

Table 11: **Effect of Alternative Ownership Changes on Job Quality**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.083*** (0.018)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.092*** (0.025)	-0.062*** (0.022)	0.017 (0.011)	0.092 (0.094)	0.010 (0.011)
1(Post M&A)	-0.047** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.070*** (0.024)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.063 (0.110)	0.006 (0.012)
1(Post Management Buyout)	-0.088* (0.048)	0.026 (0.052)	0.017 (0.070)	0.003 (0.057)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.229 (0.237)	-0.031 (0.026)
1(Post Growth Equity)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.030)	0.022 (0.014)	-0.060 (0.138)	-0.005 (0.015)
Observations	874,801	876,572	782,966	867,847	357,633	357,633	357,633
Company-Deal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.354	0.325	0.351	0.346	0.614	0.450	0.428
Outcome S.D.	1.144	1.169	1.276	1.321	0.505	3.473	0.387
P-value (Post LBO=Post M&A)	0.166	0.096	0.154	0.807	0.017	0.837	0.806

Note: This table reports the effect of four types of ownership changes on job quality measures. The sample includes 1,371 LBOs, 1,010 M&As, 178 management buyouts, and 700 growth equity deals. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). The bottom row reports the p-values for the F-tests for the equality of LBO and M&A coefficients. All models include company-deal and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.


Table 12: **Effect of LBOs on Job Quality: Matching Estimation**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post) × 1(LBO)	-0.075*** (0.021)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.086*** (0.029)	-0.045* (0.026)	0.014 (0.014)	0.043 (0.119)	0.002 (0.013)
Observations	125,670	125,767	107,552	125,002	54,584	54,584	54,584
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Deal-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.527	0.501	0.519	0.500	0.785	0.623	0.603
Outcome S.D.	1.002	1.043	1.141	1.159	0.523	3.481	0.381

Note: This table reports the effect of an LBO on job quality using a matching estimator. We construct the control sample using matched non-treated firms. We match each LBO target to five never-targeted companies with at least 1 review in the 3 years prior to the deal using founded year, industry, average % of reviewers with >3-year tenure (over last 3 years), average % of reviewers in jobs that typically require only high school (over last 3 years), and log number of reviews (over last 3 years). We use the [Abadie and Imbens \(2006\)](#) distance metric that weights each dimension by its standard deviation. We use company-quarter-level data. All models include company and deal-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.


Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables For Online Publication

Figure A.1: Distribution of Glassdoor Ratings




Note: This figure presents histograms of the four rating dimensions in the universe of Glassdoor over the period 2008 to 2019. The y -axis is the fraction for each score (the sum of bar heights equals one). Glassdoor added Culture & Values as a rating item in May 2012, when it also disallowed half-point scores for other rating items. Half-point scores (2% of the sample) are dropped from the figure.

Figure A.2: Event Study of Effects of LBOs on Textual Measures from Reviewer Comments




Note: This figure presents differences-in-differences event studies of the effect of LBOs on textual measures from reviewer comments, using Equation (3). The unit of observation is a review, and we present separate coefficients for 8 quarters before and 12 quarters after the buyout. The regression is fully saturated, including dummies for all quarters around the buyout. We omit quarter -1 (the quarter before the buyout). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level.

Figure A.3: Event Study of Effects of LBOs on Reported Pay




Note: This figure presents differences-in-differences event studies of the effect of LBOs on reported pay, using Equation (3). The unit of observation is the review, and we present separate coefficients for 8 quarters before and 12 quarters after the buyout. The regression is fully saturated, including dummies for all quarters around the buyout. We omit quarter -1 (the quarter before the buyout). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level.

Figure A.4: Event Study of Effects of LBOs on Dimensions of Employee Satisfaction: DiD Imputation



Note: This figure presents differences-in-differences event studies of the effect of LBOs on four dimensions of employee satisfaction, using the DiD imputation method from [Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess \(2023\)](#). Under each panel, we plot event studies using all deals (left) and high-leverage deals (right). The unit of observation is a review, and we present separate coefficients for 8 quarters before and 12 quarters after the buyout. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level.


Figure A.5: Employment Dynamics Around LBOs




Note: This figure presents employment dynamics around LBOs. Employment data are from LinkedIn. The mean value (point symbols) and 95% confidence intervals (caps) are shown for 4 years before and after the buyout.

Figure A.6: Event Study of Effects of LBOs on Reviewer Composition


Panel A: Average Tenure




Panel B: Average Required Work Experience




Panel C: % Required High School



Panel D: % Manager




Panel E: Average Reported Experience



Note: This figure presents differences-in-differences event studies of the effect of LBOs on reviewer composition (Equation (3)) by employee and job characteristics, including average reviewer tenure in years, average reviewer jobs' required work experience in years, % of reviewers in jobs that typically require only high school, % of reviewers with a managerial position, and average self-reported years of work experience. The unit of observation is a company-quarter, and we present separate coefficients for 8 quarters before and 12 quarters after the buyout. The regression is fully saturated, including dummies for all quarters around the buyout. We omit quarter -1 (the quarter before the buyout). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Internet Appendix 6

Figure A.7: Quantile Regression Estimates of the Effect of LBOs on Dimensions of Employee Satisfaction



Note: This figure presents quantile regression estimates of the effect of LBOs on dimensions of employee satisfaction. We plot the estimated effect of LBOs at 5 different quantiles (5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th) of the satisfaction distribution with their 95% confidence intervals. Panel B (D) starts from 10th (15th) quantile due to our estimation requirements. We use company-quarter average reviews as the dependent variable. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level.

Table A.1: Correlation Matrix of Glassdoor Ratings

	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings	Benefits Rating
Compensation & Benefits	1.000							
Work-Life Balance	0.486***	1.000						
Culture & Values	0.565***	0.620***	1.000					
Senior Management	0.568***	0.617***	0.786***	1.000				
Base Earnings	0.220***	0.146***	0.099***	0.092***	1.000			
Variable Earnings	0.150***	0.085***	0.100***	0.097***	0.355***	1.000		
Any Variable Earnings	0.134***	0.078***	0.093***	0.087***	0.317***	0.982***	1.000	
Benefits Rating	0.723***	0.471***	0.560***	0.530***	0.174***	0.139***	0.131***	1.000

Note: This table presents the correlation matrix of rating dimensions and reported pay in the universe of Glassdoor over our 2008 to 2019 sample period. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Table A.2: Deal Characteristics of Management Buyouts and Growth Equity Deals

	Management Buyouts			Growth Equity Deals		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
By PitchBook Industry Sector						
Business Products/Services	178	0.34	0.48	700	0.26	0.44
Consumer Products/Services	178	0.21	0.41	700	0.22	0.41
Energy	178	0.03	0.17	700	0.02	0.15
Financial Services	178	0.06	0.24	700	0.06	0.23
Healthcare	178	0.08	0.28	700	0.15	0.35
Information Technology	178	0.25	0.44	700	0.28	0.45
Materials and Resources	178	0.02	0.13	700	0.02	0.14
Deal Characteristics						
Deal Size (USD m)	70	793.05	3123.85	292	93.66	262.19
Leverage	28	0.51	0.32	48	0.68	0.31
Number of Employees	89	2754.43	12314.14	332	936.48	2830.62
Impact Fund	178	0.03	0.17	700	0.02	0.12
ESG/Impact Fund	178	0.11	0.32	700	0.07	0.25

Note: This table presents characteristics of the 2010 to 2016 PitchBook MBOs and growth equity deals in our analysis sample.

