

Table A1: Robustness Checks: Alternate Samples^a

DV's	Sample : Excluding In-house Lobbyists				Sample : Firms larger than 5 Employees				Sample : Multiple Team Lobbying Firms			
	Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit		Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit		Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
# of Client Ties	-0.0159*** (0.0048)	-0.0159*** (0.0048)	0.0116* (0.0059)	0.0111+ (0.0060)	0.0001 (0.0029)	-0.0000 (0.0029)	0.0166** (0.0061)	0.0161** (0.0062)	-0.0096** (0.0036)	-0.0096** (0.0036)	0.0148+ (0.0088)	0.0147 (0.0090)
Lobbyist's Revenue	0.0000** (0.0000)	0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Tenure in Lobbying Firm	0.0050 (0.0176)	0.0051 (0.0176)	-0.0598+ (0.0313)	-0.0649* (0.0322)	-0.0083 (0.0152)	-0.0083 (0.0152)	-0.0353 (0.0373)	-0.0353 (0.0374)	0.0955*** (0.0197)	0.0954*** (0.0198)	-0.0981* (0.0426)	-0.1029* (0.0428)
Specialization	-0.1086 (0.2205)	-0.1081 (0.2199)	0.1848 (0.4460)	0.1586 (0.4449)	-0.0250 (0.2546)	-0.0280 (0.2545)	0.2574 (0.5412)	0.2512 (0.5281)	0.0215 (0.3541)	0.0209 (0.3545)	-0.2280 (0.5615)	-0.2247 (0.5518)
# of Ties to Politicians	0.3484*** (0.0823)	0.3487*** (0.0825)	0.0684 (0.1703)	0.0763 (0.1720)	0.1224 (0.0848)	0.1218 (0.0850)	0.1396 (0.2006)	0.1569 (0.1984)	0.1931+ (0.1070)	0.1920+ (0.1071)	0.0533 (0.2366)	0.0890 (0.2379)
Political Contribution	0.1906+ (0.1065)	0.1908+ (0.1064)	0.5548* (0.2377)	0.5950* (0.2403)	0.1360 (0.1158)	0.1350 (0.1162)	0.7894*** (0.2320)	0.7931*** (0.2346)	-0.0065 (0.1309)	-0.0069 (0.1309)	0.8649** (0.3107)	0.8617** (0.3149)
Competitive Overlap	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0003+ (0.0002)	0.0003+ (0.0002)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Firm Age	-0.0199 (0.0135)	-0.0199 (0.0135)	0.0463 (0.0301)	0.0499+ (0.0297)	-0.0165 (0.0154)	-0.0163 (0.0154)	-0.0209 (0.0351)	-0.0153 (0.0348)	-0.1980*** (0.0155)	-0.1980*** (0.0155)	-0.0118 (0.0333)	-0.0031 (0.0325)
