Does a Procurement Service Provider Generate Value for the Buyer Through Information About Supply Risks?
Published Online:28 Oct 2014https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1963
References
- (2012) Supply chain intermediation when retailers lead. Working paper, London Business School, London.Google Scholar
- (2012) Decentralized supply risk management. Kouvelis P, Boyabatli O, Dong L, Li R, eds. Handbook of Integrated Risk Management in Global Supply Chains, Chap. 14 (John Wiley & Sons, New York), 389–424.Google Scholar
- (2010) Independence of capacity ordering and financial subsidies to risky suppliers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 12(4):583–607.Link, Google Scholar
- (1999) Informational alliances. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66(4):743–768.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2012) The relational advantages of intermediation. Management Sci. 58(9):1614–1631.Link, Google Scholar
- (1993) Middlemen as experts. RAND J. Econom. 24(2):212–223.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Optimal procurement design in the presence of supply risk. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 13(2):227–243.Link, Google Scholar
- (1994) A periodic review, production planning model with uncertain capacity and uncertain demand—Optimality of extended myopic policies. Management Sci. 40(3):320–332.Link, Google Scholar
- (2001) On some agency costs of intermediated contracting. Econom. Lett. 71(1):75–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2009) Optimal supply diversification under general supply risks. Oper. Res. 57(6):1451–1468.Link, Google Scholar
- (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
- (1995) Regulating complementary products: A comparative institutional analysis. RAND J. Econom. 26(2):243–256.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2012) Supply side story: Risks, guarantees, competition and information asymmetry. Management Sci. 58(9):1694–1714.Link, Google Scholar
- (2002) The Theory of Incentives (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1995) Organizational diseconomies of scale. J. Econom. Management Strategy 4(3):399–426.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) The organization of supplier networks: Effects of delegation and intermediation. Econometrica 72(4):1179–1219.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.Link, Google Scholar
- (2000) “Swamped in information but starved of data”: Information and intermediaries in clothing supply chains. Supply Chain Management 5(3):151–161.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2012) Optimality of myopic policies for dynamic lot-sizing problems in serial production lines with random yields and autoregressive demand. Oper. Res. 60(6):1520–1536.Link, Google Scholar
- (1996) Inventory control with information about supply conditions. Management Sci. 42(10):1409–1419.Link, Google Scholar
- (2011) Operational strategies for managing supply chain disruption risk. Kouvelis P, Boyabatli O, Dong L, Li R, eds. Handbook of Integrated Risk Management in Global Supply Chains, Chap. 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ), 79–101.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2013) Supply risk management functions of sourcing intermediaries—An investigation of the clothing industry. Supply Chain Management 18(5):509–522.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) Supply chain intermediation: A barganing theoretic framework. Simchi-Levi D, Wu SD, Shen ZM, eds. Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era, Chap. 3 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston), 67–115.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2012) Using a dual-sourcing option in the presence of asymmetric information about supplier reliability: Competition vs. diversification. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 14(2):202–217.Link, Google Scholar
- (2009) Supply disruptions, asymmetric information, and a backup production option. Management Sci. 55(2):192–209.Link, Google Scholar

