

Why Do We Discriminate? Directional Beliefs and Biased Information Processing

Online Appendix

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A Experimental Design

This section provides example screenshots of all relevant screens for both treatments and across experiments.

A.1 Instructions

Figure A1: Background

Background

This study is based on a previous survey. In this previous survey, we set up a pool of potential "workers". These workers are US residents who completed an assessment test that consisted of the following three parts:

1. a **logic/math test**, consisting of 15 questions, including simple math exercises as well as questions in which the workers had to find a pattern in a logical sequence of figures in order to find the next figure of the sequence.
(Click [here](#) for an example screenshot.)
2. a test for their level of **altruism** where we provided each worker with an initial endowment of \$5 and asked him/her to indicate how much of these \$5 he/she would like to anonymously give to another worker.
(Click [here](#) for an example screenshot.)
3. and an **effort test** in which we repeatedly presented each worker with a matrix of zeros and ones and asked to indicate how many times the number "1" appears in that matrix. They had 5 minutes to solve as many matrices as possible. However, they always had the opportunity to abort the task and skip the remainder of it by just clicking an "Abort task & skip part" button.
(Click [here](#) for an example screenshot.)

The workers received a **total score** that consists of the following:

the number of logic/math questions (out of 15) that they answered correctly	+
the amount of dollars (of the maximum of \$5) that they offered in the altruism test	+
the number of matrices that the worker solved correctly in the effort task	+
Total Score	

For example, the total score of a worker who answered 7 out of 15 questions correctly in the math/logic test, who gave \$1.50 out of \$5 to the randomly chosen other worker, and who solved 4 matrices correctly got a score of $7 + 1.50 + 4 = 12.50$.

Figure A2: Decision (group Neutral)

Your decision

In the main part of this study, you will play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring some of the potential workers. You will repeatedly be presented with two workers and it is your task to hire one of them.

Note that we have set up four subgroups of workers, ♦, ■, ●, and ▲ and we have allocated each worker into one of these four groups.

Out of all hiring decisions that you make in this study, we will randomly select one hiring decision to be the "**decision-that-counts**".

Your bonus payment

If you hired the better of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the higher total score in the assessment test), you will get a bonus payment of \$2.00. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the lower score in the assessment test), you will get no bonus payment.

Data

All data that you enter in this survey will be treated anonymously and will solely be used for academic research. Neither the experimenter nor anyone else will be able to identify you from the answers that you give in this survey.

If you have read and understood these explanations, please click "Next" to answer **a few test questions** about the information on this page.

Figure A3: Decision (group Race)

Your decision

In the main part of this study, you will play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring some of the potential workers. You will repeatedly be presented with two workers and it is your task to hire one of them.

Out of all hiring decisions that you make in this study, we will randomly select one hiring decision to be the "**decision-that-counts**".

Your bonus payment

If you hired the better of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the higher total score in the assessment test), you will get a bonus payment of \$2.00. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the lower score in the assessment test), you will get no bonus payment.

Data

All data that you enter in this survey will be treated anonymously and will solely be used for academic research. Neither the experimenter nor anyone else will be able to identify you from the answers that you give in this survey.

If you have read and understood these explanations, please click "Next" to answer **a few test questions** about the information on this page.

Figure A4: Test Questions

True or False: The workers completed a logic/math test, an altruism test and an effort test.

- ☐ True
☐ False

True or False: A very good worker to hire is one that has very good logic/math skills, is very altruistic and puts a lot of effort into tasks.

- ☐ True
☐ False

What is the total score of a worker who solved 5 math/logic questions correctly, who gave \$2.44 to the randomly chosen other worker and who solved 3 matrices correctly in the effort task?

How high would your bonus payoff be, if you hired a worker with a total score of 15.3 instead of a worker with a total score of 10.5 in the decision-that-counts?

 \$

How high would your bonus payoff be, if you instead hired a worker with a total score of 2.60 instead of a worker with a total score of 5 in the decision-that-counts?

 \$

A.2 Belief Stage

This section shows screenshots of the belief stage. The screenshots show the elicitation of beliefs about Asian workers. The elicitation of beliefs about workers from the other groups was conducted identically.

