The Ombudsman: A Closer Look at the Efficiency of Top Executive Pay and Incentives

References

• Armstrong CS, Vashishtha R (2012) Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value. J. Financial Econom. 104(1):70–88.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong CS, Larcker DF, Su C-L (2010) Endogenous selection and moral hazard in compensation contracts. Oper. Res. 58(4, Pt. 2):1090–1106.Link, Google Scholar
• Core JE, Guay WR (2010) Is CEO pay too high and are incentives too low? A wealth-based contracting framework. Acad. Management Perspect. 24(1):5–19.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jacquart P, Armstrong JS (2013) Are top executives paid enough? An evidence-based review. Interfaces 43(6):580–589.Link, Google Scholar
• Low A (2009) Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. J. Financial Econom. 92(3):470–490.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Manski CF (2003) Partial Identification of Probability Distributions (Springer, New York).Google Scholar
• Rosenbaum PR (2002) Observational Studies, 2nd ed. (Springer, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tamer E (2010) Partial identification in econometrics. Ann. Rev. Econom. 2(1):167–195.Crossref, Google Scholar