

# Internet Appendix to “Executive Cooperativeness: Evidence from Conference Calls”

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
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
### Figure IA.1 The Distribution and Kernel Density of *Change in Team Cooperativeness Excluding CEO* conditional on *Increase CEO Cooperativeness*

This figure reports the distribution and kernel density of *Change in Team Cooperativeness Excluding CEO*, measured as the change in the total number of interactions the entire executive team initiates (excluding the CEO), scaled by the frequency of that team during conference calls in a year. We examine only observations in the years around a change in CEO. Blue (yellow) bars report the distribution for observations where the new CEO is more (less) cooperative than the previous CEO. Blue (yellow) lines report the kernel density for observations where the new CEO is more (less) cooperative than the previous CEO. *Increase CEO Cooperativeness* is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the new CEO's cooperativeness in the first full year after promotion is greater than the predecessor CEO's cooperativeness in his or her last full year in the position.

Change in team cooperativeness excluding CEO conditional on increase CEO cooperativeness




Kernel Density of Change in Team Cooperativeness Excluding CEO



### Figure IA.2 Cooperative Behavior Probability Distribution


This histogram reports the probability of cooperative behavior across each 10% relative order of questions in quarterly conference calls. A question's relative order is the question's position to the total number of questions asked. For example, if a total of 25 questions are asked in a conference call, then the 6<sup>th</sup> question's relative order would be  $6/25 = 24\%$ , which falls into the third bin (20-30%). The X axis is the relative order of questions, and the Y axis is the probability of cooperative behavior (i.e., responses to questions where the executive engages a colleague).




### Figure IA.3 Abnormal Return Volatility

This figure examines the abnormal return volatility around the announcement of a new CEO. In Panels A-C, we use abnormal returns that are calculated using market-adjusted returns, CAPM model, and Fama-French three factor model


Panel A Market-adjusted returns



Panel B Abnormal returns based on CAPM model



Panel C Abnormal returns based on Fama-French three factor model



### Table IA.1 Sample Sizes

This table describes samples used in the analysis, Panel A describes, for each main table, the sample selection method, the number of firms, and the number of observations by job. Panel B reports the sample sizes and units of analysis for each table.

#### Panel A Sample sizes of different tables

Tables	Explanation	Number of firms	Number of executives	Number of unique non-CEOs	Number of unique CEOs
Table 3, Table 4	Sample including CEO and C-Suite	2,486	10,864	8,684	3,628
Table 6, Table 7	Sample including only non-CEO executives	2,454	8,684	8,684	0
Table 5, Table 8	Sample including only new CEOs	1,105	1,387	0	1,387

#### Panel B Unit of analysis and observations of different tables

Tables	Panels	Unit of Analysis	Number of Observations
Table 3	Panel A	Executive-Year Level and Firm-Year Level	42,691
	Panel B	Executive-Year Level	42,691
Table 4	Panel A	Executive-Year Level	30,911
	Panel B	Executive-Year Level	30,911
Table 5		Firm-Year Level	754
Table 6	Panel A	Executive-Year Level	13,734
	Panel B	Executive-Year Level	13,734
Table 7	Panel A	Executive-Year Level	11,565
	Panel B	Executive-Year Level	4,373
Table 8		CEO Appointment Announcement Level	1,197

