Who Wants Consumers to Be Informed? Facilitating Information Disclosure in a Distribution Channel

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2017.0770

References

  • Abhishek V, Jerath K, Zhang Z (2015) Agency selling or reselling? Channel structures in electronic retailing. Management Sci. 62(8):2259–2280.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bhardwaj P (2001) Delegating pricing decisions. Marketing Sci. 20(2):143–169.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bresnahan TF, Reiss PC (1985) Dealer and manufacturer margins. RAND J. Econom. 16(2):253–268.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cachon GP, Lariviere MA (2005) Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Sci. 51(1):30–44.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Chen Y, Xie J (2008) Online consumer review: Word-of-mouth as a new element of marketing communication mix. Management Sci. 54(3):477–491.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cheng HK, Liu Y (2012) Optimal software free trial strategy: The impact of network externalities and consumer uncertainty. Inform. Systems Res. 23(2):488–504.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Fabinger M, Weyl EG (2016) Functional forms for tractable economic models and the cost structure of international trade. Working paper, University of Tokyo, Tokyo.Google Scholar
  • Gao F, Su X (2017) Online and offline information for omnichannel retailing. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(1):84–98.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Grossman S (1981) The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. J. Law Econom. 24(3):461–483.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gu Z, Tayi G (2015) Consumer mending and online retailer fit-uncertainty mitigating strategies. Quant. Marketing Econom. 13(3):252–282.Google Scholar
  • Gu Z, Tayi G (2016) Consumer pseudo-showrooming and omni-channel product placement strategies. Management Inform. Systems Quart. 41(2):583–606.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gu Z, Xie Y (2013) Facilitating fit revelation in the competitive market. Management Sci. 59(5):1196–1212.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Guo L (2009) Quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel. Management Sci. 55(9):1513–1526.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Hagiu A, Wright J (2014) Marketplace or reseller? Management Sci. 61(1):184–203.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Hartman T (2016) Amazon vendor central v. seller central: What are the benefits? Content26.com. Accessed September 13, 2018, https://content26.com/blog/amazon-vendor-central-v-seller-central/.Google Scholar
  • Hao L, Fan M (2014) An analysis of pricing models in the electronic book market. MIS Quart. 38(4):1017–1032.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hao L, Guo H, Easley R (2017) A mobile platform’s in-app advertising contract under agency pricing for app sales. Production Oper. Management 26(2):189–202.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hong Y, Pavlou PA (2014) Product fit uncertainty in online markets: Nature, effects, and antecedents. Inform. Systems Res. 25(2):328–344.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Johnson J (2013) The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets. Working paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.Google Scholar
  • Johnson J, Myatt D (2006) On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(3):756–784.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kuksov D, Lin Y (2010) Information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace. Marketing Sci. 29(3):507–524.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kwark Y, Chen J, Raghunathan S (2014) Online product reviews: Implications for retailers and competing manufacturers. Inform. Systems Res. 25(1):93–110.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kwark Y, Chen J, Raghunathan S (2017) Platform or wholesale? A strategic tool for online retailers to benefit from third-party information. MIS Quart. 41(3):763–785.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lariviere MA, Porteus EL (2001) Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 3(4):293–305.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lewis T, Sappington D (1994) Supplying information to facilitate price discrimination. Internat. Econom. Rev. 35(2):309–327.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Milgrom P (1981) Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell J. Econom. 12(2):380–391.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mishra BK, Prasad A (2004) Centralized pricing versus delegating pricing to the salesforce under information asymmetry. Marketing Sci. 23(1):21–27.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Mishra BK, Prasad A (2005) Delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets with symmetric and asymmetric information. Marketing Sci. 24(3):490–497.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Mulpuru S, Swerdlow F, Naparstek L, Gold D, Glazer L (2016) Brief: Digital touchpoint investments significantly influence U.S. retail sales. Forrester Res. Accessed September 13, 2018, https://www.forrester.com/report/Brief+Digital+Touchpoint+Investments+Significantly+Influence+US+Retail+Sales/−/E−RES116715.Google Scholar
  • Niculescu MF, Wu DJ (2014) Economics of free under perpetual licensing: Implications for the software industry. Inform. Systems Res. 25(1):173–199.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Spengler J (1950) Vertical integration and antitrust policy. J. Political Econom. 58(4):347–352.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Sun M (2011) Disclosing multiple product attributes. J. Econom. Management Strategy 20(1):195–224.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Sun M (2015) Product fit uncertainty and information provision in a distribution channel. Working paper, Boston University, Boston.Google Scholar
  • Tan Y, Carrillo J, Cheng HK (2015) The agency model for digital goods. Decision Sci. 47(4):628–660.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Tyagi RK (1999) A characterization of retailer response to manufacturer trade deals. J. Marketing Res. 36(4):510–516.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • U.S. Department of Commerce (2016) Quarterly retail e-commerce sales. U.S. Census Bureau News. Accessed September 13, 2018, http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf.Google Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.