Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development

References

• Alexander C.Notes on the Synthesis of Form (1964) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Arellano M., Bond S. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1991) 58(2):277–297Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arora A. Testing for complementarities in reduced form regressions: A note. Econom. Lett. (1996) 50(1):51–55Crossref, Google Scholar
• Athey S., Stern S. An empirical framework for testing theories of complementarity in organizational design. (2004) . Working paper, Northwestern University, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
• Azoulay P. Capturing knowledge within and across firm boundaries: Evidence from clinical development. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2004) 94(5):1591–1612Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G., Hubbard T. Contractibility and asset ownership: On-board computers and governance in U.S. trucking. Quart. J. Econom. (2004) 119:1443–1479Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G., Gibbons R., Murphy K. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quart. J. Econom. (1994) 109:1125–1156Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G., Gibbons R., Murphy K. Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. Quart. J. Econom. (2002) 117:39–84Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baldwin C., Clark K. B.Design Rules: Vol. I, The Power of Modularity (2000) (MIT Press)Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bigelow L. S., Argyres N. Make-or-buy revisited: A population-wide test of transaction cost alignment. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (2008) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Casadesus-Masanell R., Spulber D. F. The fable of Fisher Body. J. Law Econom. (2000) 43(1):67–104Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cassiman B., Veugelers R. In search of complementarity in the innovation strategy: Internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition. Management Sci. (2006) 52(1):68–82Link, Google Scholar
• Clark K., Fujimoto T.Product Development Performance, Strategy, Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry (1991) (Harvard Business School Press, Boston) Google Scholar
• Coase R. The nature of the firm. Economica (1937) 4(16):386–405Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cockburn I., Henderson R., Stern S. Balancing incentives: The tension between basic and applied research. (2003) . Working paper, Northwestern University, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
• Eppinger S. D., Whitney D. E., Smith R. P., Gebala D. A. A model-based method for organizing tasks in product development. Res. Engrg. Design (1994) 6(1):1–13Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O.Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O., Moore J. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Political Econom. (1990) 98:1119–1158Crossref, Google Scholar
• Helper S. Supplier relations and the adoption of new technology: Results of survey research in the U.S. auto industry. (1995) . NBER Working Paper 5278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Helper S. Complementarity and cost reduction: Evidence from the automobile supply industry. (1997) . NBER Working Paper 6033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Holmstrom B. The firm as a subeconomy. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (1999) 15(1):74–102Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B., Milgrom P. The firm as an incentive system. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1994) 84:972–991Google Scholar
• Ichniowski C., Shaw K. Beyond incentive pay: Insiders' estimates of the value of complementary human resource management practices. J. Econom. Perspectives (2003) 17(1):155–180Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ichniowski C., Shaw K., Prennushi G. The effects of human resource management practices on productivity. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1997) 87(3):291–313Google Scholar
• Joskow P. Asset specificity and the structure of vertical relationships: Empirical evidence. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (1988) 4:95–117Google Scholar
• Kalogeridis C. The Ford/Firestone Fiasco: Coming to blows. Automotive Industries (2005) 185(1):22–24Google Scholar
• Kiley D. Lawsuits broil over grille similarities. USA Today (2001) February 15). http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2001-02-15-grille.htmGoogle Scholar
• Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A. Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process. J. Law Econom. (1978) 21:297–326Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kumar A. After the rollover series: Deadly combination: Ford, Firestone & Florida. St. Petersburg Times (2001) May 21). http://www.sptimes.com/News/052101/Firestone/One_tire_that_failed.shtmlGoogle Scholar
• MacDuffie J. Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: Organizational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry. Indust. Labor Relations Rev. (1995) 48(2):197–221Crossref, Google Scholar
• Macher J. T., Richman B. D. Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical research in the social sciences. Bus. Politics (2008) 10(1). Article 1Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S. The organization of production: Evidence from the aerospace industry. J. Law Econom. (1984) 27:403–417Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S., Saussier S., Brousseau E., Glachant J.-M. Econometrics of contracts: An assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting. The Economics of Contracts: Theory and Application (2002) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) 273–292Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S., Meehan J., Snyder E. The costs of organization. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (1991) 7:1–25Google Scholar
• Milgrom P., Roberts J. The economics of modern manufacturing: Technology, strategy, and organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1990) 80(6):511–528Google Scholar
• Miravete E. J., Pernias J. C. Innovation complementarity and scale of production. J. Indust. Econom. (2006) 54(1):1–29Crossref, Google Scholar
• Monteverde K., Teece D. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell J. Econom. (1982) 13:206–213Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nickerson J. Toward an economizing theory of strategy: The choice of strategic position, assets, and organizational form. (1997) . Dissertation, University of California, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
• Nickerson J., Silverman B. Why aren't all truck drivers owner-operators? Asset ownership and the employment relation in interstate for-hire trucking. J. Econom. Management Strategy (2003) 12(1):91–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Novak S., Eppinger S. D. Sourcing by design: Product complexity and the supply chain. Management Sci. (2001) 47(1):189–204Link, Google Scholar
• Novak S., Klibanoff P. Contracting, directed parts, and complexity in automotive outsourcing decisions. (2004) . Mimeo, Northwestern University, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
• Novak S., Stern S. How does outsourcing affect performance dynamics? Evidence from the automobile industry. Management Sci. (2008) 54(12):1963–1979Link, Google Scholar
• Pil F., MacDuffie J. The adoption of high-involvement work practices. Indust. Relations (1996) 35(3):423–455Crossref, Google Scholar
• Segal I. Contracting with externalities. Quart. J. Econom. (1999) 114(2):337–388Crossref, Google Scholar
• Steward D. V. The design structure system: A method for managing the design of complex systems. IEEE Trans. Engrg. Management (1981) 28(3):71–74Crossref, Google Scholar
• Suh N.The Principles of Design (1990) (Oxford University Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Suh N. A theory of complexity, periodicity, and the design axioms. Res. Engrg. Design (1999) 11:116–131Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tirole J. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica (1999) 67(4):741–782Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ulrich K. The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm. Res. Policy (1995) 24:419–440Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ulrich K., Eppinger S. D.Product Design and Development (1995) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar
• Van Biesebroeck J. Complementarities in automobile production. (2006) . NBER Working Paper 12131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Whinston M. D. On the transaction cost determinants of vertical integration. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (2003) 19(1):1–23Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E. Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contract relations. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (1979) 22:3–61Google Scholar