ONLINE APPENDIX

The signals we give: Performance feedback, gender, and competition

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A Theoretical Framework

In this section, we present a simple theoretical framework to help guide the interpretation of our results. Advisees have ability $a \in \{G, B\}$ where $G > B$. Each advisee is paired with an advisor, the latter of whom receives a signal s about their advisee's ability. The signal space is $s \in \{G, B, G \cup B\}$. Denote μ as the probability that the advisor observes a signal that matches the advisee's ability ($s = a$). The advisor never observes a signal that contradicts the advisee's ability, but they may observe an uninformative signal ($s = G \cup B$). Hence, with probability $1 - \mu$ the advisor observes the completely uninformative signal (in our experiment, $1 - \mu = 0.05$).

After observing signal s, the advisor decides what feedback f to transmit to their advisee. Matching the experimental design, the advisor cannot lie but can obscure information. Hence, an advisor receiving a signal $s = G$ can choose to send one element $f \in \{G, G \cup B\}$. Analogously, an advisor receiving a signal $s = B$ can choose to send one element $f \in \{B, G \cup B\}$. When $s = G \cup B$, $f = G \cup B$.

We assume that the advisee values information for two reasons: (i) its instrumental value (that is, information guides optimal decision making); and (ii) its hedonic value (that is, the advisee gains ego utility from believing that they are of higher ability). Or equivalently, the advisee receives a lower utility from believing that they are of lower ability.[1]

A.1 Advisee's Welfare

The advisee forms subjective prior beliefs p_0 about the probability that their ability is $a = G$. We assume that the advisee derives utility from the beliefs they hold about their ability, $b(p_0) = \beta p_0$, where $\beta > 0$ represents the marginal utility the advisee derives from holding higher beliefs about their ability.

Moreover, the advisee receives instrumental utility. Specifically, the advisee's instrumental payoff depends on: (i) whether or not the advisee enters into a tournament; and (ii) the advisee's ability. Denote the advisee's payoff as π_a^E, where $E \in \{0, 1\}$ represents the advisee's tournament-entry decision and $a \in \{G, B\}$ represents their ability. Hence, there are four possible payoff values, and we assume that

$$\pi_G^1 > \pi_G^0 > \pi_B^0 \geq \beta > \pi_B^1 = 0.$$

[1] Although one could also consider a theoretical model where advisees receive benefits from distorting beliefs, we assume that advisees are Bayesian in their updating behavior (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005).

The requirement that $\pi_B^0 \geq \beta$ derives from an assumption that instrumental utility weakly dominates ego utility.[2]

Given belief p_0, the advisee enters the tournament if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} p_0 \cdot \pi_G^1 &> p_0 \cdot \pi_G^0 + (1 - p_0) \cdot \pi_B^0 \\ \Rightarrow p_0 &> \frac{\pi_B^0}{\pi_G^1 - \pi_G^0 + \pi_B^0}. \end{aligned} \tag{A.1}$$

We denote the resulting instrumental utility as $U(p_0, a)$, since it is completely determined by beliefs p_0 and ability a. Hence, and assuming that advisees are risk-neutral, the advisee's total welfare is given by

$$W(p_0, a) = b(p_0) + U(p_0, a). \tag{A.2}$$

A.2 Advisor's Utility

The advisor does not receive any direct reward for the feedback they choose to give to their advisee. We assume that the advisor is altruistic, and places some weight $\alpha > 0$ on their advisee's total welfare.

The advisor does not know the prior belief that their advisee holds about their own performance, but the advisor forms second-order beliefs about the advisee's confidence. Let $\hat{p}_0$ represent the advisor's belief of the prior probability that the advisee has assigned to having ability $a = G$. We assume advisors are heterogeneous in their second-order beliefs. Specifically, we assume that $\hat{p}_0$ is uniformly distributed, $\hat{p}_0 \sim \mathcal{U}(0, 1)$.

Given this, we represent the advisor's utility as

$$\alpha \hat{W}(\hat{p}_0, a) = \alpha \left[b(\hat{p}_0) + U(\hat{p}_0, a) \right]. \tag{A.3}$$

Next, for simplicity, we normalize $\alpha = 1$. In addition, we also augment the instrumental-utility component of (A.3) with $\gamma \in \{0, 1\}$ to indicate whether the advisor's feedback has any impact on the advisee's instrumental utility. Specifically, if $\gamma = 0$, the advisor's feedback is non-instrumental in that their feedback will have no impact on the advisee's tournament-entry decision.[3] If $\gamma = 1$, the advisor's feedback is instrumental in influencing the advisee's tournament-entry decision. Hence, given signal s, the advisor chooses feedback f to maximize

$$b(\hat{p}_0) + \gamma U(\hat{p}_0, a). \tag{A.4}$$

[2] Specifically, we assume that the material gain from making the correct entry decision: $\pi_B^0 - \pi_B^1 = \pi_B^0$, is at least as large as the gain from believing one is $a = G$ for certain rather than $a = B$ for certain, which is β.

[3] Although the advisee continues to receive instrumental utility from their decision, from the advisor's perspective this utility is fixed and hence unaffected by feedback.

A.3 Advisor's Feedback Decisions

We now evaluate the advisor's optimal strategy given each possible signal that they receive.

First, consider an advisor who observes $s = G \cup B$. Since they have only one action ($f = G \cup B$), their strategy is trivial.

Next, consider an advisor who observes $s = G$. The advisor can either send precise feedback ($f = G$) or obscure feedback ($f = G \cup B$). It is straightforward to show that they will always send precise feedback, i.e., $f = G$. This is because $f = G$ is a perfectly informative signal, which results in a second-order posterior belief of $\hat{p}_1 = 1$ regardless of the second-order prior. Hence, the advisor will expect the advisee to enter the tournament. Given that only high-ability advisees ($a = G$) can induce such signals (and therefore receive such feedback from their advisor), from the advisor's point of view, this leads to the uniquely maximal welfare for the advisee, consisting of the highest belief and the highest instrumental payoffs: $b(1) + \gamma \cdot \pi_G^1$.[4]

Finally, consider an advisor who observes $s = B$. The advisor can either send precise feedback ($f = B$) or obscure feedback ($f = G \cup B$). Since $b(0) = 0$, the advisor's utility from sending precise feedback is simply $\gamma \cdot \pi_B^0$. We next turn to the advisor's utility from obscuring feedback.

Denote $\nu \in [0, 1]$ as the probability that an advisor observing $s = B$ obscures feedback. We can determine how advisors perceive their advisees to update their beliefs, after receiving feedback, to arrive at a new posterior, $\hat{p}_1$. That is,

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{p}_1 = \Pr(G|f = G \cup B) &= \frac{\Pr(f = G \cup B|G) \cdot \Pr(G)}{\Pr(f = G \cup B)} \\
&= \frac{(1-\mu) \cdot \hat{p}_0}{(1-\mu) \cdot \hat{p}_0 + [(1-\mu) + \mu\nu] \cdot (1 - \hat{p}_0)} \\
&= \frac{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0}{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0 + (0.05 + 0.95\nu) \cdot (1 - \hat{p}_0)},
\end{aligned} \tag{A.5}$$

given $\mu = 0.95$.

The advisor expects the advisee to enter the tournament if (A.5) $>$ the RHS of (A.1), i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\frac{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0}{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0 + (0.05 + 0.95\nu) \cdot (1 - \hat{p}_0)} > \frac{\pi_B^0}{\pi_G^1 - \pi_G^0 + \pi_B^0} \\
\Rightarrow &\frac{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0}{0.05 + 0.95\nu \cdot (1 - \hat{p}_0)} > \frac{\pi_B^0}{\pi_G^1 - \pi_G^0 + \pi_B^0}.
\end{aligned} \tag{A.6}$$

The LHS of (A.6) is increasing in $\hat{p}_0$. This implies that the advisor's perception of the likelihood of tournament entry by the advisee is increasing in their belief about the advisee's confidence. Additionally, the LHS of (A.6) is decreasing in ν. This implies that as more advisors who

[4] To see that obscuring feedback ($f = G \cup B$) would always result in lower utility to the advisor, it is sufficient to note that obscuring feedback would always result in $\hat{p}_1 < 1$, and $b(\hat{p}_1) < b(1)$ for all $\hat{p}_1 < 1$.

receive a signal $s = B$ obscure feedback ($f = G \cup B$), the more such feedback is expected to be perceived as a negative signal of performance, thus leading to lower tournament entry by the advisee.

We now make two observations. First, an advisor who perceives that their advisee has sufficiently low confidence will believe that the advisee never (mistakenly) enters the tournament independent of ν. In this case, the advisor will always obscure feedback, since $b(\hat{p}_1) + \gamma \cdot \pi_B^0 > \gamma \cdot \pi_B^0$, and $b(\hat{p}_1) > 0$ for $\hat{p}_1 > 0$.

Second, an advisor who perceives that their advisee has sufficiently high confidence will believe that the advisee always enters the tournament independent of ν. In this case, obscuring feedback ($f = G \cup B$) will nonetheless result in the advisee (mistakenly) entering the tournament (receiving a payoff of $\pi_B^1 = 0$), and consequently having a welfare equal to their ego utility only: $b(\hat{p}_1) = \hat{p}_1 > 0$. On the other hand, sending precise feedback will result in non-entry (receiving a payoff of π_B^0), zero ego utility (since $b(\hat{p}_1) = b(0) = 0$), and consequently a welfare of: $\gamma \cdot \pi_B^0$. The advisor's decision will therefore depend on the instrumentality of feedback (i.e., γ):

1. When feedback is non-instrumental ($\gamma = 0$), the advisor only cares about their advisee's ego utility. Hence, an advisor receiving negative a signal $s = B$ will always obscure feedback. That is, when feedback is non-instrumental, all advisors receiving a negative signal $s = B$ will obscure feedback, and therefore $\nu = 1$. Obscuring feedback has no material consequences, since advisees do not have the opportunity to receive their advisor's feedback before making their tournament-entry decision. Because advisees are not naïve, they correctly perceive that "no news is bad news", and hence update in the negative direction. However, given that there is a chance that feedback may have come from an *uninformed* advisor, they remain more confident than the counterfactual of receiving precise feedback ($f = B$).

2. When feedback is instrumental ($\gamma = 1$), the advisor cares about both the ego and instrumental utilities of the advisee. Given our assumption that the advisee's instrumental payoff dominates their ego utility, i.e., $\gamma \cdot \pi_B^0 \geq \beta > b(\hat{p}_1) = \beta \hat{p}_1$, an advisor would send precise feedback *only if they perceive their advisee to have sufficiently high confidence*.