Figure A5: Elicitation of Priors (group Neutral)




Figure A6: Elicitation of Priors (group Race)





Figure A7: Elicitation of Posteriors (group Neutral)

This graph shows the scores of all ▲-workers in our sample.



Out of all ▲-workers in our pool of workers, what fraction got a score between ...






Figure A8: Elicitation of Posteriors (group Race)

This graph shows the scores of all asian workers in our sample.



Out of all asian workers in our pool of workers, what fraction got a score between ...



A.3 Hiring Stage

Figure A9: Hiring Instructions (Experiment ‘No Information’)

You will now play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring potential workers.

The task: You will repeatedly be presented with a randomly drawn pair of workers from our pool of workers. It is your task to hire one of these two workers.

Your bonus payment: In particular, in the end one of the decisions will be randomly drawn as the **decision-that-counts**. If you hired the better of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **higher total score in the assessment test**), you will get a bonus payment of **\$2.00**. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **lower score in the assessment test**), you will get **no bonus** payment.

Figure A10: Hiring Instructions (Experiment ‘Ambiguous Information’)

You will now play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring potential workers.

The task: You will repeatedly be presented with a randomly drawn pair of workers from our pool of workers. It is your task to hire one of the two workers.

Your bonus payment: In the end one of the decisions will be randomly drawn as the **decision-that-counts**. If you hired the **better** of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **higher total score in the assessment test**), you will get a bonus payment of **\$2.00**. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **lower score in the assessment test**), you will get **no bonus** payment.

Important: On each hiring page, you will be given a message that is meant to tell you who the **better** worker is. However, the message comes from either a **True News** source or a **Fake News** source.

The True News source will always tell you the truth, whereas the Fake News source will never tell you the truth.

If you want, you can request more messages for each decision by clicking on the "**Request Another Message**" button below the two workers.

Whether a message comes from the True News source or the Fake News source is **randomly** determined for each message.

It is up to you how many messages (max. 10) you request and whether or not you follow them.

Figure A11: Hiring Instructions (Experiment ‘Uncertain Information’)

You will now play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring potential workers.

The task: You will repeatedly be presented with a randomly drawn pair of workers from our pool of workers. It is your task to hire one of the two workers.

Your bonus payment: In the end one of the decisions will be randomly drawn as the **decision-that-counts**. If you hired the **better** of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **higher total score in the assessment test**), you will get a bonus payment of **\$2.00**. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **lower score in the assessment test**), you will get **no bonus** payment.

Important: On each hiring page, you will be given a message that is meant to tell you who the **better** worker is. However, the message comes from either a **True News** source or a **Fake News** source.

The True News source will always tell you the truth, whereas the Fake News source will never tell you the truth.

If you want, you can request more messages for each decision by clicking on the **"Request Another Message"** button below the two workers.

The likelihood that a message comes from the **True News source is 60%**, the likelihood that a message comes from the **Fake News source is 40%**.

It is up to you how many messages (max. 10) you request and whether or not you follow them.

Figure A12: Hiring Instructions (Experiment ‘Tangible Information’)

You will now play the role of an employer who is in charge of hiring potential workers.

The task: You will repeatedly be presented with a randomly drawn pair of workers from our pool of workers. It is your task to hire one of these two workers.

Your bonus payment: In particular, in the end one of the decisions will be randomly drawn as the **decision-that-counts**. If you hired the better of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **higher total score in the assessment test**), you will get a bonus payment of **\$2.00**. However, if you hired the worse of the two workers in the decision-that-counts (i.e. the one with the **lower score in the assessment test**), you will get **no bonus** payment.

Important: On each hiring page, you will be given a random piece of information about the two workers.

If you want you can request more information for each decision by clicking on the **"Get more information"** button below the two workers.

It is up to you how many pieces of information (max. 10) you request and whether or not you follow them.

Figure A13: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘No Information’, group Neutral)




Figure A14: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘No Information’, group Race)




Figure A15: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘Ambiguous Information’ & ‘Uncertain Information’, group Neutral)

Which of these two workers do you hire?
(Please just click on the shape of the worker who you want to hire.)

 - worker		 - worker
Diamond	Group	Triangular

Message 1
The better worker is:

 - worker

Request Another Message

Figure A16: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘Ambiguous Information’ & ‘Uncertain Information’, group Race)

Which of these two workers do you hire?

Juan

Hispanic or Latin

Nansi

Asian

Race

Message 1

The better worker is:

Juan

Request Another Message

Figure A17: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘Tangible Information’, group Neutral)

Which of these two workers do you hire?
(Please just click on the shape of the worker you want to hire.)

 - worker

 - worker

Diamond

Group

Triangular

A-

Highschool English Grade (final year)

A+

[Get more Information](#)

Figure A18: Hiring Decision (Experiment ‘Tangible Information’, group Race)

Which of these two workers do you hire?
(Please just click on the worker you want to hire.)

 **Juan**

 **Nansi**

Hispanic or Latin

Race

Asian

A-

Highschool English Grade (final year)

A+

[Get more Information](#)

B Previous Data Collection


This section describes the full data collection process and presents the main results for the pooled sample as well as for wave 1 only.

The hiring experiments were conducted in two waves: Wave 1 in December 2021 and Wave 2 in September 2025. Both waves were pre-registered prior to data collection. The pre-registration for Wave 1, however, was not fully specified, and the realized sample size was smaller than the pre-registered target of 2,500 employers, due to initial resource constraints. To address this, Wave 2 implemented a fully pre-registered replication based on the working paper version of this study, with all hypotheses, analyses, treatments, and exclusion criteria clearly defined. Pooling the two waves yields a combined sample of 2,533 participants.

Wave 1 was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry under AEARCTR-0008609. In wave 1, 1,267 participants completed the study in time. After application of the exclusion criteria (pass at least 60% of the comprehension questions), I ended up with a sample of 1,138 participants, unevenly split across the four experiments as follows: 454 participants in the ‘No Information’ experiment, 234 participants in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment, 108 participants in the ‘Uncertain Information’ experiment, and 106 participants in the ‘Tangible Information’ experiment.


This Section presents the results of the main text for wave 1 as well as for the pooled sample.

Figure B1: Mean beliefs about group productivities




Notes: This figure shows the mean productivity beliefs. The first two bars in each panel show the mean productivity beliefs *before* the group-level information update of employers in treatment Race and treatment Neutral, respectively, the last two bars in each panel show the mean productivity beliefs *after* the group-level information update. Beliefs are plotted as the difference in mean beliefs about Hispanic workers and mean beliefs about Asian workers such that negative values indicate higher beliefs about the productivity of Asian workers than beliefs about the productivity of Hispanic workers, and vice versa. Panel (a) shows data from wave 1, panel (b) shows data from the pooled sample. Error bars show the standard errors of the means.

Figure B2: Prior and Posterior belief distributions




Notes: Panels (a) – (d) show employer belief distributions about the productivities of Asian workers before (low opacity) and after (high opacity) the group-level information update in treatment Race and treatment Neutral, respectively. Panels (e) – (f) show employer belief distributions about the productivities of Hispanic workers before (low opacity) and after (high opacity) the group-level information update in treatment Race and treatment Neutral, respectively. The left panels show data from wave 1, the right panels use data from the pooled sample.

Figure B3: Disparities in hiring rates across experiments




Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the Hispanic worker is hired and 0 otherwise, on the treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0), controlling for employer fixed effects. *Negative* coefficients indicate discrimination against Hispanic workers. The horizontal axis groups results by experiment ('No Information', 'Ambiguous Information', 'Uncertain Information', and 'Tangible Information'). Panel (a) shows data from wave 1, panel (b) shows data from the pooled sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Figure B4: Systematically different information processing



Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the employer follows the majority of observed signals on the interaction between a treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0) and a dummy equal to 1 if the majority of signals suggested hiring the Hispanic worker, controlling for employer fixed effects. *Negative* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment were *less* likely to follow the majority of signals when they favored the Hispanic worker. The horizontal axis groups results by experiment ('Ambiguous Information', 'Uncertain Information', and 'Tangible Information'). Panel (a) shows data from wave 1, panel (b) shows data from the pooled sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Figure B5: Systematically different information search




