

# Online Appendix: Gender differences in high-stakes performance and college admission policies

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## Appendix

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Table A1: Distribution of weights by gender

Male students			Female students		
Weight	Percent	Cum.	Weight	Percent	Cum.
40/140	15.60	15.60	40/140	14.15	14.15
50/140	3.55	19.15	50/140	3.70	17.85
60/140	23.60	42.74	60/140	25.02	42.87
70/140	6.68	49.43	70/140	7.98	50.85
80/140	50.57	100.00	80/140	49.15	100.00
<b>Total</b>	100.00		<b>Total</b>	100.00	

Table A2: Heterogeneity in field subjects' weights

	(1)	(2)
	1(Taking all exams)	Average weight
Female	0.00631* (0.00343)	0.0663 (0.0514)
Year FE	✓	✓
Mean Dep. Var	0.585	13.69
<i>N</i>	84677	84677

Sample: post-reform. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Avg. weight =  $\frac{W_B + W_C}{2}$ , with  $or = 0$  if the exam is not taken.

Note: column (1) - OLS regression of an indicator for taking all exams on a female indicator and year FE.  
column (2) - OLS regression of the average weight at admission on a female indicator and year FE.

Table A3: Date of birth effect  
Dependent Variable: Admission Grade

	(1)	(2)
Born in January	0.0727*** (0.0115)	0.0724*** (0.0115)
Year FE		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.00120	-0.00120
<i>N</i>	30255	30255

Sample: born in January or December.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Parental education gradient in admission grades

Dependent Variable: Admission Grade				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Both college educated	0.461*** (0.00557)			
At least one college educated		0.388*** (0.00464)		
Mother college educated			0.407*** (0.00491)	
Father college educated				0.384*** (0.00494)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean Dep. Var	7.08e-08	7.08e-08	7.08e-08	7.08e-08
Mean Indep. Var	0.233	0.455	0.347	0.341
<i>N</i>	183451	183451	183451	183451

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Note: OLS regressions of admission grades on one control at a time and year FE in all cases.

Table A5: Dependent Variable: Admission Grade Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0205*** (0.00275)	-0.0222*** (0.00547)	-0.0229*** (0.00251)	-0.0192*** (0.00497)
Female	0.0430*** (0.00187)		0.0328*** (0.00173)	
Female	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Gender-specific trends		✓		✓
Controls			✓	✓
Mean Dep. Var	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.499
<i>N</i>	183451	183451	182259	182259

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Rank is equal to one for the highest score within a cohort and zero for the lowest.

Controls: Mother and father education and occupation, year and month of birth, nationality, high school, postal code.

Table A6: Robustness Admission Grades

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0506*** (0.00952)	-0.0608*** (0.00872)	-0.0661*** (0.00761)	-0.0533*** (0.00712)
Female	0.142*** (0.00645)	0.109*** (0.00600)	0.142*** (0.00645)	0.108*** (0.00596)
Female	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Post $\times$ Subject weights			✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-1.57e-08	-0.00244	7.08e-08	-0.00240
Subject weights	19	19	Baseline (enrolment)	Baseline (enrolment)
$N$	183451	182259	183451	182259

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Controls: Mother and father education and occupation, year and month of birth, nationality, high school, postal code.

Table A7: Re-weighting effects of the reform

	Admission Grade		$\Delta$ Admission Grade Admission Grade, based on pre-treatment formula	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0641*** (0.0165)	-0.0621*** (0.0152)	-0.0475*** (0.00256)	-0.0452*** (0.00254)
Female	0.141*** (0.0106)	0.114*** (0.00985)		
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.000151	-0.0000259	-0.000338	-0.000303
$N$	70228	70067	70228	70067

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Sample: public schools, weighted to match admission scores by gender/year in the population via entropy balancing. Pre-treatment formula: pre-treatment weights for high school vs. high stakes and for core vs. field subjects within the high stakes GPA.

Controls: Mother and father education and occupation, year and month of birth, nationality, high school, postal code.

Table A8: Re-weighting effects of the reform, public schools, unweighted.

