

Appendix A1. Loan Placement and Descriptive Characteristics by State

State	Number of Loans	% Market Share¹	GDP / Cap	% of National GDP²	Judicial Factor⁴	% Urban Population
<i>DF (Mexico City)</i>	25,250	25.49%	189	21.84%	0.2	98.60%
<i>Mexico (City)</i>	10,177	20.16%	50.2	9.48%	1	73.00%
Chiapas	3,137	25.24%	29.9	1.70%	-0.2	32.00%
Nayarit	2,050	20.46%	42.9	0.54%	-1.1	44.00%
Tlaxcala	708	19.49%	40.3	0.57%	-0.9	34.00%
Guerrero	2,251	18.69%	40.5	1.68%	-1.8	40.40%
Zacatecas	1,697	18.10%	41.8	0.76%	-1.5	37.00%
Michoacán	4,226	17.20%	41.6	2.21%	-1.3	47.10%
Jalisco	11,920	17.08%	71.2	6.31%	0.4	73.80%
Yucatan	2,445	16.36%	58.9	1.41%	-1.8	60.10%
Puebla	3,741	15.64%	49.5	3.55%	0.4	48.30%
Quintana Roo	1,805	15.48%	108.5	1.64%	-1	75.50%
Morelos	1,524	15.39%	64.5	1.38%	0.6	60.90%
Nuevo Leon	8,453	15.30%	133.9	7.43%	0.5	90.60%
Durango	1,648	15.03%	66.9	1.33%	0.9	55.40%
Tamaulipas	4,588	14.51%	82.9	3.34%	1.4	80.90%
Aguascalientes	1,643	13.97%	87.7	1.23%	2.9	72.60%
Coahuila	3,810	13.99%	102.2	3.37%	1	85.20%
Colima	1,039	13.85%	71.3	0.53%	0.1	71.90%
Guanajuato	5,187	13.50%	55.1	3.60%	0.1	60.90%
San Luis Potosi	2,427	13.36%	56.4	1.81%	-0.2	50.20%
Oaxaca	1,398	12.19%	32.4	1.52%	0.2	24.30%
Campeche	1,390	12.01%	123.4	1.24%	0.2	55.70%
Sinaloa	3,667	11.90%	57.2	1.99%	-0.2	56.90%
Hidalgo	1,301	11.53%	41.9	1.30%	-0.2	30.90%
Veracruz	4,462	11.35%	44.2	4.17%	-1.5	42.80%
Chihuahua	3,581	11.07%	100.3	4.33%	-0.4	78.80%
Baja California	3,969	10.84%	92.5	3.50%	0.7	85.10%
Tabasco	1,064	10.71%	46.4	1.25%	0.9	33.50%
Baja California S.	921	10.03%	87.1	0.60%	-0.6	70.10%
Queretaro	1,412	9.16%	80.9	1.72%	0.1	51.40%
Sonora	2,599	8.44%	84.3	2.68%	0.5	75.10%
Correlation with Market Share	-	-	0.16	0.35	-0.16	-0.05
Correlation with Market Share ³	-	-	-0.11	-0.16	-0.24	-0.27

¹ Accumulated loans as a percentage of firms registered with IMSS (Social Security) in 2005

² Participation of State GDP in national GDP. current pesos

³ Correlation excluding Mexico City (DF and State of Mexico)

⁴ Quality of Legal and Judicial system, larger is better. See Laeven and Woodruff (2004)

