Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities
- Jose H. Blanchet ,
Jose H. Blanchet
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5895-0912
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
- Martin I. Reiman ,
Martin I. Reiman
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4919-2894
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;
- Virag Shah ,
Virag Shah
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3930-0348
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
- Lawrence M. Wein ,
Lawrence M. Wein
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6125-0220
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
- Linjia Wu
Linjia Wu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6941-8902
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
Jose H. Blanchet
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5895-0912
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
Martin I. Reiman
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4919-2894
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;
Virag Shah
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3930-0348
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
Lawrence M. Wein
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6125-0220
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Linjia Wu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6941-8902
Management Science and Engineering Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305;