**Table IA.2 Team Cooperativeness Controlling for Turnover**

This table reports the results of examining the change in *Cooperativeness* of executive teams around CEO turnover.  $\Delta Team\ Cooperativeness_{Non\_CEO}$  is the change in the cooperativeness of the entire executive team (excluding the CEO) from the last year of the prior CEO's tenure to the first full year of the current CEO's tenure. *Increase CEO Cooperativeness* is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the new CEO's cooperativeness in the first full year after promotion is greater than the predecessor CEO's cooperativeness in his or her last full year in the position. *Turnover* is the ratio of the number of different executives between the current and previous conference calls over the average number of executives in the conference calls of the most recent two years. In column 3, we re-estimate the regression in a subsample where there is no change in the composition of executives on earnings conference calls. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$\Delta Team\ Cooperativeness_{Non\_CEO}$	$\Delta Team\ Cooperativeness_{Non\_CEO}$	$\Delta Team\ Cooperativeness_{Non\_CEO}$
<i>Increase CEO Cooperativeness</i>	0.037*** (7.40)	0.029*** (4.78)	0.035*** (4.20)
<i>Increase CEO Cooperativeness</i> × <i>Turnover</i>		0.043 (1.53)	
<i>Turnover</i>	0.038** (2.03)	0.016 (0.63)	
<i>ROA</i>	0.091*** (2.68)	0.091*** (2.68)	0.046 (0.71)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>	-0.005 (-0.83)	-0.005 (-0.83)	0.003 (0.26)
<i>Size</i>	-0.001 (-0.45)	-0.001 (-0.48)	0.003 (0.60)
<i>BTM</i>	-0.001 (-0.08)	-0.001 (-0.12)	-0.007 (-0.60)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.006 (0.37)	0.006 (0.39)	0.021 (0.80)
<i>SP500</i>	-0.018** (-2.15)	-0.018** (-2.15)	-0.031* (-1.91)
<i>Log (#People)</i>	-0.029*** (-2.64)	-0.029*** (-2.63)	-0.054*** (-2.75)
<i>Female</i>	0.005 (0.50)	0.007 (0.65)	0.010 (0.66)
<i>Minority</i>	0.004 (0.51)	0.004 (0.60)	0.002 (0.12)
<i>Age</i>	0.001* (1.89)	0.001** (1.99)	0.001 (1.27)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.007 (0.89)	0.007 (0.91)	-0.007 (-0.53)
<i>CFO</i>	0.002 (0.11)	0.000 (0.00)	
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.027 (1.33)	0.024 (1.20)	0.062* (1.96)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.009 (-0.45)	-0.008 (-0.40)	-0.001 (-0.06)
Constant	-0.021 (-0.32)	-0.023 (-0.36)	-0.046 (-0.50)
Observations	754	754	253
Fixed Effects	Industry	Industry	Industry
Cluster	Firm	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0861	0.0889	0.1962

**Table IA.3 Promotion Controlling for Charitable, Teamwork, Teamwork Posting, and Social Capital**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion* controlling for controlling for *Charitable*, *Teamwork*, *Teamwork Posting*, and *Social Capital*. *Promotion* is an indicator equal to 1 if the non-CEO executive gets promoted in the following year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness Above Median* is an indicator equal to 1 if the Cooperativeness of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. *Charitable* is an indicator equal to 1 if the executive is involved in any charitable organization, and 0 otherwise. *Teamwork* is a proxy for firm-level teamwork culture, weighted-frequency count of teamwork-related words in conference calls, as defined by Li et al. (2021). *Teamwork Posting* is the teamwork culture score based on job postings, constructed by Huang et al. (2024). *Social Capital* is the first principal component from the standardized values of local associations, voter turnout in presidential elections, census response rates, and the number of nonprofit organizations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>	(3) <i>Promotion</i>	(4) <i>Promotion</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median</i>	0.067*** (11.42)	0.051*** (10.89)	0.054*** (11.34)	0.052*** (11.77)
<i>ROA</i>		-0.086*** (-2.79)	-0.105*** (-3.08)	-0.110*** (-3.53)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>		0.001 (0.16)	-0.001 (-0.27)	0.000 (0.02)
<i>Size</i>		-0.004 (-1.42)	-0.004 (-1.35)	-0.006** (-2.31)
<i>BTM</i>		0.001 (0.20)	-0.003 (-0.48)	0.005 (0.71)
<i>Leverage</i>		0.016 (1.06)	0.009 (0.56)	0.020 (1.36)
<i>SP500</i>		0.007 (0.92)	0.007 (0.80)	0.011 (1.52)
<i>Log(#People)</i>		-0.046*** (-4.80)	-0.052*** (-5.21)	-0.049*** (-5.42)
<i>Female</i>	0.004 (0.35)	0.013 (1.55)	0.019** (2.14)	0.017** (2.15)
<i>Minority</i>	0.009 (1.06)	0.013* (1.84)	0.009 (1.33)	0.009 (1.36)
<i>Age</i>	-0.000 (-0.17)	-0.000 (-0.50)	-0.000 (-0.57)	-0.000 (-0.34)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.056*** (10.22)	0.061*** (11.38)	0.066*** (12.00)	0.061*** (11.95)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.102*** (-20.98)	-0.095*** (-20.51)	-0.101*** (-20.74)	-0.098*** (-21.84)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.016* (1.76)	0.010 (1.46)	0.017** (2.29)	0.014** (2.09)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.005 (-0.64)	-0.002 (-0.34)	-0.009 (-1.31)	-0.006 (-0.90)
<i>Charitable</i>	0.030*** (3.73)			
<i>Teamwork</i>		-0.005 (-0.97)		
<i>Teamwork Posting</i>			-0.139 (-1.51)	
<i>Social Capital</i>				0.006 (1.59)
Constant	0.070** (2.03)	0.181*** (4.94)	0.231*** (5.99)	0.210*** (6.07)
Observations	13,734	11,816	11,747	13,261
Fixed Effects	Firm×Year	Industry×Year	Industry×Year	Industry×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0783	0.0853	0.0898	0.0854

