Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees

References

• Adcock C. J. A bayesian approach to calculating sample sizes. Statistician (1988) 37:433–439Crossref, Google Scholar
• Allingham M. G., Sandmo A. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. J. Public Econom. (1972) 1:323–338Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alm J., McKee M. Tax compliance as a coordination game. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (2004) 54:297–312Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alm J., Bahl R., Murray M. N. Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game. J. Development Econom. (1993) 42:1–33Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alm J., Blackwell C., McKee M. Audit selection and firm compliance with a broad-based sales tax. National Tax J. (2004) 57:209–227Crossref, Google Scholar
• Andreoni J., Erard B., Feinstein J. Tax compliance. J. Econom. Literature (1998) 36:818–860Google Scholar
• Avenhaus R., von Stengel B., Zamir S., Aumann R., Hart S. Inspection games. Handbook of Game Theory (2002) 3(Elsevier Science B. V., Amsterdam) 1947–1987Google Scholar
• Baiman S., Demski J. S. Economically optimal performance evaluation and control systems. J. Accounting Res. (1980a) 18(Supplement):184–220Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baiman S., Demski J. S. Variance analysis procedures as motivational devices. Management Sci. (1980b) 26:840–848Link, Google Scholar
• Beck P. J., Jung W.-O. Taxpayers' reporting decisions and auditing under information asymmetry. Accounting Rev. (1989) 64:468–487Google Scholar
• Besim M., Jenkins G. P. Tax compliance: When do employees behave like the self-employed. Appl. Econom. (2005) 37:1201–1208Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bontems P., Bourgeon J.-M. Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy. Eur. Econom. Rev. (2005) 49:409–435Crossref, Google Scholar
• Border K. C., Sobel J. Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 54:525–540Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bushman R., Kanodia C. A note on strategic sampling in agencies. Management Sci. (1996) 42:151–156Link, Google Scholar
• Chang C. F., Steinbart P. J., Tuckman H. P. Are medicare audits random or predictable. J. Accounting Public Policy (1993) 12:135–154Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chatterjee K., Morton S., Mukherji A., Migdalas A., Pardalos P., Pitsoulis L. Strategic audit policies without commitment. Pareto Optimality, Game Theory and Equilibria (2008) (Springer Verlag, Berlin) 407–436Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cho J., Wong J., Wong N. Book-tax differences and inland revenue audit adjustments in New Zealand. J. Bus. Finance Accounting (2006) 33:1650–1667Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coven M., Kogan R. Introduction to the federal budget process. (2006) . Report, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC. Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=155Google Scholar
• Cowell F., Aaron H. J., Slemrod J. Carrots and sticks in enforcement. The Crisis in Tax Administration (2004) (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC) 230–275Chap. 8Google Scholar
• Cremer H., Gahvari F. Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax. J. Public Econom. (1995) 60:235–249Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dubin J. A., Graetz M. J., Wilde L. L. Are we a nation of tax cheaters? New econometric evidence on tax compliance. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1987) 77:240–245Google Scholar
• Feldman N. E., Slemrod J. Estimating tax noncompliance with evidence from unaudited tax returns. Econom. J. (2007) 117:327–352Google Scholar
• Feller W.An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications (1968) I(John Wiley & Sons, New York) Google Scholar
• Feltham G. D., Paquette S. M. The interrelationship between estimated tax payments and taxpayer compliance. J. Amer. Taxation Assoc. (2002) 24:27–45Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fisman R., Wei S.-J. Tax rates and tax evasion: Evidence from “missing imports” in china. J. Political Econom. (2004) 112:471–496Crossref, Google Scholar
• Florens J.-P., Foucher C. Pollution monitory: Optimal design of inspection—an economic analysis of the use of satellite information to Deter oil pollution. J. Environ. Econom. Management (1999) 38:81–96Crossref, Google Scholar
• Franzoni L. A., Bouckaert B., De Geest G. Tax evasion and tax compliance, in encyclopedia of law and economics. The Economics of Public and Tax Law (2000) IV(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK) 52–94Google Scholar
• Fuente A. D. L., Marin J. M. Innovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development. J. Monetary Econom. (1996) 38:269–301Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibbons R.A Primer in Game Theory (1992) (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, UK) Google Scholar
• Graetz M. J., Reinganum J. F., Wilde L. L. The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (1986) 2:1–32Google Scholar
• Gutkin A. n.d. How tax returns are selected for audit. () . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://totse2.net/totse/en/privacy/taxaudit.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Guy D. M., Carmichael D. R., Whittington R.Audit Sampling: An Introduction (2002) 5th ed.(Wiley, New York) Google Scholar
• Hajek J., Huskova M., Beran R., Dupac V. Limiting distributions in simple random sampling from a finite population. Collected Works of Jaroslav Hajek: With Commentary (1998) (Wiley, Chichester, UK) 231–242Chap. 15Google Scholar
• Hohzaki R. An inspection game with multiple inspectees. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (2007) 178:894–906Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holt C. A., Laury S. K. Risk aversion and incentive effects. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2002) 92:1644–1655Crossref, Google Scholar
• Horgan J. M. Stabilizing the sieve sample using PPS. Auditing: J. Practice Theory (1997) 16:40–51Google Scholar
• Horgan J. M. A list-sequential sampling scheme with applications in financial auditing. IMA J. Management Math. (2003) 14:31–48Crossref, Google Scholar
• IRS Audit n.d. Selecting tax returns for IRS audit. () . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.irs-audit.net/Selecting_tax_returns_for_IRS_audit.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Kaplow L., Shavell S. Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. J. Political Econom. (1994) 102:583–606Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kinney W. R., Warren C. S. The decision-theory approach to audit sampling: An extension and application to receivables confirmation. J. Accounting Res. (1979) 17:275–285Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCubbin J. G. Optimal tax enforcement: A review of the literature and practical implications. National Tax J. (2003) 56:16–26Google Scholar
• Mete M. Bureaucratic behavior in strategic environments: Politicians, taxpayers, and the IRS. J. Politics (2002) 64:384–407Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mills L. F. Book-tax differences and internal revenue service adjustments. J. Accounting Res. (1998) 36:343–356Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mills L. F., Sansing R. C. Strategic tax and financial reporting decisions: Theory and evidence. Contemporary Accounting Res. (2000) 17:85–106Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mookherjee D., Png I. Optimal auditing, insurance, and redistribution. Quart. J. Econom. (1989) 104:399–415Crossref, Google Scholar
• Newman D. P., Patterson E., Smith R. The influence of potentially fraudulent reports on audit risk assessment and planning. Accounting Rev. (2001) 76:59–80Crossref, Google Scholar
• Patterson E., Noel J. Audit strategies and multiple fraud opportunities of misreporting and defalcation. Contemporary Accounting Res. (2003) 20:519–549Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pentland B. T., Carlile P. Audit the taxpayer, not the return: Tax auditing as an expression game. Accounting, Organ. Soc. (1996) 21:269–287Crossref, Google Scholar
• Picard P. Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue. J. Public Econom. (1996) 63:27–56Crossref, Google Scholar
• Polinsky M. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. Internat. Rev. Law Econom. (2007) 26:323–335Crossref, Google Scholar
• Polinsky M., Shavell S. On offense history and the theory of deterrence. Internat. Rev. Law Econom. (1998) 18:305–324Crossref, Google Scholar
• Polinsky M., Shavell S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. J. Econom. Literature (2000) 38:45–76Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rhoades S. C. Costly false detection errors and taxpayer rights legislation: Implications for tax compliance, audit policy and revenue collections. J. Amer. Taxation Assoc. (1997) 19:27–47Google Scholar
• Rhoades S. C. The impact of multiple component reporting on tax compliance and audit strategies. Accounting Rev. (1999) 74:63–85Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rogers L. W. Memorandum for commissioner rossotti: Final audit report—The internal revenue service needs to improve treatment of taxpayers during office audits. (1999) . Report, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/reports/093602fr.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Sanchez I., Sobel J. Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies. J. Public Econom. (1993) 50:345–369Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sandmo A. The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view. National Tax J. (2005) 58:643–663Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sansing R. C. Information acquisition in a tax compliance game. Accounting Rev. (1993) 68:874–884Google Scholar
• Slemrod J., Yitzhaki S., Auerbach A. J., Feldstein M. Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration. Handbook of Public Economics (2002) 3(Elsevier Science B. V., Amsterdam) 1423–1470Chap 22Google Scholar
• U.S. Department of the Treasury FY 2006 budget in brief. (2005) (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC) . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/management/budget/budgetinbriefGoogle Scholar
• U.S. Department of the Treasury FY 2007 budget in brief. (2006) (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC) . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/management/budget/budgetinbrief/Google Scholar
• U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO) Highway projects—Extent of unobligated balances for demonstration projects. (2004) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC) . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GAO-04-935R&accno=A11818Google Scholar
• U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO) A glossary of terms used in the federal budget process. (2005) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC) . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05734sp.pdfGoogle Scholar
• U.S. Internal Revenue Service (U.S. IRS) Initiatives to identify unreported income. (2004) 78(April 7). IRS HeadlinerGoogle Scholar
• U.S. Internal Revenue Service (U.S. IRS) The examination (audit) process. (2006) . Report FS-2006-10, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC. Accessed September 25, 2009, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-06-10.pdfGoogle Scholar
• U.S. Office of Management and Budget (U.S. OMB) Budget system and concepts, on budget of the united states government: Browse fiscal year 2006. (2006) (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC) . Accessed September 25, 2009, http://origin.www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/browse.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Wurst J., Neter J., Godfrey J. Efficiency of sieve sampling in auditing. J. Bus. Econom. Statist. (1989) 7:199–205Google Scholar