Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game
Published Online:17 Aug 2015https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2154
References
- (2008) A survey of psychological games: Theoretical findings and experimental evidence. Innocenti A, Sbriglia P, eds. Games, Rationality and Behavior: Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments (Palgrave Macmillan, London), 204–232.Google Scholar
- (2013) Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in the Trust Game. IGIER Working Paper 506, Bocconi University, Milan.Google Scholar
- (2006) Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of emotion. Personality Soc. Psych. Rev. 10:20–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2007) Guilt in games. Amer. Econom. Rev. Papers Proc. 97:170–176.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2009) Dynamic psychological games. J. Econom. Theory 144:1–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2003) Rationalization and incomplete information. B.E. J. Theoret. Econom. 3:Article 3.Google Scholar
- (2013) Deception: The role of guilt. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93:227–232.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2015) Frustration and anger in games. IGIER Working paper 539, Bocconi University, Milan.Google Scholar
- (2011) Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: Estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models. J. Appl. Econometrics 26:437–453.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1995) Trust, reciprocity, and social-history. Games Econom. Behav. 10:122–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1995) Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game. Games Econom. Behav. 8:56–90.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1987) Rationalizability and correlated equilibria. Econometrica 55:1391–1402.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2013) Rational choice research on social dilemmas: Embeddedness effects on trust. Wittek R, Snijders TAB, Nee V, eds. Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research (Stanford University Press, Redwood City, CA), 113–150.Google Scholar
- (2004) The supply of information by a concerned expert. Econom. J. 114:487–505.Google Scholar
- (2002) The neurobiology of social affiliation and pair bonding. Pfaff D, Arnold AP, Etgen AM, Fahrbach SE, Rubin RT, eds. Hormones, Brain, and Behavior (Academic Press, San Diego), 299–337.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Triangulating the neural, psychological and economic bases of guilt aversion. Neuron 70:560–572.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2006) Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74:1579–1601.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Participation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101:1213–1239.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2013) Other-regarding preferences: A selective survey of experimental results. Kagel J, Roth A, eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
- (2015) Epistemic game theory. Young P, Zamir S, eds. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 4 (North Holland, Amsterdam), 619–702.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) Learning to play Bayesian games. Games Econom. Behav. 46:282–303.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2002) Marital investment, time consistency and emotions. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 48:57–69.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2008) Psychological games. Durlauf SN, Blume LE, eds. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. Vol. 6 (Palgrave Macmillan, London), 714–718.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2000) Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games Econom. Behav. 30:163–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2010) Testing guilt aversion. Games Econom. Behav. 68:95–107.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1989) Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games Econom. Behav. 1:60–79.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2005) Deception: The role of consequences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95:384–394.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) Trust responsiveness and beliefs. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 55:25–30.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1967) Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Part I: The basic model. Management Sci. 14(3):159–182.Link, Google Scholar
- (1968a) Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Part II, Bayesian equilibrium points. Management Sci. 14(5):320–334.Link, Google Scholar
- (1968b) Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Part III: The basic probability distribution of the game. Management Sci. 14(7):486–502.Link, Google Scholar
- (2006) Irrational emotions or emotional wisdom? The evolutionary psychology of emotions and behavior. Forgas J, ed. Hearts and Minds: Affective Influences on Social Cognition and Behavior, Frontiers of Psychology Series (Psychology Press, New York), 21–40.Google Scholar
- (2005) Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature 435:673–676.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Fishy gifts: Bribing with shame and guilt. Working paper, Peking University, Shenzhen, China.Google Scholar
- (2009) Is mistrust self-fulfilling? Econom. Lett. 104:89–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1977) The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 13:279–301.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2007) Stochastic Orders (Springer, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) The power of shame and the rationality of trust. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
- (2008) Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. Econometrica 76:1467–1480.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2008) The neurobiology of trust. Scientific Amer. 298:88–95.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2005) Oxytocin is associated with human trustworthiness. Hormones Behav. 48:522–527.Crossref, Google Scholar

