Competing with Copycats When Customers Are Strategic

In this paper, we use a two-period game theoretical model to examine the decisions of a manufacturer and a copycat firm who are competing for strategic customers. The manufacturer decides on the amount of its market expansion advertising investment in the first period and on its pricing strategy in both periods. Advertising increases the “size of the pie,” but eventually the manufacturer may end up inadvertently sharing the benefits with the copycat. After the first period, the copycat makes a market-entry decision, and, if it opts to enter, it also decides on a pricing strategy. The customers are strategic, and they decide whether or not to buy, when to buy, and which product to buy. We find that, interestingly, lower quality levels of the manufacturer’s product may increase the manufacturer’s prices and profit. Moreover, the manufacturer may be worseoff when customers are more likely to purchase its product immediately rather than wait for a price reduction or for the copycat’s product. Finally, the copycat may be worseoff when customers withhold their purchases in the first period in anticipation of the possibility of copycat product becoming available in a later period.

The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2016.0613.