Notes: Panels (a) and (b) of this figure show the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the employer requests a second signal on the interaction between a treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0) and a dummy equal to 1 if the first signal suggested hiring the Hispanic worker, controlling for employer fixed effects. *Positive* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment were *more* likely to request a second signal when the first signal favored the Hispanic worker. Panels (c) and (d) show the coefficients from an OLS regression of the number of requested signals per decision on the same interaction, again controlling for employer fixed effects. *Positive* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment requested *more* signals when the first signal favored the Hispanic worker. The horizontal axes group results by experiment ('Ambiguous Information', 'Uncertain Information', and 'Tangible Information'). The left panels show data from wave 1, the right panels use data from the pooled sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

C Group-level Beliefs

Figure C1 shows the relation between mean beliefs about black, white, Asian and Hispanic workers and provides evidence, that the largest difference in prior beliefs, and hence in potential for motivated beliefs, lies in the difference between Asian and Hispanic workers.


Figure C1: Mean beliefs about group productivities



Notes: Figures (a) and (b) show the mean beliefs before the group-level information update of employers in group Race and group Neutral, respectively, figures (c) and (d) show the mean beliefs after the group-level information update of employers in group Race and group Neutral, respectively. Beliefs are plotted as the difference in means compared to beliefs about blacks. Error bars show the standard errors of the means.

Figure C2 shows differences in differences in posterior beliefs about Asian and Hispanic workers between treatment Race and treatment Neutral for each experiment separately. More specifically, I calculate the differences in mean beliefs about Asian and Hispanic workers for each employer of treatment Race and subtract the difference of the mean of the mean beliefs about Asian and Hispanic workers of employers in treatment Neutral. This is a measure of heterogeneity in posterior beliefs and shows that beliefs were homogeneously updated across experiments.

Figure C2: Heterogeneity in posterior beliefs




Notes: The figures show histograms of the differences in differences between employer beliefs about Asian and Hispanic workers, and between both treatments. The calculations uses the individual posteriors of treatment Race and the mean posteriors of treatment Neutral, as no employer participated in both treatments. Negative values imply higher beliefs for Asians than for Hispanics in treatment Race than in treatment Neutral.

D Additional Results

This section provides additional results. Section D.1 shows results from decisions in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment, when individuals requested one additional signal and ended up with two conflicting signals. Section D.2 provides results of the counter-hypotheses for hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b. Section D.3 adds the numbers to all figure of the main text. Finally, Section D.4 provides results of some robustness exercises.

D.1 Discrimination under Conflicting Signals

Figure D1: Hiring rates of Hispanic workers under wiggle room



Notes: The vertical axis displays the fraction of hired Hispanics in treatment Race minus the fraction of hired Hispanics in treatment Neutral. The horizontal axis groups the decisions by experiments (‘No Information’, ‘Ambiguous Information’). Decisions in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment only include decisions in which subjects only requested one additional signal and ended up with two conflicting signals. Error bars indicate standard errors of the means.

Figure D1 provides further support to the idea that individuals misperceived the informativeness of the ambiguous signals to align with their motives to form the

belief that the Asian worker is more productive. Given that subjects believe there is a 50% chance of Fake News for each signal, in the absence of motivated reasoning, decisions in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment with two conflicting signals (i.e., one suggesting the Hispanic worker and one suggesting the Asian worker) should be similar to decisions in the No Information experiment. Instead, Figure D1 shows that there is more discrimination in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment in this case.

D.2 Counter-hypotheses

To give more insights into the data structure this section provides results for the following “counter-hypotheses” for hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b:

Counter-hypothesis 2a: *If the majority of all considered signals in a decision suggests to hire the Asian worker in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment, employers in treatment Race are more likely to act according to the suggestion than employers in treatment Neutral.*


Counter-hypothesis 2b: *If the majority of all considered signals in a decision suggests to hire the Asian worker, the difference in the likelihood to follow the suggestion between treatment Race and treatment Neutral is larger in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment than in the ‘Uncertain Information’ and the ‘Tangible Information’ experiments.*

Counter-hypothesis 3: *If the initial information signal suggests to hire the Asian worker in the ‘Ambiguous Information’ experiment, employers in treatment Race are less likely to request a 2nd signal and request less signals than employers in treatment Neutral.*

These counter-hypotheses compare the subjects that stopped requesting signals when the majority of the received signals suggested to hire the Asian worker (instead of the Hispanic worker).