	Admission Grade		$\Delta$ Admission Grade Admission Grade, based on pre-treatment formula	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0354** (0.0149)	-0.0389*** (0.0140)	-0.0482*** (0.00264)	-0.0458*** (0.00261)
Female	0.103*** (0.00978)	0.0839*** (0.00916)		
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.139	-0.138	-0.000646	-0.000609
$N$	70228	70067	70228	70067

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Sample: public schools. Pre-treatment formula: pre-treatment weights for high school vs. high stakes and for core vs. field subjects within the high stakes GPA.

Controls: Mother and father education and occupation, year and month of birth, nationality, high school, postal code.

Table A9: Effect of the reform along the performance distribution  
Dependent Variable: Admission Grade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.00625 (0.0172)	-0.0321* (0.0179)	-0.120*** (0.0186)	-0.109*** (0.0191)
Female	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Predicted 1-25%	Predicted 25-50%	Predicted 50-75%	Predicted 75-100%
Mean Dep. Var	-0.383	-0.154	0.0720	0.466
$N$	45863	45863	45863	45862

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Within faculty-field-municipality autocorrelation in outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Thresh. Grade	#Enrolled Students	%Female Enrolled
Lagged T.Grade	0.949*** (0.0167)		
Lagged #Enrolled Students		0.987*** (0.00750)	
Lagged %Female Enrolled			0.951*** (0.00840)
Mean Dep. Var	-0.873	341.6	0.584
$N$	874	874	874

Standard errors clustered by the panel unit faculty-field-municipality.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Estimates weighted by the number of enrolled students.

Note: OLS regressions of the dependent variable on its lagged value.

Table A11: Threshold grades, program of enrollment

	Thresh G. (pre-treat).		Thresh G. (actual).	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.168*** (0.00498)		0.168*** (0.00498)	
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0262*** (0.00769)	-0.0537*** (0.0155)	-0.0720*** (0.00795)	-0.107*** (0.0158)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Gender-specific trends		✓		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.833	-0.833	-0.872	-0.872
<i>N</i>	166372	166372	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Thresh G. (pre-treat): based on pre-reform avg. values by faculty-field-municipality.

Thresh G. (actual): based on pre and post-reform averages by faculty-field-municipality.




Table A12: Allocation change across vs. within-field

	TG(pre-treat)	TG(pre-treat field avg.)	TG(pre-treat) - TG(pre-treat field avg.)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.168*** (0.00498)	0.0535*** (0.00173)	0.115*** (0.00467)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0262*** (0.00769)	-0.00223 (0.00270)	-0.0220*** (0.00715)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.833	-0.841	0.00763
$N$	166372	169955	166372

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

TG(pre-treat): threshold grade of enrolment, based on pre-reform avg. values by faculty-field-municipality.

TG(pre-treat field avg.): average by field of study.

Table A13: Date of birth effect

Dependent variable: threshold grade		
	(1)	(2)
Born in January	0.0585*** (0.0112)	0.0591*** (0.0112)
Year FE		✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.870	-0.870
$N$	28063	28063

Sample: born in January or December.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Parental education gradient in threshold grades

Dependent variable: threshold grade				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Both college educated	0.390*** (0.00584)			
At least one college educated		0.318*** (0.00457)		
Mother college educated			0.330*** (0.00496)	
Father college educated				0.328*** (0.00499)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean Dep. Var	-0.872	-0.872	-0.872	-0.872
Mean Indep. Var	0.230	0.452	0.344	0.337
$N$	170082	170082	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Note: OLS regressions of threshold grades on one control at a time and year FE in all cases.

Table A15: College performance and expected gains from the reform

College performance (passed/enrolled credits)	
(1)	
Female, $\widehat{\beta}(X) > 0$	0.0594*** (0.0122)
Male, $\widehat{\beta}(X) < 0$	-0.115*** (0.0190)
Male, $\widehat{\beta}(X) > 0$	-0.0534*** (0.0127)
Intercept (Female, $\widehat{\beta}(X) < 0$ )	0.00589 (0.00839)
Mean Dep. Var	-3.07e-11
$N$	39159
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ , ** $p < 0.05$ , *** $p < 0.01$ . Weighted sample.	
College performance (passed/enrolled credits)	
(1)	
$\widehat{\beta}(X)$	0.244*** (0.0587)
Female	0.116*** (0.0109)
Female $\times$ $\widehat{\beta}(X)$	0.0711 (0.0691)
Intercept	-0.0754*** (0.00900)
Mean Dep. Var	-3.07e-11
$N$	39159
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ , ** $p < 0.05$ , *** $p < 0.01$ . Weighted sample.	