Appendix A2. Sample Timeline –Bank

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	
ZETA	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * BobB product developer "had been convinced of need for SME-credit for years" * PDE as adviser to Commercial director, who attends just to "comply with protocol" * "Transformed" by PDE process, this will happen and I don't do it at Zeta, nobody will <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * AH intense focus on SE guarantee definition, KA piloted * Zeta has existing relationship with Findev, AH becomes critical interlocutor between SE and Findev 	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * First ideas small working capital loans to pre-approved SMEs * KA is in commercial, proposes to use checking account information to estimate rough cash flows for SMEs * Send 2,000 pre-approved "checking account overdraft authorization" to selected clients <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Results of test program used to build an internal business case * Formal "task force" recruited, charged with testing and designing a robust product * Main focus on using liquidity information from checking movements to create a credit score/ credit analysis tool * Budget approved for larger pre-approval test * Ad-Hoc SE guarantee (regular, not first losses) 	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * InterCard, based on experience with Delta, begins pushing for SME cards at Zeta * Credit analysis begins incorporating elements of credit card credit scoring, but checking movements still core of analysis * Expand pre-approval test to other regions, still focus on "AAA" clients <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Low delinquency rates in tests lead to "recalibration" of models open up to broader market * Hybrid product: working capital loan with "Delta Card" (to take advantage of InterCard marketing and promotion budgets) * "Guinea Pig" for all new SE guarantee modifications * Formal team approved 	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Product rolled out in three key regions * Model includes branch-level "SME advisors" (driven by KA's familiarity with commercial) * AH influence in IT leads to strong push for automation of authorization processes * "When this thing takes off, the biggest bottle neck will be authorization, we don't notice it now because they are pre-approved" <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * In reaction to Delta, product becomes official * Semi-national rollout * Testing models for loan approval and branch-level client acquisition * Strong leverage of extension agents, worried about running out of pre-approvals * "People here are becoming too comfortable with pre-approvals, if we don't develop a strong commercial model... we will hit a plateau soon" 	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * National rollout of product * Participate in SE auctions, second place bidders * Most aggressive promoter during SME week, strong media push <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * AH departure coincides with depletion of clear pre-approval cases, and the yet-undefined approval process for new prospects * SME salesforce at branch level beginning to take off * Automatic approval process through IT systems serious glitches, lack of clarity within SME team hindering coordination 	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * AH fired out of bank, internal fight as superior takes over the product. Internal exodus in team. <p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * SME Week. Quarterly SME Development events. Use of mass media // Internal coordination broken down
Driving Individual(s)	<p>Jan-Jun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * B to B manager (AH) * Commercial sub-manager (KA) * Risk analyst (JL) 					
Extended Team	<p>Jul-Dec</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AH and KA work informally with SE. Recruit JL from risk, she brings in friends from legal 	<p>Ad-Hoc team, no formal team yet--all members retain formal job</p>	<p>Formal team hired, housed in commercial. KA moves to head SME team, AH still in formal job, but de facto leader of process</p>	<p>IT team added to formal SME team</p> <p>AH formally moved to SME area to manage product launch</p>	<p>CEO. President asked to step in and engage in heavy promotion, driven by SE events</p>	
Periodic Rituals	<p>PDE Workshops</p> <p>Intense participants in SE coordination and guarantee design meetings</p>	<p>Coordination meetings, held outside of bank, usually in local coffee shop. Often with SE team in SE offices</p>	<p>Coordination meetings formalized, held at commercial area of bank. Include risk, legal members, some formally hired for SME products</p>	<p>Product launched in Mexico</p> <p>City-promotion events and training events held in key regions across the country. AH and KA become key promoters.</p>	<p>SME Week. Quarterly SME Development events. Use of mass media // Internal coordination broken down</p>	