Firm Size	-0.0011 (0.0028)	-0.0011 (0.0028)	-0.0026 (0.0060)	-0.0028 (0.0062)	-0.0005 (0.0029)	-0.0005 (0.0029)	-0.0015 (0.0068)	-0.0017 (0.0070)	0.0005 (0.0028)	0.0006 (0.0028)	0.0029 (0.0070)	0.0025 (0.0071)
Law Firm	0.0524 (0.1240)	0.0523 (0.1241)	0.3878+ (0.2194)	0.3919+ (0.2197)	-0.1086 (0.1295)	-0.1077 (0.1291)	0.4984+ (0.2669)	0.5211+ (0.2690)	-0.1098 (0.1427)	-0.1085 (0.1426)	0.4886 (0.3119)	0.4903 (0.3137)
Lobbying Firm					-1.4330*** (0.1739)	-1.4301*** (0.1742)	0.0682 (0.3603)	0.0713 (0.3481)	-2.0441*** (0.3014)	-2.0483*** (0.3017)	-0.7028 (0.8664)	-0.7629 (0.8305)
Firm-Employee Distance	-0.0546 (0.3965)	-0.0419 (0.4132)	0.2390 (0.5856)	-0.2863 (0.6612)	0.8888* (0.3587)	0.8273* (0.3732)	-0.2126 (0.6983)	-0.7326 (0.7228)	1.0725** (0.3935)	1.0377* (0.4178)	-0.3263 (0.7275)	-0.7645 (0.7365)
Discontinuous Increase	1.6052*** (0.1996)	1.6219*** (0.2786)	0.6902* (0.3208)	0.0962 (0.4139)	2.1052*** (0.2244)	1.9772*** (0.2833)	0.7863* (0.3657)	0.1530 (0.5048)	2.0858*** (0.2660)	1.9833*** (0.3655)	1.0589* (0.4299)	0.3406 (0.6358)
Discontinuous X Distance		-0.1169 (1.2961)		4.3376* (2.0660)		0.8709 (1.2843)		4.0643+ (2.2595)		0.5213 (1.2442)		3.6382 (2.4633)
Constant	-3.0326*** (0.2622)	-3.0349*** (0.2594)	-2.0294*** (0.5750)	-1.9527*** (0.5772)	-1.7539*** (0.2604)	-1.7443*** (0.2588)	-2.1039*** (0.6188)	-2.0438** (0.6225)	-0.5427 (0.4247)	-0.5282 (0.4237)	-0.7679 (1.2661)	-0.6394 (1.2620)
Period Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chamber Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Majority Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log pseudolikelihood	-1468.27	-1468.27	-253.15	-250.75	-1282.23	-1281.95	-220.36	-218.21	-964.12	-964.04	-174.12	-172.76
N	8704	8704	424	424	6655	6655	401	401	6007	6007	326	326

