overall impact			
Treated (edutainment)	0.006	0.013	0.050
	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.076)
Observations	1,902	1,902	1,897
R^2	0.014	0.018	0.005
Panel B: Gender specific impact			
Treated (edutainment)	0.022	0.035	0.024
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.093)
Treated $\times$ Male	-0.037^{*}	-0.051	0.061
	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.116)
Male	0.029^{*}	0.078^{***}	-0.123
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.079)
Treatment on Males	-0.015	-0.016	0.085
	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.099)
Observations	1,902	1,902	1,897
R^2	0.016	0.019	0.005
Panel C: Statistics on dependent variable (in control group)			
Mean	0.619	0.728	3.966
Standard deviation	0.212	0.445	1.550

Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column 1, the share of money the participant allocated to him- or herself out of 2000 TSh in a real-effort dictator game; column 2, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant in a spectator choice decided to divide proportionality (and not equally) in a spectator choice involving two other participants; column 3, the participant's response to an hypothetical question about whether an income difference between a teacher and a doctor is fair (1-5, 1-the income difference is completely fair, 5-the income difference is completely unfair). Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in the treatment group. Treated $\times$ Male: interaction variable between Treated and Male. Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2. See Tables A19 and A20 for full regressions including all controls. Treatment on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated $\times$ Male. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools ($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$).

Table A19: Impact on social preferences, overall impact, full models

	Incentivized					
	Money for self		Proportional bonus		Unfairness of salary inequality	
Treated (edutainment)	0.002	0.006	0.019	0.013	0.066	0.050
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.079)	(0.076)
Male	0.012	0.012	0.028	0.055**	−0.117**	−0.095
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.058)	(0.065)
Age		0.004		−0.026***		−0.016
		(0.005)		(0.009)		(0.031)
Household with no parents		−0.027***		0.020		0.069
		(0.009)		(0.024)		(0.076)
Access to TV		−0.002		−0.004		−0.027
		(0.005)		(0.011)		(0.029)
Business stream		−0.019		0.039		0.041
		(0.017)		(0.029)		(0.080)
Business knowledge		0.031**		−0.001		−0.040
		(0.014)		(0.024)		(0.083)
Business ambitions		−0.036**		−0.008		−0.045
		(0.015)		(0.027)		(0.121)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.055		−0.264**		−0.447**
		(0.040)		(0.121)		(0.227)
Constant	0.613***	0.596***	0.714***	1.317***	4.026***	4.641***
	(0.013)	(0.103)	(0.022)	(0.178)	(0.067)	(0.605)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,910	1,897
R^2	0.001	0.014	0.001	0.018	0.002	0.005

Note: Full version of panel A, Table A18. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools
($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

Table A20: Impact on social preferences, gender-specific impact, full models

	Incentivized					
	Money for self		Proportional bonus		Unfairness of salary inequality	
Treated (edutainment)	0.019	0.022	0.034	0.035	0.036	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.095)	(0.093)
Treated × Male	−0.041*	−0.037*	−0.036	−0.051	0.071	0.061
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.117)	(0.116)
Male	0.031*	0.029*	0.044	0.078***	−0.149**	−0.123
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.072)	(0.079)
Age		0.003		−0.027***		−0.015
		(0.005)		(0.009)		(0.031)
Household with no parents		−0.027***		0.020		0.069
		(0.009)		(0.024)		(0.076)
Access to TV		−0.002		−0.004		−0.026
		(0.005)		(0.011)		(0.029)
Business stream		−0.018		0.040		0.039
		(0.017)		(0.029)		(0.079)
Business knowledge		0.030**		−0.001		−0.040
		(0.014)		(0.024)		(0.083)
Business ambitions		−0.035**		−0.006		−0.047
		(0.015)		(0.028)		(0.121)
O-level failure rate for school		−0.056		−0.265**		−0.446**
		(0.038)		(0.119)		(0.227)
Constant	0.603***	0.593***	0.705***	1.313***	4.042***	4.647***
	(0.014)	(0.102)	(0.024)	(0.179)	(0.071)	(0.601)
Observations	1,915	1,902	1,915	1,902	1,910	1,897
R^2	0.003	0.016	0.002	0.019	0.002	0.005

Note: Full version of panel B, Table A18. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools
($^{*}: p < 0.10, ^{**}: p < 0.05, ^{***}: p < 0.01$)

References

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