Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism

References

• Babaioff M., Walsh W. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. Fourth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (2003) (ACM, New York) 64–75Crossref, Google Scholar
• Babaioff M., Nisan N., Pavlov E. Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market. Fifth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (2004) (ACM, New York) 9–20Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chu L. Y., Shen Z.-J. Truthful double auction mechanisms for e-marketplace. (2004a) . Working paper, University of California, Berkeley, CAGoogle Scholar
• Chu L. Y., Shen Z.-J. Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: A comparison of double auction design approaches. (2004b) . Working paper, University of California, Berkeley, CAGoogle Scholar
• Clarke E. H. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice (1971) 11:17–33Crossref, Google Scholar
• Groves T. Incentives in teams. Econometrica (1973) 41(4):617–631Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huang P., Scheller-Wolf A., Sycara K. Design of a multi-unit double auction e-market. Comput. Intelligence (2002) 18(4):596–617Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P. A dominant strategy double auction. J. Econom. Theory (1992) 56(2):434–450Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica (1979) 47(1):61–73Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B., Satterthwaite M. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J. Econom. Theory (1983) 29(2):265–281Crossref, Google Scholar
• Porter M. E. Strategy and the Internet. Harvard Bus. Rev. (2001) 79(3):62–78Google Scholar
• Shapley L. Complements and substitutes in the optimal assignment problem. Naval Res. Logist. Quart. (1962) 9(1):45–48Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A. E., Ockenfels A. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2002) 92(4):1093–1103Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance (1961) 16(1):8–37Crossref, Google Scholar