**Table IA.4 Alternative Fixed Effects**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion*, using firm and industry-by-year effects. *Promotion* is an indicator equal to 1 if the executive gets promoted within the next year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness Above Median* is an indicator equal to 1 if the *Cooperativeness* of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, *Interaction – Multiple* is indicator that is equal to 1 if the executive initiates interactions with more than one colleague during all conference calls in a year, and 0 otherwise. *Interaction – Single* is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the executive initiates interactions with only one colleague in a year, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

**Panel A: Main effects**

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median</i>	0.036*** (10.45)	0.042*** (12.72)
<i>ROA</i>		-0.109*** (-3.91)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>		-0.001 (-0.42)
<i>Size</i>		-0.010* (-1.88)
<i>BTM</i>		0.006 (0.82)
<i>Leverage</i>		-0.031* (-1.78)
<i>SP500</i>		0.008 (0.84)
<i>Log(#People)</i>		0.084*** (11.53)
<i>Female</i>		0.008 (1.03)
<i>Minority</i>		0.010 (1.53)
<i>Age</i>		0.000 (1.24)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>		0.042*** (11.87)
<i>CFO</i>		-0.121*** (-26.28)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>		0.014*** (2.74)
<i>Topic</i>		-0.009* (-1.77)
Constant	0.031*** (19.74)	0.047 (0.93)
Observations	23,372	23,372
Fixed Effects	Firm, Industry×Year	Firm, Industry×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	-0.0028	0.0952

**Panel B: Breadth of Cooperativeness and Promotion**

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>
<i>Interaction – Multiple</i>	0.084*** (12.05)	0.091*** (13.67)
<i>Interaction – Single</i>	0.022*** (6.47)	0.031*** (9.36)
<i>ROA</i>		-0.109*** (-3.95)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>		-0.001 (-0.40)
<i>Size</i>		-0.010* (-1.92)
<i>BTM</i>		0.005 (0.81)
<i>Leverage</i>		-0.030* (-1.74)
<i>SP500</i>		0.007 (0.73)
<i>Log(#People)</i>		0.074*** (10.15)
<i>Female</i>		0.009 (1.09)
<i>Minority</i>		0.010 (1.51)
<i>Age</i>		0.000 (0.94)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>		0.040*** (11.31)
<i>CFO</i>		-0.124*** (-26.73)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>		0.014*** (2.65)
<i>Topic</i>		-0.008* (-1.67)
Constant	0.029*** (17.60)	0.068 (1.35)
$H_0: \beta (\text{Interaction – Multiple}) = \beta (\text{Interaction – Single})$	F-statistic = 78.66 p-value = 0.0000	F-statistic = 81.11 p-value = 0.0000
Observations	23,372	23,372
Fixed Effects	Firm, Industry×Year	Firm, Industry×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0041	0.1021

