An Empirical Analysis of Contract Structures in IT Outsourcing

References

• Alchian A., Demsetz H. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1972) 62(5):777–795Google Scholar
• Anand B., Khanna T. The structure of licensing contracts. J. Indust. Econom. (2000) 48(1):103–135Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson S. W., Dekker H. C. Management control for market transactions: The relations between transaction costs, incomplete contract design and subsequent performance. Management Sci. (2005) 51(12):1734–1752Link, Google Scholar
• Ang S., Beath C. M. Hierarchical elements in software contracts. J. Organ. Comput. (1993) 3(3):329–362Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ang S., Straub D. Production and transaction economies and IS outsourcing: A study of the U.S. banking industry. MIS Quart. (1998) 22(4):535–552Crossref, Google Scholar
• Argyres N., Liebeskind J. P. Contractual commitments, bargaining power and governance inseparability: Incorporating history into transaction cost theory. Acad. Management Rev. (1999) 24(1):49–63Crossref, Google Scholar
• Argyres N., Bercovitz J., Mayer K. J. Complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions: An empirical study of IT services contracts. Organ. Sci. (2007) 18(1):3–19Link, Google Scholar
• Aron R., Clemons E. K., Reddi S. Just right outsourcing: Understanding and managing risk. J. Management Inform. Systems (2005) 22(2):37–55Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arruñada B., Garicano L., Vazquez L. Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution. J. Law Econom. Organ. (2001) 17(1):257–284Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aubert B., Rivard S., Patry M. A transaction cost approach to outsourcing behavior: Some empirical evidence. Inform. Management (1996) 30(2):51–64Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aubert B., Rivard S., Patry M. A transaction cost model of IT outsourcing. Inform. Management (2004) 41(7):921–932Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aubert B., Patry M., Rivard S., Smith H. IT outsourcing risk management at British Petroleum. Proc. 34th Hawaii Internat. Conf. System Sci. (2001) Maui, HICrossref, Google Scholar
• Brousseau E., Coeurderoy R. The governance of intellectual property rights in knowledge transfers: An empirical analysis of supervision provisions in technology licensing agreements. Internat. J. Econom. Bus. (2005) 12(3):403–424Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clemons E. K., Hitt L. M. Poaching and the misappropriation of information: Transaction risks of information exchange. J. Management Inform. Systems (2004) 21(2):87–107Crossref, Google Scholar
• Costello J., Imparato N. Overcoming the legal behemoth: The urgent need for a private legal system in electronics. Capital for Our Time: The Economic, Legal, and Management Challenges of Intellectual Capital (1999) (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA) 51–69Google Scholar
• Crocker K. J., Masten S. E. Mitigating contractual hazards: Unilateral options and contract length. RAND J. Econom. (1988) 19(3):327–343Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crocker K. J., Reynolds K. The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of Air Force engine procurement. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24(1):126–146Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeCanio S. J., Frech H. E. Vertical contracts: A natural experiment in natural gas pipeline regulation. J. Inst. Theoret. Econom. (1993) 149(2):370–392Google Scholar
• Dorn P. Selling one's birthright. Inform. Week (1989) 241(October 16):52Google Scholar
• Earl M. The risks of outsourcing IS. Sloan Management Rev. (1996) 37(3):26–32Google Scholar
• Evans S. Strategic flexibility for high technology maneuvers: A conceptual framework. J. Management Stud. (1991) 28(1):69–89Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fitzgerald G., Willcocks L.Outsourcing Information Technology: Contracts and Client/Vendor Relationships (1994) (Oxford Institute of Information Management, Oxford, UK) Google Scholar
• Gopal A., Sivaramakrishnan K., Krishnan M. S., Mukhopadhyay T. Contracts in offshore software development: An empirical analysis. Management Sci. (2003) 49(12):1671–1683Link, Google Scholar
• Greene W. H.Econometric Analysis (2003) (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ) Google Scholar
• Grossman S. J., Hart O. D. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(4):691–719Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grover V., Cheon M. J., Teng J. The effects of service quality and partnership on the outsourcing of information systems functions. J. Management Inform. Systems (1996) 12(4):89–116Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Acad. Management J. (1995) 38(1):85–112Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O.Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heckman J. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica (1979) 47(1):153–161Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heide J. B. The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Acad. Management J. (1992) 35(2):265–291Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heide J. B., John G. Do norms matter in marketing relationships? J. Marketing (1992) 56(2):32–44Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heide J. B., Miner A. S. The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Acad. Management J. (1992) 35(2):265–291Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holland R. B.Terminations for Convenience: A Contractor's Guide (2003) (Management Concepts, Inc., Vienna, VA) Google Scholar
• Jensen M., Meckling W., Werin L., Wijkander H. Specific and general knowledge, and organizational structure. Contract Economics (1992) (Blackwell, Oxford, UK) 251–291Google Scholar
• Johnson J. L., Lee R., Saini A. Market-focused strategic flexibility: Conceptual advances and an integrative model. J. Acad. Marketing Sci. (2003) 31(1):74–89Crossref, Google Scholar
• Joskow P. L. Contract duration and relationship specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1987) 77(1):168–185Google Scholar
