Dynamics of Contract Design with Screening

References

• Abreu D, Pearce D, Stacchetti E. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica (1990) 58:1041–1063Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhattacharyya S, Lafontaine F. Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts. RAND J. Econom. (1996) 26:761–781Crossref, Google Scholar
• Biais B, Mariotti T, Plantin G, Rochet JC. Dynamic security design: Convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2007) 74:345–390Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cvitanić J, Wan X, Zhang J. Continuous-time principal-agent problems with hidden action and lump-sum payment. Appl. Math. Optim. (2008) 59:99–146Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeMarzo PM, Sannikov Y. Optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous-time agency model. J. Finance (2006) 61:2681–2724Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fong KG. Evaluating skilled experts: Optimal scoring rules for surgeons. (2009) . Working paper, University of California, Berkeley, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
• Giat Y, Hackman ST, Subramanian A. Investment under uncertainty, heterogeneous beliefs and agency conflicts. Rev. Financial Stud. (2010) 23:1360–1404Crossref, Google Scholar
• Green E, Prescott E, Wallace N. Lending and the smoothing of uninsurable income. Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade (1987) (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis) Google Scholar
• He Z, Wei B, Yu J. Optimal long-term contracting with learning. (2012) . Working paper, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica (1987) 55:303–328Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kwak DY. Numerical PDE. (2007) . Lecture note. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, DaejeonGoogle Scholar
• Laffont JJ, Martimort D. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2002) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prat J, Jovanovic B. Dynamic incentive contracts under parameter uncertainty. (2010) . Working paper, New York University, New YorkGoogle Scholar
• Sannikov Y. Agency problems, screening and increasing credit lines. (2007a) . Working paper, Princeton University, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar
• Sannikov Y. Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time. Econometrica (2007b) 75:1285–1329Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sannikov Y. A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2008) 75:957–984Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schättler H, Sung J. The first-order approach to continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility. J. Econom. Theory (1993) 61:331–371Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schättler H, Sung J. On optimal sharing rules in discrete and continuous-times principal-agent problems with exponential utility. J. Econom. Dynam. Control (1997) 21:551–574Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spear S, Srivastava S. On repeated moral hazard with discounting. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 54:599–617Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sung J. Linearity with project selection and controllable diffusion rate in continuous-time principal-agent problems. RAND J. Econom. (1995) 26:720–743Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sung J. Corporate insurance and managerial incentives. J. Econom. Theory (1997) 74:297–332Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sung J. Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach. Rev. Financial Stud. (2005) 18:1021–1073Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wan X. Dynamic agency, costly project search and repeated private shocks. (2011) . Working paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, KowloonGoogle Scholar
• Williams N. On dynamic principal-agent problems in continuous time. (2006) . Working paper, University of Wisconsin–Madison, MadisonGoogle Scholar
• Williams N. Persistent private information. Econometrica (2011) 79:1233–1275Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhang Y. Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks. J. Econom. Theory (2009) 144:635–675Crossref, Google Scholar