Online Appendix (OA) for

"Competitive Dynamics in the Political Marketplace: How Donor Firms' Political Wins Prompt Product-Market Peers to Appoint Politicians to Their Boards"

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Online Appendix 1. Placebo Tests

Dependent variable =	***Number of Non-Politicians Appointed***		***Number of Politicians Appointed***	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Peers	0.005	0.006	0.038	0.031
	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Annual Board Turnover		0.620***		0.082**
		(0.076)		(0.028)
Log(Employees)		0.269***		0.010
		(0.024)		(0.015)
Leverage		-0.264***		0.189
		(0.049)		(0.123)
Profitability		-0.001		0.035
		(0.010)		(0.031)
Industry Competition (HHI)		-0.573		0.384
		(0.449)		(0.360)
Constant	0.926***	0.429***	0.071*	-0.120+
	(0.041)	(0.065)	(0.028)	(0.072)
Election F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,273	14,273	538	538
Adj-R-squared	0.032	0.130	0.009	0.042

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Online Appendix 2. Robustness Tests: Alternative Model Specifications

Dependent variable =	***Number of Politicians Appointed***				***Probability of Hiring Politicians***			
	Poisson Model		Zero-inflated Poisson Model		OLS Model		Logit Model	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment Peers	0.611*	0.633*	0.577*	0.571*	0.012*	0.012*	0.588*	0.614*
	(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.254)	(0.261)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.285)	(0.291)
Annual Board Turnover		0.557***		0.551***		0.024***		0.586***
		(0.100)		(0.105)		(0.005)		(0.099)
Log(Employees)		0.225***		0.251***		0.009***		0.213***
		(0.057)		(0.065)		(0.002)		(0.056)
Leverage		-0.265		-0.258		-0.005		-0.179
		(0.255)		(0.249)		(0.005)		(0.217)
Profitability		0.041		0.040		0.001		0.027
		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.001)		(0.046)
Industry Competition (HHI)		0.094		-0.011		-0.012		-0.604
		(2.547)		(2.592)		(0.068)		(2.492)
Constant	-20.845	-22.345	1.091***	0.202	0.024***	0.005	-5.037***	-5.314***
	(.)	(232.516)	(0.308)	(0.495)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(1.183)	(1.286)
Election F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,273	14,273	14,273	14,273	14,273	14,273	13,509	13,509
Pseudo-R-squared	0.048	0.082					0.035	0.066
Log Likelihood			-2021.224	-1963.146				
Adj-R-squared					0.006	0.016		

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The absence of a standard error for the constant in Model 1 is likely attributable to issues with model convergence.

Online Appendix 3. Robustness Tests: Alternative Samples

Dependent variable =	***Number of Politicians Appointed***			
	General Elections Sample		Sample with Hedging Donor Firms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Peers	0.000	0.000	0.013*	0.013*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Annual Board Turnover		0.033***		0.028***
		(0.004)		(0.005)
Log(Employees)		0.012***		0.012***
		(0.002)		(0.003)
Leverage		-0.009**		-0.008
		(0.004)		(0.006)
Profitability		-0.000		0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Industry Competition (HHI)		-0.007		-0.014
		(0.034)		(0.080)
Constant	0.026***	0.002	0.023***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Election F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	601,450	601,450	16,847	16,847
Adj-R-squared	0.009	0.030	0.007	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Online Appendix 4. Alternative Explanation: Mimetic Isomorphism

Dependent variable =	***Probability of PAC Creation***		
	(t+1)	*(t+2)*	*(t+3)*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment Peers	0.496	0.670	0.412
	(0.482)	(0.486)	(0.514)
Annual Board Turnover	-0.043	0.006	-0.040
	(0.196)	(0.210)	(0.247)
Log(Employees)	0.372***	0.289***	0.121
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.083)
Leverage	-0.577	-0.283	-0.505
	(0.490)	(0.343)	(0.459)
Profitability	0.057	0.041	0.039
	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Industry Competition (HHI)	-3.535	-2.496	2.615
	(5.925)	(4.494)	(3.576)
Constant	-4.849***	-2.464+	-3.328*
	(1.202)	(1.314)	(1.517)
Election F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,556	7,537	7,216
Pseudo-R-squared	0.109	0.108	0.095

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Online Appendix 5. Alternative Explanation: Governance Pressures

Dependent variable =	***Number of Politicians Appointed***			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Peers	0.014*	0.011+	0.014*	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Number of Common Analysts	0.001	0.000		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Treatment Peers x Common Analysts		0.001		
		(0.001)		
Number of Common Institutional Investors			0.000+	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Treatment Peers x Common Institutional Investors				0.000
				(0.000)
Annual Board Turnover	0.027***	0.027***	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Log(Employees)	0.009**	0.009**	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Leverage	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Profitability	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Industry Competition (HHI)	0.010	0.012	0.011	0.010
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Constant	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Election F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,273	14,273	14,273	14,273
Adj-R-squared	0.018	0.018	0.020	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001