a. Standard errors clustered by connected politicians. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$. The results are robust to the exclusion of firms with a single registered lobbyist (M1-M4), the exclusion of lobbyists working in small firms (M5-M8), and the exclusion of lobbyists where all lobbyists in the firm jointly participate in lobbying deals (M9-12). We conclude that the results are not an artifact of lobbyists with no variation in the firm-employee distance measure or small firms.

Table A2: Robustness Checks: Independent Variables^a

DVs	Variable : Chair Assignments Only				Sample : Close Congressional Elections			
	Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit		Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
# of Client Ties	-0.0027 (0.0027)	-0.0027 (0.0027)	0.0136** (0.0052)	0.0134* (0.0053)	0.0022 (0.0046)	-0.0007 (0.0036)	0.0176* (0.0086)	0.0183* (0.0087)
Lobbyist's Revenue	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0000** (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Tenure in Lobbying Firm	-0.0092 (0.0120)	-0.0092 (0.0120)	-0.0432 (0.0301)	-0.0424 (0.0307)	0.0212 (0.0197)	-0.0035 (0.0151)	-0.0620 (0.0426)	-0.0701 (0.0436)
Specialization	-0.0196 (0.1824)	-0.0156 (0.1815)	0.1275 (0.4141)	0.0674 (0.4096)	0.1579 (0.3421)	-0.1505 (0.2941)	0.4135 (0.6092)	0.3982 (0.5904)
# of Ties to Politicians	0.2162** (0.0679)	0.2162** (0.0679)	0.1629 (0.1536)	0.1690 (0.1541)	0.2597* (0.1219)	0.1681+ (0.0997)	0.3525 (0.2519)	0.3769 (0.2510)
Political Contribution	0.0863 (0.0942)	0.0856 (0.0941)	0.7155*** (0.2028)	0.7509*** (0.2054)	0.3993* (0.1711)	0.2843* (0.1314)	0.7753* (0.3420)	0.7565* (0.3494)
Competitive Overlap	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002+ (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Firm Age	-0.0123 (0.0112)	-0.0123 (0.0112)	0.0202 (0.0278)	0.0231 (0.0278)	-0.0009 (0.0179)	-0.0056 (0.0137)	0.0282 (0.0413)	0.0330 (0.0391)
Firm Size	0.0008 (0.0025)	0.0008 (0.0025)	0.0012 (0.0060)	0.0010 (0.0061)	0.0050 (0.0037)	0.0023 (0.0033)	-0.0068 (0.0110)	-0.0074 (0.0109)
Law Firm	-0.0990 (0.1074)	-0.0983 (0.1076)	0.4145+ (0.2125)	0.3894+ (0.2161)	0.1481 (0.1786)	0.0726 (0.1458)	0.5219 (0.3337)	0.5413 (0.3345)
Lobbying Firm	-1.1861*** (0.1306)	-1.1863*** (0.1308)	-0.1568 (0.2817)	-0.1727 (0.2719)	-0.9039*** (0.2291)	-0.9439*** (0.1936)	-0.1204 (0.4461)	-0.0979 (0.4334)
Firm-Employee Distance	0.9473** (0.2984)	0.9709** (0.3069)	-0.0080 (0.5570)	-0.4214 (0.5753)	0.8187 (0.5928)	0.8504+ (0.4937)	-0.3985 (1.0856)	-1.1734 (1.1788)
Discontinuous Increase	1.8902*** (0.2304)	1.9674*** (0.2818)	0.8392* (0.4251)	-0.0093 (0.5316)	1.1316** (0.3928)	1.0825** (0.3602)	0.6836 (0.4909)	-0.0080 (0.6600)
Discontinuous X Distance		-0.7115 (1.6180)		9.1227** (3.0635)		0.9263 (1.6024)		4.3878+ (2.6222)
Constant	-2.0668*** (0.2058)	-2.0723*** (0.2040)	-2.1916*** (0.5383)	-2.0756*** (0.5415)	-2.3046*** (0.3728)	-1.8753*** (0.3013)	-2.2437** (0.7944)	-2.1005** (0.7806)
Period Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chamber Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Majority Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log pseudolikelihood	-1817.21	-1817.08	-303.41	-298.48	-560.75	-853.62	-130.89	-129.41
N	9686	9686	555	555	2869	4286	257	257

