Revenue Ranking of Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders

References

• Anandalingam G., Day R. W., Raghavan S. The landscape of electronic market design. Management Sci. (2005) 51:316–327Link, Google Scholar
• Arora A., Greenwald A., Kannan K., Krishnan R. Effects of information-revelation policies under market-structure uncertainty. Management Sci. (2007) 53:1234–1248Link, Google Scholar
• Back K., Zender J. F. Auctions of divisible goods: On the rationale for the Treasury experiment. Rev. Financial Stud. (1993) 6:733–764Crossref, Google Scholar
• Capen E., Clapp R., Campbell W. Competitive bidding in high-risk situations. J. Petroleum Tech. (1971) 23:641–653Crossref, Google Scholar
• Elmaghraby W. Auctions within e-sourcing events. Production Oper. Management (2007) 16:409–422Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R. On optimal reservation prices in auctions. Management Sci. (1987) 33:763–770Link, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Dougherty E. L., Lohrenz J. A model for the distribution of the number of bids on federal offshore oil leases. Management Sci. (1986) 32:1087–1094Link, Google Scholar
• Geoffrion A., Krishnan R. E-Business and management science: Mutual impacts (Part 2 of 2). Management Sci. (2003) 49:1445–1456Link, Google Scholar
• Harstad R. M. Alternative common-value auction procedures: Revenue comparisons with free entry. J. Political Econom. (1990) 98:421–429Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harstad R. M., Kagel J. H., Levin D. Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders. Econom. Lett. (1990) 33:35–40Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harstad R. M., Pekeč A., Tsetlin I. Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders. Games Econom. Behav. (2008) 62:476–508Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hendricks K., Pinkse J., Porter R. H. Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2003) 70:115–145Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holt C. A. Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures. J. Political Econom. (1980) 88:433–445Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jackson M. O., Kremer I. The relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2006) 73:961–981Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Levin D.Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse (2002) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Harstad R. M., Levin D. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica (1987) 55:1275–1304Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klemperer P. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. J. Econom. Surveys (1999) 13:227–286Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klemperer P.Auctions: Theory and Practice (2004) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin D., Ozdenoren E. Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders. J. Econom. Theory (2004) 118:229–251Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin D., Smith J. L. Comment on “Some evidence on the winner's curse”. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1991) 81:370–375Google Scholar
• Levin D., Smith J. L. Comment on “Some evidence on the winner's curse”. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1994) 84:585–599Google Scholar
• Li T., Zheng X. Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: Theory and evidence from procurement auctions. (2006) . CeMMAP Working Paper CWP13/06, CeMMAP, LondonGoogle Scholar
• Maskin E. S., Riley J. G. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica (1984) 52:1473–1518Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E. S., Riley J. G., Hahn F. Optimal multi-unit auctions. The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games (1989) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) 312–335Google Scholar
• Matthews S. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: A buyer's point of view. Econometrica (1987) 55:633–646Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P., McMillan J. Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders. J. Econom. Theory (1987) 43:1–19Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P., Quan D. C., Vincent D. R. How to set minimum acceptable bids, with an application to real estate auctions. J. Indust. Econom. (2002) 50:391–416Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P. R. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding. Econometrica (1981) 49:921–943Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P. R., Weber R. J. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica (1982) 50:1089–1122Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parlour C. A., Rajan U. Rationing in IPO's. Rev. Finance (2005) 9:33–63Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parlour C. A., Prasnikar V., Rajan U. Compensation for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence. Games Econom. Behav. (2007) 60:339–356Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pesendorfer W., Swinkels J. M. The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions. Econometrica (1997) 65:1247–1281Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rothkopf M. H. A model of rational competitive bidding. Management Sci. (1969) 15:362–373Link, Google Scholar
• Rothkopf M. H. Equilibrium linear bidding strategies. Oper. Res. (1980a) 28:576–583Link, Google Scholar
• Rothkopf M. H. On multiplicative bidding strategies. Oper. Res. (1980b) 28:570–575Link, Google Scholar
• Rothkopf M. H., Harstad R. M. Modeling competitive bidding: A critical essay. Management Sci. (1994) 40:364–384Link, Google Scholar
• Samuelson W. F. Competitive bidding with entry costs. Econom. Lett. (1985) 17:53–57Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wilson R. B. Competitive bidding with disparate information. Management Sci. (1969) 15:446–448Link, Google Scholar
• Winkler R. L., Brooks D. G. Competitive bidding with dependent value estimates. Oper. Res. (1980) 28:603–613Link, Google Scholar