Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Published Online:1 May 2007https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248
- Cited by
- 20 May 2026 | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 209, No. 3
- 1 April 2023 | Production and Operations Management, Vol. 32, No. 4
- 15 February 2021 | Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 46, No. 2
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 67, No. 2
- 28 May 2019 | Economic Theory, Vol. 69, No. 4
- SSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 84
- 20 February 2017 | International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 46, No. 4
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 63, No. 8
- Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100
- 9 December 2015 | International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 45, No. 1-2
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- 26 May 2012 | International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 42, No. 4
- Honam Mathematical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2
- 21 September 2012 | Dynamic Games and Applications, Vol. 3, No. 1
- Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 39, No. 15
- 19 May 2011 | Dynamic Games and Applications, Vol. 1, No. 2
- Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 1
- Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 67, No. 2
- 1 May 2007 | Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 32, No. 2
Volume 32, Issue 2
May 2007
Pages 257-496
Article Information
Metrics
Information
- Received:June 15, 2005
- Published Online:May 01, 2007
Copyright © 2007, INFORMS
Cite as
Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala, (2007) Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research 32(2):413-424.
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248
Keywords