Appendix A3. Sample Timeline--State

	Jan/Jan	Jul/Dec	Jan/Jan	Jul/Dec	Jan/Jan	Jul/Dec	Jan/Jan	Jul/Dec	Jan/Jan	Jul/Dec
NORTHWEST										
Main Events	<p>* JV and state ministry entered administration with promise to develop SMEs. State-level offers to lend directly to SMEs</p> <p>* CR social entrepreneur, during first PDE meeting saw the "opportunity" had been waiting for years to help SMEs in my state"</p>	<p>* JV and CR partnership: "we wanted to shape SINAFIN as much as possible to suit the needs of the state"</p> <p>* Involve local business associations (relatively strong and well organized) from beginning</p> <p>* JV uses SE funds to start state SME development fund, matching federal funds 1:1 with State funds</p>	<p>* Initial results of state loans are promising, low delinquency rates</p> <p>* Banks increasingly critical of direct lending by government</p> <p>* JV looks at direct lending numbers: "not scalable, we would have to become a bank, that is not our job, but we showed the banks that SMEs are good"</p>	<p>* Taskforce agrees to create an extension agent program for the state. Program's success is noticed by the SE, incorporated into national SINAFIN</p> <p>* State moves away from direct lending, channels funds to extension agents and guarantors</p> <p>* Given taskforce, Northwest used as test market by most banks in SINAFIN</p>	<p>* Extension agent program moved 50% within ministry, 50% within local business associations</p> <p>* Local financial intermediaries recruited to guarantee programs, condition to go after "missing middle" (SMEs not addressed by national banks)</p>	<p>* First state where four largest banks are already competing for SME credit: since Northwest was a test market, the products were mostly developed here</p> <p>* State receives additional funding for guarantees to bolster SINAFIN guarantee</p> <p>* Not a bidding system, but ministry negotiates aggressive local (state-level) commitments from the banks. If commitments are met, additional state guarantee kicks in to further subsidy risk in the state</p>	<p>* All local banks are offering SME products</p> <p>* Strongest extension agent program in the country</p> <p>* First loan placement results in the country</p> <p>* "missing middle" programs</p> <p>* SME credit market working, but microenterprises not able to access the program</p>	<p>* Plans to expand guarantees to microcredit and other "missing middle" programs</p> <p>* Extension agent program at business associations a huge success: not only helping with loan placement, also strengthening associations</p>	<p>* National SME Week and national media promotion of products. State creates SME week, SME fairs, aggressive media campaign</p>	
Driving Individual(s)	<p>* State Minister of the Economy (JV)</p> <p>* Delegate, State SE</p> <p>* Delegation (CR)</p> <p>* Sub-Minister, General Director of State Ministry</p> <p>* President of one, VP of the other local business associations</p>	<p>* JV creates an SME team within the ministry</p> <p>* SME team creates an SME taskforce together with CR, local associations, NGOs, banks</p>	<p>* CR takes a stronger lead bringing SINAFIN to the state</p>	<p>* Business associations recruited to manage extension agent program and to pre-approve clients for banks</p>	<p>* JV, with CR create a semi-annual convention and SME credit prize for banks. Idea then also incorporated to SE</p>	<p>* Task force still meets bimonthly, results and prizes reviewed semi-annually</p>	<p>* National SME Week and national media promotion of products. State creates SME week, SME fairs, aggressive media campaign</p>			
Extended Team	<p>* SME team at state ministry</p>	<p>* CR recruits additional local bank managers to taskforce</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets monthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets monthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>				
Periodic Rituals	<p>* PDE workshops in the state</p> <p>* JV and CR (opposing political parties) actively participate in subsequent PDE and SINAFIN process</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace"</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets monthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>	<p>* Taskforce meets bimonthly at local "government palace", shifting from guarantee design to loan placement</p>				