Table A16: Predicted effect of the reform and pre-reform admission grades

	$\widehat{\beta}(X)$
	(1)
Admission Grade	-0.0121*** (0.000952)
Female	-0.0736*** (0.00121)
Female $\times$ Admission Grade	-0.0194*** (0.00132)
Intercept	0.0446*** (0.000868)
Mean Dep. Var	-3.60e-08
$N$	98774

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Pre-reform sample.

Table A17: College performance potential and expected gains from the reform, OLS prediction of  $\widehat{\beta}(X)$

	College performance (passed/enrolled credits)
	(1)
Female, $\widehat{\beta}(X) > 0$	0.0696*** (0.0121)
Male, $\widehat{\beta}(X) < 0$	-0.0832*** (0.0162)
Male, $\widehat{\beta}(X) > 0$	-0.0488*** (0.0136)
Intercept (Female, $\widehat{\beta}(X) < 0$ )	-0.000585 (0.00862)
Mean Dep. Var	-3.07e-11
$N$	39159

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Weighted sample.

Figure A1: Effect of the reform on admission grades by gender




Figure A2




Figure A3: College performance and expected gains from the reform





Figure A4: College performance and expected gains from the reform (unweighted)





Figure A5: College performance and expected gains from the reform across fields



## Appendix B: Career Prospects

In this Appendix, we study how the change in students' allocation changes students' career prospects. To this aim, we use survey data on a sample of pre-treatment college graduates from Catalan universities with information on labor market outcomes four years after graduation. For every student, we do not observe the exact academic program, but area (i.e., field of study) indicators and the university. There are enough area indicators (more than 50), which combined with the university of enrollment make it a meaningful measure, despite some measurement error. Figure A6 displays the social science classification to illustrate the level of detail of the field of study that we observe.<sup>1</sup>

Figure A6: Degree classification example: social science

**Catàleg de titulacions**

CODI	ENSENYAMENT	SUBÀMBIT DETALLAT (1r NIVELL)		SUBÀMBIT AMPLIAT (2n NIVELL)		ÀMBIT
2010101	Economia	20101	Economia	201	Economia, Empresa i Turisme	2 Ciències socials i jurídiques
2010102	Comptabilitat i finances	20101	Economia			
2010201	Administració i direcció d'empreses	20102	Administració d'Empreses			
2010202	Màrqueting i investigació de mercats					
2010203	Ciències empresarials					
2010204	Estudis internacionals d'economia i empresa					
2010301	Turisme	20103	Turisme			
2020101	Dret	20201	Dret	202	Dret, laboral i polítiques	
2020201	Criminologia	20202	Laboral			
2020202	Relacions laborals					
2020203	Ciències del treball					
2020204	Prevençió i seguretat integral	20203	Polítiques			
2020301	Gestió i administració pública					
2020302	Ciències polítiques i de l'administració					
2020401	Sociologia	20204	Sociologia, Geografia			
2020402	Antropologia social i cultural					
2020403	Geografia					
2030101	Comunicació audiovisual	20301	Comunicació	203	Comunicació i Documentació	
2030102	Periodisme					
2030103	Publicitat i relacions públiques					
2030201	Informació i documentació	20302	Documentació			
2040101	Educació infantil	20401	Mestres	204	Educació	
2040102	Educació primària					
2040103	Mestre. Especialitat d'Educació Especial					
2040104	Mestre. Especialitat d'Educació Física					
2040105	Mestre. Especialitat d'Educació Musical					
2040106	Mestre. Especialitat de Llengua Estrangera					
2040201	Pedagogia	20402	Pedagogia i Psicopedagogia			
2040202	Psicopedagogia					
2040203	Formació de professorat					
2050101	Treball social	20501	Treball i educació social	205	Intervenció Social	
2050102	Educació social					
2050201	Psicologia social i organitzacional					
2050201	Psicologia social i organitzacional	20502	Psicologia			
2100101	Titulacions Mixtes	21001	Titulacions Mixtes	210	Titulacions Mixtes	

<sup>1</sup>We do not observe academic programs (columns 1 and 2), but sub-sub-area indicators (columns 3 and 4).