Table A.3: Comparison of PitchBook, Glassdoor, and Matched Samples

	All PB Deals			GD Matched Deals			Deals in Analysis Sample		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
By Deal Type									
Vanilla LBO	3,572	0.75	0.44	2,762	0.75	0.43	1,371	0.73	0.44
Public to Private	3,572	0.07	0.25	2,762	0.08	0.26	1,371	0.11	0.31
Corporate Divestiture	3,572	0.19	0.39	2,762	0.17	0.38	1,371	0.16	0.36
By PitchBook Industry Sector									
Business Products/Services	3,572	0.35	0.48	2,762	0.34	0.47	1,371	0.32	0.47
Consumer Products/Services	3,572	0.20	0.40	2,762	0.21	0.41	1,371	0.23	0.42
Energy	3,572	0.04	0.18	2,762	0.03	0.16	1,371	0.02	0.13
Financial Services	3,572	0.05	0.23	2,762	0.05	0.22	1,371	0.04	0.20
Healthcare	3,572	0.15	0.35	2,762	0.16	0.36	1,371	0.15	0.35
Information Technology	3,572	0.17	0.38	2,762	0.19	0.39	1,371	0.23	0.42
Materials and Resources	3,572	0.04	0.19	2,762	0.03	0.16	1,371	0.01	0.10
Deal Characteristics									
Deal Size (USD m)	1,367	529.20	2326.83	1,009	525.20	1440.30	547	723.09	1755.61
Leverage	408	0.52	0.33	351	0.50	0.33	241	0.52	0.35
Number of Employees	1,970	1230.76	5009.25	1,472	1348.95	5567.17	788	2026.61	7435.39
Impact Fund	3,572	0.03	0.16	2,762	0.03	0.17	1,371	0.03	0.18
ESG/Impact Fund	3,572	0.11	0.31	2,762	0.11	0.31	1,371	0.13	0.34

Note: This table presents characteristics of PitchBook LBOs between 2010 and 2016, the deals we matched to Glassdoor, and the deals in our analysis sample.

Table A.4: Association of Employee Satisfaction Changes with Investor Returns by Deal Status

Panel A: Fully Resolved Deals								
	Compensation & Benefits		Work-life Balance		Culture & Values		Senior Management	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(Return)	0.259***		0.247***		0.348***		0.214*	
	(0.095)		(0.085)		(0.117)		(0.124)	
Return Pctle		0.251		0.289		0.504*		0.220
		(0.201)		(0.190)		(0.293)		(0.210)
Observations	150	149	150	149	68	68	150	149
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.579	0.573	0.638	0.632	0.572	0.557	0.690	0.686
Outcome Mean	-0.140	-0.140	-0.368	-0.368	-0.555	-0.555	-0.289	-0.289
Outcome S.D.	0.776	0.776	0.807	0.807	0.865	0.865	0.929	0.929
Return Mean	0.436	0.632	0.436	0.632	0.434	0.615	0.436	0.632
Return S.D.	0.410	0.261	0.410	0.261	0.516	0.286	0.410	0.261

Panel B: Not Fully Resolved Deals								
	Compensation & Benefits		Work-life Balance		Culture & Values		Senior Management	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(Return)	0.145		0.183		0.169		0.209	
	(0.136)		(0.142)		(0.170)		(0.180)	
Return Pctle		0.167		0.208		0.227		0.210
		(0.153)		(0.161)		(0.192)		(0.189)
Observations	199	199	200	200	159	159	199	199
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.563	0.564	0.551	0.552	0.550	0.552	0.555	0.554
Outcome Mean	-0.298	-0.298	-0.202	-0.202	-0.289	-0.289	-0.394	-0.394
Outcome S.D.	0.811	0.811	0.777	0.777	0.856	0.856	0.941	0.941
Return Mean	0.276	0.441	0.279	0.444	0.294	0.465	0.276	0.441
Return S.D.	0.271	0.258	0.272	0.260	0.281	0.259	0.271	0.258

Note: This table reports tests of the association between deals' gross-of-fee returns and the changes in employee satisfaction ratings around the deal, using Equation (4). The dependent variable is the change in the residualized quarterly average rating between all pre-deal quarters and particular post-deal quarters. The independent variables are investor returns measured as the natural log of 1.1 plus the IRR, or percentile rank IRR of the deal amongst all the deals by this buyout fund. In Panel A, we restrict the sample to deals that were fully resolved as of March 2020 according to SPI records. In Panel B, we restrict the sample to deals that were not fully resolved as of March 2020 and were partially dependent on the valuation reported by the manager to SPI prior to March 2020. Controls in all specifications include deal-year fixed effects, log of amount invested, and the pre-deal rating levels. Standard errors are clustered by SPI industry sub-sector. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.5: **Main Analysis Sample and Return-Matched Sample Comparison**

	Deals in Analysis Sample			Return-matched Deals		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Deal Type						
Vanilla LBO	1,371	0.73	0.44	351	0.56	0.50
Public to Private	1,371	0.11	0.31	351	0.22	0.41
Corporate Divestiture	1,371	0.16	0.36	351	0.22	0.41
PitchBook Industry Sector						
Business Products/Services	1,371	0.32	0.47	351	0.24	0.43
Consumer Products/Services	1,371	0.23	0.42	351	0.22	0.41
Energy	1,371	0.02	0.13	351	0.02	0.15
Financial Services	1,371	0.04	0.20	351	0.04	0.19
Healthcare	1,371	0.15	0.35	351	0.14	0.35
Information Technology	1,371	0.23	0.42	351	0.32	0.47
Materials and Resources	1,371	0.01	0.10	351	0.02	0.14
Deal Characteristics						
Deal Size (USD m)	547	723.09	1755.61	198	909.79	1312.49
Leverage	241	0.52	0.35	117	0.50	0.34
Number of Employees	788	2026.61	7435.39	199	2835.68	7225.20
Impact Fund	1,371	0.03	0.18	351	0.05	0.21
ESG/Impact Fund	1,371	0.13	0.34	351	0.17	0.38
Number of Investors	1,371	1.98	1.25	351	1.76	1.30
Firm Characteristics at Deal Date						
Firm Age	1,021	28.25	25.92	300	28.79	26.46
Number of Reviews	1,371	15.45	44.45	351	19.50	48.50
% Long Tenure	876	0.44	0.34	212	0.47	0.33
% High School	970	0.19	0.32	256	0.16	0.28
Pre-deal Average Ratings						
Compensation & Benefits	1,281	3.20	0.86	334	3.30	0.84
Work-Life Balance	1,284	3.52	0.88	335	3.62	0.83
Culture & Values	952	3.45	1.03	229	3.63	0.92
Senior Management	1,283	3.10	1.00	334	3.19	0.95

Note: This table presents characteristics of PitchBook-Glassdoor matched LBOs between 2010 and 2016 in our main analysis sample and the deals we matched to return. The firm characteristics at the deal date and pre-deal average ratings are measured for the twelve quarters prior to the LBO.

Table A.6: F-statistic and P-value for Joint Test for Pre-Trends: DiD Imputation

Panel A: All Deals				
	Compensation & Benefits (1)	Work-Life Balance (2)	Culture & Values (3)	Senior Management (4)
F-statistic	0.901	1.474	0.544	0.573
P-value	0.515	0.161	0.824	0.801

Panel B: High-leverage Deals				
	Compensation & Benefits (1)	Work-Life Balance (2)	Culture & Values (3)	Senior Management (4)
F-statistic	0.514	1.046	0.849	1.799
P-value	0.847	0.398	0.559	0.072

Note: This table presents the F-statistic and p-value for the joint test for no pre-trends for event studies in Appendix Figure A.4 using the DiD imputation method from [Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess \(2023\)](#). Panel A is for all deals. Panel B is for high-leverage deals.

