Trust Building Among Strangers

References

• Alchian Armen, Demsetz Harold. The property rights paradigm. J. Econom. History (1973) 33:16–27Crossref, Google Scholar
• Axelrod R.The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (Basic Books, New York) Google Scholar
• Berg Joyce, Dickhaut John, McCabe Kevin. Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games Econom. Behavior (1995) 10:122–142Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bradach J., Eccles R. Price, authority, trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Ann. Rev. Sociology (1989) 15:97–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer Colin. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction (2003) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Google Scholar
• Camerer Colin, Ho Teck-Hua. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal-form games. Econometrica (1999) 67(4):827–874Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer Colin, Hogarth Robin. The effects of financial incentives in economic experiments: A review and capital-labor production framework. J. Risk Uncertainty (1999) 19:7–42Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer Colin, Weigelt Keith. Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model. Econometrica (1988) 56(1):1–37Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C., Ho Teck-Hua, Chong Juin-Kuan. Sophisticated learning and strategic teaching. J. Econom. Theory (2002) 104:137–188Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C. F., Ho T-H., Chong J-K. A cognitive hierarchy model of one-shot games. Quart. J. Econom. (2004) 119(3):861–898Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chiles T. H., McMackin J. F. Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics. Acad. Management Rev. (1996) 21:73–99Crossref, Google Scholar
• Craswell Richard. On the uses of “trust”: Comment on Williamson, “Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization.”. J. Law Econom. (1993) 36:487–500Crossref, Google Scholar
• Creed W. E. D., Miles R. E., Kramer R. M., Tyler T. R. Trust in organizations: A conceptual framework linking organizational forms, managerial philosophies, and the opportunity costs of controls. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (1994) (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA) 16–38Google Scholar
• Forsythe Robert, Horowitz Joel, Savin N. Z., Sefton Martin. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games Econom. Behavior (1994) 6:347–369Crossref, Google Scholar
• Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica (1991) 58:637–666Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fukuyama F.Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995) (The Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Glaeser Edward, Laibson David, Scheinkman Jose, Soutter Christine. Measuring trust. Quart. J. Econom. (2000) 115(3):811–846Crossref, Google Scholar
• Granovetter M. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociology (1985) 91:481–510Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greene Graham. The Ministry of Fear (1943) (Penguin Books, New York) Google Scholar
• Gurtman M. B. Trust, distrust, and interpersonal problems: A circumplex analysis. J. Personality Soc. Psych. (1992) 62:989–1002Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hayashi Nahoko, Yamagishi Toshio. Selective play: Choosing partners in an uncertain world. Personality Soc. Psych. Rev. (1998) 2(4):276–289Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heckathorn Douglas. Collective sanctions and the emergence of prisoner’s dilemma norms. Amer. Sociology Rev. (1988) 55:366–384Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hertwig Ralph, Ortmann Andreas. Experimental practices in economics: A challenge for psychologists. Behavioral Brain Sci. (2001) 24:383–403Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ho Teck-Hua, Weigelt Keith. Task complexity, equilibrium selection, and learning: An experimental study. Management Sci. (1996) 42:659–679Link, Google Scholar
• Ho Teck-Hua, Keith Weigelt. Trust building among strangers. (2004) . Working paper, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CAGoogle Scholar
• Hoffman Elizabeth, McCabe Kevin, Smith Vernon. Social distance and other regarding behavior in dictator games. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1996) 86(3):653–660Google Scholar
• Hoffman Elizabeth, McCabe Kevin, Smith Vernon. Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: Experimental economics and evolutionary psychology. Econom. Inquiry (1998) 36(3):335–352Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoffman Elizabeth, McCabe Kevin, Shachat Keith, Smith Vernon. Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games. Games Econom. Behavior (1994) 7:346–380Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jenkins Douglas, Mitra Atul, Gupta Nina, Shaw Jason. Are financial incentives related to performance? A meta-analytic review of empirical research. J. Appl. Psych. (1998) 83:777–787Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kahneman Daniel, Knetsch Jack L., Thaler Richard. Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. J. Political Econom. (1990) 98(6):1325–1348Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kiyonari Tohko, Yamagishi T. A new game of trust: Letting the partner be the dictator. 7th Internat. Conf. Soc. Dilemmas (1997) Cairns, AustraliaGoogle Scholar
• Kiyonari Tohko, Tanida Shigehito, Yamagishi Toshio. Social exchange and reciprocity: Confusion or a heuristic? Evolution Human Behavior (2000) 21(6):411–427Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kollock P. The emergence of exchange structures: An experimental study of uncertainty, commitment, and trust. Amer. J. Sociology (1994) 100:313–345Crossref, Google Scholar
• Malhotra Deepak, Keith Murnighan J. Self versus social impression management in dictatorship games. (2000) . Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University, Evanston, ILGoogle Scholar
• Mayer R. C., Davis J. H., Schoorman F. D. An integrative model of organizational trust. Acad. Management Rev. (1995) 20:709–734Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAllister D. J. Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Acad. Management J. (1995) 38:24–59Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCabe K., Smith V., LePore M. Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter? Proc. National Acad. Sci. United States of America (2000) 97(National Academies of Science Press, Washington, D.C.) 4404–4409Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey R., Palfrey T. An experimental study of the centipede game. Econometrica (1992) 60:803–836Crossref, Google Scholar
• Orbell John, Dawes Robyn. A “cognitive miser” theory of cooperators’ advantage. Amer. Political Sci. Rev. (1991) 85:515–528Crossref, Google Scholar
• Orbell John, Dawes Robyn. Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and the option of not playing the game. Amer. Sociology Rev. (1993) 58:787–800Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ring P. S., Van de Ven A. H. Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations. Strategic Management J. (1992) 13:483–498Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rosenthal R. Games of perfect information, predatory pricing, and the chain-store paradox. J. Econom. Theory (1982) 25:92–100Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shapiro S. P. The social control of impersonal trust. Amer. J. Sociology (1987) 93:623–658Crossref, Google Scholar
• Smith Vernon, Walker James M. Rewards, experience, and decision costs in first price auctions. Econom. Inquiry (1993) 31:237–244Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wright Robert. The Moral Animal. (1995) (Vintage Books, New York) Google Scholar
• Yamagishi T., Yamagishi M. Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. Motivation Emotion (1994) 18:9–66Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yamagishi T., Cook K. A., Watabe W. M. Uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the United States and Japan. Amer. J. Sociology (1998) 104:165–194Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zucker L. Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. Research in Organizational Behavioral (1986) 8(JAI Press, Stamford, CT) 53–111Google Scholar