Optimality of Public Persuasion for Single-Good Allocation
References
- (2020) Warning against recurring risks: An information design approach. Management Sci. 66(10):4612–4629.Link, Google Scholar
- (2023) Information design for congested social services: Optimal need-based persuasion. Management Sci. 69(7):3778–3796.Link, Google Scholar
- (2019) Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econom. Theory 182:185–217.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2023) Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling. Theoret. Econom. 18(1):15–36.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2022) Multi-channel Bayesian persuasion. Preprint, submitted November 18, https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.09789.Google Scholar
- (2016) Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoret. Econom. 11(2):487–522.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2019) Information design: A unified perspective. J. Econom. Literature 57(1):44–95.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Information design in operations. Druehl C, Elmaghraby W, eds. Pushing the Boundaries: Frontiers in Impactful OR/OM Research (INFORMS, Catonsville, MD), 176–201.Google Scholar
- (2022) Persuasion in networks: Public signals and cores. Oper. Res. 70(4):2264–2298.Link, Google Scholar
- (2023) Information design for spatial resource allocation. Preprint, submitted July 17, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4505414.Google Scholar
- (2023) On information design with spillovers. Preprint, submitted March 8, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537289.Google Scholar
- (2021) Informing the public about a pandemic. Management Sci. 67(10):6350–6357.Link, Google Scholar
- (2021) Persuading customers to buy early: The value of personalized information provisioning. Management Sci. 67(2):828–853.Link, Google Scholar
- (2019) The simple economics of optimal persuasion. J. Political Econom. 127(5):1993–2048.Crossref, Google Scholar
- Excedr (2025) Biotech partnerships: How partnering with big pharma can support R&D. Accessed April 29, 2025, https://www.excedr.com/blog/how-biotech-partnerships-support-research.Google Scholar
- (2023) Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers. Preprint, submitted March 14, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340090.Google Scholar
- (2004) What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation? J. Finance 59(4):1805–1844.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2019) Bayesian persuasion and information design. Annual Rev. Econom. 11(1):249–272.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2021) Extreme points and majorization: Economic applications. Econometrica 89(4):1557–1593.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2018) Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals. Proc. 13th Workshop Econom. Networks Systems Comput. (NetEcon ’18) (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 1. Google Scholar
- (2019) Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues. Oper. Res. 67(5):1397–1416.Link, Google Scholar
- (2018) Crowdsourcing exploration. Management Sci. 64(4):1727–1746.Link, Google Scholar
- (2008) Old technology meets new technology: Complementarities, similarities, and alliance formation. Strategic Management J. 29(1):47–77.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2021) Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory, 3rd ed. (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia).Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2007) How smart is smart money? A two-sided matching model of venture capital. J. Finance 62(6):2725–2762.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2019) Information design in spatial resource competition. Preprint, submitted September 27, https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.12723.Google Scholar

