Crosscluster Referrals and Subsidy Schemes in Multicluster Healthcare Systems

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0526

Problem definition: Excessive and highly variable waiting times for specialty services are a long-standing problem for public healthcare systems. Healthcare authorities in some jurisdictions have begun to experiment with schemes to improve system performance, including crosscluster referrals, which allow patients to switch from their home cluster to other clusters with shorter waiting times, and opt-out subsidies, which help patients seeking services from private providers outside the public system. However, few studies in the literature have examined the structure of the problem or offered analytical insights to the design of such schemes. Methodology/results: We construct a multicluster service network model to study optimal routing policies under both individual and system optimization. We define externalities in a network setting and establish their properties, and we further identify conditions under which referrals are effective or counterproductive in reducing system costs. We also show that lowering the switching cost could inadvertently degrade overall system performance. In contrast to the classic result for single-cluster systems, our analysis of opt-out and switching incentives reveals that fixed subsidies generally cannot fully coordinate a multicluster system because of the crosscluster effect of externalities. However, they can effectively reduce system costs in wide ranges of system parameter values. We further show that dynamic (state-dependent) subsidies can achieve perfect alignment between individual and system optimization. Managerial implications: Our study suggests that crosscluster referrals are effective when there is a substantial workload imbalance but without excessive system congestion. They should be implemented with proper operational control; referrals should be promoted when the workload imbalance is high, but they should be discouraged when the overall system workload is very high, whereas the imbalance is insubstantial. Furthermore, fixed opt-out and switching subsidies can effectively improve system performance under different demand conditions and should be applied strategically.

Funding: The work of L. Liu was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant General Program 72371122]. The work of W. Shang was supported by the Hong Kong Government [General Research Fund Grant LU 13502219]. The work of S. Zheng was partially supported by the Hong Kong Government [General Research Fund Grant 16502621].

Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0526.

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