Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters

References

• BBC News Timeline: BP oil spill. (2010) . (September 19), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10656239Google Scholar
• Becker G. The gulf oil leak and optimal safety precautions. Beckner-Posner Blog (2010) July 4). http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/07/the-gulf-oil-leak-and-optimal-safety-precautions-becker.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Cohen MA. Optimal enforcement strategy to prevent oil spills: An application of a principal-agent model with “moral hazard”. J. Law Econom. (1987) 30(1):23–51Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawley J. US airlines say pilot fatigue rule would cost jobs. Thomson Reuters (2011) September 15). http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/airlines-fatigue-idUSS1E78E1WT20110915Google Scholar
• Donn J. U.S. nuclear regulators weaken safety rules, fail to enforce them: AP investigation. Huffington Post (2011) June 20). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/us-nuclear-regulators-safety-industry_n_880222.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Economist, The The oil well and the damage done. (2010) June 17). http://www.economist.com/node/16381032Google Scholar
• Gowrisankaran G. Competition and regulation in the airline industry. (2002) . Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2002-01, January 18. Accessed January 5, 2012, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2002/el2002-01.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Hausken K, Zhuang J. Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game. Decision Anal. (2011) 8(1):46–70Link, Google Scholar
• Kadambe S, Segerson K. On the role of fines as an environmental enforcement. J. Environ. Planning Management (1998) 41(2):217–226Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kambhu J. Direct controls and incentives systems of regulation. J. Environ. Econom. Management (1990) 18(2):72–85Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Tirole J. Using cost observation to regulate firms. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(3):614–641Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Rochest J-C. Regulation of a risk averse firm. Games Econom. Behav. (1996) 25(2):149–173Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lin S-W. Designing incentive systems for risk-informed regulation. (2004) . Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin–Madison, MadisonGoogle Scholar
• Oh Y. Surveillance or punishment? A second-best theory of pollution regulation. Internat. Econom. J. (1995) 9(3):89–101Crossref, Google Scholar
• Polinsky AM, Shavell S. The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1979) 69(5):880–891Google Scholar
• Portillo E. US airways, pilots union spar in court. Charlotte Observer (2011) August 19). http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/08/19/2540023/us-airways-pilots-union-spar-in.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Posner R. The gulf oil leak. Becker-Posner Blog (2010) July 4). http://www.beckner-posner-blog.com/2010/07/the-gulf-oil-leakposner.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Riccio J. Competition and nuclear power: A dangerous combination. Synthesis/Regeneration Magazine Online (1996) 11(Fall). http://www.greens.org/s-r/11/11-10.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Rosenau PV. The Competition Paradigm: America's Romance with Conflict, Contest, and Commerce (2003) (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD) Google Scholar
• Shavell S. A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. RAND J. Econom. (1984) 15(2):271–280Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walsh B. The Gulf disaster: Whose asses need kicking? Time Magazine (2010) June 10). http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1995843,00.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Wright T. The political economy of coal mine disasters in China: “Your rice bowl or your life”. China Quart. (2004) 179):629–646Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yeager PC. The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution (1990) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) Google Scholar
• Zhuang J, Bier VM. Balancing terrorism and natural disasters—Defensive strategy with endogenous attack effort. Oper. Res. (2007) 55(5):976–991Link, Google Scholar