Asymptotic Measure-Based Values of Nonatomic Games

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.4.737

Let v = min(μ1, μ2, …, μn), where μ1, μ2, …, μn are mutually singular nonatomic probability measures, i.e., v is the market game derived from an n-glove nonatomic market with transferable utility. We describe the set of all μ-asymptotic values of v, where μ ranges over all non-atomic probability measures for which μi is absolutely continuous with respect to μ and dμ/dμ ∈ L2(μ) for all 1 ≤ in. This set is proved to be convex and relatively open.

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