**Table IA.5 Executive Cooperativeness and Promotion Controlling for Executive Sentiment Called**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion* controlling for *Executive Sentiment Called*. *Promotion* is a n indicator equal to 1 if the executive gets promoted within the next year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness Above Median* is an indicator equal to 1 if the *Cooperativeness* of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. *Executive Sentiment Called* is the word count–weighted average sentiment of first responses to all cooperation initiated by the executive in a given firm and year. In column 1, when executives do not initiate any cooperation, *Executive Sentiment Called* is left blank. In column 2, under the same condition, *Executive Sentiment Called* is assigned a value of 0. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median</i>	0.003 (0.08)	0.067*** (11.46)
<i>Female</i>	-0.007 (-0.24)	0.006 (0.54)
<i>Minority</i>	-0.012 (-0.55)	0.009 (1.04)
<i>Age</i>	0.000 (0.37)	0.000 (0.03)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.073*** (5.25)	0.058*** (10.61)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.139*** (-10.70)	-0.104*** (-21.18)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	-0.006 (-0.15)	0.016* (1.80)
<i>Executive Sentiment Called</i>	0.002 (0.18)	0.007 (0.90)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.012 (-0.33)	-0.004 (-0.58)
Constant	0.138 (1.11)	0.069** (2.00)
Observations	3,171	13,734
Fixed Effects	Firm×Year	Firm×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0506	0.0763

**Table IA.6 Executive Cooperativeness and Promotion in the Next Two and Three Years**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between executive *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion* in the next two years (*Promotion\_t+2*) and the next three years (*Promotion\_t+3*). *Cooperativeness Above Median* is an indicator equal to 1 if the *Cooperativeness* of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion_t+2</i>	(2) <i>Promotion_t+3</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median</i>	0.079*** (8.37)	0.079*** (5.74)
<i>Female</i>	0.003 (0.17)	-0.000 (-0.01)
<i>Minority</i>	0.016 (1.02)	0.005 (0.21)
<i>Age</i>	-0.001 (-1.14)	-0.002 (-1.09)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.093*** (9.78)	0.103*** (7.26)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.159*** (-18.39)	-0.208*** (-15.90)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.033** (2.18)	0.062*** (2.74)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.022 (-1.38)	-0.058** (-2.37)
Constant	0.230*** (3.52)	0.434*** (4.25)
Observations	8,984	5,851
Fixed Effects	Firm×Year	Firm×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0762	0.0666

**Table IA.7 Promotion Test Controlling for Natural Retire, Internal Hire and Fire**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion* controlling for *Natural Retire*, *Internal Hire* and *Fire*. *Promotion* is an indicator equal to 1 if the executive gets promoted within the next year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness Above Median* is indicator equal to 1 if the *Cooperativeness* of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. *Natural Retire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO's age is between 63 and 71, and the company's ROA is higher or equal to the median of the ROA in the same industry in the same year, and 0 otherwise. *Internal Hire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the new CEO is internally hired, and 0 otherwise. *Fire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO was forced to leave, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. We retain the Firm, Industry  $\times$  Year fixed effect to load *Natural Retire*, *Internal Hire*, and *Fire* (firm-level characteristics).

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median</i>	0.042*** (12.72)	0.030*** (8.83)
<i>ROA</i>	-0.109*** (-3.91)	-0.092*** (-3.27)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>	-0.001 (-0.42)	-0.001 (-0.37)
<i>Size</i>	-0.010* (-1.88)	0.002 (0.36)
<i>BTM</i>	0.006 (0.82)	-0.001 (-0.08)
<i>Leverage</i>	-0.031* (-1.78)	-0.052*** (-2.80)
<i>SP500</i>	0.008 (0.84)	0.001 (0.15)
<i>Log(#People)</i>	0.084*** (11.53)	0.077*** (9.55)
<i>Female</i>	0.008 (1.03)	0.005 (0.61)
<i>Minority</i>	0.010 (1.53)	0.017** (2.57)
<i>Age</i>	0.000 (1.24)	0.000 (1.09)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.042*** (11.87)	0.035*** (9.67)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.121*** (-26.28)	-0.097*** (-20.26)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.014*** (2.74)	0.014*** (2.70)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.009* (-1.77)	-0.007 (-1.38)
<i>Natural Retire</i>		-0.056*** (-7.28)
<i>Internal Hire</i>		-0.039*** (-4.63)
<i>Fire</i>		-0.012 (-0.99)

Constant	0.047 (0.93)	-0.019 (-0.37)
Observations	23,372	18,088
Fixed Effects	Firm, Industry×Year	Firm, Industry×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0952	0.0775

