Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion in Bargaining

References

• Armstrong M. S. A comparison of arbitration procedures for risk averse disputants. Decision Sci. (2004) 35:639–664Crossref, Google Scholar
• Binmore K., Rubinstein A., Wolinsky A. The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. RAND J. Econom. (1986) 17:176–188Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brams S. J., Kilgour D. M., Merrill S., Young H. P. Arbitration procedures. Negotiation Analysis (1991) (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI) 47–65Google Scholar
• Chun Y., Thompson W. Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points. Games Econom. Behav. (1982) 2:213–223Crossref, Google Scholar
• Commission on Health and Safety and Workers' Compensation Literature review: Final offer arbitration. (1999) . http://www.dir.ca.gov/chswc/basebalarbffinal.htmGoogle Scholar
• Crawford V. P. Compulsory arbitration, arbitral risk and negotiated settlements: A case study of bargaining under imperfect information. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1982) 49(1):69–82Crossref, Google Scholar
• Curry A. F., Pecorino P. The use of FOA as a screening device. J. Conflict Resolution (1993) 37:655–669Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farmer A., Pecorino P. Bargaining with informative offers: An analysis of final offer arbitration. J. Legal Stud. (1998) 27:415–432Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gardner R.Games for Business and Economics (1995) (John Wiley & Sons, New York) Google Scholar
• Greenstein E., Weissman I., Gerchak Y. Estimating arbitrator's hidden judgement in final offer arbitration. Group Decision and Negotiation (2004) 13(3):291–298Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kilgour D. M. Game-theoretic properties of final-offer arbitration. Group Decision and Negotiation (1994) 3:285–301Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luce R. D., Raiffa H.Games and Decisions (1957) (John Wiley & Sons, New York) Google Scholar
• Major League Baseball Players Association (2006) . 2007–2011 basic collective agreement, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdfGoogle Scholar
• Manzini P., Mariotti M. Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining and arbitration. Games Econom. Behav. (2001) 37:170–195Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miller P. (2005) . It's arbitration time, http://thesportseconomist.com/2005/01/its-arbitration-time.htmGoogle Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Econometrica (1984) 52(2):461–488Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B.Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Nash J. F. The bargaining problem. Econometrica (1950) 18:155–162Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nash J. F. Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. (1951) 54:286–295Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nash J. F. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica (1953) 21:128–140Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rubinstein A., Safra Z., Thomson W. On the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution and its extension to non-expected utility preferences. Econometrica (1992) 60:1171–1186Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stevens E. M. Is compulsory arbitration compatible with bargaining? Indust. Relations (1966) 5:38–52Google Scholar
• Wittman D. Final offer arbitration. Management Sci. (1986) 32(12):1551–1561Link, Google Scholar
• Zeng D.-Z. An amendment to final offer arbitration. Math. Soc. Sci. (2003) 46:9–19Crossref, Google Scholar