Table A4. Sample Qualitative Evidence by Phase and Mechanism

Effective Activation	Ineffective Activation
1. Creating the Opportunity through a Common Vision	
1.1 Revealing Hidden, Private Dissent	
<p>We thought enough of them would be interested, but it was impossible to know. There was such a gap between what they said in public, what they did in actions, and what they told us “en corto” [privately].</p> <p>To see many quotes from bankers saying that there was a large opportunity here. I truly thought I was alone. I knew these guys, we often met for other things, and they had never said anything like that to me.</p>	<p>In an open forum, people are not individuals but representatives of their organization and their sector. If you ask me for my opinion, I will give you the opinion of my organization. That is what I am expected to do [...] It is a lot to ask to put someone on stage and ask her to personally disagree with her entire sector.</p>
1.2 Creating a Critical Mass through a Joint Definition	
<p>We could not do anything if we did not have enough scale and the participation of enough banks and supporting organizations [...] to provide enough liquidity, to spread the risks, to share credit information.</p> <p>We all came from such different starting places that we had to work with others from the very [...] definition of the process; we needed to discover who would work with us, learn their language.</p>	<p>My opinion has been, and still remains, that there is an excellent reason why we [the banks] are not lending to SMEs. Let's start with the basics: if they were credit worthy, someone would have lent to them already. [...] They are now suggesting a guarantee subsidy [...] I have been around long enough to know where partnerships with government officials end [...] We just speak radically different languages and have radically different incentives.</p>
1.3 Crafting a Shared Identity and Toolkit for Action	
<p>It was difficult to be a part of it and not be changed by it. You can track all of the people who participated in the entire process of the Plan and you will see that none of them stayed in their jobs.</p> <p>I was frustrated with Jaime because, after months of work, the end product of the PDE was remarkably similar to our original version [...] but we needed to let them identify each other, they had to feel like they had jointly produced the plan so they could start working together.</p>	<p>I can see no reason to participate in the program [...] We meet eighty percent of our lending targets by lending to local and federal governments and corporate clients. Just the complexity of creating the products and then analyzing each loan would make it a nightmare.</p> <p>Findev managers have been there for more than twenty years. [...] After the 1995 crisis many people lost their jobs. Those who remained built a culture that protects their job above everything else. [...] they don't take risks.</p>
2. Crafting New Practices	
2.1 Crafting Interdisciplinary Organizational Experiments	
<p>We realized there was no way we could come up with a program that would just work for everyone [...] we learned that we needed to try many things [...] to figure out what would work.</p> <p>We had to establish alliances with the state governments [...] As soon as we had the PDE, we spent the next six months signing agreements [...] to give money to state governments. [...] The money had no conditions, only to promote SME credit.</p>	<p>My boss just never bought into it. I told him about the work everyone else was doing, I told him we just needed to do a few small tests [...] After one conversation that almost ended in a fight, he made me promise that if he gave me money for a study and he was right, I would not bring this up again [...] Through the meetings, the study was kind of designed to confirm my boss' doubts about SMEs [...] and the study only ended up in his drawer.</p>
2.2 Hiding Experiments in Plain Sight	
<p>Of course everybody knew we were doing this, starting with my boss. It is really hard to hide a pink elephant, you know? [...] But they did not {officially know, you see? My boss would often remind me that "he knew nothing of this," meaning that if things went bad, it would be all on me.</p>	<p>The governor had campaigned on being an SME champion [...] As soon as we started working with Economia on the new program, it seemed politically important to announce it, both to show that we were keeping our promise and to build political momentum around it [...] We got killed, in the worst way. [...] it was too early, we had not learned what worked.</p>
2.3 Reinforcing Collective Toolkits and Shared Identities	
<p>We were suddenly left out [...] It was one of those 'not good with them, much worse without them' situations. Economia was now negotiating directly with the banks and we were not a part of the process anymore. Anything was better than not being part of that process [...] I don't like admitting this, but without that public pressure we probably would not have allowed SINAFIN to happen.</p>	<p>Companies repaid their loans and the lenders made money, but we were not able to build momentum around it. The banks remained skeptical about SMEs and they were not willing to continue lending without government money [...] The programs just died out [...] we never worked as a broader team, it was always the banks here, government there.</p>
3. Disseminating Results	
3.1 Staging Dissemination Performances	
<p>Mexican SMEs have developed a type of inferiority complex, they just don't see themselves as credit-worthy [...] They are rightly afraid, most entrepreneurs don't know what to do with a credit line</p> <p>When I need a [regional] bank manager to step up the efforts [...] all I have to do is give an “official recognition” of leadership in the state to his competitor [...] I get a call the very next day</p>	<p>The programs just died out [...] we were not able to get the little machine [the market] to run the way it started now with SINAFIN [...] our biggest mistake was not to sell our results better [...] to all the players in the market. We assumed once it worked that it would all happen on its own.</p>
3.2 Recruiting High-Status Participants	
<p>There comes a point when you need to bring in the big guns [...]. You have to signal that this [...] is something that organizations in their entirety are supporting. [...] When you show a picture in the newspaper of the CEOs of major banks with the presidents of business associations and the minister of the economy with a sign behind them that says “SME credit” it sends a signal.</p>	<p>I must have personally organized at least ten different forums on SME credit, and small credit fairs, and meetings with local banks, and workgroups with the associations. I went on radio interviews every week. I tried everything, but nobody seemed to be paying attention [...] My best coverage was in page 3 of the business section.</p>

Table A5. Opportunity Recognition by Stakeholder

	Number of Recognizers	Number who Took Action	Hierarchical Level (of Leader)
<i>Federal Level</i>			
ECONOMIA	5	4	Middle
FINDEV	5	2	Middle
OTHERS¹	14	3	Varied
<i>Banks</i>			
GAMMA	3	2	Middle
DELTA	4	2	Middle
EPSILON	3	3	Middle
ZETA	3	2	Middle
ALPHA	2	2	Middle
BETA	3	1	Low
ETA	2	2	Top
THETA	1	1	Top
IOTA	3	2	Middle
<i>States</i>			
NORTHWEST	7	5	Top / Middle
SOUTHWEST	6	4	Middle
EAST	3	3	Middle
NORTH	5	3	Low
CENTER	4	3	Middle
SOUTHEAST	2	2	Middle

² Includes NGOs, business associations, and other development banks.