Taken together, an advisor who receives a negative signal $s = B$ will always obscure feedback when feedback is non-instrumental. When feedback is instrumental, the advisor's feedback choice will depend on their second-order beliefs. Specifically, they will obscure feedback if they have sufficiently low $\hat{p}_0$, but they will send precise feedback if they have sufficiently high $\hat{p}_0$. Solving for the precise cut-off $\hat{p}_0^*$ which characterizes the perfect Bayesian equilibrium

equates to finding the fixed point of (A.6):

$$\frac{0.05 \cdot \hat{p}_0^*}{0.05 + 0.95\hat{p}_0^* \cdot (1 - \hat{p}_0^*)} = \frac{\pi_B^0}{\pi_G^1 - \pi_G^0 + \pi_B^0} \tag{A.7}$$

The precise value of $\hat{p}_0^*$ depends on the payoffs (i.e., π_a^E for $E \in \{0, 1\}$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$). Given our assumptions, we note that the RHS of (A.7) is bounded between 0 and 1. Here we consider one example, where the ratio of payoffs is similar to the parameters used in our experiment. When $\pi_G^1 = 6$, $\pi_G^0 = 2$, $\pi_B^0 = 1$, and $\pi_B^1 = 0$, from (A.7), $\nu = \hat{p}_0^* \approx \frac{4}{5}$. Then among advisors who receive a negative signal $s = B$, 80% of advisors (those with $\hat{p}_0 < 0.80$) will obscure feedback, and 20% of advisors (those with $\hat{p}_0 \geq 0.80$) will send precise feedback, expecting it to prevent the advisee from mistakenly entering the tournament.

A.4 Summary

Here, we summarize the key observations resulting from our theoretical framework. First, independent of the instrumentality of feedback, an advisor who receives a positive signal $s = G$ will always send precise feedback. An advisor who receives a negative signal $s = B$ will obscure feedback when feedback is non-instrumental. However, when feedback is instrumental and an advisor receives a negative signal $s = B$, some advisors will obscure feedback while others will send precise feedback, and this will depend on their beliefs of the advisee's confidence. Overall, the likelihood of obscuring feedback decreases if: (i) feedback is positive, (ii) feedback is instrumental, and (iii) the advisor holds higher second-order beliefs about the advisee's confidence.

B Additional Figures and Tables



(a) Overall



(b) Non-Instrumental Feedback



(c) Instrumental Feedback

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.1: Proportion of advisors who send feedback that is vaguer than signal (by signal valence and treatment) [Main Experiment]



(a) Overall



(b) Non-Instrumental Feedback



(c) Instrumental Feedback

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.2: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal (by signal valence, signal precision, and treatment), with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half) [Main Experiment]



(a) Non-Instrumental Feedback

(b) Instrumental Feedback

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.3: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal (by signal valence, signal precision, treatment, and advisee's gender), with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half) [Main Experiment]



(a) Non-Instrumental Feedback

(b) Instrumental Feedback

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.4: Proportion of advisors who send feedback that is vaguer than signal (by signal valence, advisee's gender, and treatment) [Main Experiment]



Note: These statements are presented in a random order for each advisor.

Figure B.5: Post-experimental survey question to capture advisors' motives for feedback decisions [Follow-up Experiment]



Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.6: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal when feedback is non-instrumental (by signal valence and signal precision) [Follow-up Experiment]



Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.7: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal when feedback is non-instrumental, excluding those who fail comprehension check question (by signal valence and signal precision) [Follow-up Experiment] (N = 919)



(a) Main Experiment (b) Follow-up Experiment

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.8: Proportion of advisors sending no or vague feedback, given precise signals of performance (by signal valence and treatment)



(a) Entire sample (N = 1,210) (b) Not failing comprehension question (N = 911)

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.9: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal when feedback is non-instrumental, both overall and excluding those who fail comprehension check question (by signal valence, signal precision, and advisee's gender) [Follow-up Experiment]



Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.10: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal when feedback is non-instrumental, excluding those who fail comprehension check question (by signal valence, signal precision, and advisee's gender) [Main Experiment] (N = 508)



(a) Beliefs about Advisee's Baseline Tournament Choice (b) IAT Scores

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.11: Advisors' beliefs about advisee's tournament choice and advisors' IAT scores [Main Experiment]



Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.12: Gender differences in envy motives [Follow-up Experiment]



(a) Advisors observe a negative signal of "Rank 4" (b) Advisors observe a positive signal of "Rank 1"

Figure B.13: Advisors' beliefs about feedback decisions of other advisors [Main Experiment]



(a) Male Advisees

(b) Female Advisees

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure B.14: Proportion of advisees choosing to enter tournament, with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half)

Table B.1: Number of advisors assigned to each treatment by advisee's gender

Signal Received	Main Experiment								Follow-up Experiment			
	Non-Instrumental				Instrumental							
	Male	Female	NB	Total	Male	Female	NB	Total	Male	Female	NB	Total
Precise, Positive (Rank 1 / Rank 2)	136	100	2	238	83	118	0	201	133	159	6	298
Precise, Negative (Rank 3 / Rank 4)	121	87	1	209	98	105	0	203	144	147	0	291
Vague, Positive (Top Half)	50	45	0	95	43	50	0	93	178	145	8	331
Vague, Negative (Bottom Half)	57	38	0	95	39	67	1	107	149	155	0	304
Total	364	270	3	637	263	340	1	604	604	606	14	1,224

NB: Non-Binary. The follow-up experiment only has the non-instrumental feedback treatment.

Table B.2: OLS regression results for attrition by advisees [Main Experiment]

	(1)	(2)
Dependent Variable: Advisee does not return for Phase 3		
Raven's matrices task attempts	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Raven's matrices task score	−0.009**	−0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prior belief about own expected rank	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Male	−0.004	−0.085
	(0.015)	(0.080)
Male × Raven's matrices task score		0.005
		(0.005)
Nonbinary	0.175	0.168
	(0.205)	(0.199)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Black/ African American	0.071**	0.074**
	(0.036)	(0.037)
Hispanic/ Latino	−0.031	−0.031
	(0.026)	(0.026)
College	0.028	0.027
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Bachelor	0.002	0.002
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Masters or above	0.010	0.010
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income = $20k-$39k	0.001	−0.000
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income = $40k-$59k	0.033	0.032
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Income = $60k-$79k	0.006	0.005
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income = $80k-$99k	−0.022	−0.023
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income > $100k	0.018	0.018
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Strong conservative	−0.043	−0.043
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Moderate conservative	−0.022	−0.022
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Moderate liberal	−0.022	−0.023
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Strong liberal	−0.016	−0.015
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Democrat	−0.030	−0.029
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Republican	−0.013	−0.014
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Constant	0.178**	0.225**
	(0.079)	(0.095)
Observations	1,305	1,305
R^2	0.027	0.028

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.3: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (overall and by treatment), with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half) [Main Experiment]

	Overall			Non-Instrumental		Instrumental	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee							
Negative signal	0.087^{**}	0.097^{***}	0.144^{***}	0.137^{**}	0.130^{**}	0.042	0.079
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Precise signal	0.204^{***}	0.210^{***}	0.199^{***}	0.183^{***}	0.192^{***}	0.233^{***}	0.248^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Negative signal × Precise signal	-0.106^{**}	-0.124^{**}	-0.155^{**}	-0.133^{*}	-0.146^{**}	−0.092	-0.130^{*}
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Instrumental feedback	−0.006	0.003	0.016				
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.044)				
Negative signal × Instrumental			−0.090				
			(0.073)				
Precise signal × Instrumental			0.029				
			(0.078)				
Negative signal × Precise signal			0.054				
× Instrumental feedback			(0.103)				
Constant	0.110^{***}	0.190^{**}	0.184^{*}	0.105^{***}	0.112	0.108^{***}	0.312^{**}
	(0.026)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.032)	(0.132)	(0.032)	(0.139)
Negative signal	−0.019	−0.027	−0.011	0.004	−0.015	−0.050	−0.051
+ Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1,241	1,241	1,241	637	637	604	604
R^2	0.028	0.050	0.051	0.022	0.062	0.038	0.086

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's gender, quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a positive signal of "Rank 1" or "Top Half".

Table B.4: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment, interacting with advisee's gender), with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half) [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental		Instrumental	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee				
Female advisee	-0.073	-0.067	0.113^{*}	0.089
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Negative signal	0.035	0.028	0.133^{*}	0.175^{**}
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.074)
Precise signal	0.140^{*}	0.159^{**}	0.353^{***}	0.348^{***}
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.088)
Female advisee × Negative signal	0.240^{**}	0.244^{**}	-0.159	-0.167^{*}
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Female advisee × Precise signal	0.099	0.076	-0.217^{*}	-0.182
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.116)
Negative signal × Precise signal	-0.024	-0.048	-0.214^{*}	-0.245^{**}
	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Female advisee	-0.260^{*}	-0.238	0.209	0.201
× Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.147)
Constant	0.140^{***}	0.173	0.047	0.234^{*}
	(0.049)	(0.138)	(0.032)	(0.140)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type				
Positive Vague	-0.073	-0.067	0.113^{*}	0.089
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Negative Vague	0.167^{*}	0.176^{*}	-0.045	-0.077
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Positive Precise	0.026	0.008	-0.104	-0.093
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Negative Precise	0.006	0.014	-0.053	-0.059
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	634	634	603	603
R^2	0.029	0.068	0.045	0.090

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

Table B.5: Probit regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (overall and by treatment) [Main Experiment]

	Overall			Non-Instrumental		Instrumental	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee							
Negative signal	0.380^{**}	0.451^{***}	0.626^{***}	0.553^{**}	0.589^{***}	0.201	0.367
	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.220)	(0.228)	(0.236)
Precise signal	0.683^{***}	0.730^{***}	0.681^{***}	0.610^{***}	0.665^{***}	0.768^{***}	0.879^{***}
	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.191)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.203)
Negative signal × Precise signal	-0.325^{*}	-0.409^{**}	-0.458^{*}	-0.364	-0.432^{*}	-0.295	-0.472^{*}
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.273)
Instrumental feedback	-0.026	0.000	0.071				
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.239)				
Negative signal × Instrumental			-0.360				
			(0.321)				
Precise signal × Instrumental			0.111				
			(0.274)				
Negative signal × Precise signal			0.091				
× Instrumental feedback			(0.370)				
Constant	-1.233^{***}	-1.046^{***}	-1.068^{***}	-1.252^{***}	-1.308^{***}	-1.240^{***}	-0.711
	(0.128)	(0.301)	(0.321)	(0.173)	(0.430)	(0.174)	(0.446)
Negative signal	0.055	0.042	0.168	0.189	0.158	-0.094	-0.105
+ Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.128)	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.139)
Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1,241	1,241	1,241	637	637	604	604

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's gender, quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a signal of "Rank 1", "Rank 2", or "Top Half".