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**Table IA.8 Promotion and Cooperativeness Yearly Change**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Promotion* and the change in *Cooperativeness* from year  $t$  to year  $t+1$  ( $Cooperativeness_{(t+1)-t}$ ), year  $t+2$  ( $Cooperativeness_{(t+2)-t}$ ), and year  $t+3$  ( $Cooperativeness_{(t+3)-t}$ ). All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The  $t$ -statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Cooperativeness</i> $(t+1)-t$	(2) <i>Cooperativeness</i> $(t+2)-t$	(3) <i>Cooperativeness</i> $(t+3)-t$
<i>Promotion</i>	0.005 (0.65)	-0.008 (-0.81)	0.010 (0.89)
<i>Female</i>	0.001 (0.14)	0.001 (0.12)	0.001 (0.15)
<i>Minority</i>	0.003 (0.88)	0.004 (0.98)	0.009 (1.56)
<i>Age</i>	-0.000* (-1.88)	-0.001*** (-3.39)	-0.001*** (-2.70)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	-0.001 (-0.57)	0.000 (0.14)	-0.002 (-0.36)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.004** (-2.44)	-0.008*** (-3.02)	-0.013*** (-3.40)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.012* (1.75)	0.013* (1.80)	0.016 (1.56)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.007 (-1.16)	-0.011 (-1.50)	0.013 (1.27)
Constant	0.048** (2.24)	0.096*** (3.78)	0.035 (0.92)
Observations	7,805	5,078	3,238
Fixed Effects	Firm×Year	Firm×Year	Firm×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	-0.0235	0.0063	0.0401

**Table IA.9 Alternative Measures of Cooperativeness and Promotion**

This table reports the results of examining the relation between *Cooperativeness* and *Promotion*. *Promotion* is an indicator equal to 1 if the non-CEO executive gets promoted in the following year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness Above Median\_1* is an indicator equal to 1 if the *Cooperativeness* of the non-CEO executive is above the median of all peers in the same industry and year, and 0 otherwise. *Cooperativeness* is the number of times during which an executive engages in a colleague (i.e., engages in cooperative behavior in response to a question) scaled by the total number of questions (as opposed to the total number of times) to which the executive responds in a given year. For *Cooperativeness Above Median\_2*, *Cooperativeness* is the number of questions an executive engages a colleague scaled by the total number of questions to which the executive responds in a given year. For *Cooperativeness Above Median\_3*, *Cooperativeness* is the number of questions during which an executive engages a scaled by the total number of questions to which the executive not passing in a given year. *Power Change* is an indicator equal to 1 if the year-over-year change in the executive's share of total executive team compensation (calculated as the executive's compensation divided by the total compensation of the executive team) is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. *Demotion* is an indicator equal to 1 if the C-suite executive gets demoted in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Promotion</i>	(2) <i>Promotion</i>	(3) <i>Promotion</i>	(4) <i>Power Change</i>	(5) <i>Demotion</i>
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median_1</i>	0.068*** (11.64)			0.027*** (2.65)	-0.005** (-1.91)
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median_2</i>		0.068*** (11.56)			
<i>Cooperativeness Above Median_3</i>			0.068*** (11.56)		
<i>Female</i>	0.006 (0.54)	0.006 (0.54)	0.006 (0.54)	0.003 (0.19)	-0.001 (-0.12)
<i>Minority</i>	0.009 (1.03)	0.009 (1.04)	0.009 (1.04)	-0.006 (-0.50)	0.001 (0.16)
<i>Age</i>	0.000 (0.04)	0.000 (0.05)	0.000 (0.05)	-0.004*** (-5.14)	0.002*** (9.17)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.058*** (10.60)	0.058*** (10.60)	0.058*** (10.60)	-0.139*** (-13.64)	-0.016*** (-5.45)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.104*** (-21.21)	-0.104*** (-21.21)	-0.104*** (-21.21)	-0.058*** (-6.67)	-0.028*** (-12.37)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.016* (1.81)	0.016* (1.81)	0.016* (1.81)	0.002 (0.09)	-0.017** (-2.54)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.004 (-0.56)	-0.004 (-0.56)	-0.004 (-0.56)	-0.019 (-1.05)	-0.002 (-0.33)
<i>Constant</i>	0.068** (1.98)	0.068** (1.98)	0.068** (1.98)	0.909*** (12.78)	-0.048** (-2.09)
Observations	13,734	13,734	13,734	12,939	34,361
Fixed Effects	Firm×Year	Firm×Year	Firm×Year	Firm×Year	Firm×Year
Cluster	Firm	Firm	Firm	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0764	0.0763	0.0763	0.274	0.0249