Table A6. Strategic Role, Underlying Motivations, and Perspectives by Stakeholder Group

Stakeholder	STRATEGIC ROLE	MOTIVATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES	
		Reformers	Opponents
ECONOMIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Design, finance, assign guarantees. - (Only) Neutral convener of broader conversation. - New, legitimate actor in an old field, with resources to finance process. - Initiator, curator, manager of entire process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide legitimacy and visibility to the ministry. - SME as engine of growth for the country. - Economia in unique position to create linkages: new team, no bad blood. - Large political potential for President's party. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economia needs a policy success. This is too risky. - We should not be convincing banks to do their work. Mandate them! - Economia does not have the weight or the authority to push through necessary programs and reforms.
BANKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Design, finance, distribute loan products. - Few national banks, historically skeptical: involvement carried symbolic value (Nixon in China). - High concentration in sector meant that only national banks had the size, resources, and footprint to efficiently support new market. - Alternative path through new intermediaries: too long and risky given power of banks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SME: Majority of firms in Mexico (95%) - Other markets already saturated. E.g. No room for individual credit cards. But an SME credit card? - Build new political channels and support new federal administration in policy priority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SMEs unstable, obscure, risky, illiquid, unprofitable. - Politically charged issue. If you enter this and something goes wrong, very visible. - Dramatic structural implications. Banks separated between individual banking and corporate banking. This does not fit anywhere. Who owns this? - Government cannot be trusted. They will not repay guarantees, administrative nightmare.
FINDEV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide administrative expertise and backbone to guarantees. - Largest development bank with explicit SME mandate: Ideal institutional partner. - Extensive expertise managing guarantees with banks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Heart of Findev's mission. - Banks & Economia working together. Will happen with or without us. - If we oppose it and it works, will be the last straw. If we support and it fails, not our problem. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We should own this issue. Not Economia. They will fail and we should not help them succeed. - Banks cannot own credit decisions, taxpayers own part of the risk. Without supervision banks will take advantage. - We are giving free money to banks. Banks are thieves. Cannot trust them.
STATE GOVERNMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Customize guarantees to local realities, add funding, distribute & supervise, mobilize SMEs - Economia lacked manpower and resources to ensure proper national rollout of program. - In touch with local SMEs, sensitive to needs and barriers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SME credit requires national banks. (No local banks in Mexico) We are too small to be able to sway large banks. - SINAFIN can bring additional "free" money to the state. - If it works, we get credit for something without carrying the risk. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Federal administration is new and from opposition. We should not help them. - Development programs should be managed by states. Federal administration violates state autonomy. - No political control of this. If banks do bad things, local SMEs will blame it on us.
NGOs, ASSOCIATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (Only ones with) Expertise in SME realities and dynamics. - Inform other stakeholders, mobilize SMEs. - Provide alternative administrative support given Findev's resistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government-private partnerships necessary for development. - Need independent surveillance/ supervision to limit downsides. - Associations, NGOs currently "invisible" and irrelevant to SMEs. We can use this program to regain visibility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Why should we pay banks to do their work? - Guarantee subsidies create market distortions. - Guarantees will make banks MORE risk averse. They will lend to safe SMEs, make it even harder for "average" SMEs to get credit.