Table A.7: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality, Stacked Approach

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits (1)	Work-Life Balance (2)	Culture & Values (3)	Senior Management (4)	Base earnings (5)	Variable earnings (6)	Any variable earnings (7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.083*** (0.018)	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.093*** (0.024)	-0.063*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.011)	0.119 (0.093)	0.012 (0.011)
Observations	32,639,625	32,706,811	29,266,857	32,373,398	12,591,219	12,591,219	12,591,219
Stack-Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stack-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.327	0.353	0.349	0.618	0.457	0.436
Outcome S.D.	1.148	1.172	1.279	1.325	0.504	3.463	0.386

Note: This table reports the effect of LBOs on job quality measures using a stacked regression methodology ([Baker, Larcker, and Wang, 2022](#)). The estimator includes dataset-specific unit- and time-fixed effects (i.e., stack-company FE and stack-quarter FE. A stack is a deal). We also include industry-quarter fixed effects. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the stack-company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.8: Effect of LBOs on Reviewer Composition

	Avg. Tenure	Avg. Req. Work Exp.	% Req. High School	% Manager	Avg. Experience	Log Reviews (Current Emps)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(Post LBO)	-0.024 (0.077)	0.014 (0.032)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.178 (0.146)	0.015 (0.014)
Observations	620,473	461,610	924,494	924,494	331,647	911,598
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.328	0.448	0.285	0.234	0.305	0.685
Outcome S.D.	4.297	1.556	0.217	0.224	5.809	0.688

Note: This table shows the effect of LBOs on reviewer composition by employee and job characteristics at the company-quarter level (Equation (1)), including average reviewer tenure in years, average reviewer jobs' required work experience in years, % of reviewers in jobs that typically require only high school, % of reviewers with a managerial position, average years of (relevant) work experience, and log number of reviews by current employees. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.9: Role of Layoffs in the Effect of LBOs on Job Quality

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.146*** (0.038)	-0.110*** (0.041)	-0.116 (0.071)	-0.129*** (0.048)	-0.018 (0.022)	0.049 (0.252)	0.006 (0.029)
1(Post LBO) × 1(Low Layoff)	0.045 (0.055)	0.047 (0.058)	0.033 (0.091)	0.097 (0.068)	0.031 (0.032)	0.156 (0.303)	0.013 (0.035)
Observations	844,806	846,538	756,732	837,951	326,529	326,529	326,529
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.327	0.353	0.348	0.618	0.456	0.434
Outcome S.D.	1.146	1.170	1.278	1.323	0.504	3.466	0.386

Note: This table shows the role of layoffs in the effect of LBOs on job quality. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). We compute layoff intensity as the difference between the average departure rate in the 4 years prior to the deal and the average departure rate in the 4 years after the deal. 1(Low Layoff) indicates deals with below-median layoff intensity (1%). Employment data are from LinkedIn. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by company. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Table A.10: **Post-deal Job Quality Changes and Returns Measured using TVM and PME**

Panel A: Returns Measured with Total Value Multiple							
	Satisfaction Data				Salary Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
log(Return)	0.076** (0.038)	0.035 (0.036)	0.053 (0.047)	0.059 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.225* (0.116)	0.027** (0.012)
Observations	350	351	228	350	241	241	241
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.553	0.584	0.550	0.602	0.553	0.593	0.626
Outcome S.D.	0.798	0.793	0.864	0.935	0.258	2.844	0.326

Panel B: Returns Measured with Public Market Equivalent							
	Satisfaction Data				Salary Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
log(Return)	0.063** (0.031)	0.037 (0.034)	0.061 (0.042)	0.057* (0.033)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.194 (0.120)	0.024* (0.013)
Observations	331	331	216	331	224	224	224
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.542	0.579	0.546	0.593	0.570	0.595	0.629
Outcome S.D.	0.783	0.776	0.865	0.926	0.240	2.847	0.326

Note: This table reports tests of the association between deals' gross-of-fee returns and the changes in job quality around the deal. The dependent variables are the change in the residualized quarterly average ratings or reported wages (as indicated in the column of the table) from the pre-deal quarters average to the post-deal quarters average. The independent variable of interest is the deal return. In Panel A (B), the return is measured as a log of 0.1 plus the deal's TVM (PME). PME's are computed against the style and the investee firm's industry sector of the Russell 2000 Index. The control variables are the same in both panels and include deal year fixed effects, the amount invested, and the average rating or salary data before the deal that corresponds to the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the industry sub-sector of the LBO, as indicated in SPI. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.11: Association of Pre-deal Employee Satisfaction with the Deals' Investor Returns

Panel A: Internal Rate of Returns

	Compensation & Benefits		Work-life Balance		Culture & Values		Senior Management	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(Return)	0.019 (0.140)		0.035 (0.170)		0.043 (0.211)		0.057 (0.154)	
Return Pctle		0.089 (0.172)		0.222 (0.159)		0.365 (0.236)		0.234 (0.150)
Observations	350	350	351	351	228	228	350	350
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.033	0.034	0.014	0.020	0.039	0.051	0.013	0.018
Outcome Mean	0.034	0.034	0.078	0.078	0.149	0.149	0.048	0.048
Outcome S.D.	0.753	0.753	0.757	0.757	0.865	0.865	0.878	0.878
Return Mean	0.345	0.522	0.346	0.524	0.337	0.513	0.345	0.522
Return S.D.	0.346	0.271	0.346	0.272	0.371	0.272	0.346	0.271

Panel B: Public Market Equivalents

	Compensation & Benefits		Work-life Balance		Culture & Values		Senior Management	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(Return)	0.003 (0.041)		-0.032 (0.049)		0.027 (0.067)		0.030 (0.050)	
Return Pctle		-0.048 (0.150)		-0.111 (0.165)		0.105 (0.259)		0.122 (0.150)
Observations	331	331	331	331	216	216	331	331
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.041	0.042	0.014	0.014	0.049	0.049	0.012	0.012
Outcome Mean	0.034	0.034	0.091	0.091	0.128	0.128	0.028	0.028
Outcome S.D.	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.870	0.870	0.873	0.873
Return Mean	0.371	0.518	0.371	0.518	0.377	0.512	0.371	0.518
Return S.D.	0.989	0.284	0.989	0.284	0.983	0.285	0.989	0.284

Note: This table reports tests of the association between deals' gross-of-fee returns and pre-deal employee satisfaction ratings, using Equation (4). The dependent variable is the residualized quarterly average rating for all quarters before the deal. The independent variables are investor returns measured as a percentage of invested capital or the percentile rank of the deals' return amongst all the deals by this buyout fund. In Panel A, the return is measured as the natural log of 1.1 plus the IRR. In Panel B, the return is measured as the natural log of 0.1 plus the deal's PME. PMEs are computed against the style and the investee firm's industry sector of the Russell 2000 Index. The control variables are the same in both panels and include deal year fixed effects, the amount invested, and the average rating or salary data before the deal that corresponds to the dependent variable. Controls in all specifications include deal-year fixed effects, log of amount invested, and the pre-deal rating levels. Standard errors are clustered by SPI industry sub-sector. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.12: Comparison of LBO Targets and Matched Public Equity Peers

	Return-matched LBO targets	Public Peers	Difference
	Mean	Mean	T-test
Firm Characteristics at Deal Date			
Firm Age	28.790	29.802	-1.012
Number of Reviews	19.499	26.898	-7.399**
% Long Tenure	0.472	0.490	-0.018
% High School	0.161	0.131	0.030*
Pre-deal Average Ratings			
Compensation & Benefits	3.297	3.234	0.063
Work-Life Balance	3.620	3.441	0.179***
Culture & Values	3.634	3.340	0.294***
Senior Management	3.185	3.011	0.174***

Note: This table shows pre-deal firm characteristics for the LBO targets where we have return data and the matched public equity peers. The variable values are measured for the twelve quarters prior to the LBO. The unit of observation is a deal. P-values are from a two-sided t-test for means. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Table A.13: Leverage correlations with other characteristics

Pre-deal characteristics		Raw leverage		Industry-adj. leverage	
		Level	Rank	Level	Rank
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Raw ratings	Overall rating	-0.023	-0.048	0.094	0.028
	Compensation & Benefits	-0.024	-0.033	0.117	0.062
	Work-life Balance	-0.045	-0.068	0.074	0.032
	Culture & Values	-0.028	-0.057	0.070	0.035
	Senior Management	-0.062	-0.072	0.041	-0.010
Orthogonalized ratings	Overall rating	0.012	0.007	0.083	0.043
	Compensation & Benefits	0.033	0.038	0.116	0.096
	Work-life Balance	0.015	-0.002	0.062	0.045
	Culture & Values	0.030	0.015	0.068	0.058
	Senior Management	-0.043	-0.024	0.028	0.013
Labor composition	% Long Tenure	-0.063	-0.025	-0.044	0.009
	% Long Work Experience	-0.093	-0.112	-0.078	-0.080
	% High School	0.099	0.102	0.054	0.044
	% Managers	0.064	0.056	0.016	0.035
Other characteristics	Base Earnings	-0.019	-0.000	0.102	0.068
	Variable Earnings	-0.012	-0.067	-0.029	-0.011
	Company Size	-0.013	-0.064	-0.026	-0.054
	Company Age	-0.022	-0.017	-0.036	0.005

Note: This table reports univariate correlations between leverage and pre-deal characteristics. The characteristics are computed as the average value of the respective variable over 12 quarters preceding the deal. In columns (1) and (2), we use the raw deals' new debt from PitchBook. In columns (3) and (4), we use industry-adjusted new debt by subtracting the industry median. Columns (1) and (3) report Pearson's correlations, while columns (2) and (4) report Spearman's correlations. None of the coefficients are significant at a confidence level of at 5%. The Pearson's (Spearman's) correlation between raw and industry-adjusted debt ratios is 0.72 (0.88) and is significant at the 1% confidence level.