a. Standard errors clustered by connected politicians. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10.

Table A2: Robustness Checks: Independent Variables (cont'd)^a

DV's	Variable : Discontinuous Decrease				Variable : Other Committee Switches			
	Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit		Logit Exit		Logit Spin-out Exit	
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
# of Client Ties	-0.0022 (0.0027)	-0.0022 (0.0027)	0.0139* (0.0054)	0.0140* (0.0055)	-0.0022 (0.0027)	-0.0022 (0.0027)	0.0141** (0.0053)	0.0138** (0.0052)
Lobbyist's Revenue	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Tenure in Lobbying Firm	-0.0089 (0.0121)	-0.0088 (0.0121)	-0.0483 (0.0308)	-0.0486 (0.0309)	-0.0086 (0.0121)	-0.0081 (0.0121)	-0.0449 (0.0298)	-0.0435 (0.0297)
Specialization	-0.0532 (0.1817)	-0.0553 (0.1815)	0.0603 (0.4180)	0.0197 (0.4257)	-0.0623 (0.1826)	-0.0659 (0.1829)	0.0815 (0.4179)	0.0733 (0.4180)
# of Political Connections	0.2011** (0.0669)	0.2020** (0.0672)	0.1585 (0.1552)	0.1604 (0.1544)	0.1903** (0.0663)	0.1922** (0.0663)	0.1616 (0.1571)	0.1765 (0.1589)
Political Contribution	0.1125 (0.0937)	0.1141 (0.0938)	0.7814*** (0.2110)	0.7830*** (0.2121)	0.1173 (0.0941)	0.1185 (0.0940)	0.7543*** (0.2088)	0.7527*** (0.2086)
Competitive Overlap	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0002+ (0.0001)	0.0002+ (0.0001)
Firm Age	-0.0127 (0.0110)	-0.0127 (0.0110)	0.0229 (0.0274)	0.0234 (0.0276)	-0.0124 (0.0110)	-0.0127 (0.0110)	0.0200 (0.0279)	0.0196 (0.0279)
Firm Size	0.0005 (0.0025)	0.0005 (0.0025)	0.0007 (0.0062)	0.0009 (0.0062)	0.0005 (0.0025)	0.0005 (0.0025)	0.0009 (0.0060)	0.0007 (0.0060)
Law Firm	-0.0663 (0.1095)	-0.0667 (0.1095)	0.4429* (0.2166)	0.4515* (0.2161)	-0.0665 (0.1095)	-0.0661 (0.1096)	0.4367* (0.2126)	0.4364* (0.2147)
Lobbying Firm	-1.1700*** (0.1288)	-1.1728*** (0.1290)	-0.2201 (0.2733)	-0.2312 (0.2754)	-1.1814*** (0.1283)	-1.1821*** (0.1284)	-0.1606 (0.2828)	-0.1573 (0.2853)
Firm-Employee Distance	0.9186** (0.3115)	0.9577** (0.3179)	-0.5883 (0.6266)	-0.5120 (0.6234)	0.9083** (0.3013)	0.8536** (0.3059)	-0.0356 (0.5528)	-0.1667 (0.5895)
Discontinuous Increase	1.5535*** (0.2080)	1.5596*** (0.2085)	0.1327 (0.3744)	0.1490 (0.3752)	1.5393*** (0.1725)	1.5424*** (0.1726)	0.6621* (0.2995)	0.6595* (0.3011)
Increase X Distance	-0.0203 (0.9797)	-0.0573 (0.9825)	3.8985* (1.7253)	3.8240* (1.7202)				
Discontinuous Decrease	-0.2820 (0.2590)	-0.1452 (0.2916)	0.8271 (0.5158)	1.5659+ (0.8881)				
Decrease X Distance		-0.8835 (1.0076)		-5.1960 (4.1340)				
Committee Switch					0.1717 (0.2494)	-0.0149 (0.3051)	-0.3043 (0.3982)	-0.8695 (0.7650)
Switch X Distance						1.1179 (1.1287)		2.7755 (2.5311)
Constant	-2.1206*** (0.2057)	-2.1222*** (0.2059)	-2.0514*** (0.5310)	-2.0297*** (0.5283)	-2.1080*** (0.2066)	-2.1037*** (0.2068)	-2.1708*** (0.5369)	-2.1628*** (0.5389)
Period Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chamber Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Majority Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log pseudolikelihood	-1810.34	-1810.13	-300.07	-299.54	-1810.63	-1810.14	-303.50	-302.93
N	9686	9686	555	555	9686	9686	555	555

a. Standard errors clustered by connected politicians. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The results are robust to only with discontinuous increases due to a connected politician becoming a chair (M1-M4) and as a result of close elections (M5-M8). We cannot replicate the results with discontinuous decreases in the value of relational capital after the depositions of connected politicians (M9-M12) and connected politicians' assignments to non-powerful committees (M9-M12).

