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Available Issues

December 4, 2012 - June 5, 2026

Available Issues

December 4, 2012 - June 5, 2026

Fairness Without Discrimination: Individually Fair Outcomes in the Kidney Exchange Problem

Published Online:29 Jun 2026https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2025.0430

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