**Table IA.10 Alternative Clustering Choice**

This table reports the results of examining stock returns around the dates of CEO appointment announcements. We cluster the standard errors at the firm level. *(Excess) Return [-1, 1]* is the raw (market-adjusted, CAPM adjusted, Fama-French three factors model, and Fama-French-Carhart four factors model) stock return in the three days around the announcement of the CEO appointment. *Increase CEO Cooperativeness* is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the new CEO's cooperativeness in the first full year after promotion is greater than the predecessor CEO's cooperativeness in his or her last full year in the position. *Natural Retire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO's age is between 63 and 71, and the company's ROA is higher or equal to the median of the ROA in the same industry in the same year, and 0 otherwise. *Internal Hire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the new CEO is internally hired, and 0 otherwise. *Fire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO was forced to leave, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Return [-1, 1]</i>	(2) <i>Excess Return [-1, 1]</i>	(3) <i>Excess Return [-1, 1]-CAPM</i>	(4) <i>Excess Return [-1, 1]-FAMA3</i>	(5) <i>Excess Return [-1, 1]-FAMA4</i>
<i>Increase CEO Cooperativeness</i>	0.007* (1.91)	0.006 (1.61)	0.006* (1.81)	0.006* (1.74)	0.007** (1.99)
<i>ROA</i>	0.009 (0.33)	0.006 (0.25)	0.008 (0.35)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.002 (-0.11)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>	0.005 (1.28)	0.005 (1.30)	0.004 (1.20)	0.005 (1.32)	0.005 (1.41)
<i>Size</i>	0.001 (0.50)	0.001 (0.51)	0.001 (0.91)	0.001 (0.86)	0.001 (0.71)
<i>BTM</i>	-0.011* (-1.73)	-0.009 (-1.58)	-0.009 (-1.60)	-0.007 (-1.33)	-0.007 (-1.35)
<i>Leverage</i>	-0.007 (-0.58)	-0.004 (-0.33)	-0.009 (-0.84)	-0.009 (-0.77)	-0.009 (-0.77)
<i>SP500</i>	-0.007 (-1.20)	-0.006 (-1.07)	-0.007 (-1.28)	-0.006 (-1.19)	-0.006 (-1.08)
<i>Log(#People)</i>	0.006 (0.99)	0.005 (0.86)	0.006 (1.00)	0.007 (1.17)	0.007 (1.31)
<i>Female</i>	0.000 (0.07)	0.003 (0.45)	0.001 (0.12)	0.002 (0.31)	0.002 (0.32)
<i>Minority</i>	0.002 (0.49)	0.002 (0.55)	0.001 (0.20)	0.002 (0.44)	0.001 (0.33)
<i>Age</i>	-0.000 (-0.64)	-0.000 (-0.43)	0.000 (0.02)	-0.000 (-0.07)	-0.000 (-0.11)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	-0.001 (-0.25)	-0.002 (-0.38)	-0.001 (-0.19)	-0.001 (-0.32)	-0.002 (-0.45)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.005 (-0.46)	-0.001 (-0.15)	-0.000 (-0.04)	-0.000 (-0.00)	-0.001 (-0.11)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.004 (0.37)	0.009 (0.94)	0.008 (0.84)	0.006 (0.58)	0.006 (0.64)
<i>Topic</i>	-0.002 (-0.22)	-0.001 (-0.08)	0.004 (0.48)	0.004 (0.50)	0.005 (0.57)
<i>Natural Retire</i>	-0.003 (-0.68)	-0.003 (-0.74)	-0.001 (-0.31)	-0.001 (-0.42)	-0.002 (-0.64)
<i>Internal Hire</i>	-0.013*** (-2.77)	-0.015*** (-3.40)	-0.012*** (-2.74)	-0.012*** (-2.63)	-0.011** (-2.55)
<i>Fire</i>	-0.006 (-1.15)	-0.007 (-1.29)	-0.009* (-1.89)	-0.010* (-1.95)	-0.009* (-1.88)
Constant	0.019 (0.51)	0.010 (0.30)	-0.019 (-0.59)	-0.019 (-0.60)	-0.020 (-0.62)
Observations	1,197	1,197	1,180	1,180	1,180
Fixed Effects	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry
Cluster	Firm	Firm	Firm	Firm	Firm
Adj. R-squared	0.0260	0.0255	0.0237	0.0213	0.0208

