Implications of Renegotiation for Optimal Contract Flexibility and Investment
Published Online:1 Dec 2007https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0731
References
- Renegotiation design with unverifiable information. Econometrica (1994) 62(2):257–282Crossref, Google Scholar
- Centralization of stocks: Manufacturer vs. retailers. Management Sci. (1999) 45(2):178–191Link, Google Scholar
- A general framework for the study of decentralized distribution systems. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2001) 3(4):373–381Link, Google Scholar
- Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2002) 4(3):171–207Link, Google Scholar
- Analysis of supply contracts with total minimum commitment. IIE Trans. (1997) 29(5):373–381Crossref, Google Scholar
- Signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships. Econometrica (1993) 61(4):745–782Crossref, Google Scholar
- Co-Opetition (1996) (Doubleday, New York) Google Scholar
- Biform games. Management Sci. (2007) 53(4):537–549Link, Google Scholar
- Capacity choice and allocation: Strategic behavior and supply chain performance. Management Sci. (1999a) 45(8):1091–1108Link, Google Scholar
- Capacity allocation using past sales: When to turn-and-earn. Management Sci. (1999b) 45(5):685–703Link, Google Scholar
- Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain. Management Sci. (2001) 47(5):629–646Link, Google Scholar
- Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry. Management Sci. (2006) 52(6):881–896Link, Google Scholar
- The next step for e-markets. Manufacturing Systems (2000) 18(7):26Google Scholar
- Cooperative investments and the value of contracting. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1999) 89(1):125–147Crossref, Google Scholar
- Strategic investments, trading and pricing under forecast updating. Management Sci. (2006) 52(12):1913–1929Link, Google Scholar
- Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric information: Cycle stocks, safety stocks and consignment stocks. Oper. Res. (2001) 49(4):487–500Link, Google Scholar
- A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information. Management Sci. (2000) 46(3):444–450Link, Google Scholar
- Designing supply contracts: Contract type and information asymmetry. Management Sci. (2004) 50(4):550–589Link, Google Scholar
- Economist, The Asian semiconductors: Saving chips from market dips. (1996) January 20):63Google Scholar
- Managing high-tech capacity expansion via capacity reservation. Production Oper. Management (2005) 14(2):232–251Crossref, Google Scholar
- United States Contract Law (1999) (Juris Publishing, Huntington, NY) Google Scholar
- A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers. Oper. Res. (2003) 51(5):771–784Link, Google Scholar
- Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation. Naval Res. Logist. Quart. (2001) 48(1):41–64Crossref, Google Scholar
- Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica (1988) 56(4):755–785Crossref, Google Scholar
- A principal-agent model for product specification and production. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):106–119Link, Google Scholar
- The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
- Two in Taiwan lay new plans. Electronic Buyers' News (1995) August 28):10Google Scholar
- Inducing forecast revelation through restricted returns. (2002) . Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, ILGoogle Scholar
- Flexible and risk-sharing supply contracts under price uncertainty. Management Sci. (1999) 45(10):1378–1398Link, Google Scholar
- , Aumann R. J., Hart S. The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (1992) 1(Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 591–667Crossref, Google Scholar
- The state of biologics manufacturing. (2001) . Report (March 12), J.P. Morgan, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Remedies for breach. Purchasing (2001) May 5):20–24Google Scholar
- A bargaining framework in supply chains (the assembly problem). (2002) . Working paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CACrossref, Google Scholar
- Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica (1953) 21(1):129–140Crossref, Google Scholar
- Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the hold-up problem. RAND J. Econom. (1995) 26(2):163–179Crossref, Google Scholar
- Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information. Management Sci. (2006) 52(8):1238–1257Link, Google Scholar
- Sell the plant? The impact of contract manufacturing on innovation, capacity and profitability. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):133–150Link, Google Scholar
- Implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity. Management Sci. (2007) 53(12):1859–1871Link, Google Scholar
- How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Bus. Rev. (1979) 57(2):2–10Google Scholar
- Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica (1982) 50(2):97–108Crossref, Google Scholar
- OEMs walking away from contracts—AMD sues Alcatel as suppliers feel full force of inventory wave. Electronics Buyers News (2001) April 9):1257Google Scholar
- Bargaining for Advantage (1999) (Viking, New York) Google Scholar
- Biomanufacturing capacity: Current and future requirements. J. Commercial Biotechnology (2001) 8(1):43–50Crossref, Google Scholar
- Private communication with Lonza executive. (2001) Google Scholar
- Procurement and renegotiation. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(2):235–259Crossref, Google Scholar
- Capacity investments in supply chains: Sharing the gain rather than sharing the pain. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2003) 5(4):317–333Link, Google Scholar
- The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives. Management Sci. (1999) 45(10):1339–1358Link, Google Scholar
- Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (1999) 1(2):89–111Link, Google Scholar
- Coordinating investment, production, and subcontracting. Management Sci. (1999) 45(7):954–971Link, Google Scholar