Table B.6: Probit regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment, interacting with advisee's gender) [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental		Instrumental	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee				
Female advisee	-0.421	-0.458	0.685^{*}	0.601
	(0.363)	(0.362)	(0.393)	(0.407)
Negative signal	0.147	0.150	0.762^{*}	0.945^{**}
	(0.295)	(0.288)	(0.405)	(0.425)
Precise signal	0.383	0.461^{*}	1.357^{***}	1.408^{***}
	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.359)	(0.373)
Female advisee × Negative signal	0.947^{**}	1.042^{**}	-0.874^{*}	-0.906^{*}
	(0.462)	(0.460)	(0.497)	(0.511)
Female advisee × Precise signal	0.565	0.529	-0.946^{**}	-0.854^{*}
	(0.404)	(0.401)	(0.435)	(0.446)
Negative signal × Precise signal	0.135	0.045	-0.947^{**}	-1.105^{**}
	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.449)	(0.466)
Female advisee	-1.171^{**}	-1.139^{**}	1.019^{*}	1.003^{*}
× Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.528)	(0.527)	(0.563)	(0.573)
Constant	-1.080^{***}	-1.041^{**}	-1.680^{***}	-1.194^{**}
	(0.221)	(0.453)	(0.330)	(0.538)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type				
Positive Vague	-0.421	-0.458	0.685^{*}	0.601
	(0.363)	(0.362)	(0.393)	(0.407)
Negative Vague	0.526^{*}	0.584^{**}	-0.189	-0.305
	(0.287)	(0.294)	(0.304)	(0.312)
Positive Precise	0.144	0.071	-0.261	-0.254
	(0.177)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.195)
Negative Precise	-0.079	-0.026	-0.116	-0.157
	(0.183)	(0.194)	(0.187)	(0.199)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	634	634	603	603

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

Table B.7: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment and advisor's gender, interacting with advisee's gender) [Main Experiment]

	Male Advisors		Female Advisors	
	Non-Instrumental	Instrumental	Non-Instrumental	Instrumental
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee				
Female advisee	-0.115	0.175^{**}	-0.021	0.098
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Negative signal	-0.104	0.227^{*}	0.253^{*}	0.154
	(0.067)	(0.120)	(0.133)	(0.100)
Precise signal	0.162^{**}	0.352^{***}	0.081	0.316^{***}
	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.087)
Female advisee × Negative signal	0.386^{***}	-0.219	0.059	-0.223^{*}
	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.186)	(0.131)
Female advisee × Precise signal	0.176	-0.257^{**}	0.051	-0.146
	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.142)
Negative signal × Precise signal	0.169	-0.140	-0.169	-0.310^{**}
	(0.107)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.131)
Female advisee	-0.548^{***}	0.234	-0.012	0.184
× Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.189)	(0.198)	(0.225)	(0.184)
Constant	0.100	0.091	0.266	0.356^{*}
	(0.184)	(0.199)	(0.210)	(0.203)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type				
Positive Vague	-0.115	0.175^{**}	-0.021	0.098
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Negative Vague	0.270^{**}	-0.044	0.038	-0.126
	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.155)	(0.093)
Positive Precise	0.061	-0.082	0.030	-0.048
	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.100)
Negative Precise	-0.102	-0.067	0.077	-0.087
	(0.096)	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.077)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	319	298	313	303
R^2	0.137	0.154	0.106	0.152

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

Table B.8: Proportion of advisors stating a given reason for sending / obscuring positive signals of performance [Follow-up Experiment]

	Choose to send feedback			Choose to obscure feedback			Fisher's exact
	Precise signal (1)	Vague signal (2)	Total (3)	Precise signal (4)	Vague signal (5)	Total (6)	p-values (3) versus (6)
Preference for transparency (I preferred to be *transparent/honest*.)	0.865	0.704	0.764	0.364	0.479	0.402	<0.001***
Preference for discretion (I preferred to be *discreet/ambiguous*.)	0.045	0.050	0.048	0.154	0.127	0.145	<0.001***
Sense of duty (It was *my duty* to provide my worker with performance information.)	0.671	0.569	0.607	0.406	0.282	0.364	<0.001***
Responsibility aversion (I *did not want to be responsible* for providing my worker with performance information.)	0.019	0.038	0.031	0.077	0.042	0.065	0.060*
Regret aversion (I *did not want my worker to regret* their choice of payment.)	0.174	0.227	0.207	0.294	0.254	0.280	0.046**
Concern for advisee's ego (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *ego and self-esteem*.)	0.271	0.315	0.299	0.224	0.155	0.201	0.010***
Concern for advisee's motivation (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *motivation to improve*.)	0.355	0.327	0.337	0.322	0.296	0.313	0.591
Concern for advisee's feelings (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *emotions and feelings*.)	0.265	0.331	0.306	0.294	0.239	0.276	0.461
Image concerns (I cared about my worker's *opinion of me*.)	0.142	0.181	0.166	0.252	0.324	0.276	0.002***
Comparison with advisee's performance (I *compared* my worker's performance *to my own*.)	0.142	0.138	0.140	0.308	0.183	0.266	<0.001***
Usefulness of feedback (I considered the *usefulness* of the message to my worker.)	0.561	0.496	0.520	0.385	0.254	0.341	<0.001***
Ambiguity in signal of performance (I was *uncertain about my worker's ability* based on the information I received.)	0.058	0.069	0.065	0.119	0.070	0.103	0.116
Random (I chose *randomly* / I *did not care*.)	0.006	0.008	0.007	0.035	0.070	0.047	0.002***
Mistake (I made a *mistake*.)	0.000	0.012	0.007	0.021	0.042	0.028	0.069*
Other (Other: please explain.)	0.013	0.015	0.014	0.007	0.000	0.005	0.432
Observations	155	260	415	143	71	214	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.9: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions against different motives given positive signals of performance [Follow-up Experiment]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee																
Transparency	-0.353^{***}															-0.261^{***}
	(0.039)															(0.043)
Discretion		0.291^{***}														0.196^{***}
		(0.071)														(0.072)
Sense of duty			-0.218^{***}													-0.115^{***}
			(0.037)													(0.037)
Responsibility aversion				0.186^{*}												-0.046
				(0.098)												(0.110)
Regret aversion					0.092^{**}											0.043
					(0.046)											(0.044)
Concern for advisee's ego						-0.113^{***}										-0.074^{*}
						(0.041)										(0.040)
Concern for advisee's motivation							-0.025									-0.004
							(0.040)									(0.039)
Concern for advisee's emotions								-0.033								0.014
								(0.041)								(0.038)
Image concerns									0.152^{***}							0.121^{**}
									(0.049)							(0.050)
Comparison with advisee										0.190^{***}						0.096^{*}
										(0.051)						(0.054)
Usefulness of feedback											-0.162^{***}					-0.088^{**}
											(0.037)					(0.036)
Ambiguity in signal												0.118				0.019
												(0.074)				(0.072)
Random													0.438^{***}			0.339^{***}
													(0.119)			(0.114)
Mistake														0.331^{**}		0.114
														(0.159)		(0.164)
Other															-0.200	-0.024
															(0.134)	(0.094)
Constant	0.566^{***}	0.317^{***}	0.455^{***}	0.332^{***}	0.319^{***}	0.370^{***}	0.348^{***}	0.350^{***}	0.309^{***}	0.305^{***}	0.415^{***}	0.331^{***}	0.331^{***}	0.335^{***}	0.342^{***}	0.550^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.041)
Observations	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629
R^2	0.128	0.028	0.053	0.006	0.007	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.017	0.024	0.029	0.004	0.017	0.007	0.002	0.208

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.10: Dominance analysis of advisors' feedback decisions against different motives given positive signals of performance [Follow-up Experiment]

	Dominance Statistic	Ranking
	(1)	(2)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee		
Transparency	0.088	1
Sense of duty	0.030	2
Discretion	0.019	3
Usefulness of feedback	0.016	4
Comparison with advisee	0.013	5
Image concerns	0.013	6
Random	0.012	7
Concern for advisee's ego	0.007	8
Regret aversion	0.004	9
Mistake	0.003	10
Responsibility aversion	0.002	11
Ambiguity in signal	0.002	12
Other	0.001	13
Concern for advisee's emotions	0.000	14
Concern for advisee's motivation	0.000	15
Observations	629	

Table B.11: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions against signal valence, signal precision, and ambiguity in signal as a motive for feedback choice [Follow-up Experiment]

	Precise Signal		Vague Signal		Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee					
Ambiguity in signal	0.246***	0.191*	0.084	0.003	0.191*
	(0.063)	(0.098)	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.098)
Negative signal	−0.018	−0.028	0.120***	0.108***	−0.028
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Ambiguity in signal × Negative signal		0.096		0.134	0.096
		(0.128)		(0.125)	(0.128)
Vague signal					−0.249***
					(0.038)
Ambiguity in signal × Vague signal					−0.188
					(0.133)
Negative signal × Vague signal					0.136**
					(0.057)
Ambiguity in signal × Negative signal × Vague signal					0.038
					(0.178)
Constant	0.458***	0.463***	0.209***	0.214***	0.463***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Observations	589	589	635	635	1,224
R^2	0.023	0.024	0.022	0.024	0.066

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.12: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions against signal valence, signal precision, and preference for transparency as a motive for feedback choice [Follow-up Experiment]

	Precise Signal		Vague Signal		Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee					
Transparency preference	-0.475^{***}	-0.533^{***}	-0.264^{***}	-0.168^{***}	-0.533^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Negative signal	-0.015	-0.087	0.120^{***}	0.248^{***}	-0.087
	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.065)	(0.056)
Transparency preference × Negative signal		0.116		-0.199^{***}	0.116
		(0.074)		(0.075)	(0.074)
Vague signal					-0.488^{***}
					(0.057)
Transparency preference × Vague signal					0.365^{***}
					(0.071)
Negative signal × Vague signal					0.335^{***}
					(0.086)
Transparency preference × Negative signal × Vague signal					-0.315^{***}
					(0.105)
Constant	0.776^{***}	0.813^{***}	0.388^{***}	0.325^{***}	0.812^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Observations	589	589	635	635	1,224
R^2	0.214	0.217	0.099	0.111	0.204

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.13: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions against signal valence, signal precision, and concern about advisee's motivation to improve as a motive for feedback choice [Follow-up Experiment]

