A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1070.0139

References

  • Akerlof G. A. The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quart. J. Econom. (1970) 84(3):488–500CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Aumann R. J. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. J. Math. Econom. (1974) 1(1):67–96CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bandyopadhyay S., Barron J. M., Chaturvedi A. R. Competition among sellers in online exchanges. Inform. Systems Res. (2005) 16(1):47–60LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Baumol W., Panzar J., Willig R. D.Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (1982) (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York) Google Scholar
  • Baye M., Morgan J. Information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2001) 91(3):454–474CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Baye M., Kovenock D., de Vries C. Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1993) 83(1):289–294Google Scholar
  • Baye M. R., Kovenock D., de Vries C. G. The all-pay auction with complete information. Econom. Theory (1996) 8(2):291–305CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bhargava H. K., Feng J. Preferential placement bias in information gatekeepers. (2004) . Working paper, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PAGoogle Scholar
  • Bhargava H. K., Choudhary V. Economics of an information intermediary with aggregation benefits. Inform. Systems Res. (2004) 15(1):22–36LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bhargava H. K., Feng J., Pennock D. M. Implementing sponsored search in web search engines: Computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms. INFORMS J. Comput. (2007) 19(1):137–148LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Biglaiser G. Middlemen as experts. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24(2):212–223CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bradlow E. T., Schmittlein D. C. The little engines that could: Modeling the performance of world wide web search engines. Marketing Sci. (2000) 19(1):43–62LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Butters G. Equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1977) 44(3):465–491CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Caves R., Porter M. E. From entry barriers to mobility barriers. Quart. J. Econom. (1977) 91(2):241–262CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chambers J. M., Cleveland W. S., Kleiner B., Tukey P. A.Graphical Methods for Data Analysis (1983) (Duxbury Press, Boston, MA) Google Scholar
  • Chen Y., Iyer G., Padmanabhan V. Referral infomediaries. Marketing Sci. (2002) 21(4):412–434LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Clay K., Krishnan R., Wolff E. Prices and price dispersion on the web: Evidence from the online book industry. J. Indust. Econom. (2001) 49(4):521–539CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Clemons E. K., Hann I.-H., Hitt L. M. Price dispersion and differentiation in online travel: An empirical investigation. Management Sci. (2002) 48(1):534–549LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Dasgupta P., Maskin E. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1986) 53(1):1–26CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Diehl K., Kornish L., Lynch J. Smart agents: When lower search costs for quality information increase price sensitivity. J. Consumer Res. (2003) 30(1):56–72CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Economist, The The Internet sells its soul. Economist (2002) April 20):23–24Google Scholar
  • Edelman B., Ostrovsky M., Schwarz M. Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2007) 97(1):242–259CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ellison G., Ellison S. F. Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the internet. (2004) . Working Paper 10570, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MACrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ewerhart C., Fieseler K. Procurement auctions and unit-price contracts. RAND J. Econom. (2003) 34(3):569–581CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Understanding rent dissipation: On the use of game theory in industrial organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1987) 77(2):176–183Google Scholar
  • Gandal N. The dynamics of competition in the internet search engine market. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (2001) 19(7):1103–1117CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Grossman G. M., Shapiro C. Informative advertising with differentiated goods. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1984) 51(1):63–81CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Guillemin V., Pollack A.Differential Topology (1974) (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
  • Hann I.-H., Terwiesch C. Measuring the frictional costs of online transactions: The case of a name-your-own-price channel. Management Sci. (2003) 49(11):1563–1579LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Johnson R., Wichern D.Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis (1998) (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ) Google Scholar
  • Johnson E. J., Moe W., Fader P., Bellman S., Lohse J. On the depth and dynamics of online search behavior. Management Sci. (2004) 50(3):299–308LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lancaster K. A new approach to consumer theory. J. Political Econom. (1966) 74(2):132–157CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Liu D., Chen J. Designing online auctions with past performance information. Decision Support Systems (2006) 42(3):1307–1320CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lizzeri A. Information revelation and certification intermediaries. RAND J. Econom. (1999) 30(2):214–231CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Maynard Smith J. The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. J. Theoret. Biol. (1974) 47:209–221CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • McGee J., Thomas H. Strategic groups: Theory, research and taxonomy. Strategic Management J. (1986) 7:141–160CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Morton F. S., Zettelmeyer F., Silva-Risso J. Internet car retailing. J. Indust. Econom. (2001) 49(4):501–519CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Posner R. A. The social costs of monopoly and regulation. J. Political Econom. (1975) 83(4):807–828CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Pratt J. W., Wise D. A., Zeckhauser R. Price differences in almost competitive markets. Quart. J. Econom. (1979) 93(2):189–211CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rob R. Equilibrium price distributions. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1985) 52(3):487–504CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rudin W.Principles of Mathematical Analysis (1976) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar
  • Shapiro C. Consumer information, product quality, and seller reputation. Bell J. Econom. (1982) 13(1):20–35CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Simon L. K. Games with discontinuous payoffs. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 54(4):569–597CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Smith M., Brynjolfsson E. Consumer decision-making at an internet shopbot: Brand still matters. J. Indust. Econom. (2001) 49(4):541–558CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Spence M. Job market signaling. Quart. J. Econom. (1973) 87(3):355–374CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Stahl D. O. Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1989) 79(4):700–712Google Scholar
  • Stegeman M. Advertising in competitive markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1991) 81(1):210–223Google Scholar
  • Stigler G. The economics of information. J. Political Econom. (1961) 69(3):213–225CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Stiglitz J. E., Schmalensee R., Willig R. D. Imperfect information in the product market. Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) (North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 769–847CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Tirole J.The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
  • Tullock G., Buchanan J. M., Tollison R. D., Tullock G. Efficient rent-seeking. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (1980) (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX) 97–112Google Scholar
  • Varian H. R. A model of sales. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1980) 70(4):651–659Google Scholar
  • Weber T. A., Zheng Z. A model of search intermediaries and paid referrals. (2002) . Working Paper 02-12-01, Department of Operations and Information Management, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PAGoogle Scholar
  • Zhang X., Feng J. Price cycles in online advertising auctions. Proc. 26th Internat. Conf. Inform. Systems (2005) (Association of Information Systems, Las Vegas, NV) Google Scholar
  • Zwick R., Rapoport A., Lo A., Muthukrishnan A. Consumer sequential search: Not enough or too much? Marketing Sci. (2003) 22(4):503–519LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.