Stand by Me—Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

References

• Antonetti M, Rufini A (2008) Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams. Managerial Decision Econom. 29(7):547–554.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blume A, Ortmann A (2007) The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. J. Econom. Theory 132(1):274–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Charness G (2003) Truth or consequences: An experiment. Management Sci. 49(1):116–130.Link, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Cooper DJ (2006) A change would do you good: An experimental study of how to overcome coordination failure in organizations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(3):669–693.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Cooper DJ (2007) It’s what you say not what you pay: An experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 5(6):1223–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown M, Heywood JS (2009) Helpless in finance: The cost of helping effort among bank employees. J. Labor Res. 30(2):176–195.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
• Camerer C, Ho T-H, Chong J-K (2002) Sophisticated learning and strategic teaching. J. Econom. Theory 104(1):137–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quart. J. Econom. 117(3):817–869.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chaudhuri A, Schotter A, Sopher B (2006) Talking ourselves to efficiency: Coordination conventions in an inter-generational minimum effort game with private, almost common and common knowledge of advice. Econom. J. 119(534):91–122.Google Scholar
• Cooper DJ, Kagel JH (2016) Other-regarding preferences: A selective survey of experimental results. Kagel JH, Roth AE, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Chap. 4 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
• Cooper DJ, Stockman CK (2002) Fairness and learning: An experimental examination. Games Econom. Behav. 41(1):26–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawford V, Broseta B (1998) What price coordination? The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play. Amer. Econom. Rev. 88(1):198–225.Google Scholar
• Drago R, Garvey GT (1998) Incentives for helping on the job: Theory and evidence. J. Labor Econom. 16(1):1–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr D, Kübler D, Danz D (2012) Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game. Experiment. Econom. 15(4):622–640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamilton BH, Nickerson JA, Owan H (2003) Team incentives and worker heterogeneity: An empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and participation. J. Political Econom. 111(3):465–497.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamilton BH, Nickerson JA, Owan H (2012) Diversity and productivity in production teams. Breyson A, ed. Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, Vol. 13 (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK), 99–138.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamman J, Rick S, Weber RA (2007) Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives. Experiment. Econom. 10(3):285–303.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2011) Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Sci. 57(4):611–627.Link, Google Scholar
• Hyndman K, Terracol A, Vaksmann J (2009) Learning and sophistication in coordination games. Experiment. Econom. 12(4):450–472.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hyndman K, Ozbay EY, Schotter A, Ehrblatt WZ (2012) Convergence: An experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 10(3):573–604.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kogan S, Kwasnica AM, Weber RA (2011) Coordination in the presence of asset markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(2):927–947.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Offerman T (2002) Hurting hurts more than helping helps. Eur. Econom. Rev. 46(8):1423–1437.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Terracol A, Vaksmann J (2009) Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 70(1–2):54–71.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Van Huyck JB, Battalio R, Beil R (1990) Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. Amer. Econom. Rev. 80(1):234–248.Google Scholar
• Weber RA (2006) Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(1):114–126.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weber RA, Camerer C (2003) Cultural conflict and merger failure: An experimental approach. Management Sci. 49(4):400–415.Link, Google Scholar
• Wilcox N (2006) Theories of learning in games and heterogeneity bias. Econometrica 74(5):1271–1292.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zwick R, Chen X-P (1999) What price fairness? A bargaining study. Management Sci. 45(6):804–823.Link, Google Scholar