Table A1. Heckman Sample Selection Analysis of Strategic Change

Variable	First stage probit		(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Inventor CEO	0.123***	(0.027)			0.357***	(0.026)	0.358***	(0.027)	0.430***	(0.033)	0.466***	(0.035)
Inventor CEO × CEO liberalism							0.237	(0.197)	0.197	(0.197)	0.150	(0.210)
Inventor CEO × CEO career variety									1.137***	(0.216)	1.257***	(0.212)
Inventor CEO × Industry dynamism											0.001	(0.001)
CEO liberalism			0.214***	(0.056)	0.180**	(0.059)	0.158**	(0.061)	0.167**	(0.060)	0.172**	(0.059)
CEO career variety			0.348***	(0.057)	0.402***	(0.061)	0.403***	(0.061)	0.346***	(0.065)	0.349***	(0.064)
Industry dynamism			-0.004***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.000)	-0.003***	(0.000)
CEO duality			-0.120***	(0.022)	-0.123***	(0.022)	-0.124***	(0.022)	-0.115***	(0.023)	-0.120***	(0.023)
CEO ownership			0.000	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.002)
CEO tenure			-0.008***	(0.002)	-0.008***	(0.002)	-0.008***	(0.002)	-0.009***	(0.002)	-0.009***	(0.002)
CEO founder experience			0.161***	(0.035)	0.089**	(0.033)	0.092**	(0.033)	0.124***	(0.033)	0.113***	(0.033)
CEO STEM degree earned			-0.374***	(0.048)	-0.366***	(0.048)	-0.361***	(0.046)	-0.325***	(0.047)	-0.340***	(0.046)
CEO highest degree earned			0.042***	(0.012)	0.041***	(0.012)	0.037**	(0.012)	0.030*	(0.013)	0.030*	(0.013)
CEO international experience			0.124***	(0.018)	0.151***	(0.018)	0.150***	(0.018)	0.131***	(0.019)	0.133***	(0.019)
CEO is male			0.023	(0.054)	0.044	(0.062)	0.057	(0.060)	0.056	(0.063)	0.066	(0.065)
CEO age			0.005	(0.013)	0.008	(0.014)	0.010	(0.014)	0.026+	(0.014)	0.022	(0.014)
CEO incentive compensation			0.096***	(0.028)	0.093***	(0.028)	0.082**	(0.030)	0.088**	(0.029)	0.089**	(0.029)
CEO is an outsider			-0.070**	(0.023)	-0.055*	(0.023)	-0.050*	(0.023)	-0.030	(0.024)	-0.040+	(0.023)
TMT tenure			-0.033***	(0.004)	-0.032***	(0.004)	-0.032***	(0.004)	-0.031***	(0.004)	-0.031***	(0.004)
TMT age			-0.003	(0.002)	-0.005*	(0.002)	-0.005*	(0.002)	-0.003	(0.002)	-0.004+	(0.002)
Female executives			-0.310***	(0.069)	-0.339***	(0.072)	-0.326***	(0.072)	-0.299***	(0.071)	-0.304***	(0.071)
TMT highest degree earned			0.132***	(0.015)	0.139***	(0.016)	0.139***	(0.016)	0.127***	(0.016)	0.131***	(0.016)
Firm age	0.006***	(0.001)	0.006***	(0.001)	0.007***	(0.001)	0.007***	(0.001)	0.007***	(0.001)	0.007***	(0.001)
Firm performance	0.123**	(0.004)	-0.508***	(0.035)	-0.529***	(0.036)	-0.526***	(0.036)	-0.531***	(0.036)	-0.533***	(0.035)
Firm size	0.152***	(0.006)	-0.094***	(0.009)	-0.081***	(0.010)	-0.081***	(0.010)	-0.072***	(0.011)	-0.078***	(0.011)
Firm patents			-0.000	(0.007)	-0.004	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.007)
Institutional ownership			-0.653***	(0.027)	-0.664***	(0.024)	-0.664***	(0.023)	-0.621***	(0.028)	-0.617***	(0.026)
Inside director			-0.771***	(0.098)	-0.785***	(0.100)	-0.832***	(0.102)	-0.808***	(0.099)	-0.828***	(0.099)
Industry munificence			-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Strategic change replaced			-0.531***	(0.019)	-0.537***	(0.021)	-0.532***	(0.021)	-0.502***	(0.023)	-0.505***	(0.023)
Constant	-1.301***	(0.063)	3.851***	(0.151)	3.593***	(0.187)	3.569***	(0.186)	3.288***	(0.202)	3.408***	(0.192)
Inverse Mills ratio			0.836***	(0.066)	0.999***	(0.080)	1.012***	(0.079)	1.023***	(0.085)	0.996***	(0.084)
Exclusion restriction	0.004***	(0.000)										
Wald chi square (*p*)	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	

Notes. N = 9,137. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests for all variables. Industry and year dummies included in all models. Industry dynamism, CEO age, firm patents, and industry munificence were rescaled to be 100th, 10th,100th, and 100th of their original values, respectively, to allow proper reporting of results. $^{+}p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$