• Kalnins A., Mayer K. J. Relationships and hybrid contracts: An analysis of contract choice in information technology. J. Law Econom. (2004) 20(1):207–229Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kern T., Willcocks L. P. Exploring information technology outsourcing relationships: Theory and practice. J. Strategic Inform. Systems (2000) 9(4):321–350Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kern T., Willcocks L. Exploring relationships in information technology outsourcing: The interaction approach. Eur. J. Inform. Systems (2002) 22(1):3–19Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koh C., Ang S., Straub D. W. IT outsourcing success: A psychological contract perspective. Inform. Systems Res. (2004) 15(4):356–373Link, Google Scholar
• Lacity M. C., Hirschheim R. The information systems outsourcing bandwagon. Sloan Management Rev. (1993) 35(1):73–86Google Scholar
• Lacity M. C., Willcocks L. P. Interpreting technology sourcing decisions from a transaction cost perspective: Finding and critique. Accounting Management Inform. Tech. (1995) 5(3):203–244Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lacity M. C., Willcocks L. P. An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: Lessons from experience. MIS Quart. (1998) 22(3):362–409Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lacity M. C., Willcocks L. P., Feeny D. F. The value of selective IT sourcing. Sloan Management Rev. (1996) 37(3):1–25Google Scholar
• Lee J. N., Miranda S. M., Kim Y.-M. IT outsourcing strategies: Universalistic, contingency, and configurational explanations of success. Inform. Systems Res. (2004) 15(2):110–131Link, Google Scholar
• Leiblein M. J., Miller D. J. An empirical examination of transaction and firm-level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm. Strategic Management J. (2003) 24(9):839–859Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levinthal D. A., Fichman M. Dynamics of inter-organizational attachments: Auditor-client relationships. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1988) 33(3):345–369Crossref, Google Scholar
• Macneil I. R. Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. (1978) 72:854–905Google Scholar
• Macneil I. R.The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (1980) (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT) Google Scholar
• Mahnke V., Overby M. L., Vang J. Strategic outsourcing of IT services: Theoretical stocktaking and empirical challenges. Indust. Innovation (2005) 12(2):205–253Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S. E., Crocker K. J. Efficient adaptation in long-term contracts: Take-or-pay provisions for natural gas. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1985) 75(2):1083–1093Google Scholar
• Mayer K. J., Argyres N. A. Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer industry. Organ. Sci. (2004) 15(4):394–410Link, Google Scholar
• McFarlan F. W., Young F.Cathay Pacific: Doing More with Less (2003) . Harvard Business School Case 9-303-106, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Minehart D., Neeman Z. Termination and coordination in partnerships. J. Econom. Management Strategy (1999) 8(2):191–221Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mulherin J. H. Complexity in long-term contracts: An analysis of natural gas contractual provisions. J. Law Econom. Organ. (1986) 2(1):105–117Google Scholar
• Nam K., Rajagopalan S., Rao H., Chaudhury A. A two-level investigation of information systems outsourcing. Comm. ACM (1996) 39(7):36–44Crossref, Google Scholar
• Niederman F., Brancheau J. C., Wetherbe J. C. Information systems management issues for the 1990s. MIS Quart. (1991) 15(4):474–500Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkhe A. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm cooperation. Acad. Management J. (1993) 36(4):794–829Crossref, Google Scholar
• Poppo L., Zenger T. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management J. (2002) 23:707–725Crossref, Google Scholar
• Quinn J. B., Hilmer F. Strategic outsourcing. Sloan Management Rev. (1994) 35(4):43–66Google Scholar
• Reuer J., Ariño A. Strategic alliance contracts: Dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity. Strategic Management J. (2007) 28:313–330Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ring P., Van de Ven A. H. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. Acad. Management Rev. (1994) 19(1):90–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ryall M. D., Sampson R. C., Arino A., Reuer J. J. Do prior alliances influence alliance contract structure? Strategic Alliances (2006) (Houndsmills, Palgrave MacMillan) Google Scholar
• Shaver J. M. Accounting for endogeneity when assessing strategy performance: Does entry mode choice affect FDI survival? Management Sci. (1998) 44(4):571–585Link, Google Scholar
• Teece D. J. Strategies for managing knowledge assets: The role of firm structure and industrial context. Long Range Planning (2000) 33(1):35–54Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thornburg B. G. Going private: Technology, due process, and Internet dispute resolution. Univ. California Davis Law Rev. (2000) 34(1):151–220Google Scholar
• Van de Ven A. H., Walker G. The dynamics of interorganizational cooperation. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1984) 29(4):598–621Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walden E. A. Intellectual property rights and cannibalization in information technology outsourcing contracts. MIS Quart. (2005) 29(4):699–721Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang E. T. G., Barron T., Seidmann A. Contracting structures for custom software development: The impacts of informational rents and uncertainty on internal development and outsourcing. Management Sci. (1997) 43(12):1726–1744Link, Google Scholar
• Whang S. Contracting for software development. Management Sci. (1992) 38(3):307–324Link, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) (Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Young-Ybarra C., Wiersema M. Strategic flexibility in information technology alliances: The influence of transaction cost economics and social exchange theory. Organ. Sci. (1999) 10(4):439–459Link, Google Scholar
• Zaheer A., Venkatraman N. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management J. (1995) 16(5):373–392Crossref, Google Scholar