Does Corporate Governance Matter More for High Financial Slack Firms?

References

• Bates TW, Kahle KM, Stulz RM (2009) Why do US firms hold so much more cash than they used to? J. Finance 64(5):1985–2021.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Mullainathan S (2003) Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. J. Political Econom. 111(5):1043–1075.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S (2004) How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quart. J. Econom. 119(1):249–275.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Scharfstein DS (1990) A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. Amer. Econom. Rev. 80(1):93–106.Google Scholar
• Brav A, Jiang W, Partnoy F, Thomas R (2008) Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance. J. Finance 63(4):1729–1775.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cremers M, Ferrell A (2014) Thirty years of shareholder rights and firm valuation. J. Finance 69(3):1167–1196.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Daniel K, Grinblatt M, Titman S, Wermers R (1997) Measuring mutual fund performance with characteristic-based benchmarks. J. Finance 52(3):1035–1058.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Daniel F, Lohrke FT, Fornaciari CJ, Turner RA Jr (2004) Slack resources and firm performance: A meta-analysis. J. Bus. Res. 57(6):565–574.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Disatnik D, Duchin R, Schmidt B (2014) Cash flow hedging and liquidity choices. Rev. Finance 18(2):715–748.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dittmar A, Duchin R (2011) The dynamics of cash. Working paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Google Scholar
• Dittmar A, Mahrt-Smith J (2007) Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. J. Financial Econom. 83(3):599–634.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Duchin R, Matsusaka J, Ozbas O (2010) When are outside directors effective? J. Financial Econom. 96(2):195–214.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Duchin R, Gilbert T, Harford J, Hrdlicka CM (2015) Precautionary savings with risky assets: When cash is not cash. Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle.Google Scholar
• Frésard L, Salva C (2010) The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings. J. Financial Econom. 98(2):359–384.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Giroud X, Mueller HM (2010) Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? J. Financial Econom. 95(3):312–331.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gompers P, Ishii J, Metrick A (2003) Corporate governance and equity prices. Quart. J. Econom. 118(1):107–155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harford J, Mansi SA, Maxwell WF (2008) Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. J. Financial Econom. 87(3):535–555.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harvey CR, Lins KV, Roper AH (2004) The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme. J. Financial Econom. 74(1):3–30.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Amer. Econom. Rev. 76(2):323–329.Google Scholar
• Kalcheva I, Lins KV (2007) International evidence on cash holdings and expected managerial agency problems. Rev. Financial Stud. 20(4):1087–1112.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karpoff JM, Malatesta P (1989) The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation. J. Financial Econom. 25(2):291–322.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karpoff JM, Wittry MD (2015) Institutional and political economy considerations in natural experiments: The case of state antitakeover laws. Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle.Google Scholar
• Keynes JM (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt Brace, London).Google Scholar
• Lins KV, Servaes H, Tufano P (2010) What drives corporate liquidity? An international survey of cash holdings and lines of credit. J. Financial Econom. 98(1):160–176.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Margotta DG, McWilliams TP, McWilliams VB (1990) An analysis of the stock price effect of the 1986 Ohio takeover legislation. J. Law, Econom., Organ. 6(1):235–251.Google Scholar
• Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J. Financial Econom. 13(2):187–221.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Opler T, Pinkowitz L, Stulz RM, Williamson R (1999) The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. J. Financial Econom. 52(1):3–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pound J (1987) The effects of antitakeover amendments on takeover activity: Some direct evidence. J. Law Econom. 30(2):353–367.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Richardson S (2006) Over-investment of free cash flow. Rev. Accounting Stud. 11(2):159–189.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Romano R (1987) The political economy of takeover statutes. Virginia Law Rev. 73(1):111–199.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ryngaert M, Netter JM (1988) Shareholder wealth effects of the Ohio antitakeover law. J. Law, Econom., Organ. 4(2):373–383.Google Scholar
• Schumann L (1988) State regulation of takeovers and shareholder wealth: The case of New York’s 1985 takeover statutes. RAND J. Econom. 19(4):557–567.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yermack D (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. J. Financial Econom. 40(2):185–211.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhang XF (2006) Information uncertainty and stock returns. J. Finance 61(1):105–137.Crossref, Google Scholar