Table A3: Robustness Checks: Decomposition of Distance Measure^a

DV's	Logit						Conditional Logit			
	Exit		Spin-out		Spin-out Exit		Exit		Spin-out	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
# of Client Ties	-0.0021 (0.0027)	-0.0021 (0.0027)	0.0053+ (0.0032)	0.0053+ (0.0032)	0.0138* (0.0054)	0.0139* (0.0054)	-0.0079 (0.0065)	-0.0079 (0.0065)	0.0261+ (0.0140)	0.0264+ (0.0140)
Lobbyist's Revenue	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Tenure in Lobbying Firm	-0.0068 (0.0122)	-0.0068 (0.0122)	-0.0399+ (0.0224)	-0.0401+ (0.0223)	-0.0470 (0.0308)	-0.0455 (0.0309)	0.3185*** (0.0429)	0.3180*** (0.0427)	0.0674 (0.0611)	0.0628 (0.0602)
Specialization	-0.0172 (0.1880)	-0.0164 (0.1881)	0.0702 (0.3298)	0.0833 (0.3254)	0.1438 (0.4229)	0.1588 (0.4211)	1.0733* (0.4541)	1.0740* (0.4539)	0.1600 (0.9176)	0.0978 (0.9120)
# of Political Connections	0.1947** (0.0658)	0.1948** (0.0658)	0.1908+ (0.1070)	0.1912+ (0.1070)	0.1710 (0.1559)	0.1577 (0.1553)	0.4710+ (0.2715)	0.4696+ (0.2716)	0.8822 (0.5569)	0.8613 (0.5475)
Political Contribution	0.1082 (0.0938)	0.1080 (0.0939)	0.5108** (0.1735)	0.5063** (0.1735)	0.7724*** (0.2126)	0.7639*** (0.2119)	-0.0243 (0.1887)	-0.0301 (0.1884)	0.5423 (0.3670)	0.5130 (0.3569)
Competitive Overlap	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Firm Age	-0.0144 (0.0111)	-0.0143 (0.0110)	-0.0020 (0.0205)	-0.0011 (0.0203)	0.0233 (0.0276)	0.0236 (0.0276)	0.0309 (0.0215)	0.0313 (0.0215)	0.2396*** (0.0638)	0.2419*** (0.0652)
Firm Size	-0.0002 (0.0027)	-0.0002 (0.0027)	0.0001 (0.0050)	0.0000 (0.0050)	0.0004 (0.0062)	0.0004 (0.0063)	-0.0011 (0.0063)	-0.0013 (0.0065)	0.0259+ (0.0150)	0.0269+ (0.0157)
Law Firm	-0.0624 (0.1090)	-0.0623 (0.1090)	0.2856+ (0.1666)	0.2875+ (0.1668)	0.4569* (0.2156)	0.4682* (0.2150)	-0.0138 (0.2039)	-0.0136 (0.2040)	0.0917 (0.4799)	0.1263 (0.4897)
Lobbying Firm	-1.2259*** (0.1333)	-1.2258*** (0.1333)	-1.2195*** (0.2466)	-1.2123*** (0.2465)	-0.1893 (0.2854)	-0.1778 (0.2860)	-0.0710 (0.2649)	-0.0715 (0.2653)	-1.6090* (0.7200)	-1.6317* (0.7195)
Firm-Employee Overlap	1.0188** (0.3600)	1.0276** (0.3554)	0.2178 (0.7157)	0.5943 (0.6513)	-0.6653 (0.8068)	-0.2736 (0.7685)	0.3400 (0.5042)	0.3949 (0.5012)	0.0084 (0.9474)	0.2257 (0.9228)
Firm-Employee Complementarity	-0.9180 (1.2549)	-0.9609 (1.2632)	0.8362 (2.1906)	-0.3723 (2.3286)	0.9036 (2.7210)	-0.4599 (2.8803)	-1.2652 (1.6801)	-1.3969 (1.6865)	2.0570 (3.3499)	1.1280 (3.2361)
Discontinuous Increase	1.5459*** (0.1987)	1.5390*** (0.1932)	1.3864*** (0.3126)	1.4031*** (0.3094)	0.0168 (0.3760)	0.0510 (0.3662)	1.5068*** (0.3880)	1.5580*** (0.3842)	1.4664* (0.6591)	1.3909* (0.6142)
Discontinuous X Overlap	0.0965 (0.6676)		2.0630* (0.9261)		3.3573* (1.3605)		1.2477 (1.4277)		4.8992 (3.3965)	
Discontinuous X Complementarity		0.4393 (1.9580)		6.3125* (2.8902)		11.0098* (4.7394)		2.9820 (4.2250)		18.1406** (7.0080)
Constant	-2.0950*** (0.2048)	-2.0955*** (0.2052)	-4.1382*** (0.4152)	-4.1646*** (0.4174)	-2.1286*** (0.5362)	-2.1209*** (0.5365)				
Period Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chamber Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Party Majority Fixed-effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log pseudolikelihood	-1809.30	-1809.28	-671.14	-671.14	-300.07	-299.84	-798.46	-798.71	-209.13	-208.03
N	9686	9686	9686	9686	555	555	4512	4512	1730	1730

a. Standard errors clustered by connected politicians. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$. We decompose firm-employee distance into overlap and complementarity between the firm and the employee. Both overlap and complementarity positively moderate the relationship between discontinuous increases and employee entrepreneurship but not mobility to established firms.