Table A.14: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality by Leverage: Interaction Approach

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	-0.076* (0.040)	-0.054 (0.047)	-0.014 (0.066)	-0.055 (0.050)	0.012 (0.019)	0.251 (0.196)	0.022 (0.022)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High Leverage})$	-0.121** (0.059)	-0.130** (0.064)	-0.130 (0.094)	-0.078 (0.073)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.117 (0.288)	-0.011 (0.033)
Observations	842,903	844,632	755,134	836,066	326,076	326,076	326,076
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.356	0.327	0.353	0.349	0.618	0.456	0.435
Outcome S.D.	1.146	1.170	1.278	1.323	0.504	3.464	0.386

Note: This table shows the effect of LBOs on job quality by leverage using an interaction approach and company-quarter-level data. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). The coefficient on $\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$ represents the effect for low-leverage deals using median cut-off. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.15: **Role of Layoffs in the Effect of LBOs on Job Quality: Interacted with Leverage**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.085 (0.057)	-0.078 (0.060)	-0.052 (0.090)	-0.071 (0.073)	0.020 (0.031)	0.050 (0.255)	-0.008 (0.029)
1(Post LBO) × 1(High Layoff)	0.019 (0.086)	0.085 (0.103)	0.136 (0.156)	0.074 (0.105)	-0.017 (0.040)	0.276 (0.419)	0.050 (0.048)
1(Post LBO) × 1(High Leverage)	-0.211** (0.094)	-0.186* (0.096)	-0.200 (0.139)	-0.125 (0.115)	0.010 (0.062)	0.119 (0.378)	0.027 (0.043)
1(Post LBO) × 1(High Layoff) × 1(High Leverage)	0.052 (0.133)	-0.065 (0.144)	0.007 (0.251)	-0.049 (0.166)	-0.034 (0.083)	-0.232 (0.760)	-0.057 (0.087)
Observations	841,325	843,052	753,854	834,493	325,275	325,275	325,275
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.356	0.327	0.353	0.349	0.618	0.456	0.435
Outcome S.D.	1.146	1.171	1.278	1.324	0.504	3.464	0.386

Note: This table shows the role of layoffs in the effect of LBOs on job quality, interacted with deal leverage. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). We compute layoff intensity as the difference between the average departure rate in the 4 years prior to the deal and the average departure rate in the 4 years after the deal. 1(High Layoff) indicates deals with above-median layoff intensity (1%). Employment data are from LinkedIn. 1(High Leverage) indicates deals with above-median leverage, measured as the ratio of debt to deal size. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Table A.16: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality by Employee Tenure at Firm: Review Level

Panel A: Review Level

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	0.024 (0.030)	0.033 (0.026)	0.039 (0.034)	0.036 (0.036)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.237)	0.001 (0.022)
1(Post LBO) × 1(2-3 Years Tenure)	-0.092*** (0.018)	-0.035** (0.017)	-0.088*** (0.019)	-0.074*** (0.022)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.043 (0.205)	0.003 (0.018)
1(Post LBO) × 1(4-5 Years Tenure)	-0.136*** (0.024)	-0.101*** (0.022)	-0.134*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.026)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.045 (0.317)	-0.000 (0.027)
1(Post LBO) × 1(6+ Years Tenure)	-0.114*** (0.031)	-0.096*** (0.024)	-0.145*** (0.031)	-0.091*** (0.035)	-0.029* (0.017)	-0.008 (0.289)	0.002 (0.025)
1(2-3 Years Tenure)	-0.136*** (0.004)	-0.149*** (0.004)	-0.179*** (0.004)	-0.261*** (0.005)	0.065*** (0.004)	0.735*** (0.019)	0.087*** (0.002)
1(4-5 Years Tenure)	-0.135*** (0.005)	-0.196*** (0.005)	-0.223*** (0.006)	-0.345*** (0.006)	0.171*** (0.005)	1.338*** (0.029)	0.149*** (0.003)
1(6+ Years Tenure)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.205*** (0.007)	-0.183*** (0.007)	-0.324*** (0.009)	0.358*** (0.006)	1.764*** (0.038)	0.185*** (0.004)
Observations	2,096,944	2,101,483	2,089,274	2,074,669	714,874	714,874	714,874
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.240	0.206	0.219	0.241	0.498	0.321	0.300
Outcome S.D.	1.273	1.328	1.391	1.450	0.582	4.221	0.462

Panel B: Review Level, Controlling for Other Worker and Job Characteristics

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base Earnings	Variable Earnings	Any Variable Earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	0.047 (0.039)	0.081** (0.034)	0.074* (0.042)	0.076 (0.047)	0.033 (0.022)	-0.135 (0.320)	-0.016 (0.029)
1(Post LBO) × 1(2-3 Years Tenure)	-0.111*** (0.026)	-0.068*** (0.022)	-0.099*** (0.025)	-0.091*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.154 (0.286)	0.016 (0.025)
1(Post LBO) × 1(4-5 Years Tenure)	-0.144*** (0.032)	-0.134*** (0.027)	-0.172*** (0.029)	-0.159*** (0.035)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.119 (0.447)	0.006 (0.038)
1(Post LBO) × 1(6+ Years Tenure)	-0.112*** (0.037)	-0.108*** (0.030)	-0.150*** (0.037)	-0.099** (0.045)	-0.031 (0.020)	0.038 (0.398)	0.006 (0.034)
1(2-3 Years Tenure)	-0.141*** (0.005)	-0.134*** (0.005)	-0.173*** (0.006)	-0.255*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.646*** (0.020)	0.078*** (0.002)
1(4-5 Years Tenure)	-0.158*** (0.006)	-0.176*** (0.006)	-0.220*** (0.007)	-0.348*** (0.007)	0.098*** (0.003)	1.107*** (0.028)	0.126*** (0.003)
1(6+ Years Tenure)	-0.075*** (0.009)	-0.191*** (0.008)	-0.206*** (0.008)	-0.363*** (0.010)	0.225*** (0.004)	1.334*** (0.033)	0.142*** (0.003)
Observations	1,061,066	1,062,659	1,057,160	1,060,382	477,266	477,266	477,266
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.259	0.228	0.240	0.267	0.619	0.357	0.330
Outcome S.D.	1.266	1.329	1.329	1.443	0.576	4.324	0.470

Note: This table reports how the effect of an LBO varies with the number of years an employee has been at the firm, using review-level data. This tenure variable takes one of four values: 0-1 year, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, and more than 5 years. The interaction with 0-1 years of tenure is omitted so that the coefficient on 1(Post LBO) represents the effect for that group. Panel B further controls for other worker and job characteristics, including a job's required work experience, required education, and a worker's manager status. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes < 0.05, and * denotes < 0.1.

Table A.17: **Effect of LBOs on Performance Pay Components by Manager Status**

	Has variable pay (1)	Has cash bonus (2)	Has stock bonus (3)	Has profit sharing (4)	Has sales commissions (5)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.010** (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.000 (0.007)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Manager})$	0.032** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.012)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.008)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Manager})$	0.170*** (0.002)	0.158*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)
Observations	296,783	296,783	296,783	296,783	296,783
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.447	0.418	0.348	0.338	0.369
Outcome S.D.	0.398	0.360	0.132	0.142	0.210

Note: This table reports the effect of LBOs on performance pay components by manager status, using company-quarter-cohort level data (Equation (2)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes < 0.05, and * denotes < 0.1.