The results in Figures D2 and D3 confirm the “counter-hypotheses” and hence lend further support for the motivated information acquisition behavior described in the main text.


Figure D2: Results of the Counter-hypotheses of Hypotheses 2a and 2b




Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the employer follows the majority of observed signals on the interaction between a treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0) and a dummy equal to 1 if the majority of signals suggested hiring the Asian worker, controlling for employer fixed effects. *Positive* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment were *more* likely to follow the majority of signals when they favored the Asian worker. The horizontal axis groups results by experiment ('Ambiguous Information', 'Uncertain Information', and 'Tangible Information'). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Figure D3: Results of the Counter-hypothesis of Hypothesis 3

(a) Likelihood to request a 2nd signal



(b) Number of signals requested per decision



Notes: Panel (a) of this figure shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the employer requests a second signal on the interaction between a treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0) and a dummy equal to 1 if the first signal suggested hiring the Asian worker, controlling for employer fixed effects. *Negative* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment were *less* likely to request a second signal when the first signal favored the Asian worker. Panel (b) shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of the number of requested signals per decision on the interaction between a treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0) and a dummy equal to 1 if the first signal suggested hiring the Hispanic worker, controlling for employer fixed effects. *Negative* coefficients indicate that employers in the Race treatment requested *less* signals when the first signal favored the Asian worker. The horizontal axes group results by experiment ('Ambiguous Information', 'Uncertain Information', and 'Tangible Information'). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

D.3 Main Results

Table D1 shows the main text results across experiments and thereby provides the numbers for Figures 3 to 5 of the main text.

Table D1: Main results across experiments

	Information Experiment			
	(1) No	(2) Ambiguous	(3) Uncertain	(4) Tangible
Discrimination				
Race	-0.267*** (0.035)	-0.102*** (0.024)	-0.104*** (0.023)	-0.020 (0.017)
Mean (neutral)	0.479	0.512	0.543	0.467
Following Signals				
Race*Hispanic (maj)		-0.209*** (0.031)	-0.180*** (0.031)	-0.143*** (0.024)
Mean (neutral)		0.828	0.890	0.848
Request 2nd Signal				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.036* (0.019)	0.040** (0.017)	0.029* (0.015)
Mean (neutral)		0.593	0.761	0.808
Number of Signals				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.162 (0.108)	0.064 (0.110)	0.344*** (0.108)
Mean (neutral)		4.079	5.071	5.154
N	2,422	2,478	2,394	2,471

*Notes: This table provides the OLS results underlying the presented estimated in Figures 3–5. Outcomes are presented in bold, ‘Race’ is a treatment dummy equal to 1 if the employer was in treatment Race, and 0 otherwise, ‘Race*Hispanic (maj)’ refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a majority of signals that suggest to hire the Hispanic worker, ‘Race*Hispanic (1st)’ refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a first signal that suggests to hire the Hispanic worker. Mean (neutral) show the means of the respective outcome in treatment ‘Neutral’. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.*

D.4 Robustness Checks

During the Instructions, participants in all four experiments had to answer a few comprehension questions in order to make sure that instructions were understood. While the main text includes all participants that answered at least 3 out of 5 of these questions correctly, this section shows results for stricter limits. Table D2 shows results for participants who answered at least 4 out of 5 questions correctly, Table D3 for those who answered all comprehension questions correctly. The results of the main text are robust to these variations.