	Precise Signal		Vague Signal		Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee					
Motivation to improve	0.061	-0.037	-0.024	-0.024	-0.037
	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.061)
Negative signal	-0.012	-0.081	0.124^{***}	0.124^{***}	-0.081
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Motivation to improve × Negative signal		0.193^{**}		0.001	0.193^{**}
		(0.086)		(0.075)	(0.086)
Vague signal					-0.270^{***}
					(0.045)
Motivation to improve × Vague signal					0.013
					(0.078)
Negative signal × Vague signal					0.205^{***}
					(0.067)
Motivation to improve × Negative signal × Vague signal					-0.192^{*}
					(0.114)
Constant	0.459^{***}	0.492^{***}	0.222^{***}	0.222^{***}	0.492^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Observations	589	589	635	635	1,224
R^2	0.004	0.012	0.020	0.020	0.058

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.14: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment, interacting with advisee's gender), controlling for advisors' second-order beliefs [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental			Instrumental		
	Pooled	$<$ Median	$\geq$ Median	Pooled	$<$ Median	$\geq$ Median
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee						
Female advisee	-0.069	-0.112	-0.013	0.090	0.181	0.111
	(0.064)	(0.129)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.124)	(0.073)
Negative signal	0.025	-0.035	0.071	0.176^{**}	0.315^{**}	0.107
	(0.069)	(0.130)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.160)	(0.073)
Precise signal	0.113^{*}	0.221	0.092	0.328^{***}	0.397^{***}	0.371^{***}
	(0.062)	(0.135)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.143)	(0.076)
Female advisee $\times$ Negative signal	0.244^{**}	0.145	0.455^{***}	-0.167^{*}	-0.469^{**}	0.038
	(0.113)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.100)	(0.191)	(0.140)
Female advisee $\times$ Precise signal	0.098	0.051	0.073	-0.180^{**}	-0.264	-0.194^{*}
	(0.085)	(0.176)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.192)	(0.102)
Negative signal $\times$ Precise signal	0.037	-0.094	0.125	-0.238^{**}	-0.496^{**}	-0.111
	(0.091)	(0.166)	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.209)	(0.123)
Female advisee	-0.280^{*}	-0.135	-0.498^{**}	0.209	0.497^{*}	0.060
$\times$ Negative signal $\times$ Precise signal	(0.143)	(0.227)	(0.208)	(0.136)	(0.254)	(0.195)
Belief about advisee's prior	0.014			-0.002		
	(0.035)			(0.033)		
Constant	0.144	0.251	0.100	0.240	0.272	0.107
	(0.157)	(0.228)	(0.176)	(0.153)	(0.248)	(0.181)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type						
Positive Vague	-0.069	-0.112	-0.013	0.090	0.181	0.111
	(0.064)	(0.129)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.124)	(0.073)
Negative Vague	0.174^{*}	0.033	0.442^{***}	-0.077	-0.288^{*}	0.149
	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.155)	(0.080)	(0.149)	(0.122)
Positive Precise	0.028	-0.062	0.060	-0.090	-0.083	-0.083
	(0.060)	(0.124)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.153)	(0.075)
Negative Precise	-0.008	-0.051	0.017	-0.048	-0.056	0.015
	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.121)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	634	265	369	603	272	331
R^2	0.071	0.118	0.137	0.090	0.142	0.150

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

In columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6), "$<$ Median" ("$\geq$ Median") implies that advisors believe that their advisees have a lower confidence (higher or equal confidence) about their performance than the median advisor.

Table B.15: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions against advisee's gender, signal valence, and concern about advisee's ego [Follow-up Experiment]

	Female Advisee			Male Advisee		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee						
Concern for advisee's ego	0.108^{**}	-0.131^{**}	-0.124^{**}	-0.018	-0.071	-0.070
	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Negative signal	0.033	-0.068	-0.050	0.080^{**}	0.048	0.068
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.066)
Concern for advisee's ego $\times$ Negative signal		0.454^{***}	0.458^{***}		0.133	0.132
		(0.087)	(0.090)		(0.089)	(0.092)
Precise signal	0.221^{***}	0.216^{***}	0.223^{***}	0.181^{***}	0.180^{***}	0.172^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Constant	0.234^{***}	0.286^{***}	0.571^{***}	0.240^{***}	0.258^{***}	0.185
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.178)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.119)
Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Observations	606	606	606	604	604	604
R^2	0.059	0.097	0.129	0.045	0.049	0.091

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

Table B.16: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment, interacting with advisee's gender), controlling for advisors' IAT scores [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental			Instrumental		
	Pooled	$\geq$ Median	$<$ Median	Pooled	$\geq$ Median	$<$ Median
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee						
Female advisee	-0.071	-0.111	-0.013	0.077	0.002	0.114
	(0.064)	(0.087)	(0.105)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.105)
Negative signal	0.016	-0.041	0.098	0.159^{**}	0.224^{**}	0.127
	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Precise signal	0.102^{*}	0.028	0.201^{**}	0.322^{***}	0.330^{***}	0.300^{***}
	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.104)
Female advisee $\times$ Negative signal	0.247^{**}	0.315^{*}	0.196	-0.133	-0.130	-0.098
	(0.113)	(0.176)	(0.158)	(0.098)	(0.125)	(0.161)
Female advisee $\times$ Precise signal	0.102	0.109	0.061	-0.169^{*}	-0.077	-0.184
	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.142)
Negative signal $\times$ Precise signal	0.054	0.173	-0.084	-0.230^{**}	-0.237	-0.221
	(0.090)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.102)	(0.151)	(0.154)
Female advisee	-0.282^{**}	-0.365^{*}	-0.194	0.183	0.065	0.183
$\times$ Negative signal $\times$ Precise signal	(0.143)	(0.212)	(0.207)	(0.134)	(0.182)	(0.212)
IAT score	-0.070			-0.123^{**}		
	(0.049)			(0.051)		
Constant	0.192	0.320	0.123	0.284^{**}	0.270	0.271
	(0.139)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.140)	(0.184)	(0.220)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type						
Positive Vague	-0.071	-0.111	-0.013	0.077	0.002	0.114
	(0.064)	(0.087)	(0.105)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.105)
Negative Vague	0.176^{*}	0.205	0.183	-0.055	-0.128	0.017
	(0.095)	(0.160)	(0.124)	(0.078)	(0.109)	(0.125)
Positive Precise	0.031	-0.002	0.049	-0.092	-0.075	-0.070
	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.102)
Negative Precise	-0.004	-0.051	0.051	-0.042	-0.140	0.016
	(0.069)	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.066)	(0.102)	(0.094)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	634	321	313	603	298	305
R^2	0.074	0.126	0.071	0.101	0.166	0.092

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.

The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

In columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6), "$\geq$ Median" ("$<$ Median") implies that advisors are more or equally implicitly biased (less implicitly biased) than the median advisor.

Table B.17: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by treatment, interacting with advisee's gender), controlling for advisors' beliefs about the decisions of other advisors [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental	Instrumental
	(1)	(2)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee		
Female advisee	−0.059	0.102
	(0.064)	(0.065)
Negative signal	0.029	0.174**
	(0.068)	(0.075)
Precise signal	0.118*	0.334***
	(0.061)	(0.065)
Female advisee × Negative signal	0.227**	−0.164
	(0.113)	(0.100)
Female advisee × Precise signal	0.067	−0.196**
	(0.087)	(0.092)
Negative signal × Precise signal	0.033	−0.245**
	(0.090)	(0.103)
Female advisee	−0.254*	0.214
× Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.143)	(0.135)
Other advisors will obscure negative signals from male advisees	0.043	0.036
	(0.054)	(0.056)
Other advisors will obscure negative signals from female advisees	−0.040	−0.009
	(0.042)	(0.044)
Other advisors will obscure positive signals from male advisees	0.120*	0.112
	(0.061)	(0.070)
Other advisors will obscure positive signals from female advisees	0.006	−0.031
	(0.045)	(0.047)
Constant	0.159	0.225
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Female Advisee Relative to Male Advisee by Signal Type		
Positive Vague	−0.059	0.102
	(0.064)	(0.065)
Negative Vague	0.169*	−0.062
	(0.095)	(0.079)
Positive Precise	0.009	−0.095
	(0.061)	(0.068)
Negative Precise	−0.018	−0.045
	(0.069)	(0.065)
Controls	Y	Y
Observations	634	603
R^2	0.083	0.099

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.
The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a vague positive signal for a male advisee.

Table B.18: OLS regression results of advisees' tournament entry decisions, with positive and negative signals recoded (Positive = rank 1, top half; Negative = rank 2, rank 3, rank 4, bottom half)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable: Advisee revises decision toward tournament entry			
Positive instrumental feedback	0.197^{***}	0.166^{***}	0.194^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Negative instrumental feedback	-0.174^{***}	-0.101^{**}	-0.122^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.042)
No instrumental feedback	-0.019	0.023	0.027
	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Female advisee	-0.003	0.035	0.037
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Female advisee $\times$ Positive instrumental feedback		0.044	0.046
		(0.065)	(0.065)
Female advisee $\times$ Negative instrumental feedback		-0.137^{**}	-0.130^{**}
		(0.056)	(0.056)
Female advisee $\times$ No instrumental feedback		-0.082	-0.087
		(0.070)	(0.071)
Constant	-0.007	-0.023	0.164
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.105)
Controls	N	N	Y
Observations	1,196	1,196	1,196
R^2	0.091	0.099	0.109

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Other controls include the advisee's age, education level, posterior beliefs about their performance, and absolute score in the task.

C Further Investigation of Advisors' Behavior in Main Experiment

In this section, we use data from the main experiment to examine factors that may explain why advisors choose to obscure positive feedback from advisees.

Envy by advisors about advisee's positive performance. Some advisors may obscure positive signals of performance because they are envious of high-performing advisees. We expect this to manifest in particular for advisors who hold pessimistic beliefs about their own performance (and who would therefore be more envious of a positive signal of their advisee's performance).

Table C.1: OLS regression results of advisors' feedback decisions (by signal valence, pooled for all treatments) [Main Experiment]

	Positive Signal				Negative Signal			
	Precise		Vague		Precise		Vague	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee								
Advisor's expected rank	0.061*	0.034	0.046	0.032	0.012	−0.028	0.058	0.027
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Advisor's Raven's matrices task score		−0.020***		−0.010		−0.023***		−0.024**
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.010)
Constant	0.148	0.532**	0.185	0.376	0.472***	0.905***	0.044	0.469*
	(0.165)	(0.211)	(0.174)	(0.241)	(0.152)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.262)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	439	439	188	188	412	412	202	202
R^2	0.051	0.071	0.154	0.167	0.028	0.058	0.050	0.087

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
A higher expected rank means the advisor expects to have achieved lower performance.
Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation.