Table A.18: **Effect of LBOs on Within-Firm Pay Inequality**

Panel A: Effect of LBOs on Within-Firm Pay Inequality

	Standard deviation		90-10 log difference		90-50 log difference	
	Base pay	Total pay	Base pay	Total pay	Base pay	Total pay
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	0.011 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.027 (0.017)	0.027 (0.017)	0.010 (0.010)	0.009 (0.012)
Observations	78,796	78,796	78,796	78,796	78,796	78,796
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.389	0.404	0.417	0.434	0.362	0.380
Outcome S.D.	0.145	0.156	0.320	0.347	0.203	0.224

Panel B: Effect of LBOs Interacted with Firm Having Above-Median Inequality Increase

Dependent Variable: Compensation & Benefits	Standard Deviation	90-10 log Difference	90-50 log Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	-0.087** (0.043)	-0.069* (0.039)	-0.081** (0.040)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{High Ineq Delta})$	-0.002 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.056)	-0.014 (0.056)
Observations	328,625	328,625	328,625
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.425	0.425	0.425
Outcome S.D.	1.016	1.016	1.016

Note: Panel A of this table reports the effect of LBOs on within-firm pay inequality using three measures: the standard deviation, 90-10 ratio, and 90-50 ratio, in either base pay or total pay, all at the company-quarter level. Panel B reports the effects of LBOs on Compensation & Benefits rating interacted with an indicator variable that equals one if an LBO target has an above-median change in inequality around buyout. We use company-quarter-level data (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.19: **Effect of Canceled LBOs on Job Quality**

Panel A: Summary Statistics of Canceled LBO Sample Reviews

	All			Canceled LBOs			Control Sample		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Company-Quarter Level									
Number of Reviews	828,160	4.13	18.96	2,745	15.58	46.92	825,415	4.09	18.78
Avg. Compensation & Benefits	822,040	3.43	1.15	2,738	3.18	0.85	819,302	3.43	1.15
Avg. Work-Life Balance	823,771	3.64	1.17	2,741	3.35	0.90	821,030	3.65	1.17
Avg. Culture & Values	738,625	3.70	1.28	2,078	3.31	0.96	736,547	3.70	1.28
Avg. Senior Management	815,283	3.39	1.33	2,723	2.92	0.98	812,560	3.39	1.33
Avg. Base Earnings	409,358	59,407	34,281	1,766	68,752	34,871	407,592	59,367	34,273
Avg. Variable Earnings	409,358	4,209	14,485	1,766	6,888	14,144	407,592	4,197	14,486
Avg. Any Variable Earnings	409,358	0.244	0.388	1,766	0.388	0.382	407,592	0.243	0.388
Review Level									
Compensation & Benefits	3,113,167	3.50	1.26	38,337	3.27	1.19	3,074,830	3.50	1.26
Work-Life Balance	3,120,146	3.60	1.31	38,416	3.43	1.28	3,081,730	3.60	1.31
Culture & Values	2,869,077	3.73	1.38	34,097	3.53	1.33	2,834,980	3.73	1.38
Senior Management	3,037,220	3.37	1.43	37,364	3.05	1.35	2,999,856	3.37	1.44
Base Earnings	1,153,618	62,971	39,902	12,736	62,803	41,300	1,140,882	62,973	39,886
Variable Earnings	1,153,618	5,481	18,635	12,736	5,853	17,474	1,140,882	5,477	18,648
Any Variable Earnings	1,153,618	0.291	0.454	12,736	0.371	0.483	1,140,882	0.290	0.454

Panel B: Effect of Canceled LBOs on Job Quality

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
ℙ(Post Cancelled LBO)	-0.028 (0.040)	0.082* (0.048)	0.037 (0.075)	0.058 (0.052)	0.059*** (0.020)	-0.223 (0.209)	-0.030 (0.023)
Observations	822,040	823,771	738,625	815,283	316,224	316,224	316,224
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.356	0.328	0.353	0.350	0.617	0.458	0.437
Outcome S.D.	1.150	1.174	1.280	1.327	0.503	3.452	0.385

Note: Panel A of this table presents summary statistics for the canceled LBO sample on each Glassdoor rating dimension, pay variables, and the number of reviews at the company-quarter and review level. Panel B reports the effect of canceled LBOs on job quality measures as a placebo test. The sample includes 108 canceled LBOs and all never-targeted firms as controls. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table A.20: **Summary Statistics of M&A Sample Reviews**

	All			Ever-M&A Sample			Control Sample		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Company-Quarter Level									
Number of Reviews	843,357	4.16	18.89	15,096	6.07	14.52	828,261	4.12	18.96
Avg. Compensation & Benefits	837,213	3.42	1.15	15,072	3.29	0.96	822,141	3.43	1.15
Avg. Work-Life Balance	838,935	3.64	1.17	15,064	3.44	1.03	823,871	3.64	1.17
Avg. Culture & Values	750,419	3.69	1.28	11,682	3.38	1.14	738,737	3.70	1.28
Avg. Senior Management	830,392	3.38	1.32	15,009	3.01	1.13	815,383	3.39	1.33
Avg. Base Earnings	356,688	60,861	34,106	7,769	72,050	38,045	348,919	60,612	33,972
Avg. Variable Earnings	356,688	4,512	14,413	7,769	8,046	18,012	348,919	4,433	14,313
Avg. Any Variable Earnings	356,688	0.258	0.387	7,769	0.389	0.414	348,919	0.255	0.386
Review Level									
Compensation & Benefits	3,197,134	3.49	1.25	83,953	3.35	1.21	3,113,181	3.50	1.26
Work-Life Balance	3,204,088	3.60	1.31	83,928	3.43	1.31	3,120,160	3.60	1.31
Culture & Values	2,941,598	3.72	1.39	72,483	3.45	1.41	2,869,115	3.73	1.38
Senior Management	3,119,909	3.36	1.43	82,674	3.08	1.41	3,037,235	3.37	1.43
Base Earnings	1,159,453	63,600	40,237	27,025	73,215	45,803	1,132,428	63,371	40,067
Variable Earnings	1,159,453	5,763	19,098	27,025	9,575	24,069	1,132,428	5,672	18,954
Any Variable Earnings	1,159,453	0.300	0.458	27,025	0.406	0.491	1,132,428	0.298	0.457

Note: This table presents summary statistics for our M&A sample on each Glassdoor rating dimension, reported pay, and the number of reviews at the company-quarter and review level. The Ever-M&A sample is all the companies with M&A deals in our main analysis (1,010 deals). The control sample is non-targeted companies.

Table A.21: **Effect of LBOs on Job Quality: Controlling for Employee Composition**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.087*** (0.018)	-0.068*** (0.019)	-0.098*** (0.024)	-0.070*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.011)	0.122 (0.094)	0.012 (0.011)
% Short Tenure	0.010*** (0.004)	0.072*** (0.004)	0.092*** (0.004)	0.138*** (0.004)	-0.095*** (0.002)	-0.348*** (0.019)	-0.038*** (0.002)
% Managers	0.316*** (0.006)	0.140*** (0.006)	0.306*** (0.007)	0.321*** (0.007)	0.292*** (0.004)	1.169*** (0.036)	0.115*** (0.004)
% Masters/Prof	0.046*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	0.054*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.012)	0.203*** (0.007)	0.320*** (0.044)	0.027*** (0.005)
% Long Work Experience	0.052*** (0.005)	0.077*** (0.005)	0.070*** (0.006)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.098*** (0.003)	0.222*** (0.021)	0.022*** (0.002)
% Headquarters	0.094*** (0.004)	0.109*** (0.004)	0.120*** (0.005)	0.104*** (0.004)	0.051*** (0.002)	0.208*** (0.020)	0.025*** (0.002)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.359	0.328	0.356	0.352	0.635	0.459	0.437
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Note: This table reports the effect of LBOs on job quality measures after controlling for employee composition. We add five continuous controls for the percentage of reviews in each company-quarter by employees who report the following characteristics: a tenure of less than three years, a job title that indicates the employee is a manager, a job title that typically requires Masters or Professional degrees, a job title that typically requires above-median work experience, and a location in the company headquarter's MSA. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Appendix B: Deal Characteristic Analysis For Online Publication