Table A7. Subprocesses within the Theme of Experimentation: By Bank

Bank Name	First Idea	EXPERIMENTATION						OUTCOME
		Concerning inter-disciplinary teams	Maintaining Symbolism of "Scarey"	Reinforcing Team Identity		Collaborating Across Stakeholders		
				Internal	External			
GAMMA	* Working capital loans * Find empty branches separated from bank image							Survived
DELTA	* Original idea: working capital loans * First possible idea: POS terminals, loan to finance PC for SMEs							Survived
EPSILON	* Working capital loan, existing credit card scoring models on SME owner as proxy							Survived
ZETA	* Working capital loan, use checking account balances to pre-approve AAA SME clients							Survived
ALPHA	* Original idea: Simple fixed asset loans for SMEs (collateral=safes) * First possible idea: flexible mortgages							Shut Down (Team Disbanded)
BETA	* Provide working capital loans, existing credit scoring models for credit cards as proxy							Did not start (No Resources)
ETA	* Simple fixed asset loan, start with good mortgage clients							Did not start (No Champion)
THETA	* Working capital loans, identify good clients through credit card balances							Did not start (No Champion)
IOTA	* "Maquila" export loan							Shut Down (Opposition)

Table A8. Subprocesses within the Theme of Experimentation. By State


State Name	First Idea	EXPERIMENTATION					OUTCOME
		Concerning inter-disciplinary teams	Maintaining Symbolism of "Secrecy"	Reinforcing Team Identity		Collaborating Across Stakeholders	
				Internal	External		
NORTHWEST	* State-subsidized SME credit fund * Joint guarantee with Federation to subsidize local intermediaries						Survived
SOUTHWEST	* State-subsidized Microcredit fund * Joint guarantee with Federation to subsidize local intermediaries						Survived (2nd attempt)
EAST	* State-subsidized Microcredit fund						Unclear (2 weak pilots)
NORTH	* State-Subsidized SME credit fund						Shut Down (No Resources)
CENTER	* No unified idea: local banker wants to become test case for his bank, Economia delegation wants to attract SINAFIN money						Did not start (No Unified idea)
SOUTHEAST	* State-subsidized Microcredit fund						Unclear (much opposition)

Appendix A9. Sample Organizational Chart--Bank



* Note that this is a partial organizational chart, where only one area is expanded within each level.

Appendix A10. Sample Organizational Chart--Government



*.Note that this is a partial organizational chart, where only one area is expanded within each level.

Appendix A11. Survival of Institutional Entrepreneurs by Phase, Hierarchical Level

Managerial Level		Opportunity	Recognition	Action	Experiment	Disseminate
Top	1	2	1			
	2	6	2	1		
	3	12	4	4		
Middle	4	18	7	6	3	2
	5	25	14	13	11	7
	6	31	8	7	5	2
Lower/ Line	7	33	11	8		
	8	31	16	6		
	9	47	12	1		

Table A12. Subprocesses within the Themes of Practice Dissemination: By Bank

Bank Name	Dissemination			Outcome
	Product / Practice Disseminated	Crafting Dissemination Events		
		Local (State) Events	Mass Media Events	
GAMMA	* Two products: simple working capital loan; "hybrid", quasi microcredit product through new subsidiary			Success: Both products growing aggressively
DELTA	* SME credit card, for working capital revolving loans * Evaluating fixed asset promotions			Success: Most successful product: loans placed
EPSILON	* Working capital loan (simple loan, not revolving) * Fixed asset loan in testing phase			Success: Currently fastest growing product.
ZETA	* Revolving working capital loan * Debit card option to dispose of loan or pay vendors			TBD: Success until 2005, no growth in 2006, team disbanded
ALPHA	NA			Failure
BETA	NA			Failure
ETA	NA			Failure
THETA	NA			Failure
IOTA	NA			Failure

Table A13. Subprocesses within the Themes of Practice Dissemination: By State

State Name	DISSEMINATION				OUTCOME
	Product / Practice Disseminated	Crafting Dissemination Events			
		Local (State) Events	Mass Media Events	Recruiting Trade Actors	
NORTHWEST	* Joint guarantee: Active banks & lenders to "strategic sectors" receive "extra" subsidy by State				Success: Highest SME credit volume, highest growth rate
SOUTHWEST	* Most active banks receive "extra" subsidy by State				Success: Highest SME credit penetration
EAST	* Banks promoting products, but no support from state government				*TBD: Growth beginning to pick up
NORTH	* Banks promoting products, but no support from state government				Failure
CENTER	NA				Failure
SOUTHEAST	* State-subsidized microcredit (private sector disapproves) * Banks promoting products, but no support from state government				Failure