Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice

References

• Barlow R. E., Proschan F.Statistical Theory of Reliability and Life Testing (1975) (Holt, New York) Google Scholar
• Beall S., Carter C., Carter P. L., Germer T., Hendrick T., Jap S. D., Kaufmann L., Maciejewski D., Monczka R., Petersen K. The role of reverse auctions in strategic sourcing. (2003) . Report, Center for Advanced Procurement Studies Research, Tempe, AZGoogle Scholar
• Beil D. R., Wein L. M. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process. Management Sci. (2003) 49:1529–1545Link, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D., Pesendorfer M. Information structures in optimal auctions. J. Econom. Theory (2007) 137:580–609Crossref, Google Scholar
• Branco F. The design of multidimensional auctions. RAND J. Econom. (1997) 28:63–81Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cachon G., Zhang F. Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry. Management Sci. (2006) 52:881–896Link, Google Scholar
• Center for Advanced Procurement Studies Research 2006 eProcurement Benchmark Report. (2006) (Center for Advanced Procurement Studies Research, Tempe, AZ) Google Scholar
• Che Y.-K. Design competition through multidimensional auctions. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24:668–680Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen F. Auctioning supply contracts. Management Sci. (2007) 53:1562–1576Link, Google Scholar
• Chen R. R., Roundy R. O., Zhang R. Q., Janakiraman G. Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement. Management Sci. (2005) 51:467–482Link, Google Scholar
• Dasgupta S., Spulber D. F. Managing procurement auctions. Inform. Econom. Policy (1989/1990) 4:5–29Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellram L. M. Total cost modeling in purchasing. (1994) . Report, Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies, Tempe, AZGoogle Scholar
• Elmaghraby W. J. Supply contract competition and sourcing policies. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2000) 2:350–371Link, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Haruvy E., Katok E. A comparison of buyer-determined and price-based multiattribute mechanisms. Marketing Sci. (2007) 26:629–641Link, Google Scholar
• Eso P., Szentes B. Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2007) 74:705–731Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D., Tirole J.Game Theory (1991) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Ghawi D., Schneider G. P. New approaches to online procurement. Proc. Acad. Inform. Management Sci. (2004) 8(2):25–28Google Scholar
• International Chamber of CommerceIncoterms 2000: ICC Official Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms (1999) (ICC Publishing, New York) Google Scholar
• Jap S. D. An exploratory study of the introduction of online reverse auctions. J. Marketing (2003) 67:96–107Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jap S. D. The impact of online reverse auction design on buyer-supplier relationships. J. Marketing (2007) 71:146–159Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krishna V.Auction Theory (2002) (Academic Press)Google Scholar
• Kulp S. L., Randall T. Procurement at Betapharm Corp. (A). (2005) . HBS Case 9-105-30, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
• Maskin E., Riley J. Asymmetric auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2000) 67:413–438Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E., Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal: The case of private values. Econometrica (1990) 58:379–409Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E., Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, II: Common values. Econometrica (1992) 60:1–42Crossref, Google Scholar
• Müller A., Stoyan D.Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks (2002) (John Wiley & Sons, New York) Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. (1981) 6:58–73Link, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica (1983) 51:1767–1798Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkes D., Kalagnanam J. Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51:435–451Link, Google Scholar
• Pinker E. J., Seidmann A., Vakrat Y. Managing online auctions: Current business and research issues. Management Sci. (2003) 49:1457–1484Link, Google Scholar
• Rezende L. Biased procurement auctions. Econom. Theory (2009) 38:169–185Crossref, Google Scholar
• Skreta V. On the informed seller problem: Optimal information disclosure. (2008) . Working paper, New York University, New YorkGoogle Scholar
• Tan G. Optimal procurement mechanisms for an informed buyer. Canadian J. Econom. (1996) 29:699–716Crossref, Google Scholar