To investigate this, we regress advisors' decision to obscure signals against their expectation of their own attained rank (Table C.1). Column (1) reveals that, for positive precise signals, advisors who are less confident about their performance (higher expected rank) are more likely to obscure feedback (p-value = 0.082). However, this effect disappears once we control for the advisors' actual performance (column 2: p-values = 0.346), nor is this effect significant when advisors receive vague positive signals about their advisee's performance (columns 3 and 4: p-values = 0.226 and 0.447, respectively). Overall, the estimates in Table C.1 do not provide strong convincing evidence that envy drives advisors toward obscuring positive signals of their advisee's performance.

However, the estimates in Table C.1 reveal that advisors who score better in the Raven's matrices task are less likely to obscure signals. This is the case in 3 out of 4 specifications. As such, we next investigate whether advisors' competence or a lack of comprehension of the experiment may contribute to the propensity to obscure positive signals.

Competence or incomprehension of advisors. We use advisors' performance in the Raven's matrices task as a proxy for their competence, and examine whether this can explain their feed-



(a) Overall: High-performing advisors



(b) Overall: Low-performing advisors



(c) Non-Instrumental: High-performing advisors



(d) Non-Instrumental: Low-performing advisors



(e) Instrumental: High-performing advisors



(f) Instrumental: Low-performing advisors

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure C.1: Proportion of high- and low-performing advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal (by treatment, signal valence, and signal precision) [Main Experiment]

back decisions. We classify advisors as either high-performing or low-performing based on whether their score in the Raven's matrices task is above or below the median, respectively. Figure C.1 and Table C.2 reproduce Figure 2 and Table 1, respectively, separately for high-performing and low-performing advisors. We make the following key observations, while taking caution in interpreting any statistical tests given the loss of statistical power when dividing advisors into sub-groups.

Table C.2: OLS regressions of feedback decisions by advisors' Raven's metrics score (overall and by treatment) [Main Experiment]

	Overall		Non-Instrumental		Instrumental	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee						
(a) High-Performing Advisors						
Negative signal	0.043	0.058	0.137**	0.152**	−0.041	0.006
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.044)	(0.051)
Precise signal	0.165***	0.172***	0.136***	0.141**	0.196***	0.224***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Negative signal × Precise signal	−0.026	−0.041	−0.080	−0.101	0.017	−0.043
	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Constant	0.075***	0.109	0.074**	0.110	0.075**	0.172
	(0.026)	(0.126)	(0.036)	(0.199)	(0.037)	(0.167)
Negative signal	0.018	0.017	0.058	0.051	−0.024	−0.037
+ Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	665	665	331	331	334	334
R^2	0.033	0.050	0.024	0.060	0.062	0.116
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(b) Low-Performing Advisors						
Negative signal	0.134**	0.140**	0.133	0.126	0.136	0.159*
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.095)
Precise signal	0.195***	0.190***	0.169**	0.183***	0.229***	0.224***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.082)
Negative signal × Precise signal	−0.121	−0.133*	−0.069	−0.075	−0.185	−0.204*
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.118)
Constant	0.148***	0.334**	0.146***	0.123	0.150***	0.520**
	(0.040)	(0.144)	(0.056)	(0.188)	(0.057)	(0.227)
Negative signal	0.013	0.007	0.064	0.051	−0.050	−0.045
+ Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.076)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	576	576	306	306	270	270
R^2	0.023	0.084	0.025	0.141	0.026	0.127

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's gender, quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.
The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a positive signal of "Rank 1", "Rank 2", or "Top Half".

First, panels (a) and (b) of Figure C.1 reveal that low-performing advisors are more likely to obscure signals than high-performing advisors across the board. Taking this into account, the proportion of positive versus negative feedback that is obscured is relatively consistent across

advisors from both sub-groups. However, only for low-performing advisors is the difference between obscuring vague negative signals and obscuring vague positive signals statistically significantly different, as shown in panel (b). Second, panels (c) to (f) reveal that high-performing advisors are more likely to obscure vague negative signals than vague positive signals when feedback is non-instrumental, while low-performing advisors are more likely to do so (at least directionally) regardless of the instrumentality of feedback. OLS regression estimates in Table C.2 confirm our observations from Figure C.1.

Overall, we observe that while low-performing advisors are more likely to obscure signals, they tend to do so across treatments and signal types. Importantly, a non-negligible proportion of high-performing advisors also obscure positive signals (around 25% for precise signals and 8% for vague signals). Hence, we conclude that the advisors' competence cannot fully explain their propensity to obscure positive signals, noting again that the patterns across obscuring positive versus negative signals are similar for both high and low performing advisors.

Next, we investigate whether advisors' tendency to obscure positive signals can be explained by a lack of comprehension (measured by their performance in the comprehension check question). To this end, we consider whether advisors fail the comprehension check question about the instrumentality of feedback in Part 2 of the experiment (13.1% of advisors).[5]



Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, n.s. $p > 0.10$.

Figure C.2: Proportion of advisors sending feedback that is vaguer than received signal, excluding those who fail comprehension check question (by signal valence and signal precision) [Main Experiment] (N = 1,078)

Figure C.2 presents advisors' feedback decisions with the exclusion of those who fail the comprehension check question. We find that, across the board, the obscuring of signals is similar in magnitude and relative levels to those observed in Figure 2. This sub-group of advisors

[5] Advisors are asked to answer a True/False question: "The content of your feedback may have an impact on your Worker's choice of payment".

tends to obscure both positive and negative signals, and they are more likely to obscure vague negative signals than vague positive signals (also supported by regression analysis reported in Table C.3). Overall, this implies that a lack of comprehension by the advisors is not the reason why they choose to obscure positive signals.

Table C.3: OLS regressions of advisors' feedback decisions, excluding those who who fail comprehension check question [Main Experiment]

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable: Advisor obscures feedback to advisee			
Negative signal	0.077^{**}	0.085^{**}	0.174^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.060)
Precise signal	0.185^{***}	0.183^{***}	0.168^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Negative signal × Precise signal	-0.056	-0.067	-0.109
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.077)
Instrumental feedback	-0.017	-0.009	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.043)
Negative signal × Instrumental			-0.161^{**}
			(0.074)
Precise signal × Instrumental			0.036
			(0.063)
Negative signal × Precise signal			0.064
× Instrumental feedback			(0.100)
Constant	0.092^{***}	0.184^{*}	0.173^{*}
	(0.026)	(0.097)	(0.099)
Negative signal	0.021	0.017	0.065
+ Negative signal × Precise signal	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.048)
Controls	N	Y	Y
Observations	1,078	1,078	1,078
R^2	0.032	0.054	0.060

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Other controls include the advisor's gender, age, education level, political views on social issues, and U.S. political party affiliation, as well as advisee's gender, quarter of birth, favorite color, and favorite beverage.
The baseline group in all specifications is advisors who observe a positive signal of "Rank 1", "Rank 2", or "Top Half".

D Large Language Model (LLM) Analysis of Advisors' Free-Form Text Responses in Main Experiment

In the post-experimental questionnaire of the main experiments, advisors in our main experiment were shown the original message that they received about the advisee's performance, as well as the message that they chose to send. They were then asked to provide a free-form text response to the following question: "*Why did you choose to send this message?*"

We conduct an LLM analysis of advisors' free-form text responses to this question (model: claude-opus-4-1-20250805). Specifically, we draw on the list of options provided to advisors in the follow-up experiment to classify advisors' responses using a similar set of categories. To train the model, we provide example quotes based on the statements presented in Figure B.5, and we also include some additional examples. The example statements used to train the model do not contain quotes from the data. The exact wording of the prompt is provided on the next page, and summary statistics of the categorization are presented in Table D.1.

Table D.1 shows that transparency- and discretion-related preferences are strongly associated with advisors' feedback decisions. Both for non-instrumental and instrumental feedback, advisors who choose to send feedback are more likely to indicate a preference for transparency than those who choose to obscure feedback, and they are less likely to indicate a preference for discretion. Moreover, when feedback is non-instrumental, advisors who choose to send feedback are more likely to indicate a sense of duty than those who choose to obscure feedback. These results are consistent with our observations from the structured responses provided by advisors in the follow-up experiment.

An additional result that points to the reliability of our text analysis is that advisors who choose to send positive instrumental feedback are more likely to note the usefulness of such feedback than those who choose to obscure feedback. However, the usefulness of feedback does not come up as a factor motivating advisors' decisions when feedback is non-instrumental.

We also note that advisors who obscure instrumental positive feedback are more likely to state a concern for their advisee's motivation than those who choose to send feedback. Conversely, advisors who choose to obscure non-instrumental positive feedback are more likely to state a concern for the advisee's feelings than those who choose to send feedback. However, these differences are only of marginal statistical significance. In addition, the analysis captures randomness and mistakes in decision making by advisors, but these factors make up only about 5% or less of the responses.

Finally, factors such as image concerns, comparison with the advisee's performance (envy), and ambiguity in the signals that advisors received, do not tend to emerge in the analysis. It is possible that these factors are less likely to show up in free-form text, e.g., because they are harder for participants to contextualize, or due to social desirability bias. Consequently, we opt for a more structured list as it allows us to capture these nuances in the factors driving behavior.

The prompt that we provided to the LLM is as follows (Model: claude-opus-4-1-20250805).

You are an expert at classifying participant responses from behavioral experiments.
Your task: Indicate whether each response falls into each of these categories based on what influences the participant's decision-making regarding the message they sent to their worker.

Categories:

1. Influenced by a preference for transparency or honesty.
2. Influenced by a preference for discretion or ambiguity.
3. Influenced by a sense of duty to provide their worker with performance information.
4. Influenced by an avoidance of responsibility toward giving feedback information to the worker.
5. Influenced by an avoidance of their worker regretting their decision.
6. Influenced by a concern about how the message will affect the worker's ego or self-esteem.
7. Influenced by a concern about how the message will affect the worker's motivation.
8. Influenced by a concern about how the message will affect the worker's feelings and emotions.
9. Influenced by image concerns, that is, how the participant will be perceived by their worker.
10. Influenced by how the participant's own performance compares to the worker's.
11. Influenced by a consideration of the usefulness of the message sent to the worker.
12. Influenced by ambiguity in the information the participant has received about the worker's performance.
13. Made the decision randomly.
14. Made a mistake in their decision.
15. Other factors that do not belong to any of the above categories.

Instructions:

- Output valid JSON in this exact format: {"evidence": "brief explanation citing specific phrases from the text in quotes", "categories": list of integers corresponding to all the categories from 1 to 15 that the response falls under}.
- The evidence field must quote key phrases from the participant's response.
- Be precise and consistent in your classifications.