Table D2: Main results across experiments

	Information Experiment			
	(1) No	(2) Ambiguous	(3) Uncertain	(4) Tangible
Discrimination				
Race	-0.264*** (0.037)	-0.083*** (0.025)	-0.114*** (0.024)	-0.013 (0.018)
Mean (neutral)	0.476	0.506	0.555	0.465
Following Signals				
Race*Hispanic (maj)		-0.189*** (0.031)	-0.180*** (0.032)	-0.136*** (0.025)
Mean (neutral)		0.829	0.891	0.846
Request 2nd Signal				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.038* (0.020)	0.038** (0.018)	0.027* (0.016)
Mean (neutral)		0.606	0.780	0.818
Number of Signals				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.202* (0.117)	0.046 (0.116)	0.346*** (0.112)
Mean (neutral)		4.112	5.240	5.276
N	2,184	2,254	2,177	2,219

*Notes: This table provides the OLS results of the main analyses on a sample of employers who correctly answered at least 4 out of 5 comprehension questions. Outcomes are presented in bold, 'Race' is a treatment dummy equal to 1 if the employer was in treatment Race, and 0 otherwise, 'Race*Hispanic (maj)' refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a majority of signals that suggest to hire the Hispanic worker, 'Race*Hispanic (1st)' refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a first signal that suggests to hire the Hispanic worker. Mean (neutral) show the means of the respective outcome in treatment 'Neutral'. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.*

Table D3: Main results across experiments


	Information Experiment			
	(1) No	(2) Ambiguous	(3) Uncertain	(4) Tangible
Discrimination				
Race	-0.260*** (0.045)	-0.061** (0.027)	-0.134*** (0.028)	-0.003 (0.022)
Mean (neutral)	0.482	0.482	0.574	0.455
Following Signals				
Race*Hispanic (maj)		-0.174*** (0.038)	-0.185*** (0.038)	-0.142*** (0.030)
Mean (neutral)		0.840	0.892	0.839
Request 2nd Signal				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.049* (0.026)	0.007 (0.019)	0.017 (0.020)
Mean (neutral)		0.601	0.788	0.835
Number of Signals				
Race*Hispanic (1st)		0.311** (0.144)	-0.092 (0.130)	0.302** (0.136)
Mean (neutral)		4.020	5.247	5.400
N	1,519	1,652	1,617	1,631

Notes: This table provides the OLS results of the main analyses on a sample of employers who correctly answered all 5 comprehension questions. Outcomes are presented in bold, 'Race' is a treatment dummy equal to 1 if the employer was in treatment Race, and 0 otherwise, 'Race*Hispanic (maj)' refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a majority of signals that suggest to hire the Hispanic worker, 'Race*Hispanic (1st)' refers to the interaction of an employer in treatment Race who got a first signal that suggests to hire the Hispanic worker. Mean (neutral) show the means of the respective outcome in treatment 'Neutral'. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

E Additional Experiments


Since neither the One Information experiment nor the All Information experiment allow to study the information acquisition and processing behavior without any process tracing techniques, results of the ‘One Information’ and ‘All Information’ experiments are not included in the main text but mainly serve as additional evidence. Figure E2 confirms the prior and posterior beliefs from the other four experiments as shown in Figure 1 from the main text. Figure E2 summarizes the discrimination rates in these two experiments. Neither of the experiments shows rates of discrimination, which is consistent with the limited wiggle room in both experiments.

Figure E1: Mean beliefs about group productivities (All Info & One Info)



Notes: The first two bars show the mean productivity beliefs *before* the group-level information update of employers in treatment Race and treatment Neutral, respectively, the last two bars show the mean productivity beliefs *after* the group-level information update. Beliefs are plotted as the difference in mean beliefs about Hispanic workers and mean beliefs about Asian workers such that negative values indicate higher beliefs about the productivity of Asian workers than beliefs about the productivity of Hispanic workers, and vice versa. The data underlying this figure are pooled from the One Information and All Information experiments. Error bars show the standard errors of the means.

Figure E2: No disparities in hiring rates across additional experiments



Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of a dummy that is 1 if the Hispanic worker is hired and 0 otherwise, on the treatment dummy (Race = 1, Neutral = 0), controlling for employer fixed effects. *Negative* coefficients indicate discrimination against Hispanic workers. The horizontal axis groups results by experiment ('One Information', 'All Information'). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.