Effect of Information Feedback on Bidder Behavior in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions

References

• Adomavicius G., Gupta A. Toward comprehensive real-time bidder support in iterative combinatorial auctions. Inform. Systems Res. (2005) 16(2):169–185Link, Google Scholar
• Adomavicius G., Sanyal P., Gupta A., Curley S. Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions. ICIS 2007 Proc. Paper 107 (2007) . http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2007/107Google Scholar
• Andersson A., Tenhunen M., Ygge F. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. Proc. 4th Internat. Conf. Multiagent Systems (2000) (IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC) 39–46Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ausubel L., Milgrom P. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers Theoret. Econom. (2002) 1(1):1–42Google Scholar
• Ausubel L., Cramton P., Milgrom P., Cramton P., Shoham Y., Steinberg R. The clock-proxy auction: A practical combinatorial auction design. Combinatorial Auctions (2005) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) 115–138Chap. 5Crossref, Google Scholar
• Banks J., Ledyard J. O., Porter D. P. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. RAND J. Econom. (1989) 20(1):1–25Crossref, Google Scholar
• Banks J., Olson M., Porter D. P., Rassenti S. J., Smith V. L. Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (2003) 51(3):303–350Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bapna R., Goes P., Gupta A. Replicating online Yankee auctions to analyze auctioneers' and bidders' strategies. Inform. Systems Res. (2003) 14(3):244–268Link, Google Scholar
• Bapna R., Goes P., Gupta A. User heterogeneity and its impact on electronic auction market design: An empirical exploration. MIS Quart. (2004) 28(1):21–43Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bichler M., Shabalin P., Pikovsky A. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. Inform. Systems Res. (2009) 20(1):33–59Link, Google Scholar
• Brehmer B. In one word: Not from experience. Acta Psychologica (1980) 45(2):223–241Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brewer P. J., Plott C. R. A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1996) 14(6):857–886Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brunner C., Goeree J. K., Holt C. A., Ledyard J. O. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics (2010) 2(1):39–57Crossref, Google Scholar
• Caplice C. G. An optimization based bidding process: A new framework for shipper-carrier relationships. (1996) . Ph.D. thesis, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
• Chen Y., Ledyard J. O., Durlauf S. N., Blume L. E. Mechanism design experiments. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2008) (Palgrave Macmillan, New York) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cox J. C., Roberson B., Smith V. L., Smith V. L. Theory and behavior of single object auctions. Research in Experimental Economics (1982) Vol. 2(JAI Press, Greenwich, CT) 1–43Google Scholar
• Cramton P., Shoham Y., Steinberg R., Cramton P., Shoham Y., Steinberg R. Introduction to combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial Auction (2006) (Introduction, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) 1–13Google Scholar
• de Vries S., Vohra R. V. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS J. Comput. (2003) 15(3):284–309Link, Google Scholar
• Epstein R., Henriquez L., Catalan J., Weintraub G. Y., Martinez C. A combinational auction improves school meals in Chile. Interfaces (2002) 32(6):1–14Link, Google Scholar
• Fujishima Y., Leyton-Brown K., Shoham Y. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. Proc. 16th Internat. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence (1999) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco) 548–553Google Scholar
• Goeree J. K., Holt C. A. Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. Games Econom. Behav. (2010) 70(1):146–169Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gunluk O., Ladanyi L., de Vries S. A branch-and-price algorithm and new test problems for spectrum auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51(3):391–406Link, Google Scholar
• Hudson B., Sandholm T. Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Proc. 3rd Internat. Joint Conf. Autonomous Agents Multiagent Systems (2004) (IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC) 386–393Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Lien Y., Milgrom P. Ascending prices and package bidding: A theoretical and experimental analysis. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics (2010) 2(1):160–185Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kwasnica A. M., Ledyard J. O., Porter D. P., DeMartini C. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51(3):419–434Link, Google Scholar
• Ledyard J. O., Olson M., Porter D. P., Swanson J. A., Torma D. P. The first use of a combined value auction for transportation services. Interfaces (2002) 32(5):4–12Link, Google Scholar
• Leyton-Brown K., Pearson M., Shoham Y. Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms. Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (2000) (ACM, New York) 66–76Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lucking-Reiley D. Auctions on the Internet: What's being auctioned, and how? J. Indust. Econom. (2000) 48(3):227–252Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P., McMillan J. Analyzing the airwaves auction. J. Econom. Perspect. (1996) 10(1):159–175Crossref, Google Scholar
• Neugebauer T., Selten R. Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets. Games Econom. Behav. (2006) 54(1):183–204Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ockenfels A., Roth A. E. Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. Games Econom. Behav. (2006) 55(2):297–320Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkes D. C. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. Proc. 1st ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (1999) (ACM, New York) 148–157Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkes D. C., Unger L. H. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. Proc. 17th Natl. Conf. Artificial Intelligence (2000) (AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA) 74–81Google Scholar
• Porter D., Rassenti S. J., Roopnarine A., Smith V. L. Combinatorial auction design. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA (2003) 100(19):11153–11157Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rassenti S., Smith V. L., Bulfin R. L. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocations. Bell J. Econom. (1982) 13(2):402–417Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sandholm T., Suri S., Gilpin A., Levine D. CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51(3):374–390Link, Google Scholar
• Scheffel T., Pikovsky A., Bichler M., Guler K. An experimental comparison of linear and nonlinear price combinatorial auctions. Inform. Systems Res. (2011) 22(2):346–368Link, Google Scholar
• Tennenholtz M. Some tractable combinatorial auctions. Proc. 17th Natl. Conf. Artificial Intelligence (2000) (AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA) 98–103Google Scholar
• Witten I., Frank E.Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques (2005) 2nd ed.(Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco) Google Scholar
• Yokoo M., Sakurai Y., Matsubara S. Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Proc. 17th Internat. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence (2001) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco) 1095–1101Google Scholar