In this representative survey, although girls outperform boys in educational attainment, females earn 23% less than males on average (9.3% less when accounting for field of study), as reported by Table A18.<sup>2</sup>

Table A18: Gender wage gap of college graduates

Dependent variable: ln(wage)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-0.232*** (0.00915)	-0.0923*** (0.00930)	-0.0939*** (0.00930)
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Field of study FE		✓	✓
University-by-field of study FE			✓
Mean Dep. Var	9.662	9.662	9.662
<i>N</i>	11729	11729	11724

Field of study: sub-sub-area.

Sample of 2006-2009 cohorts, 4 years after graduation.

All regressions control for year of survey FE

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The left panel of Figure A7 shows that there is almost no unconditional correlation between college selectivity and earnings. However, the right panel shows that a positive correlation exists within field of study. This is because selectivity is determined by capacity constraints and demand, and some high-paying technical degrees have good career prospects but low capacity constraints and low demand, while some degrees in the humanities have worse career prospects but high capacity constraints and demand. However, within field of study, where demand and capacity constraints are more homogeneous, the correlation is positive, as one would expect.

Figure A8 displays wages against the gender composition of academic programs. First, it shows that within academic programs, females earn lower wages. Second, it also shows that programs with a higher percentage of female students tend to pay less (for both males and females). This is important because the right panel of Figure A8 shows that due to the reform, females enroll less in programs with a higher pre-reform percentage of female

<sup>2</sup>We use the 2014 and 2017 waves of the survey, conducted by the Catalan Agency for the Quality of Universities (AQU), which include students from the 2006-2009 enrolling cohorts.

students.

Figure A7: Threshold grades and wages

Unconditionally

Within field





Figure A8

% of female students  
and wages

% female enrollment  
by pre-treatment female enrollment



Hence, given these patterns of earnings across academic programs, the effect of the reform on career prospects by gender is not straightforward. To estimate it, we first estimate expected labor market outcomes by academic program using the survey data, which includes cohorts enrolling in college between 2006 and 2009 (i.e., pre-reform cohorts):

$$Outcome_{it} = \delta Female_i + \alpha (Area \times Uni)_i + \beta Trend_t + \gamma Trend_t \times (Area \times Uni)_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where labor market outcomes of student  $i$  in enrolling cohort  $t$  are measured for the 2006-2009 enrolling cohorts (and survey FE have been partialled out), and where  $Area \times Uni$  are dummies for study subarea (or sub-sub-area) by university.

In a second step, we combine the predicted labor market outcomes from the previous regression with the college enrollment data from the Selectivitat dataset, and we estimate:

$$\widehat{Outcome}_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma Female_i + \beta Female_i \times Post_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

Table A19 reports point estimates, indicating an increase of around 2.5pp in the gap on top of a 9.3pp pre-reform gap within field of study (and an unconditional 23pp pre-reform gap). Table A20 reports point estimates on the expected employment rate. Given the high employment rate among Catalan university graduates (around 87% according to the survey), the magnitude of the effect is smaller but still significant. To benchmark the magnitude of these effects, it is interesting to compare them with the findings in ? that pollution in matriculation exam days leads to lower test scores, resulting in a decline in post-secondary education and earnings. It turns out that the effect on female test scores and career prospects is similar in magnitude to the effect of one standard deviation in pollution exposure on the day of the exam. Tables A21 and A22 report placebo tests showing that the change in the post-treatment period is large and significant compared to any changes within the pre-treatment period.

