Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms

References

• Arnold MA, Lippman SA (1995) Selecting a selling institution: Auctions versus sequential search. Econom. Inquiry 33(1):1–23.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Avery C (1998) Strategic jump bidding in English auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. 65(2):185–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Banks JS, Sobel J (1987) Equilibrium selection in signaling games. Econometrica 55(3):647–661.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berkshire Hathaway (2009) Berkshire Hathaway 2008 annual report. Berkshire Hathaway, Omaha, NE. http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2008ar/2008ar.pdf.Google Scholar
• Bernhardt D, Scoones D (1993) Promotion, turnover, and preemptive wage offers. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(4):771–791.Google Scholar
• Binswanger HP (1980) Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. Amer. J. Agricultural Econom. 62(3):395–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton G, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(1):166–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J, Klemperer P (2009) Why do sellers usually prefer auctions? Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(4):1544–1575.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Campo S, Guerre E, Perrigne I, Vuong Q (2011) Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders. Rev. Econom. Stud. 78(1):112–147.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen K-Y, Plott CR (1998) Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. 25(1):34–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cho I-K, Kreps DM (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quart. J. Econom. 102(2):179–222.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Conlisk J (1996) Why bounded rationality? J. Econom. Literature 34(2):669–700.Google Scholar
• Cooper DJ, Garvin S, Kagel JH (1997a) Adaptive learning vs. equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game. Econom. J. 107(442):553–575.Google Scholar
• Cooper DJ, Garvin S, Kagel JH (1997b) Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game. RAND J. Econom. 28(4):662–683.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cox JC, Oaxaca RL (1996) Is bidding behavior consistent with bidding theory for private value auctions? Res. Experiment. Econom. 6:131–148.Google Scholar
• Cox JC, Roberson B, Smith VL (1982) Theory and behavior of single object auctions. Res. Experiment. Econom. 2:1–43.Google Scholar
• Davis AM, Katok E, Kwasnica AM (2011) Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices? Management Sci. 57(1):177–192.Link, Google Scholar
• Denton JR (2008) Stacked deck: Go-shops and auction theory. Stanford Law Rev. 60(5):1529–1554.Google Scholar
• Easley RF, Tenorio R (2004) Jump bidding strategies in Internet auctions. Management Sci. 50(10):1407–1419.Link, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R, Katok E (2008) Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Management Sci. 54(4): 808–819.Link, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fishman MJ (1988) A theory of preemptive takeover bidding. RAND J. Econom. 19(1):88–101.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA (2004) A model of noisy introspection. Games Econom. Behav. 46(2):365–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR (2002) Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions. J. Econom. Theory 104(1):247–272.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirshleifer D, Png IPL (1989) Facilitation of competing bids and the price of a takeover target. Rev. Financial Stud. 2(4):587–606.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holt CA, Laury SK (2002) Risk aversion and incentive effects. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(5):1644–1655.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huck S, Müller W, Normann H-T (2001) Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets. Econom. J. 111(474):749–765.Google Scholar
• Isaac RM, Salmon T, Zillante A (2007) A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 62(1):144–164.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel JH (1995) A survey of experimental research. Kagel JH, Roth AE, eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 501–585.Google Scholar
• Katok E, Kwasnica AM (2008) Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions. Experiment. Econom. 11(4):344–357.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kwasnica AM, Katok E (2007) The effect of timing on bid increments in ascending auctions. Production Oper. Management 16(4):483–494.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mailath GJ (1987) Incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types. Econometrica 55(6):1349–1365.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mailath GJ, von Thadden E-L (2013) Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications. J. Econom. Theory 148(5):1841–1861.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RR, Palfrey TR (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econom. Behav. 10(1):6–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RR, Palfrey TR (1998) Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Experiment. Econom. 1(1):9–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pratt JW (1964) Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica 32(1/2):122–136.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ramey G (1996) D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types. J. Econom. Theory 69(2):508–531.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roberts JW, Sweeting A (2013) When should sellers use auctions? Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(5):1830–1861.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Simon HA (1984) Models of Bounded Rationality (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Stephenson R, Jones M, Di Lapigio S (2006) Surviving M&A auction rigors. Mergers and Acquisitions: The Dealermaker's J. 41(12):28–36.Google Scholar
• Subramanian G (2008) Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications. Bus. Lawyer 63(3):729–760.Google Scholar