Example quotes (categories in brackets):

1. I preferred to be transparent. [1]
2. I preferred to be honest. [1]
3. I preferred to tell the truth. [1]
4. I preferred to be discreet. [2]
5. I preferred to be ambiguous. [2]
6. I preferred to be a bit more vague. [2]
7. It was my duty to provide my worker with performance information. [3]
8. I have a responsibility for sending my worker information about their performance. [3]
9. I did not want to be responsible for providing my worker with performance information. [4]
10. I did not want my worker to regret the choice that they have made. [5]
11. I did not want my worker to regret the choice that they will have to make later. [5]
12. I considered how the message may affect the ego of my worker. [6]
13. I considered how the message may affect the self-esteem of my worker. [6]
14. I considered how the message may affect the confidence of my worker. [6]
15. I considered how the message may affect the motivation of my worker to improve their performance. [7]
16. I considered how the message may affect the emotions of my worker. [8]
17. I considered how the message may affect the feelings of my worker. [8]
18. I cared about the opinion of my worker toward me. [9]
19. I cared about what my worker will think of me. [9]
20. I compared the performance of my worker to my own performance. [10]
21. I considered the usefulness of the message to my worker. [11]
22. I considered how the message will influence the decision of the worker. [11]
23. I considered how the message will allow the worker to make the right payment choice. [11]
24. I thought about how the message will not affect the payment of the worker. [11]
25. I was uncertain about the ability of my worker based on the information I received. [12]
26. It was unclear to me what exact rank the worker got based on the information I received. [12]
27. I chose randomly. [13]
28. I did not care about the message I sent. [13]
29. I made a mistake. [14]
30. I did not understand what I was doing. [14]

Table D.1: Proportion of advisors stating a given reason for sending / obscuring positive signals of performance [Main Experiment]

	Non-Instrumental Feedback							Instrumental Feedback						
	Choose to send feedback			Choose to obscure feedback			Fisher's exact p-values	Choose to send feedback			Choose to obscure feedback			Fisher's exact p-values
	Precise signal (1)	Vague signal (2)	Total (3)	Precise signal (4)	Vague signal (5)	Total (6)	(3) versus (6)	Precise signal (7)	Vague signal (8)	Total (9)	Precise signal (10)	Vague signal (11)	Total (12)	(9) versus (12)
Preference for transparency (I preferred to be *transparent/honest*.)	0.557	0.435	0.517	0.145	0.000	0.125	<0.001***	0.577	0.289	0.468	0.141	0.100	0.135	<0.001***
Preference for discretion (I preferred to be *discreet/ambiguous*.)	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.113	0.000	0.097	0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.100	0.068	<0.001***
Sense of duty (It was *my duty* to provide my worker with performance information.)	0.210	0.094	0.172	0.048	0.100	0.056	0.014**	0.088	0.133	0.105	0.047	0.100	0.054	0.248
Responsibility aversion (I *did not want to be responsible* for providing my worker with performance information.)	0.006	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.014	0.252
Regret aversion (I *did not want my worker to regret* their choice of payment.)	0.006	0.012	0.008	0.016	0.000	0.014	0.520	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	–
Concern for advisee's ego (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *ego and self-esteem*.)	0.074	0.071	0.073	0.065	0.000	0.056	0.795	0.044	0.072	0.055	0.109	0.000	0.095	0.273
Concern for advisee's motivation (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *motivation to improve*.)	0.080	0.153	0.103	0.161	0.000	0.139	0.400	0.102	0.096	0.100	0.188	0.200	0.189	0.063*
Concern for advisee's feelings (I considered how the message may affect my worker's *emotions and feelings*.)	0.062	0.094	0.073	0.145	0.100	0.139	0.097*	0.022	0.012	0.018	0.031	0.000	0.027	0.644
Image concerns (I cared about my worker's *opinion of me*.)	0.006	0.012	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	–
Comparison with advisee's performance (I *compared* my worker's performance *to my own*.)	0.006	0.012	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	–
Usefulness of feedback (I considered the *usefulness* of the message to my worker.)	0.256	0.271	0.261	0.161	0.300	0.181	0.214	0.606	0.530	0.577	0.172	0.100	0.162	<0.001***
Ambiguity in signal of performance (I was *uncertain about my worker's ability* based on the information I received.)	0.006	0.024	0.011	0.048	0.000	0.042	0.118	0.022	0.012	0.018	0.016	0.000	0.014	1.000
Random (I chose *randomly* / I *did not care*.)	0.006	0.024	0.011	0.081	0.100	0.083	0.004***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.027	0.063*
Mistake (I made a *mistake*.)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.032	0.100	0.042	0.010***	0.000	0.012	0.005	0.078	0.000	0.068	0.004***
Other (Other: please explain.)	0.102	0.141	0.115	0.161	0.400	0.194	0.114	0.080	0.108	0.091	0.312	0.500	0.338	<0.001***
Observations	176	85	261	62	10	72		137	83	220	64	10	74	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Experimental Instructions

In this section, we provide screenshots of the instructions for the main tasks for both the advisor and advisee sessions.

E.1 Instructions for Advisor Sessions

Overview of Study

Here is a brief overview of the study.

What will I have to do?

There are **two parts** to this experiment, each consisting of a main task which will be explained in detail later. After you have completed Part 2, you will be asked to complete a **questionnaire**.

This experiment should take 25 minutes on average.

How much payment will I receive for my participation?

You will receive £2.25 for **completing the study**.

You may receive **additional bonus payments** depending on your decisions in either Part 1 or Part 2. At the end of the study, the computer program will randomly pick **either Part 1 or Part 2** to determine your bonus payment. Since nobody knows which part will be selected for payment, you should pay close attention to both parts as your decisions may determine your earnings.

How will my payment be made?

Once all participants complete this study, we will determine your bonus payments based on the decisions made in the tasks. The bonus payment will be made via the Prolific platform within a maximum of 21 days from the conclusion of the study.

Please note!

There will be several **Attention Check** questions throughout this study meant to test whether you are paying attention.
If you fail to correctly complete one or more of these Attention Check questions, you may not be paid.

Finally, please note that this research **does not employ deception**. This is regulated by the researchers' institutional ethics committees.

NEXT

Pre-Experiment Questionnaire

Please answer the following questions.
Any information you give will be recorded anonymously and under no circumstances will they be linked to your identity.

What is your year of birth?

What is your month of birth?

What is your gender?

What is your ethnicity? Please select all that apply.

- ☐ White/ Caucasian
- ☐ Black/ African-American
- ☐ Latino or Hispanic
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Native American
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- ☐ Other ethnic group (please state below)

What is the highest education qualification you have attained?

What is your household annual income?

In which US state/territory do you currently live?

On social issues, how would you describe your political leaning among the following options?

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a...

Of the following, which is your favorite color?

Of the following, which is your favorite choice of hot beverage?

SUBMIT RESPONSES

Part 1 Instructions

Part 1 is based on an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test that is commonly used to measure people's intelligence levels.

Numerous studies have shown that performance in similar intelligence tests are related to important areas of life, such as higher salaries, better job positions, and higher life satisfaction (Gottfredson, 2003; Neisser et al., 1996; Strenze, 2007; Bergman et al., 2015).

In this task, you will be shown 20 patterns with a missing element. You will be asked to select one option that best completes the pattern. An example pattern is provided below, where option 4 is the correct answer.



(Refresh the page if any of these images fail to load)

You will have 4 minutes to complete a set of 20 patterns. Each correct answer will add 1 point to your score and wrong answers will not affect your score.

All the participants in this study will face the same sequence of patterns.

Your bonus payment will be determined by your performance in the task. **It is in your best interest to perform the task to the best of your ability.**

NEXT

Part 1 Understanding Check

To check that you have understood the instructions, please answer the following questions. You may go back and read the instructions as many times as you want.

What task will you be completing?

- ○ Number Multiplication Task
- ○ IQ Task
- ○ Picture Recall Task
- ○ Anagram Task
- ○ Number Finding Task

What do you have to do in the task to get the correct answer?

- ○ Select one element that best complete a pattern.
- ○ Solve anagrams with numbers.
- ○ Add a series of 2-digit numbers.
- ○ Count the number of lines in a pattern.

Your bonus payment in Part 1 is expected to be higher the better your performance is.

- ○ True
- ○ False

BACK CHECK ANSWERS

Part 1

Please proceed to the IQ Task.

You will not be able to pause the task, so please make sure that you are available for the next 4 minutes without any interruption.

BEGIN TASK

Time remaining: **3:57**

Question 1

Which option best completes the pattern?



(Refresh the page if any of these images fail to load)

SUBMIT ANSWER

Part 1 Bonus Payment

Your bonus payment in Part 1 will be determined in the following way.

We will match you to **19 other participants who have completed the same IQ Task, selected at random**. You will be given a quartile rank from 1 to 4 based on your performance in this group of 20. This is summarized in the table below.

Position out of 20	Quartile Rank	Payment
1 – 5	**1**	£0.20 per correct answer
6 – 10	**2**	£0
11 – 15	**3**	£0
16 – 20	**4**	£0

Hence, a quartile rank of 1 means your score was in the top 5 of scores (you were ranked 1 – 5), while a quartile rank of 4 means you were ranked 16 – 20. Ties will be broken randomly.

If your quartile rank is 1, then you will earn **£0.20 for each correct answer**. If your quartile rank is anything other than 1, then you will earn **£0** regardless of how many correct answers you have provided.

NEXT

Part 1 Prediction

Before we conclude Part 1, please state your prediction about your performance in the task.

Specifically, please assign the following 10 tokens across each of the four quartile ranks.

- Assign **more tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **more likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- Assign **fewer tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **less likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- The **total** number of tokens assigned across all four quartile ranks **must add to 10**.

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.10** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.10 by **reporting your most-accurate prediction**.

Prediction

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	5
Quartile Rank 2:	4
Quartile Rank 3:	1
Quartile Rank 4:	0
	Total: 10

BACK

SUBMIT DECISION

Part 2

For Part 2, all participants in this experiment have been randomly assigned the role of either a "Manager" or a "Worker".

You have been assigned the role of a Manager.

You have been matched with a Worker. You will receive a short CV of your Worker based on information they have given at the beginning of the experiment.

You will be asked to make several decisions relating to your matched Worker. More instructions will be given in the screens to follow.

NEXT

Part 2 Worker CV

The CV of your Worker is given below.

CV of Your Worker	
Gender:	**Male**
Month of birth:	**Between October and December**
Favorite choice of hot beverage is:	**Coffee**
Favorite color is:	**Green**

Remember this CV is from a real person whom you have been matched with.

Note also that your Worker will not be informed that you have been shown his CV.

This is to check your attention. What is your Worker's favorite color?

NEXT

Part 2 Prediction – Instructions

Please state your prediction about your Worker's performance in Part 1.

As before, please assign the following 10 tokens across each of the four quartile ranks.

- Assign **more** tokens to a given quartile rank if you believe that **he is more likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- Assign **fewer** tokens to a given quartile rank if you believe that **he is less likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- The total number of tokens assigned across all four quartile ranks must add to 10.

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.20** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.20 by reporting your most-accurate prediction.

NEXT

Part 2 Prediction I

Please state your prediction about your Worker's performance in Part 1.

CV of Your Worker	
Gender:	**Male**
Month of birth:	**Between October and December**
Favorite choice of hot beverage is:	**Coffee**
Favorite color is:	**Green**

Prediction of Worker's Task 1 Quartile Rank

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	5
Quartile Rank 2:	5
Quartile Rank 3:	0
Quartile Rank 4:	0
	Total: 10

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.20** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.20 by reporting your most-accurate prediction.

SUBMIT DECISION

Part 2 Information about Worker's Performance

You will receive information about your Worker's Part 1 performance on the next screen.

This information can come in **one** of three possible formats:

A. With a 65% chance, you will be told his **exact quartile rank** (1, 2, 3, or 4).
B. With a 30% chance, you will be told whether his rank was in the **top half** (quartile 1 or 2) or **bottom half** (quartile 3 or 4).
C. With a 5% chance, you will be told that his quartile rank was **any possible rank between 1 and 4**.

Hence, **(A) is the most informative** information, **while (C) is the least informative** information you can receive.

Your Worker will know that you will receive information in only one of these three formats, and how likely it is that you will receive information in each format.

He will not know: (i) whether you receive the information in format A, B, or C, or (ii) the exact information you see (that is, the content within A, B, or C).

Moreover, he will not receive any other feedback about his performance.

NEXT

Part 2 Information about Worker's Performance

Below is information about your Worker's Part 1 performance.

His Part 1 quartile rank was 1.

Remember: Your Worker will **not** be given the information you see above.

This is to check your attention. Which FORMAT of information did you receive above?

NEXT

Part 2 Feedback to Worker – Instruction (Page 1)

In Part 2, **we will re-assess your Worker's quartile rank**.

Your Worker will be matched to a **new group** of 20 participants, who are **different** to the ones he was matched with in Part 1.

He will be given a **new quartile rank from 1 to 4** based on his performance compared to these new participants.

This new rank may either be the same or different as before.

NEXT

[INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT]

Part 2 Feedback to Worker – Instruction (Page 2)

In Part 2, your Worker will be asked to choose how she would like to be paid for her <u>new</u> Part 2 rank.

She can choose to receive either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if her <u>new</u> Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of her <u>new</u> Part 2 quartile rank.**

Your Worker will not receive any information about her Part 1 rank when she makes this decision.

However, **before** she makes her decision, you have a chance to provide her with feedback about her Part 1 performance.

Hence, **she may use your feedback to inform her choice of payment**.

The diagram below summarizes the sequence of events:



BACK NEXT

[NON-INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT]

Part 2 Feedback to Worker – Instruction (Page 2)

In Part 2, your Worker will be asked to choose how he would like to be paid for his <u>new</u> Part 2 rank.

He can choose to receive either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if his <u>new</u> Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of his <u>new</u> Part 2 quartile rank.**

Your Worker will not receive any information about his Part 1 rank when he makes this decision.

You have the chance to provide him with feedback about his Part 1 performance. However, your feedback will be given to him **after he has made his decision**.

Hence, your feedback **will have no impact on his choice of payment**.

The diagram below summarizes the sequence of events:



BACK NEXT

Part 2 Understanding Check

To check that you have understood the instructions, please answer the following questions. You may go back and read the instructions as many times as you want.

The content of your feedback may have an impact on your Worker's choice of payment.

- ○ True
- ○ False

Apart from your feedback, your Worker does not receive any other information about their performance.

- ○ True
- ○ False

BACK CHECK ANSWERS

[INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT]

Part 2 Feedback to Worker

You may provide your Worker with feedback about her Part 1 performance **before** she makes her payment choice for Part 2.

These are the options you can choose from. Please choose one to send to your Worker.

(1) Your Part 1 quartile rank was between 1 and 4.
(2) Your Part 1 rank was in the top half (quartile 1 or 2).
(3) Your Part 1 quartile rank was 2.

Your worker will receive your feedback **before** she makes her payment choice for Part 2.
Hence, **she may use this feedback to inform her choice of payment**.

Apart from this feedback, your Worker will **not** receive any other information about her Part 1 performance.

Your Decision:

MESSAGE (1) MESSAGE (2) MESSAGE (3)

[NON-INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT]

Part 2 Feedback to Worker

You may provide your Worker with feedback about his Part 1 performance **after** he has made his payment choice for Part 2.

These are the options you can choose from. Please choose one to send to your Worker.

(1) Your Part 1 quartile rank was between 1 and 4.
(2) Your Part 1 rank was in the top half (quartile 1 or 2).
(3) Your Part 1 quartile rank was 1.

Your worker will receive your feedback **after** he has made his payment choice for Part 2.
Hence, your feedback will have **no impact on his choice of payment**.

Apart from this feedback, your Worker will **not** receive any other information about his Part 1 performance.

Your Decision:

MESSAGE (1) MESSAGE (2) MESSAGE (3)

Part 2 Prediction II

We now ask you to predict your Worker's **new quartile rank** in light of the information you have been given about him.

Remember that your Worker's new quartile rank **may be the same or different to his previous quartile rank in Part 1**.

CV of Your Worker	
Gender:	**Male**
Month of birth:	**Between October and December**
Favorite choice of hot beverage is:	**Coffee**
Favorite color is:	**Green**

His PREVIOUS Part 1 quartile rank was 1.

Prediction of Worker's NEW quartile rank in Part 2:

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	3
Quartile Rank 2:	7
Quartile Rank 3:	0
Quartile Rank 4:	0
	Total: 10

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.20** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.20 by reporting your most-accurate prediction.

SUBMIT DECISION

Questions about your Worker

Please answer the following questions. For each correct answer you will receive £0.05.

What is your Worker's gender?

- ○ Male
- ○ Female
- ○ Trans/Intersex/Other
- ○ Not Displayed

In which month was your Worker born?

- ○ Between January and March
- ○ Between April and June
- ○ Between July and September
- ○ Between October and December
- ○ Not Displayed

What is your Worker's favorite choice of hot beverage?

- ○ Coffee
- ○ Tea
- ○ Hot chocolate
- ○ Not Displayed

What is your Worker's favorite color?

- ○ Red
- ○ Green
- ○ Blue
- ○ Purple
- ○ Not Displayed

My Worker will receive my feedback:

- ○ AFTER they have made their payment choice for Part 2.
- ○ BEFORE they make their payment choice for Part 2

SUBMIT ANSWERS

You were **given** the following information about your Worker:

Your Worker's Part 1 quartile rank was 3.

You **chose** to send the following message to your Worker:

Your Part 1 quartile rank was 3.

Why did you choose to send this message?

.

Your response to this question must be at least 5 characters long.

NEXT

(You will receive an additional £0.05 if you answer this question correctly for one of the quartile ranks below, chosen randomly.)

In Part 1, your Worker was asked to predict their own Part 1 performance **before receiving the message you sent**.

How many tokens do you think your Worker assigned to each of the four quartile ranks?

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	0
Quartile Rank 2:	0
Quartile Rank 3:	0
Quartile Rank 4:	0

Total: 0

(You will receive an additional £0.05 for each question you answer correctly.)

Consider Workers from this experiment who have attained quartile rank **1** in Part 1 (the top quartile rank).

Which of the following do you think is true?

- ○ Managers are MORE likely to give female workers their EXACT rank than male workers.
- ○ Managers are EQUALLY likely to give both female and male workers their EXACT rank.
- ○ Managers are LESS likely to give female workers their EXACT rank than male workers.

Consider Workers from this experiment who have attained quartile rank **4** in Part 1 (the bottom quartile rank).

Which of the following do you think is true?

- ○ Managers are MORE likely to give female workers their EXACT rank than male workers.
- ○ Managers are EQUALLY likely to give both female and male workers their EXACT rank.
- ○ Managers are LESS likely to give female workers their EXACT rank than male workers.

Note: EQUALLY likely = difference in percentage of male and female workers receiving EXACT rank is less than 5%.

NEXT

Questionnaire

This is the final part of the questionnaire.

In the following pages, you will be shown a number of items and asked to use the keys **E** or **I** on your keyboard to assign these items to categories.

You should assign the following items to the following categories:

Category	Item
Rational	analytical, logical, objective, reasonable, scientific
Emotional	perceptive, impulsive, empathetic, delicate, sensitive
Male	Ben, Paul, Daniel, John, Jeffrey
Female	Rebecca, Michelle, Emily, Julia, Anna

There are 7 sub-parts for which the instructions change. Please stay alert!

If you complete the task quickly and with few mistakes, you will receive a payment of £0.25. This payment will be added to your earnings in Part 2.

NEXT

E.2 Instructions for Advisee (Part 1)

Overview of Study

Here is a brief overview of the study.

What will I have to do?

This experiment will be conducted in **two parts**, each consisting of a main task which will be explained in detail later.

You will now participate in Part 1. After you have made your decisions, we will process the data and invite you to Part 2 of the experiment. Part 2 will occur **within 7 days** after you have completed Part 1.

Part 1 should take 10 minutes on average. Part 2 should take 10 minutes on average.

How much payment will I receive for my participation?

You will receive £2 for completing **both** Part 1 and Part 2 of the study.

You may receive **additional bonus payments** depending on your decisions in either Part 1 or Part 2. At the end of the study, the computer program will randomly pick **either Part 1 or Part 2** to determine your bonus payment. Since nobody knows which part will be selected for payment, you should pay close attention to both parts as your decisions may determine your earnings.

How will my payment be made?

Once all participants complete this study, we will determine your bonus payments based on the decisions made in the tasks. The bonus payment will be made via the Prolific platform within a maximum of 21 days from the conclusion of the study.

You will receive the completion payment and your bonus payment only if you complete both Part 1 and Part 2 of the study.

Please note!

There will be several **Attention Check** questions throughout this study meant to test whether you are paying attention.
If you fail to correctly complete one or more of these Attention Check questions, you may not be paid.

Finally, please note that this research **does not employ deception**. This is regulated by the researchers' institutional ethics committees.

NEXT

Pre-Experiment Questionnaire

Please answer the following questions.
Any information you give will be recorded anonymously and under no circumstances will they be linked to your identity.

What is your year of birth?

What is your month of birth?

What is your gender?

What is your ethnicity? Please select all that apply.

- ☐ White/ Caucasian
- ☐ Black/ African-American
- ☐ Latino or Hispanic
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Native American
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- ☐ Other ethnic group (please state below)

What is the highest education qualification you have attained?

What is your household annual income?

In which US state/territory do you currently live?

On social issues, how would you describe your political leaning among the following options?

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a...

