A New Solution for the Moral Hazard Problem in Team Production

References

• Alchian A, Demsetz H (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. 62(5):777–795.Google Scholar
• Andreoni J (1988) Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. J. Public Econom. 37(3):291–304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Andreoni J, Bergstrom T (1996) Do government subsidies increase the private supply of public goods? Public Choice 88(3–4):295–308.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergstrom T, Blume L, Varian H (1986) On the private provision of public goods. J. Public Econom. 29(1):25–49.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bracht J, Figuieres C, Ratto M (2008) Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment. J. Public Econom. 92(1):54–90.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(1):166–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bornstein G (2003) Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. Personality Soc. Psych. Rev. 7(2):129–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bornstein G, Budescu D, Zamir S (1997) Cooperation in intergroup, N-person, and two-person games of chicken. J. Conflict Resolution 41(3):384–406.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bornstein G, Erev I, Goren H (1994) The effect of repeated play in the IPG and IPD team games. J. Conflict Resolution 38(4):690–707.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bornstein G, Erev I, Rosen O (1990) Intergroup competition as a structural solution to social dilemmas. Soc. Behav. 5(4):247–260.Google Scholar
• Bornstein G, Gneezy U, Nagel R (2002) The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study. Games Econom. Behav. 41(1):1–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Schram A (2001) Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: Applying the contribution function approach. J. Public Econom. 79(2):399–427.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y (2008) Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods: A survey of experimental research. Plott CR, Smith VL, eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 625–643.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Li SX (2009) Group identity and social preferences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(1):431–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen R, Chen Y, Liu Y, Mei Q (2015) Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance. Games Econom. Behav.. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
• Davis D, Holt C (1993) Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
• Dragon R, Garvey G, Turnbull G (1996) A collective tournament. Econom. Lett. 50(2):223–227.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eckel CC, Grossman PJ (2005) Managing diversity by creating team identity. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 58(3):371–392.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erev I, Bornstein G, Galili R (1993) Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 29(6):463–478.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falkinger J (1996) Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average. J. Public Econom. 62(3): 413–422.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falkinger J, Fehr E, Gächter S, Winter-Ebmer R (2000) A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: Experimental evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(1):247–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S (2000a) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(4):980–994.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S (2000b) Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. J. Econom. Perspect. 14(3):159–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt K (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2004) An online recruitment system for economic experiments. Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003—GWDG Bericht 63:79–93.Google Scholar
• Groves T, Ledyard J (1977) Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the “free rider” problem. Econometrica 45(4):783–809.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gunnthorsdottir A, Rapoport A (2006) Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 101(2):184–199.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263–291.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ku G, Malhotra D, Murnighan K (2005) Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 96(2):89–103.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazear EP (1989) Pay equality and industrial politics. J. Political Econom. 97(3):561–580.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palfrey TR, Prisbrey JE (1996) Altruism, reputation, and noise in linear public goods experiments. J. Public Econom. 61(3):409–427.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rabbie JM, Horwitz M (1969) Arousal of ingroup-outgroup bias by a chance win or loss. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 13(3):269–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rapoport A, Bornstein G (1987) Intergroup competition for the provision of binary public goods. Psych. Rev. 94(3):291–299.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rapoport A, Bornstein G, Erev I (1989) Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 56(5):748–756.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reuben E, Tyran JR (2010) Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition. Eur. J. Political Econom. 26(1):25–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tajfel H, Billig M, Bundy R, Flament C (1971) Social categorization and intergroup behavior. Eur. J. Soc. Psych. 1(2):149–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tan JHW, Bolle F (2007) Team competition and the public goods game. Econom. Lett. 96(1):133–139.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertainty 5(4):297–323.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Varian H (1994) Sequential contributions to public goods. J. Public Econom. 53(2):165–186.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Warr P (1983) The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Econom. Lett. 13(2):207–211.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Welbourne TM, Gomez Mejia LR (1995) Gainsharing: A critical review and a future research agenda. J. Management 21(3):559–609.Google Scholar
• Young M, Fisher J, Lindquist T (1993) The effects of intergroup competition and intragroup cooperation on slack and output in a manufacturing setting. Accounting Rev. 68(3):466–481.Google Scholar