The Effects of Time Pressure on Quality in Software Development: An Agency Model
Published Online:1 Jun 2001https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.12.2.195.9699
References
- Software project control: An experimental investigation of judgment with fallible information. IEEE Trans. Software Engrg. (1993) 19(6):603–612Crossref, Google Scholar
- The impact of schedule estimation on software project behavior. IEEE Software (1986) 3(4Crossref, Google Scholar
- Lessons learned from modeling the dynamics of software development. Comm. ACM (1989) 32(12):1426–1435Crossref, Google Scholar
- Production information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1972) 62(5):777–795Google Scholar
- The Impacts of Budgets on People (1952) (Controllership Foundation, New York) Google Scholar
- Measuring and Managing Performance in Organizations (1996) (Dorset House, New York) Google Scholar
- The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies (1963) 2nd ed.(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL) Google Scholar
- Software Engineering Economics (1981) (Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
- The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering (1975) (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading MA) Crossref, Google Scholar
- No silver bullet: Essence and accidents of software engineering. IEEE Comput. (1987) 20(4):10–19Crossref, Google Scholar
- Fifteen years of psychology in software engineering: Individual differences and cognitive science. Proc. Seventh Internat. Conf. Software Engrg. (1984) (Orlando, FL)97–106Google Scholar
- What if programmers were treated like jocks? Amer. Programmer (1997) 10(5):21–28Google Scholar
- Microsoft's weaknesses in software development. Amer. Programmer (1997) 10(10Google Scholar
- Controlling Software Projects (1982) (Yourdon Press, A Prentice-Hall Company, Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
- Why Does Software Cost So Much? (1995) (Dorset House Publishing)Google Scholar
- Personal communication. (1997) Google Scholar
- Out of the Crisis (1986) (MIT Center For Advanced Engineering Study, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
- Parkinson's law and its implications for project management. Management Sci. (1991) 37(8):990–1001Link, Google Scholar
- Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. (1979) 10:74–91Crossref, Google Scholar
- Multi-task principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (1991) 7(Spring):25–52Google Scholar
- Microsoft corporation: Office business unit. (1990) (Boston, MA). Harvard Business School Case, 9-691-033Google Scholar
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econom. (1976) 3:305–60Crossref, Google Scholar
- Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. (1982) 28:113–120Link, Google Scholar
- Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. (1979) 47:263–291Crossref, Google Scholar
- On the folly of rewarding A., while hoping for B. Acad. Management J. (1975) 18(4):769–783Crossref, Google Scholar
- Subjective time estimates in critical path planning—a preliminary analysis. Management Sci. (1967) 13(5):307–320Link, Google Scholar
- Why work incentives fall down on the job. USA Today (1993) December 16Google Scholar
- All above average and other unintended consequences of performance appraisal systems. Paper presented at the National Public Management Res. Conf. (1992) (The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY) . Technology and Inform. Policy ProgramGoogle Scholar
- Developing products on “internet time”: The anatomy of a flexible development process. (1999) (Harvard Business School, Boston, MA) . Working PaperGoogle Scholar
- Economics, Organization and Management (1992) (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
- In-laws and Outlaws and Parkinson's Third Law (1962) (The Riverside Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
- Organizational aspects of engineering system safety: The case of offshore platforms. Science (1990) 30:1210–1216Crossref, Google Scholar
- Dysfunctional consequences of performance measurements. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1956) 1(2):240–247Crossref, Google Scholar
- The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1973) 63:134–139Google Scholar
- Organizations and markets. J. Econom. Perspectives (1991) 5(1):25–44Crossref, Google Scholar
- , Goodman P. S. Counterforces to change. Change in Organizations (1982) (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA) Google Scholar
- Teaching a Project-Intensive Introduction to Software Engineering (1987) (Pittsburgh, PA). Software Engineering Institute Technical Report, CMU/SEI-87-TR-20Crossref, Google Scholar
- Current Budgeting Practices in U.S. Industry: The State of the Art (1987) (Quorum Books, New York) Google Scholar
- Personal communication. (1997) Google Scholar