**Table IA.11 Stock Return Controlling for Executive Sentiment Called**

This table reports the results of examining stock returns around the dates of CEO appointment announcements. (*Excess*) *Return [-1, 1]* is the raw (market-adjusted, CAPM adjusted, Fama-French three factors model, and Fama-French-Carhart four factors model) stock return in the three days around the announcement of the CEO appointment. *Increase CEO Cooperativeness* is indicator that is equal to 1 if the new CEO's cooperativeness in the first full year after promotion is greater than the predecessor CEO's cooperativeness in his or her last full year in the position. *Natural Retire* is indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO's age is between 63 and 71, and the company's ROA is higher or equal to the median of the ROA in the same industry in the same year, and 0 otherwise. *Internal Hire* is an indicator equal to 1 if the new CEO is internally hired, and 0 otherwise. *Fire* is indicator equal to 1 if the predecessor CEO was forced to leave, and 0 otherwise. *Executive Sentiment Called* is the word count-weighted average sentiment of first responses to all cooperativeness initiated by the executive in a given firm and year. In column 1-5, when executives do not initiate any cooperation, *Executive Sentiment Called* is left blank. In column 6-10, under the same condition, *Executive Sentiment Called* is assigned a value of 0. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. Significance levels are indicated by \*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

VARIABLES	(1) <i>Return [-1, 1]</i>	(2) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]</i>	(3) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-CAPM</i>	(4) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-FAMA3</i>	(5) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-FAMA4</i>	(6) <i>Return [-1, 1]</i>	(7) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]</i>	(8) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-CAPM</i>	(9) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-FAMA3</i>	(10) <i>Excess Return</i> <i>[-1, 1]-FAMA4</i>
<i>Increase CEO Cooperativeness</i>	0.010** (2.35)	0.009** (2.18)	0.010** (2.55)	0.010** (2.57)	0.011*** (2.80)	0.007* (1.86)	0.006 (1.57)	0.006* (1.77)	0.006* (1.68)	0.007* (1.92)
<i>ROA</i>	0.016 (0.52)	0.014 (0.45)	0.008 (0.27)	-0.000 (-0.01)	-0.004 (-0.14)	0.009 (0.32)	0.006 (0.24)	0.008 (0.33)	0.001 (0.03)	-0.002 (-0.07)
<i>Missing Analyst Forecast</i>	0.006 (1.17)	0.005 (1.10)	0.003 (0.80)	0.004 (0.87)	0.004 (1.07)	0.005 (1.29)	0.005 (1.31)	0.004 (1.21)	0.005 (1.32)	0.005 (1.41)
<i>Size</i>	0.001 (0.46)	0.001 (0.49)	0.002 (0.87)	0.001 (0.69)	0.001 (0.59)	0.001 (0.48)	0.001 (0.49)	0.001 (0.87)	0.001 (0.81)	0.001 (0.67)
<i>BTM</i>	-0.014** (-2.04)	-0.013** (-2.01)	-0.013** (-2.13)	-0.011* (-1.87)	-0.011* (-1.94)	-0.011* (-1.76)	-0.009 (-1.60)	-0.009 (-1.61)	-0.007 (-1.32)	-0.007 (-1.35)
<i>Leverage</i>	-0.003 (-0.22)	-0.002 (-0.11)	-0.005 (-0.37)	-0.004 (-0.29)	-0.003 (-0.23)	-0.007 (-0.54)	-0.004 (-0.29)	-0.009 (-0.78)	-0.008 (-0.70)	-0.008 (-0.70)
<i>SP500</i>	-0.010 (-1.35)	-0.009 (-1.30)	-0.008 (-1.31)	-0.007 (-1.13)	-0.006 (-1.04)	-0.007 (-1.16)	-0.006 (-1.06)	-0.007 (-1.30)	-0.006 (-1.22)	-0.006 (-1.11)
<i>Log(#People)</i>	0.003 (0.43)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.002 (-0.26)	-0.001 (-0.15)	-0.001 (-0.11)	0.006 (0.96)	0.005 (0.84)	0.006 (0.97)	0.006 (1.12)	0.007 (1.25)
<i>Female</i>	0.001 (0.13)	0.003 (0.30)	0.001 (0.14)	0.002 (0.22)	0.001 (0.18)	0.000 (0.06)	0.003 (0.43)	0.001 (0.11)	0.002 (0.29)	0.002 (0.29)
<i>Minority</i>	-0.002 (-0.31)	-0.002 (-0.41)	-0.004 (-0.77)	-0.003 (-0.57)	-0.004 (-0.83)	0.002 (0.48)	0.002 (0.54)	0.001 (0.20)	0.002 (0.43)	0.001 (0.32)
<i>Age</i>	-0.000 (-0.66)	-0.000 (-0.60)	-0.000 (-0.17)	-0.000 (-0.32)	-0.000 (-0.43)	-0.000 (-0.65)	-0.000 (-0.43)	0.000 (0.03)	-0.000 (-0.06)	-0.000 (-0.10)
<i>Pay Above Median</i>	0.006 (1.10)	0.004 (0.87)	0.004 (0.84)	0.003 (0.54)	0.002 (0.41)	-0.001 (-0.25)	-0.002 (-0.37)	-0.001 (-0.19)	-0.001 (-0.32)	-0.002 (-0.45)
<i>CFO</i>	-0.005 (-0.34)	0.002 (0.11)	0.002 (0.16)	0.005 (0.35)	0.006 (0.38)	-0.005 (-0.45)	-0.002 (-0.15)	-0.001 (-0.05)	-0.000 (-0.04)	-0.001 (-0.13)
<i>Analyst Sentiment</i>	0.002	0.005	0.009	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.009	0.008	0.005	0.006