Deal Type and Size We examine two other important deal characteristics in Appendix Table B.1. First, we divide the LBO sample into three transaction types: public-to-private deals, corporate divestitures, and vanilla LBOs. The results, in Panel A, show that the negative effects are of roughly similar magnitude across the three deal types, and except for one, they are not significantly different from one another. The outlier is work-life balance, where corporate divestitures show a negative effect that is more than three times as large as vanilla LBOs. The coefficient of -0.158 represents 14% of a standard deviation (Panel A column (2)) and is significantly more negative than other LBOs (Appendix Table B.2 Panel A column (2)). Therefore, corporate divestitures are primarily responsible for a large share of the efficiencies in which employees are asked to work harder, and are also the largest source of negative effects on compensation. In these types of deals, employees at the targeted subsidiary may have previously benefited from managers who enjoyed the “quiet life” and suffered from the agency issues inherent in multiunit corporations (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). For example, Schoar (2002) argues that “conglomerates dissipate rents in the form of higher wages.”

The next characteristic is deal size. We define small as the bottom two terciles and large as the top tercile, though the results are similar using alternative deal size breakdowns. The results, shown in Appendix Table B.1 Panel B, indicate that the main effect is robust across both smaller and larger deals. However, there are more adverse effects on culture in smaller deals (column (3)). The effects on satisfaction with work-life balance and senior management are larger among bigger deals (columns (2) and (4)). These results combined with the corporate divestiture results from Panel A support the idea that as firms become larger and more diversified, employees are not required to work as hard, creating opportunities for an external acquirer (Seru, 2014).

ESG and Impact Funds Creating a positive social impact is an increasingly important priority for institutional investors, with the share of managed assets in the U.S. that are under ESG mandates as much as doubling since 2015 to represent \$17 trillion or a third of the total.³⁶ Labor relations are central to the “social” component of ESG (Henisz, Koller, and Nuttall, 2019). We examine whether deals led by funds with ESG or Impact investment mandates show different effects.

To do so, we acquired Preqin’s ESG module, which includes measures of ESG status for nearly 37,000 PE funds. We are able to match 48% of the Glassdoor-PitchBook deals’ funds to Preqin’s funds, resulting in 59% of the Glassdoor-PitchBook deals having at least one fund matched to Preqin’s funds. We focus on two categories: ESG and the subset of ESG called “Impact.” We classify deals according to the fund classification of the lead investor. The ESG category applies to any fund that reports considering environmental, social, or governance factors in its decision-making. The narrower “Impact” category includes funds with explicit investment policies to fund firms with positive social impact.³⁷ The Impact label has the stricter requirement that funds provide a formal impact strategy and evidence of compliance. Table 1 Panel C shows that while 13% of the deals in our data are associated with funds that describe themselves as ESG, only 3% are associated with Impact funds.

We first consider the full set of all ESG funds. As shown in Appendix Table B.3 Panel A, deals led by ESG funds are associated with the same negative effect on employees as other deals. One explanation is that fund ESG status is self-reported and notoriously poorly measured, which can enable funds to label

³⁶See, for example, [this USSIF article](#).

³⁷According to Preqin, “Preqin defines impact funds as funds in which the firm invests with positive impact as its primary goal. This is defined as having an impact investing policy, or being a member of GIIN and/or IFC OPIM.” See [Preqin ESG Blog](#) and [Preqin ESG Report](#).

themselves as ESG-oriented even if they are not.³⁸ Regardless, our results indicate that if limited partners wished to screen firms on treating employees well (as measured by the employees' own perceptions), they cannot achieve this by screening only on a broad ESG category. As labor relations become an increasing priority among limited partners, this potentially points to the need for new measures and sources of data.³⁹

We next focus on the Impact indicator, which represents the narrow category of investments by funds that, according to Preqin, require portfolio companies to have a positive impact. In Appendix Table B.3 Panel B, we document that our negative results are driven by non-Impact funds. There is no measurable effect of buyouts on employee satisfaction when the investment fund has an Impact orientation. Although this sample is small and our coefficients imprecise, it points to potential benefits from more stringent screens.

³⁸See, for example, [Howard-Grenville \(2021\)](#) or [this PitchBook article](#).

³⁹For example, one PE investor told PitchBook, as reported in [this PitchBook article](#), that “Sophisticated LPs are now asking tougher questions about a firm’s ESG efforts. For GPs, it’s no longer enough to just say, ‘Oh, we have an ESG policy.’”

Table B.1: **Heterogeneity in Effect of LBOs on Job Quality by Deal Type and Size**

Panel A: Deal Type

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Public to Private})$	-0.069* (0.040)	-0.067 (0.044)	-0.096 (0.061)	-0.069 (0.050)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.169 (0.193)	-0.022 (0.021)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Corp. Divestiture})$	-0.120*** (0.044)	-0.158*** (0.043)	-0.107* (0.059)	-0.098** (0.050)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.216)	-0.004 (0.025)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Vanilla LBO})$	-0.077*** (0.022)	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.090*** (0.030)	-0.052* (0.027)	0.017 (0.015)	0.270** (0.121)	0.030** (0.014)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.347	0.618	0.454	0.433
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Panel B: Deal Size

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Small Deal Size})$	-0.123*** (0.032)	-0.062* (0.035)	-0.153*** (0.048)	-0.053 (0.041)	0.004 (0.031)	0.372 (0.279)	0.032 (0.032)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Large Deal Size})$	-0.095*** (0.034)	-0.112*** (0.036)	-0.057 (0.053)	-0.115*** (0.041)	0.006 (0.019)	0.121 (0.166)	0.011 (0.019)
Observations	847,818	849,553	759,218	840,953	326,076	326,076	326,076
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.353	0.348	0.618	0.456	0.435
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.464	0.386

Note: This table shows whether deal type and deal size lead to different effects relative to a base of non-targeted companies, using Equation (1). We use company-quarter-level data. Panel A divides the sample of LBOs into three deal types: corporate divestitures, public-to-private deals, and “vanilla” deals in which a private, independent company is acquired. Panel B divides the sample of LBOs by deal size (top vs. bottom two terciles). Deals with missing size are excluded. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table B.2: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality by Deal Characteristics: Interaction Approach

Panel A: Deal Type

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	-0.077*** (0.022)	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.090*** (0.030)	-0.052* (0.027)	0.017 (0.015)	0.270** (0.121)	0.030** (0.014)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Public to Private})$	0.007 (0.046)	-0.030 (0.049)	-0.006 (0.068)	-0.017 (0.056)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.439* (0.226)	-0.052** (0.025)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Corp. Divestiture})$	-0.043 (0.049)	-0.121** (0.048)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.046 (0.056)	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.297 (0.247)	-0.034 (0.029)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.347	0.618	0.454	0.433
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Panel B: Deal Size

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$	-0.123*** (0.032)	-0.062* (0.035)	-0.153*** (0.048)	-0.053 (0.041)	0.004 (0.031)	0.372 (0.279)	0.032 (0.032)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Large Deal Size})$	0.028 (0.046)	-0.050 (0.050)	0.096 (0.071)	-0.062 (0.058)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.251 (0.322)	-0.021 (0.037)
Observations	847,818	849,553	759,218	840,953	326,076	326,076	326,076
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.353	0.348	0.618	0.456	0.435
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.464	0.386

Note: This table shows the effect of LBOs on job quality by deal characteristics using an interaction approach and company-quarter-level data. The coefficient on $\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$ in Panel A represents the effect for “vanilla” deals. The coefficient on $\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO})$ in Panel B represents the effect for small-size deals. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table B.3: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality by Fund ESG and Impact Status

