Research Commentary—Cooperation, Coordination, and Governance in Multisourcing: An Agenda for Analytical and Empirical Research

References

• Aron R., Singh J. V. Getting offshoring right. Harvard Bus. Rev. (2005) 8(12):135–143Google Scholar
• Aron R., Clemons E. K., Reddi S. Just right outsourcing: Understanding and managing risk. J. Management Inform. Systems (2005) 22(2):37–55Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bajari P., Tadelis S. Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts. RAND J. Econom. (2001) 32(3):387–407Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G. The use of performance measures in incentive contracting. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2000) 90(2):415–420Crossref, Google Scholar
• Banerjee A. V., Duflo E. Reputation effects and the limits of contracting: A study of the Indian Software Industry. Quart. J. Econom. (2000) 115(3):989–1017Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barthelemy J. The hidden cost of IT outsourcing. MIT Sloan Management Rev. (2001) 42(3):60–69Google Scholar
• Benjaafar S., Elahi E., Donohue K. L. Outsourcing via service competition. Management Sci. (2007) 53(2):241–259Link, Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Harker P. T. Competition and outsourcing with scale economies. Management Sci. (2002) 48(10):1314–1333Link, Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Lariviere M. A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):30–44Link, Google Scholar
• Che Y. K., Yoo S.-W. Optimal incentives for teams. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2001) 91(3):525–541Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clemons E. K., Reddi S. P., Row M. C. The impact of information technology on the organization of economic activity: The “move to the middle” hypothesis. J. Management Inform. Systems (1993) 10(2):9–35Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cohen L., Young A.Multi-Sourcing: Moving Beyond Outsourcing to Achieve Growth and Agility (2006) (Harvard Business Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Crocker K. J., Reynolds K. J. The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of Air Force engine procurement. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24(1):126–146Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crowston K., Osborn C., Malone T. W., Crowston K., Herman G. A. A coordination theory approach to process description and redesign. Organizing Business Knowledge: The MIT Process Handbook (2003) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Dibbern J., Goles T., Hirscheim R., Jayatilaka B. Information systems outsourcing: A survey and analysis of the literature. ACM SIGMIS Database (2004) 35(4):6–102Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dyer J. H., Singh H. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Acad. Management Rev. (1998) 23(4):660–679Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ethiraj S. K., Kale P., Krishnan M. S., Singh J. V. Where do capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study in the software services industry. Strategic Management J. (2005) 26(1):25–45Crossref, Google Scholar
• FinancialWire Multisourcing of IT, the way ahead? FinancialWire (2008) . Accessed March 15, 2008, http://financialwire.net/articles/articles.asp?analystld=0&id=77800&topicld=160&level=160Google Scholar
• Galbraith J. R.Designing Complex Organizations (1973) (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA) Google Scholar
• Gans N., Zhou Y.-P. Call-routing schemes for call-center outsourcing. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2007) 9(1):33–50Link, Google Scholar
• Goldfayn E. Organisation of RD with two agents and principal. (2006) . Discussion Paper 3/2006, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Bonn, GermanyGoogle Scholar
• Gopal A., Sivaramakrishnan K., Krishnan M. S., Mukhopadhyay T. Contracts in offshore software development: An empirical analysis. Management Sci. (2003) 49(12):1671–1683Link, Google Scholar
• Gulati R., Lawrence P. R., Puranam P. Adaptation in vertical relationships: Beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Management J. (2005) 26(5):415–440Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gurbaxani V., Whang S. The impact of information systems on organizations and markets. Comm. ACM (1991) 34(1):59–73Crossref, Google Scholar
• Itoh H. Incentives to help in multiagent situations. Econometrica (1991) 59(3):611–636Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim J. W., Park S. C. Outsourcing strategy in two-stage call centers. Comput. Oper. Res. (2010) 37(4):790–805Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koh C., Ang S., Straub D. W. IT outsourcing success: A psychological contract perspective. Inform. Systems Res. (2004) 15(4):356–373Link, Google Scholar
• Lacity M. C., Willcocks L. P., Feeny D. F. The value of selective IT sourcing. Sloan Management Rev. (1996) 37(3):13–25Google Scholar
• Lazear E. P. Pay equality and industrial politics. J. Political Econom. (1989) 97(3):561–568Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levina N., Su N. Global multisourcing strategy: The emergence of a supplier portfolio in services offshoring. Decision Sci. (2008) 39(3):541–570Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ma C.-T. Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1988) 55(4):555–571Crossref, Google Scholar
• Malone T. W. Modeling coordination in organizations and markets. Management Sci. (1987) 33(10):1317–1332Link, Google Scholar
• Malone T. W., Crowston K. What is coordination theory and how can it help design cooperative work systems? Proc. 1990 ACM Conf. Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (1990) (ACM, New York) 357–370Crossref, Google Scholar
• Malone T. W., Crowston K. The interdisciplinary study of coordination. computing surveys. ACM (1994) 26(1):87–119Google Scholar
• Malone T. W., Yates J., Benjamin R. I. Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies. Comm. ACM (1987) 30(6):484–497Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mani D., Barua A., Whinston A. B. The impact of firm learning on financial value in strategic outsourcing relationships. Proc. Internat. Conf. Inform. Systems (2009) Phoenix, AZGoogle Scholar
• Mani D., Barua A., Whinston A. An empirical analysis of the impact of information capabilities design on business process outsourcing performance. MIS Quart. (2010) 34(1):39–62Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mani D., Barua A., Whinston A. An empirical analysis of the contractual and information structures of business process outsourcing relationships. Inform. Systems Res. (2011) 22(4Google Scholar
• Marx L. M., Squintani F. Individual accountability in teams. J. Econom. Behavior Organ. (2009) 72(1):260–273Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCann J., Galbraith J. R., Nystrom P. C., Starbuck W. H. Interdepartmental relations. Handbook of Organizational Design (1981) 1(Oxford University Press, New York) 60–84Google Scholar
• Milgrom P., Roberts J.Economics, Organization and Management (1992) (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
• Nalebuff B., Stiglitz J. E. Prices and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell J. Econom. (1983) 14(1):21–43Crossref, Google Scholar
• Susarla A., Barua A., Whinston A. B. Multitask agency, modular architecture, and task disaggregation in SaaS. J. Management Inform. Systems (2010) 26(4):87–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tanriverdi H., Konana P., Ge L. The choice of sourcing mechanisms for business processes. Inform. Systems Res. (2007) 18(3):280–299Link, Google Scholar
• Thompson J. D. Organizations in action: Social science bases of administration. (1967) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar