Appropriability and Commercialization: Evidence from MIT Inventions

References

• Abbring J. H., van den Berg G. J. The identifiability of the mixed proportional hazards competing risks model. J. Royal Statist. Soc.: Ser. B (Statistical Methodology) (2003) 65:701–710Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arora A., Ceccagnoli M. Patent protection, complementary assets, and firms' incentives for technology licensing. Management Sci. (2006) 52:293–308Link, Google Scholar
• Arora A., Ceccagnoli M., Cohen W. M. R&D and the patent premium. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (2007) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Arora A., Fosfuri A., Gambardella A.Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy (2001) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arrow K. J., Nelson R. R. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (1962) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) 609–625Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bayus B. L., Jain S., Rao A. G. Too little, too early: Introduction timing and new product performance in the personal digital assistant industry. J. Marketing Strategy (1997) 34:50–63Google Scholar
• Benoit J. P. Innovation and imitation in a duopoly. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 52:99–106Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cabral R., Leiblein M. Adoption of a process innovation with learning-by-doing: Evidence from the semiconductor industry. J. Indust. Econom. (2001) 49:269–280Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cabral L., Riordan M. The learning curve, predation, antitrust and welfare. J. Indust. Econom. (1997) 45:155–169Crossref, Google Scholar
• Choi J. P. Technology transfer with moral hazard. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (2001) 19:249–266Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cohen W., Levin R., Schmalensee R., Willig R. Empirical studies of innovation and market structure. Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) II(Elsevier, New York) 1059–1107Google Scholar
• Cohen W., Levinthal D. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1990) 35:128–152Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cohen W., Nelson R., Walsh J. Protecting their intellectual assets: Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not). (2000) . Working Paper 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MACrossref, Google Scholar
• Dechenaux E., Thursby M. C., Thursby J. Shirking, sharing risk, and shelving: The role of university license contracts. (2007) . Working Paper 11128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Dixit A. K., Pindyck R. S.Investment under Uncertainty (1994) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Elfenbein D. Contract structure and performance of technology transfer agreements. (2005) . Mimeo, Washington University, Saint Louis, MOGoogle Scholar
• Gallini N. T. Patent policy and costly imitation. Rand J. Econom. (1992) 23:52–63Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gallini N. T. The economics of patents: Lessons from recent U.S. patent reform. J. Econom. Perspectives (2002) 16:131–154Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gans J. S., Hsu D. H., Stern S. When does start-up innovation spur the gale of creative destruction? Rand J. Econom. (2003) 33:571–586Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gans J. S., Hsu D. H., Stern S. The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas: Evidence from patent grant delays. Management Sci. (2007) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Goldfarb B., Henrekson M. Bottom-up versus top-down policies towards the commercialization of university intellectual property. Res. Policy (2003) 32:639–658Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hahn R. W. The economics of patent protection: Policy implications from the literature. (2003) . Mimeo, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
• Hall B. H., Jaffe A. B., Trajtenberg M. The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, insights and methodological tools. (2001) . Working Paper 8498, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MACrossref, Google Scholar
• Han A., Hausman J. Flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models. J. Appl. Econometrics (1990) 5:1–28Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen R., Thursby M. Proofs and prototypes for sale: The licensing of university inventions. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2001) 91:240–259Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamien M., Schwartz N. Timing of innovations under rivalry. Econometrica (1972) 40:43–60Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lerner J. The importance of patent scope: An empirical analysis. Rand J. Econom. (1994) 25:319–333Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin R., Klevorick A., Nelson R., Winter S. Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers Econom. Activity (1987) 3:783–820Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lilien G. L., Yoon E. The timing of competitive market entry: An exploratory study of new industrial products. Management Sci. (1990) 36:565–585Link, Google Scholar
• Lowe R., Ziedonis A. Overoptimism and performance of entrepreneurial firms. Management Sci. (2006) 52:173–186Link, Google Scholar
• Mansfield E. Patents and innovation: An empirical study. Management Sci. (1986) 32:173–181Link, Google Scholar
• Mansfield E., Schwartz M., Wagner S. Imitation costs and patents: An empirical study. Econom. J. (1981) 91:907–918Google Scholar
• Matutes C., Regibeau P., Rockett K. Optimal patent design and the diffusion of innovations. Rand J. Econom. (1996) 27:60–83Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCall B. Unemployment insurance rules, joblessness, and part-time work. Econometrica (1996) 64:647–682Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pacheco-de-Almeida G., Zemsky P. The timing of resource development and sustainable competitive advantage. Management Sci. (2007) 53:651–666Link, Google Scholar
• Pakes A. Patents as options: Some estimates of the value of holding European patent stocks. Econometrica (1986) 54:755–784Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reinganum J. F. A dynamic game of R and D: Patent protection and competitive behavior. Econometrica (1982) 50:671–688Crossref, Google Scholar
• Santoro M. D., Chakrabarti A. K. Firm size and technology centrality in industry-university interactions. Res. Policy (2002) 31:1163–1180Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shane S. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organ. Sci. (2000) 11:448–469Link, Google Scholar
• Shane S. Selling university technology: Patterns from MIT. Management Sci. (2002) 48:122–137Link, Google Scholar
• Takalo T., Kanniainen V. Do patents slow down technological progress? Real options in patent research, patenting, and market introduction. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (2000) 18:1105–1127Crossref, Google Scholar
• Taylor C., Silberston Z.The Economic Impact of the Patent System (1973) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) Google Scholar
• Teece D. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration and public policy. Res. Policy (1986) 15:285–305Crossref, Google Scholar
• Teece D., Pisano G., Shuen A. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management J. (1997) 18:509–533Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thursby J., Thursby M. C. Who is selling the ivory tower? Sources of growth in university licensing. Management Sci. (2002) 48:90–104Link, Google Scholar
• Thursby J., Thursby M. C., Stein D. Buyer and seller views of university/industry licensing. Buying In or Selling Out: The Commercialization of the American Research University (2004) (Rutgers Press, New Brunswick, NJ) 103–116Google Scholar
• Thursby J., Thursby M. C. University licensing. Oxford Rev. Econom. Policy (2007) 23:620–639Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thursby J., Jensen R., Thursby M. C. Objectives, characteristics and outcomes of university licensing: A survey of major U.S. universities. J. Tech. Transfer (2001) 26:59–72Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ziedonis A. Real options in technology licensing. Management Sci. (2007) 53:1618–1633Link, Google Scholar