Panel A: All ESG

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{ESG/Impact Fund})$	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.091** (0.045)	-0.161** (0.067)	-0.093* (0.055)	0.014 (0.023)	0.358* (0.187)	0.038* (0.022)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Non-ESG/Impact Fund})$	-0.084*** (0.020)	-0.058*** (0.020)	-0.081*** (0.026)	-0.057** (0.023)	0.011 (0.012)	0.058 (0.108)	0.006 (0.012)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.347	0.618	0.454	0.433
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Panel B: Impact Funds Only

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Impact Fund})$	-0.065 (0.091)	-0.001 (0.102)	-0.040 (0.132)	-0.056 (0.128)	0.024 (0.035)	0.411 (0.270)	0.039 (0.034)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Post LBO}) \times \mathbb{1}(\text{Non-Impact Fund})$	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.096*** (0.025)	-0.063*** (0.022)	0.010 (0.011)	0.097 (0.100)	0.010 (0.011)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.347	0.618	0.454	0.433
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Note: This table shows the effect of LBOs on job quality for funds with different ESG statuses, using Equation (1). Panel A uses the broad ESG definition, which includes Impact funds. Panel B considers only deals led by Impact funds. The data are at the company-quarter level. ESG and Impact classification are from Preqin. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Appendix C: Additional Robustness Checks For Online Publication

Matching Estimator. We use a matching estimator to construct an alternative control sample that is as similar as possible to the target sample. This helps to ensure that the full sample does not lead to spurious biases due to firms that are extremely different from buyout targets. We match each LBO target company to five never-PE-owned companies with at least one review in the three years prior to the deal. The matching is based on the founded year, industry, average percent of reviewers with more than three years of tenure, average percent of reviewers in jobs that do not typically require college, and log number of reviews. The last three variables are measured over the most recent three years. We use the [Abadie and Imbens \(2006\)](#) distance metric that weights each dimension by its standard deviation. Appendix Table C.1 shows that the matched sample is broadly similar to the LBO targets, except that the matched sample has broadly higher ex-ante satisfaction ratings. If anything, this should bias the estimation against finding a negative effect of LBOs.

Targeting. Our results raise the question of whether PE investors target firms with particularly high satisfaction for LBOs. In Appendix Table C.2, we predict buyouts using an indicator for the firm being acquired in an LBO the following quarter, dropping all subsequent quarters under PE ownership. As in the other analyses, the control group is all quarters for firms that never receive PE investment. The independent variables are rolling averages of firm-quarter-level characteristics over the preceding eight quarters. Across all models, we include firm age and size, proxied by the number of reviews. Both of these predict being an LBO target. In addition, we find that LBO investors tend to target firms with relatively high ratings for Work-Life balance, which could reflect targeting high-slack firms (column (1)). However, we do not find evidence of targeting on the other dimensions. We also do not find any evidence of targeting on employee characteristics (column (2)). They do seem to target firms with somewhat lower base pay (column (3)).

Aggregation. In Appendix Table C.3, we present the main analysis for all the ownership types at the review level – rather than the company-quarter level – and generally find similar results. The skewed firm size distribution means this review-level model puts most of its weight on the largest firms. Here, there is no effect of M&A transactions on satisfaction with compensation. The effects of LBOs on satisfaction with work-life balance and senior management are smaller and insignificant, suggesting that these results are driven by smaller firms, perhaps where the average reviewer has more contact with top executives at the firm.

In Appendix Table C.4 Panel A, we cluster standard errors by quarter rather than by company, which leads to more precise estimates than in our main table. In Appendix Table C.4 Panel B, the dependent variables are the median rather than average rating for each dimension. The estimates are similar to those in the main table.


Sample Cuts. Another sample construction concern is that the results reflect the aftermath of the financial crisis. In Appendix Table C.5, we show that the results are similar when using only deals that took place after 2013. This helps address both concerns about lower completeness for the early part of the sample and the possibility that PE deals in the wake of the financial crisis were systematically different.

We have many more reviews for the largest LBOs, as shown in Appendix Figure C.1. Our results are robust to different mechanisms of dealing with this dispersion beyond just considering review level versus company-quarter level. In Appendix Table C.6 we show that the results are robust to requiring a company to have at least 30 reviews in total during our sample period. This ensures that the results do not reflect firms with small numbers of reviews. We weight companies based on the number of reviews they have early in the sample for Appendix Table C.7 and again find the same results.

Recall that each review does not necessarily include ratings on all four dimensions. In Appendix Table C.8, we show that the results are very similar to those in our main table when we restrict the sample to reviewers who rate the company on all dimensions.

Additional Rating Dimensions. Finally, we examine the rating dimensions that we do not use in our main analysis because they are either sparsely populated or highly correlated with our main variables. These are Career Opportunities, Recommend this Company, Business Outlook, and Approves of CEO. The second and fourth are binary measures (the reviewer answers Yes or No). The third has answers including negative, neutral, and positive, which we convert into -1, 0, and 1, respectively. We also exclude Overall Rating because it is not a specific dimension of job quality and it correlates closely with the sum of the four dimensions we study. Panel A of Appendix Table C.9 contains summary statistics on these additional dimensions. Panel B shows the effect of PE buyouts on employee satisfaction on these additional rating dimensions.

Figure C.1: Number of Reviews Per LBO Target



Note: This figure presents a histogram of the number of Glassdoor reviews for the LBO targets in our analysis sample.

Table C.1: Comparison of LBO Targets and Matched Non-target Peers

	LBO targets Mean	Non-target Peers Mean	Difference T-test
Firm Characteristics at Deal Date			
Firm Age	28.247	28.528	-0.281
Number of Reviews	15.449	16.563	-1.114
% Long Tenure	0.443	0.443	0.000
% High School	0.193	0.186	0.007
Pre-deal Average Ratings			
Compensation & Benefits	3.198	3.288	-0.090***
Work-Life Balance	3.523	3.525	-0.002
Culture & Values	3.451	3.511	-0.060
Senior Management	3.099	3.184	-0.085***

Note: This table shows pre-deal firm characteristics for the LBO targets and the matched control sample of Glassdoor non-targets. The variable values are measured for the twelve quarters prior to the LBO. The unit of observation is a deal. P-values are from a two-sided t-test for means. *** denotes p-value <0.01, ** denotes p-value <0.05, and * denotes p-value <0.1.

Table C.2: LBO Targeting

	1(Target) (1)	1(Target) (2)	1(Target) (3)	1(Target) (4)
Compensation & Benefits	-0.045 (0.036)			-0.024 (0.069)
Work-Life Balance	0.099** (0.040)			0.046 (0.075)
Culture & Values	-0.047 (0.050)			-0.086 (0.082)
Senior Management	-0.067 (0.049)			-0.024 (0.086)
% Long Tenure		0.026 (0.076)		0.118 (0.154)
% Long Work Experience		-0.018 (0.127)		-0.058 (0.228)
% High School		0.063 (0.187)		0.076 (0.365)
% Managers		-0.027 (0.125)		-0.013 (0.255)
Base Earnings			-0.274* (0.166)	-0.274 (0.169)
Variable Earnings			-0.026 (0.098)	0.040 (0.104)
Any Variable Earnings			0.163 (0.843)	-0.366 (0.886)
Company Size	0.140*** (0.026)	0.136*** (0.026)	0.041 (0.034)	0.069* (0.035)
Company Age	0.080*** (0.031)	0.092*** (0.030)	0.115** (0.052)	0.059 (0.055)
Observations	856,068	856,068	362,090	334,785
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.004
Outcome Mean	0.630	0.630	0.707	0.669

Note: This table reports the OLS estimates where the dependent variable takes the value of one (multiplied by 1,000) if a company becomes an LBO target by PE in the next quarter. We include all pre-deal quarters for the LBO target and all quarters for control firms. Satisfaction rating dimensions, pay variables, and employee compositions are calculated as the rolling average over the past 8 quarters. Company size (log number of reviews) and company age (log number of quarters since the first review in Glassdoor) are measured up to the current quarter. All models include industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.3: Effect of Ownership Changes on Job Quality: Review-Level

