Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the U.S. Supplemental Security Income Program
Abstract
We study a large-scale (n = 50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. A letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total earnings reported. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings per dollar spent, highlighting the value of such a nudge in this important context.
This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4645.