Of the following, which is your favorite color?

Of the following, which is your favorite choice of hot beverage?

SUBMIT RESPONSES

Part 1 Instructions

Part 1 is based on an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test that is commonly used to measure people's intelligence levels.

Numerous studies have shown that performance in similar intelligence tests are related to important areas of life, such as higher salaries, better job positions, and higher life satisfaction (Gottfredson, 2003; Neisser et al., 1996; Strenze, 2007; Bergman et al., 2015).

In this task, you will be shown 20 patterns with a missing element. You will be asked to select one option that best completes the pattern. An example pattern is provided below, where option 4 is the correct answer.



(Refresh the page if any of these images fail to load)

You will have 4 minutes to complete a set of 20 patterns. Each correct answer will add 1 point to your score and wrong answers will not affect your score.

All the participants in this study will face the same sequence of patterns.

Your bonus payment will be determined by your performance in the task. **It is in your best interest to perform the task to the best of your ability.**

NEXT

Part 1 Understanding Check

To check that you have understood the instructions, please answer the following questions. You may go back and read the instructions as many times as you want.

What task will you be completing?

- ○ Number Multiplication Task
- ○ IQ Task
- ○ Picture Recall Task
- ○ Anagram Task
- ○ Number Finding Task

What do you have to do in the task to get the correct answer?

- ○ Select one element that best complete a pattern.
- ○ Solve anagrams with numbers.
- ○ Add a series of 2-digit numbers.
- ○ Count the number of lines in a pattern.

Your bonus payment in Part 1 is expected to be higher the better your performance is.

- ○ True
- ○ False

BACK CHECK ANSWERS

Part 1

Please proceed to the IQ Task.

You will not be able to pause the task, so please make sure that you are available for the next 4 minutes without any interruption.

BEGIN TASK

Time remaining: **3:57**

Question 1

Which option best completes the pattern?



(Refresh the page if any of these images fail to load)

SUBMIT ANSWER

Part 1 Bonus Payment

Your bonus payment in Part 1 will be determined in the following way.

We will match you to **19 other participants who have completed the same IQ Task, selected at random**. You will be given a quartile rank from 1 to 4 based on your performance in this group of 20. This is summarized in the table below.

Position out of 20	Quartile Rank	Payment
1 – 5	**1**	£0.20 per correct answer
6 – 10	**2**	£0
11 – 15	**3**	£0
16 – 20	**4**	£0

Hence, a quartile rank of 1 means your score was in the top 5 of scores (you were ranked 1 – 5), while a quartile rank of 4 means you were ranked 16 – 20. Ties will be broken randomly.

If your quartile rank is 1, then you will earn **£0.20 for each correct answer**. If your quartile rank is anything other than 1, then you will earn **£0** regardless of how many correct answers you have provided.

NEXT

Part 1 Prediction

Before we conclude Part 1, please state your prediction about your performance in the task.

Specifically, please assign the following 10 tokens across each of the four quartile ranks.

- Assign **more tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **more likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- Assign **fewer tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **less likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- The **total** number of tokens assigned across all four quartile ranks **must add to 10**.

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.10** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.10 by **reporting your most-accurate prediction**.

Prediction

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	5
Quartile Rank 2:	4
Quartile Rank 3:	1
Quartile Rank 4:	0
	Total: 10

BACK

SUBMIT DECISION

E.3 Instructions for Advisee (Part 2)

Overview of Study

As a reminder, here is a brief summary of what happened in Part 1:

In Part 1, you were asked to complete an IQ Task.
You were presented with a pattern with a missing element. You were asked to pick the correct element from the options provided. You were given 4 minutes to solve as many problems as you can.

To determine your bonus payment in Part 1, your performance was compared against those of 19 other participants who have completed the same IQ Task, selected at random.

You were given a quartile rank from 1 to 4 based on your performance relative to these 19 participants. If your quartile rank was 1, you received £0.20 for each correct answer. Otherwise, you received £0. This is summarized in the table given below.

Position out of 20	Quartile Rank	Payment
1 – 5	**1**	£0.20 per correct answer
6 – 10	**2**	£0
11 – 15	**3**	£0
16 – 20	**4**	£0

In Part 2, you will now be asked to make several simple decisions.

Just a reminder that **either Part 1 or Part 2** will be randomly picked to determine your bonus payment. Since nobody knows which part will be selected for payment, you should pay close attention to Part 2 as your decisions here may determine your earnings.

NEXT

Part 1 Understanding Check

To check that you have understood the instructions from Part 1, please answer the following questions. You may go back and read the instructions as many times as you want.

What task did you complete in Part 1?

- ○ Number Finding Task
- ○ Number Multiplication Task
- ○ IQ Task
- ○ Anagram Task
- ○ Picture Recall Task

What did you have to do in the task to get the correct answer?

- ○ Add a series of 2-digit numbers.
- ○ Solve anagrams with numbers.
- ○ Select one element that best complete a pattern.
- ○ Count the number of lines in a pattern.

How was your bonus payment in Part 1 determined based on your performance?

- ○ I earned £0.20 for each correct answer only if I was ranked in quartile 1 or 2 (scoring in the top 10 out of 20 participants), and £0 otherwise.
- ○ I earned £0.20 for each correct answer only if I was ranked in quartile 1 (scoring in the top 5 out of 20 participants), and £0 otherwise.
- ○ I earned £0.20 for each correct answer regardless of my performance.

BACK CHECK ANSWERS

Part 2 Overview

For Part 2, all participants in this experiment have been randomly assigned the role of either a "Manager" or a "Worker".

You have been assigned the role of a Worker.

You have been matched with a Manager.

You will be asked to make several decisions relating to your role as a Worker. More instructions will be given in the screens to follow.

NEXT

Part 2 Instructions

In Part 2, **we will re-assess your quartile rank** using your score in the IQ Task you have previously completed in Part 1.

While your performance has not changed, **the group of 20 participants you are compared to will be different from Part 1**.

Therefore, you will be given a **new quartile rank from 1 to 4, which may either be the same or different as before**.

You can choose how your bonus payment will be determined in Part 2 based on your new Part 2 rank.

You can choose to receive either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if your new Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of your new Part 2 quartile rank.**

This is to check your attention. How will your bonus payment be determined in Part 2?

NEXT

Part 2 Decision

Please choose how your bonus payment will be determined based on your **new** Part 2 rank.

Specifically, you can choose between receiving either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if your new Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of your new Part 2 quartile rank.**

Your Decision:

OPTION (i) OPTION (ii)

BACK

Part 2 Information and Feedback Instructions

Your Manager received information about your PREVIOUS Part 1 quartile rank (NOT your NEW Part 2 quartile rank).

This information came in **one** of three possible formats:

A. With a 65% chance, your Manager was told your **exact** Part 1 quartile rank (1, 2, 3, or 4).
B. With a 30% chance, your Manager was told whether your Part 1 rank was in the **top half** (quartile 1 or 2) or **bottom half** (quartile 3 or 4).
C. With a 5% chance, your Manager was told that your Part 1 quartile rank was **any possible rank between 1 and 4**.

Hence, **(A) is the most informative** information, **while (C) is the least informative** information your Manager could have received.

These are the three possible formats of information, but your Manager received information in only **one** of these formats.

Your Manager has decided how they would like to convey that information to you.

Note that:

1. Your Manager **may choose to send you the information they received as it is**.
   (For example, they **may** tell you that your quartile rank was 3 if they know your exact quartile rank was 3.)

2. Your Manager **may choose to give you less precise information**.
   (For example, they **may** tell you that you were in the bottom half if they know your exact quartile rank was 3.)

3. However, your manager **cannot lie or give you inaccurate information**.
   (That is, they **cannot** tell you that you were in the top half if they know that your quartile rank was 3.)

NEXT

Part 2 Understanding Check

To check that you have understood the instructions, please answer the following questions. You may go back and read the instructions as many times as you want.

It is possible for your Manager to give you LESS PRECISE information about your Part 1 quartile rank than the one they received.

- ○ True
- ○ False

It is possible for your Manager to give you INACCURATE or FALSE information about your Part 1 quartile rank.

- ○ True
- ○ False

Did you Manager receive information about your PREVIOUS Part 1 quartile rank or your NEW Part 2 quartile rank?

- ○ My PREVIOUS Part 1 quartile rank
- ○ My NEW Part 2 quartile rank

BACK CHECK ANSWERS

[NON-INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT ONLY]

Part 2 Payment Decision

We now ask you to choose again **how your bonus payment will be determined in Part 2** before receiving your Manager's message.

Please choose between receiving either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if your new Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of your new Part 2 quartile rank.**

This decision will be used to determine your bonus payment in Part 2.
Your previous decision would be overwritten by your decision here.

Your Decision:

OPTION (i) OPTION (ii)

[BOTH TREATMENTS]

Part 2 Information and Feedback

Your Manager has sent the following message to you:

Your Part 1 rank was in the top half (quartile 1 or 2).

Remember this message is from a real person whom you have been matched with.

This is to check your attention. What message did your Manager send?

NEXT

Part 2 Prediction I

We now ask you to predict your **new** **Part 2 quartile rank** in light of your Manager's message.

Specifically, please assign the following 10 tokens across each of the four quartile ranks.

- Assign **more tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **more likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- Assign **fewer tokens** to a given quartile rank if you believe that you are **less likely to attain that quartile rank**.
- The **total** number of tokens assigned across all four quartile ranks **must add to 10**.

Your Manager has sent the following message to you:

Your (PREVIOUS) Part 1 rank was in the bottom half (quartile 3 or 4).

Prediction of NEW Part 2 quartile rank:

	Token(s)
Quartile Rank 1:	0
Quartile Rank 2:	3
Quartile Rank 3:	4
Quartile Rank 4:	3

Total: 10

Payment: You may receive an additional **£0.10** based on the accuracy of your prediction. The rule to determine your payment is designed such that you can secure the largest chance of receiving £0.10 by reporting your most-accurate prediction.

BACK

SUBMIT DECISION

[INSTRUMENTAL TREATMENT ONLY]

Part 2 Payment Decision

We now ask you to choose again **how your bonus payment will be determined in Part 2** in light of the your Manager's message:

Your Part 1 rank was in the top half (quartile 1 or 2).

Please choose between receiving either:

i. **£0.20** for each correct answer **if your new Part 2 quartile rank is 1**, and **£0** otherwise, OR
ii. **£0.05** for each correct answer **irrespective of your new Part 2 quartile rank.**

This decision will be used to determine your bonus payment in Part 2.
Your previous decision would be overwritten by your decision here.

Your Decision:

OPTION (i) OPTION (ii)

References

Brunnermeier, M. K., J. A. Parker (2005). Optimal expectations. *American Economic Review*, 95(4):1092–1118.