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits (1)	Work-Life Balance (2)	Culture & Values (3)	Senior Management (4)	Base Earnings (5)	Variable Earnings (6)	Any Variable Earnings (7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.073*** (0.020)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.064** (0.028)	-0.023 (0.026)	0.022 (0.015)	0.002 (0.098)	-0.001 (0.012)
1(Post M&A)	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.068 (0.044)	-0.072* (0.038)	0.003 (0.014)	0.107 (0.144)	0.008 (0.014)
1(Post Management Buyout)	-0.055* (0.029)	0.076* (0.045)	0.078 (0.093)	0.108 (0.094)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.101 (0.146)	-0.013 (0.020)
1(Post Growth Equity)	-0.024 (0.030)	0.011 (0.035)	0.005 (0.043)	0.018 (0.040)	0.005 (0.013)	0.111 (0.120)	0.012 (0.014)
Observations	3,396,625	3,403,635	3,126,517	3,314,640	1,161,353	1,161,353	1,161,353
Company-Deal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.217	0.181	0.199	0.208	0.449	0.295	0.275
Outcome S.D.	1.259	1.317	1.390	1.438	0.579	4.179	0.458

Note: This table reports the effect of four types of ownership changes on job quality measures, using review-level data. The sample includes 1,371 LBOs, 1,010 M&As, 178 management buyouts, and 700 growth equity deals. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.4: **Effect of LBOs on Job Quality: Standard Errors and Median Ratings**

Panel A: Standard Errors Clustered by Quarter

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.083*** (0.014)	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.093*** (0.023)	-0.063*** (0.020)	0.011 (0.009)	0.119 (0.081)	0.012 (0.009)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.347	0.618	0.454	0.433
Outcome S.D.	1.145	1.170	1.277	1.323	0.504	3.468	0.386

Panel B: Median Ratings

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.087*** (0.019)	-0.051** (0.020)	-0.091*** (0.027)	-0.062*** (0.024)	0.006 (0.011)	0.025 (0.102)	0.000 (0.012)
Observations	859,501	861,251	769,555	852,586	331,647	331,647	331,647
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.353	0.321	0.347	0.343	0.614	0.443	0.425
Outcome S.D.	1.183	1.211	1.328	1.376	0.513	3.668	0.414

Note: This table reports the effect of an LBO on job quality measures, using Equation (1). Panel A uses company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable and clusters standard errors at the quarter level. Panel B uses company-quarter median ratings and reported pay in place of mean ratings and reported pay and clusters standard errors at the company level. All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.5: **Effect of LBOs on Job Quality Within Deals after 2013**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.083*** (0.023)	-0.044** (0.022)	-0.091*** (0.026)	-0.070*** (0.026)	0.006 (0.013)	0.069 (0.109)	0.007 (0.012)
Observations	849,519	851,253	761,585	842,636	328,050	328,050	328,050
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.355	0.326	0.352	0.348	0.618	0.455	0.434
Outcome S.D.	1.147	1.171	1.278	1.324	0.504	3.467	0.386

Note: This table reports the effect of an LBO on job quality measures using only deals that occurred after 2013. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.6: **Effect of LBOs on Job Quality For Firms With 30 or More Reviews**

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.072*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.021)	-0.067** (0.028)	-0.039 (0.025)	0.017 (0.014)	0.015 (0.120)	0.001 (0.014)
Observations	370,238	370,390	318,178	368,450	130,882	130,882	130,882
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.301	0.261	0.296	0.274	0.634	0.477	0.447
Outcome S.D.	0.977	1.014	1.103	1.137	0.479	3.279	0.359

Note: This table reports the effect of an LBO on job quality measures, restricting the sample to firms with at least 30 reviews. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.7: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality With Firms Weighted Based On Early Period Reviews

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.101*** (0.029)	-0.037 (0.040)	-0.075*** (0.028)	-0.031 (0.036)	0.016 (0.015)	0.059 (0.125)	0.004 (0.014)
Observations	484,138	484,457	561,217	480,931	154,784	154,784	154,784
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.404	0.337	0.377	0.317	0.689	0.543	0.509
Outcome S.D.	1.048	1.092	1.243	1.213	0.489	3.426	0.380

Note: This table reports the effect of LBOs on job quality measures with company-level weighting based on the number of reviews early in the sample. Specifically, we weight each company-quarter to the quotient: number of reviews for the company in 2008-2012/number of quarters for the company. For Culture & Values, we use 2012-2014 as Glassdoor added that rating item in May 2012. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.8: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality of Reviewers Who Rate Company on All Dimensions

	Satisfaction Data				Pay Data		
	Compensation & Benefits	Work-Life Balance	Culture & Values	Senior Management	Base earnings	Variable earnings	Any variable earnings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1(Post LBO)	-0.082*** (0.022)	-0.054** (0.023)	-0.088*** (0.025)	-0.065** (0.027)	0.002 (0.012)	0.089 (0.115)	0.009 (0.013)
Observations	757,497	757,497	757,497	757,497	295,538	295,538	295,538
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.368	0.342	0.353	0.359	0.616	0.455	0.435
Outcome S.D.	1.157	1.177	1.275	1.327	0.502	3.455	0.384

Note: This table reports the effect of an LBO on job quality measures, restricting the sample to reviewers who rate the company on all dimensions. We use company-quarter average reviews and reported pay as the dependent variable (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.

Table C.9: Additional Rating Dimensions

Panel A: Summary Statistics of Additional Rating Dimensions

	All			Ever-LBO Sample			Control Sample		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Company-Quarter Level									
Avg. Overall Rating	924,494	3.67	1.19	24,012	3.39	1.10	900,482	3.67	1.19
Avg. Career Opportunities	860,160	3.38	1.24	23,211	3.14	1.13	836,949	3.39	1.25
Avg. Recommend this Company	819,050	0.71	0.40	22,205	0.62	0.39	796,845	0.71	0.40
Avg. Business Outlook	720,425	0.43	0.68	19,030	0.30	0.65	701,395	0.44	0.68
Avg. Approves of CEO	567,124	0.45	0.64	19,669	0.31	0.62	547,455	0.45	0.64
Avg. Benefits Rating	96,662	3.58	1.21	1,186	3.28	1.23	95,476	3.58	1.21
Review Level									
Overall Rating	3,708,003	3.70	1.28	133,143	3.49	1.35	3,574,860	3.71	1.27
Career Opportunities	3,311,217	3.48	1.35	120,478	3.27	1.41	3,190,739	3.49	1.35
Recommend this Company	3,068,242	0.72	0.45	112,458	0.65	0.48	2,955,784	0.73	0.45
Business Outlook	2,714,891	0.45	0.76	100,533	0.32	0.81	2,614,358	0.45	0.76
Approves of CEO	2,433,652	0.46	0.72	98,085	0.34	0.76	2,335,567	0.47	0.72
Benefits Rating	187,101	3.64	1.24	2,058	3.26	1.28	185,043	3.65	1.24

Panel B: Effect of LBOs on Job Quality on Additional Rating Dimension

	Overall Rating	Career Opportunities	Recommend this Company	Business Outlook	Approves of CEO	Benefits Rating
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ℓ(Post LBO)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054*** (0.019)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.015)	-0.032** (0.014)	0.004 (0.083)
Observations	924,494	860,160	819,050	720,425	567,112	76,944
Company FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.335	0.341	0.288	0.315	0.310	0.445
Outcome S.D.	1.193	1.244	0.401	0.680	0.641	1.178

Note: Panel A of this table presents summary statistics on the additional rating types not used in our main analysis. Recommend this Company and Approves of CEO are binary ratings where the reviewer answers Yes or No and we convert them into 1 and 0. Business Outlook has ratings including negative, neutral, and positive, which we convert into -1, 0, and 1, respectively. Column (6) uses the benefits reviews from our sample of respondents who provided one. Panel B reports the effect of LBOs on employee satisfaction on these additional rating dimensions at the company-quarter level (Equation (1)). All models include company and industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. *** denotes p-value < 0.01, ** denotes <0.05, and * denotes <0.1.