Table A19: Dependent Variable: Predicted log(wage)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.229*** (0.00167)	-0.224*** (0.00172)	-0.244*** (0.00195)	-0.229*** (0.00203)
Female × Post 2009	-0.0212*** (0.00276)	-0.0140*** (0.00282)	-0.0361*** (0.00341)	-0.0274*** (0.00354)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Main Predictor	Sub-field × Uni	Sub-field × Uni × Female	Sub-sub-field × Uni	Sub-sub-field × Uni × Female
Mean Dep. Var	9.684	9.688	9.661	9.665
<i>N</i>	170082	170082	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A20: Dependent Variable: Predicted Employment Rate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.0109*** (0.000515)	-0.00983*** (0.000600)	-0.0148*** (0.000695)	-0.0134*** (0.000787)
Female × Post 2009	-0.00340*** (0.00104)	-0.00110 (0.00110)	-0.00868*** (0.00169)	-0.00551*** (0.00174)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Main Predictor	Sub-field × Uni	Sub-field × Uni × Female	Sub-sub-field × Uni	Sub-sub-field × Uni × Female
Mean Dep. Var	0.873	0.872	0.874	0.872
<i>N</i>	170082	170082	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A21: Dependent Variable: Predicted log(wage)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.228*** (0.00241)	-0.224*** (0.00249)	-0.243*** (0.00276)	-0.229*** (0.00288)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.0203*** (0.00319)	-0.0142*** (0.00326)	-0.0353*** (0.00392)	-0.0276*** (0.00407)
Female $\times$ Post 2007	-0.00181 (0.00334)	0.000519 (0.00344)	-0.00152 (0.00390)	0.000392 (0.00406)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Main Predictor	Sub-field $\times$ Uni	Sub-field $\times$ Uni $\times$ Female	Sub-sub-field $\times$ Uni	Sub-sub-field $\times$ Uni $\times$ Female
Mean Dep. Var	9.684	9.688	9.661	9.665
$N$	170082	170082	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A22: Dependent Variable: Predicted Employment Rate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.0117*** (0.000853)	-0.0113*** (0.000986)	-0.0144*** (0.000997)	-0.0137*** (0.00116)
Female $\times$ Post 2009	-0.00408*** (0.00109)	-0.00242** (0.00117)	-0.00835*** (0.00182)	-0.00583*** (0.00189)
Female $\times$ Post 2007	0.00143 (0.00105)	0.00277** (0.00122)	-0.000702 (0.00139)	0.000686 (0.00158)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Main Predictor	Sub-field $\times$ Uni	Sub-field $\times$ Uni $\times$ Female	Sub-sub-field $\times$ Uni	Sub-sub-field $\times$ Uni $\times$ Female
Mean Dep. Var	0.873	0.872	0.874	0.872
$N$	170082	170082	170082	170082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Appendix C: exam structure

Table A23: Exam Structure Comparison, sample of subjects

Subject	2009 (pre-reform)	2010 (post-reform)
<b>Catalan</b>	Can choose between two exam models with same structure Part 1: reading. 4 OE questions Part 2: writing. 1 OE question Part 3: reflection on language. 4 OE, 1 MCQ	Can choose between two exam models with same structure Part 1: reading. 4 OE, 2 MCQ Part 2: writing. 3 OE questions Part 3: reflection on language. 2 OE, 2 MCQ
<b>Economics</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure 6 OE questions	Can choose between two options with same structure 6 OE questions
<b>English</b>	Part 1: reading. 1 page text + 8 MCQs Part 2: writing. Choose between 2 topics (100 words) Part 3: listening. 8 MCQs	Part 1: reading. 1 page text + 8 MCQs Part 2: writing. Choose between 2 topics (100 words) Part 3: listening. 8 MCQs
<b>History</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure For each option: text + 5 OE and infographic + 5 OE	Can choose between two options with same structure For each option: text + 5 OE and infographic + 5 OE
<b>Industrial Tech.</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure 5 MCQs + 3 OE exercises	Can choose between two options with same structure 5 MCQs + 3 OE exercises
<b>Latin</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure 3 OE, 1 MCQ	Can choose between two options with same structure 3 OE, 1 MCQ
<b>Mathematics</b>	6 OE questions Must answer 3 out of 4 questions (2 points each), 1 out of 2 questions (4 points each))	6 OE questions (Must answer 5 out of 6 questions (2 points each))
<b>Philosophy</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure For each option: text + 5 OE	Can choose between two options with same structure or each option: text + 5 OE
<b>Physics</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure For each option: 6 OE questions	Can choose between two options with same structure For each option: 5 OE questions
<b>Spanish</b>	Can choose between two options with same structure Part 1: reading. 5 OE, 1 MCQ Part 2: writing. 1 OE question Part 3: reflection on language. 3 OE, 2 MCQ	Can choose between two options with same structure Part 1: reading. 4 OE, 2 MCQs Part 2: writing. 3 OE questions Part 3: reflection on language. 2 OE, 2 MCQ

Note: OE = open-ended question; MCQ = multiple choice question.

Source: <https://www.selecat.cat/>