Table A2. Analysis without control variables

	Without control variables				Without *strategic change replaced*			
Variable	**(1)**		**(2)**		**(3)**		**(4)**	
Inventor CEO	0.215***	(0.011)	0.316***	(0.043)	0.331***	(0.029)	0.384***	(0.030)
Inventor CEO × CEO liberalism			0.403*	(0.204)			0.331+	(0.180)
Inventor CEO × CEO career variety			1.050***	(0.237)			1.447***	(0.164)
Inventor CEO × Industry dynamism			0.001	(0.001)			0.020+	(0.012)
CEO liberalism			0.084***	(0.020)	0.149**	(0.052)	0.079	(0.052)
CEO career variety			0.752***	(0.036)	0.612***	(0.052)	0.495***	(0.057)
Industry dynamism			-0.003***	(0.000)	-0.040***	(0.003)	-0.041***	(0.004)
CEO duality					-0.139***	(0.019)	-0.122***	(0.018)
CEO ownership					0.009***	(0.001)	0.009***	(0.001)
CEO tenure					-0.005**	(0.002)	-0.005*	(0.002)
CEO founder experience					0.149***	(0.032)	0.150***	(0.031)
CEO STEM degree earned					-0.433***	(0.052)	-0.411***	(0.049)
CEO highest degree earned					0.003	(0.011)	-0.001	(0.011)
CEO international experience					0.079***	(0.019)	0.066***	(0.018)
CEO is male					0.124*	(0.058)	0.150*	(0.060)
CEO age					-0.002	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.001)
CEO incentive compensation					0.140***	(0.027)	0.136***	(0.030)
CEO is an outsider					-0.065**	(0.022)	-0.058**	(0.023)
TMT tenure					-0.033***	(0.004)	-0.032***	(0.004)
TMT age					-0.008***	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)
Female executives					-0.186**	(0.065)	-0.184**	(0.059)
TMT highest degree earned					0.100***	(0.016)	0.098***	(0.016)
Firm age					0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Firm performance					-0.524***	(0.037)	-0.518***	(0.033)
Firm size					-0.155***	(0.008)	-0.155***	(0.008)
Firm patents					0.002	(0.006)	0.003	(0.006)
Institutional ownership					-0.554***	(0.023)	-0.515***	(0.025)
Inside director					-1.027***	(0.116)	-1.003***	(0.113)
Industry munificence					-0.009***	(0.001)	-0.009***	(0.001)
Constant	2.902***	(0.029)	2.932***	(0.036)	5.138***	(0.146)	4.962***	(0.152)
Wald chi square (*p*)	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	

Notes. N = 9,137. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests for all variables. Industry and year dummies included in all models. Industry dynamism, CEO age, firm patents, and industry munificence were rescaled to be 100th, 10th,100th, and 100th of their original values, respectively, to allow proper reporting of results.

$^{+}p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$

Table A3. DiD analysis: Exogeneous removal of inventor CEOs and strategic change

	Without control variables, except for firm performance and firm size		With all control variables	
Variable	**(1)**		**(2)**	
TreatedXPost	-0.720*	(0.349)	-0.802+	(0.445)
Treat	0.703*	(0.279)	0.786*	(0.358)
Post	0.044	(0.087)	-0.331+	(0.169)
CEO liberalism			0.138	(0.481)
CEO career variety			-0.195	(0.386)
Industry dynamism			-0.007	(0.005)
CEO duality			0.852***	(0.181)
CEO ownership			-0.243	(0.151)
CEO tenure			-0.010	(0.013)
CEO founder experience			-0.287	(0.307)
CEO STEM degree earned			0.612*	(0.304)
CEO highest degree earned			-0.173	(0.112)
CEO international experience			0.405**	(0.126)
CEO is male			1.942*	(0.925)
CEO age			-0.175	(0.111)
CEO incentive compensation			0.248	(0.244)
CEO is an outsider			0.091	(0.150)
TMT tenure			-0.043	(0.047)
TMT age			0.022	(0.021)
Female executives			-0.123	(0.810)
TMT highest degree earned			0.010	(0.164)
Firm age			-0.000	(0.006)
Firm performance	-2.112***	(0.363)	-1.768***	(0.463)
Firm size	-0.184***	(0.041)	-0.130	(0.086)
Firm patents			-0.059*	(0.024)
Institutional ownership			0.677+	(0.352)
Inside director			0.974	(0.868)
Industry munificence			-0.002*	(0.001)
Strategic change replaced			-0.219	(0.175)
Constant	3.718***	(0.535)	1.107	(1.574)
Wald chi square (p)	0.000		0.000	

Notes. N = 9,137. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests for all variables. Industry and year dummies included in all models. Industry dynamism, CEO age, firm patents, and industry munificence were rescaled to be 100th, 10th,100th, and 100th of their original values, respectively, to allow proper reporting of results.

$^{+}p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$

Figure A. Differences in Strategic Change Between Treated (Inventor CEO replaced by non-inventor CEO) and Control (Non-inventor CEO replaced by non-inventor CEO) Groups