<i>Executive Sentiment Called</i>	(0.13) 0.001	(0.35) 0.002	(0.66) 0.001	(0.33) 0.003	(0.35) 0.003	(0.34) 0.001	(0.88) 0.001	(0.79) 0.001	(0.50) 0.003	(0.56) 0.003
<i>Topic</i>	(0.22) -0.012	(0.35) -0.008	(0.20) -0.001	(0.69) 0.001	(0.75) 0.002	(0.19) -0.002	(0.29) -0.001	(0.22) 0.004	(0.65) 0.005	(0.71) 0.005
<i>Natural Retire</i>	(-0.94) -0.002	(-0.68) -0.001	(-0.08) 0.000	(0.07) 0.001	(0.20) -0.000	(-0.20) -0.003	(-0.06) -0.003	(0.47) -0.001	(0.51) -0.001	(0.57) -0.002
<i>Internal Hire</i>	(-0.39) -0.013**	(-0.25) -0.015***	(0.12) -0.012**	(0.22) -0.012**	(-0.02) -0.012**	(-0.67) -0.013***	(-0.74) -0.015***	(-0.31) -0.012***	(-0.40) -0.012***	(-0.61) -0.011**
<i>Fire</i>	(-2.27) -0.004	(-2.89) -0.005	(-2.38) -0.009	(-2.36) -0.010*	(-2.29) -0.010*	(-2.71) -0.006	(-3.31) -0.007	(-2.69) -0.009*	(-2.59) -0.010**	(-2.50) -0.009*
Constant	(-0.66) 0.047 (0.97)	(-0.72) 0.039 (0.84)	(-1.47) 0.005 (0.12)	(-1.67) 0.004 (0.09)	(-1.68) 0.002 (0.05)	(-1.15) 0.018 (0.49)	(-1.30) 0.010 (0.28)	(-1.90) -0.019 (-0.56)	(-1.97) -0.020 (-0.59)	(-1.90) -0.020 (-0.60)
Observations	884	884	870	870	870	1,197	1,197	1,180	1,180	1,180
Fixed Effects	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry	Industry
Cluster	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement	Announcement
	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date	Date
Adj. R-squared	0.0282	0.0280	0.0258	0.0192	0.0220	0.0252	0.0247	0.0228	0.0209	0.0205